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[ II ■! !|' 1 ' '1 jr '|i 

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3 3433 07136855 

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: A^CfiLiSrisfAlr,'* &c. 

• •• ••»• 





ioiii^i ^ 



I BEiitBVE that, in oflbrisig fhe piesent volume to the public, 
I am rendering an aooeptable flerrice, not only to those 'who 
have been, who are, or who prospectively may be, connected 
with the affidn of onr Indian and Colonial dependendes, but 
to all who have a common interest in good government and 
the administiative efficteney of the empire. But I am especially 
anxious that it should be regarded as notUng more than a 
fcucieuluB of Selections, for which the Editor alone is respon- 
sible, from the numerous public and private papers, left behind 
him by the bte Lord Metcalfe. Bearing in mind that these 
papers are the growth of forty yea^ of inqesnant official activity, 
the reader will not*^.<^ec{- tb find.*wil3i!n ihe compass of a single 
volume more tfaan'ceilean spedimens or illustrations, conveying, 
it is hoped, a just idea'^f :&*e'chal7aeter of the writei^s public 
life and the tenor of hjs epimons,!l(ilt-bnly a faint one of the 
extent of his aetivily an^Hke'icii^z&tude of his labors. 

I have Evaded the papers into three parts, illustrative of the 
three great epochs of Lord Metcalfe's career : firstiy, his earlier 
official life in India before he became a member of the Supreme 
Oovemment ; secondly, the period during which he sate as a 
member c( that Oovemment; and thirdly, the space of time 
embraced by his Jamaica and Canada administrations. Under 
each of these heads will be found a considerable number and 
variety of papers, indicating the writer^s opinions on aU, or 

▲ 2 


nearly all, the principal qneetions submitC^ to his conndera- 
tion during the forty-five years of his public service. In this 
respect there is a completeness about the present collection 
which I believe would not have been much enhanced if the 
dimensions of the work had been greatly extended. 

Except in one or two especial cases, when I have desired to 
place beside each other, two or more papers bearing on the same 
subject, perhaps illustrating some particular chapter of Met- 
calfe's career, the arrangement of the first and the third parts of 
the collection is strictly chronological, according to the date of 
composition. In the second part I have thought it more expedient 
to classify the Council Minutes — ^placing in separate sections the 
Military and Political, the Revenue and Judicial Papers; and 
so on. The first and third parts have more of autobiographical 
interest than the second, for they relate mainly to circumstances 
with which the writer was personally and actively concerned; 
but perhaps the second part, devoted to minutes written at a 
time when Sir Charles Metcalfe's duties, as a member of the 
Supreme Government^ involved the consideration of the whole 
range of Indian Government, political and administrative, will 
be considered of the greatest abstract importance. It is, how- 
ever, that which necessarily most imperfectly represents the 
extent of Sir Charley Metcalfe's literary activity. The work of 
a member of CounciI'i£^*p]bia|!cailjL jJeHi^T^f k, ^^^ the writer 
of these papers addressed^ ^igisejfeltrhe^t^'to the consideration 
of almost every question t^i cepnefbej&fe him. 

With regard to the-^iipra/thAmgelv^s. a few words may be 
said. The selection t>f:tbei9'*l|%^:V.^..^fluG^<^d hy various 
considerations. I can hardly hope that it is altogether such as 
Lord Metcalfe himself would have made, but I have endea- 
voured, to the utmost of my ability, to approximate to such a 
consummation. It has been my object to impart as much 
variety as possible to the collection. Some of the papers are 
historical; some disquisitional; some are given for the sake of 
the facts, others for the sake of the arguments they contain; 
some as illustrations of the character or career of the writer; 


others for their abstract interest or importance. And it may 
be addedy that whilst I have striven to make the intent and 
purport of the insertion of each letter, minute, or despatch 
especially appreciable by the reader of Lord Metcalfe's '' Life 
and Correspondence," it has been my endeavour^ at the same 
time, so to select and so to arrange the papers as to give to 
the present volume something of a biographical character, and 
thereby to render it in itself sufficiently intelligible to those 
who now for the first time make the acquaintance of the great 
and good man who wrote them. 

To the accomplishment of this object I believed that the in- 
trusion of many explanatory notes was not necessary. The 
papers, for the most part^ tell their own story. To have in- 
serted much biographical matter would have been to repeat 
what I have written elsewhere; and to conmient, either ap- 
provingly or disapprovingly, on. Lord Metcalfe's opinions, would 
have been clearly an impertinence. These opinions are pub- 
lished because they are his; and whether they are mine or not 
the majority of readers will not care to inquire. It is hardly 
in the nature of things that any two men should concur wholly 
in opinion on so large a variety of subjects; but, where difier- 
ence arises, there are few who will not mistrust their own judg- 
ment on finding that Metcalfe is their opponent. The reader, 
at all events, may in every case feel assured that the opinion 
expressed is the growth of much thought and much experience; 
that it comes honestly and earnestly, from the full heart; and 
that it has been maintained throughout a life distinguished by 
many great qualities, but by none so much as by its consistency. 

Li such a collection as this, altogether to have avoided the 
insertion of papers relating to circumstances almost forgotten, 
or to systems of government long since exploded, would have 
been impossible, if it would have been desirable. The vast 
changes which have taken place during the last half century, 
in the administrative principles and practices of the English in 
India, must necessarily impart something of an antiquarian 
chanicter to such a volume as this. But whilst, in a biogra- 

pliioal point of Tiew, h is intentting to tnoe the optmons of 
the imteTf and to disoem die extent to which he msjr have 
been inetmmental in erolving or hRitwrnng the chai^ges of 
whifih I epeakt there ib much in those papeie to be reed with 
piofit et the present tame; and in otheis axe contaiifeed ksBorn 
as per&ient to the prMe&t conjunctine of poblic affinis as 
though thegr had been written yesterday. There are, indeed, 
many weighty pditical troths incokated in these writmgs of 
Lord Metcalfe, die disregard of which has been life with na-» 
tional calamity, of which we are only now beginning to fethom 
the nttermost depih& 

The pqien in this collection have, with one or two excepdons, 
been printed from the original dxafts in Lord Metcalfe's hand- 
writing, and may therefere be relied upon as wholly and ex- 
cbsi'vely his own — a rdianoe not always to be placed in the 
published minates and deqMitches of statesmen who have be- 
nefited laigely by ministerial asristanoe at diffiient q>ochs of 
their career. Two or three of them have been printed, whoUy 
or pardyy befoie; but, with these trifling ezoeptionsy the contents 
of the volume are now given to the public for the first time. 

It should be added that the notes to which no initkls aze 
attached are wholly the Editor's. Lord Metcalfe's own are dis- 
tinguished by the initials O. T. M. 

J. W. KATE. 



The Policy op Sm Geobge Bablow 
Protection of Minor States 
Danger of Retrogression 
Abandonment of Gohud and Jyepore 
Impossibility of Isolation 
Etus of False Economy 
Inducements to Public Zeal 
Lord Wellesley*s System 

Tbx Mission to EmmxT Snren 
General Objects of the Mission 
General Results • 

Runjeet's Proposals 
Proposed En^ngement considered 
Character of Rnnieet Sin^h 
His Jealousy of tne Missum 
IBa Milita^ Resources 
Strength of the Sikh Army 
Its JU^ans of Snpport 
The Lesser Sikh Chiefs . 

Thz Lakd Retenu^ gt Delhi 

Past Systems and Early Settlements 

Rights of the Village ZumeendftTs 

Proposed System 

Its probable Results . • 

Duty to the People 

Advanta^ of Moderate Assessments 

Cultivation of Waste Lands 

Stimulants to Exertion . • 

Judicial Administratigii o? Delhi 
Former state of Misrule 
True objects of Punishment 
Epidemic Crimes . • • 













Opinions of Lord HasfcingB 

Deficienoy of Eecord 

FieTention of Prison-breaking 

Equalisation of Fonishment . 

G^ral Eesnlts of Metcalfe's Ajdministration 

Militant Detbkce of the Delhi Tebbhobt 
Fortifications of Delhi . 
Elements of Danger . 
Advanta^ of Fortified Posts 
Fortifications of Loodiana . 
Fortifications of Kumal and Hansee 
Fortifications of Delhi 
Dep6t8 for Stores 
Fortresses in the Native States 

The Bokbabdxent of Fo&TifDS]) Plaices 
The Disaster at Kalunga 
Disasters at Bhurtpore and Kumona 
Causes of Failure . 
Evils of Excessiye Confidence 
Contempt of our F^emies . 
Uses ofHeavy Artillery 
Uses of Mortar Batteries . 
Effects of Shelling 
Increased Skill of our Enemies 

Adionistkation of Hyderabad 
Employment of European Officers 
Amount of Interference 
Hyderabad and Na^re 
Letter to Mr. Martin . 
Mr. Martin's Views . 
Letter to Mr. Swinton . 
Village Settlements 
Mode of Settlement-Making 
Native Influence 
Inequality of Settlements 
Eesults of the First Settlements 
The Minister's Proposals 
The Finances of Hyderabad 
Character of Chunaoo-Lall 

The BuBHBSE War . . . 
Excitement in India • • 
The Effects of the Nepaul War 
Force Eequired . 
Moral Effects 


Question of Interference . 
Obligation to the rightful Prince 
Usurpation of Doorjun Saul 
Ulwur and Jyepore 
General Policy • 

























MAHBAnA-PouncB . . I 

Expected Death of Scindiali . • • 

Consequent Measures ... 

Thb Ck)DrAOE or India * . * . 

Change of Inscription . . 

Advantages of Change * • - . 

Itui2s POE JomoB Civil Sekyice . 


Insecurity of our Position in India 

The Native Army . . ' . 

Colonisation . . ' . 

Besults of the First Mahratta War . 

Extension of Territory .... 

Impolicy of a War vith Sind 

Dimculff of Dealing with Sindhians 

A War with Sind oonoxious to the Home Government 

Evils of Extension towards the Indus * • 


Begnlar and Irregular Troops 

" Lord Comwallis's School *' 

Military Men in Civil Employ . 

Reform of our System of Government 

Native Aj^ncv 

The Mutmy at Barrackpore . 

Allowances of the Hydeiabad Eesidency 

Irregular Horse 

Effects of the Siege of Bhturtpore 

Appointment to me Supreme Council 

Anairs of Bajpootana-rNon-Interf erence, &c. 








PART 11. 
Inlitan QTouncil 4Dn(nutes. 

Machihbbt op Indian Govebnxbnt (Introductory "Ba^) 
Frecariousness of our Power ' 

Duty towards the Governed 

European Settlers 

Kiiups and Company's Establishments 

Ee^Lction of Taxation . 

Administration of Justice . 

Native Asency • . 

The King^s and Company's Annies 

Qoestion of their Amalgamation 

The Local Governments . 

Seats of Government 


» Iffecta of Extension . . 



DiBtribuiioii of the Miliiazy Force 
Our Sjstem of Goyenuneat 
Temper of our Govemors 
Necessity of an Efficient Anny . 
Causes of its Increase 
Permanent Increase 
Power of the Native States 


Opinions of Lord William Bentinck 
Sources of Danger 
Danger from Foreign Enemies 
Danger of IntemaTReyolt 
Danger of Increased Enlightenment 
The mtive Army 
Officering of the Armj 
Proposea Abolition of tiie Bombay 
Malay Troops 
Irregolar Coips 
Preparations for Invasion . 
Best Means of Meeting Danger 


Advantages of Concentration 

Local Protection and External Defenoe 

Insofficiency of our Army 



Designs of Eussia in the East 
Probable Line of Advance . 
Evils of Interference beyond the InduB 
Jealousy of the Native Princes 


Inexpediency of its Establishment 
Sir Charles Metcalfe's Foresight {Note) 

Affaibs of Htderabad 

Early Connexion with the Nizam 

Death of Meer AUum • 

Keign of Chundoo Lall 

His Extortions 

European Superintendence 

Bevenue Beforms . 

Village Settlements 

Their Besults 

Cost of our Interference 

Intibfebence and Non-Intsbfebence 
Duty towards the Native States 
Arguments against Interference 
Biues for our Guidance 

BUBSIA AKD Pebsia : 

Inexpediency of Interference 
The Persian Mission 

. 180 

. 181 

. 182 

. 183 

. 185 

. 187 

. 189 

. 191 

. 19« 

. 193 

. 194 

. 195 

. 197 

. 198 

. 199 

. 201 

. 202 

. 203 

* 905 

. 206 

. 207 

. 208 

. 209 

. 210 

. 211 

. 213 

. 215 

. 216 

. 217 

. 218 
. 218 
. 2L9 

. 220 

. 221 

. 223 

. 224 

. 225 

. 227 

. 229 

. 230 

. 231 

. 235 

. 237 

. 238 

. 241 

. 243 

. 245 
. 246 
. 247 . 



In>iAK Liin) ItBTENUE . • ... . .249 

Definition of Land Eereniie . . • . . 849 

Eidd Assessments and Village Comnumities • . . 251 

Proprietary Tenures • • . 253 

The Permanent Settlement of Bengal .... 253 

Pbotbietabt Bights • • . • • . 255 

Question of Ownership of the Soil . . .256 

Amount of Assessment • • . • . 267 

Efutwar Bights . . . • • .258 

Different D^criptions of Bjuts • . . . . 259 

Begolation-Proprietors ...... 260 

Bevenne Surreys . • • • • • . 262 

LoKG Leases . . . . . 264 

Assessment of Land yielding Tihtable Firodaoe . 266 

JuBXSDicnoN 07 THE Cbown CotBTs .... 269 

Necessity of a Controlling Power ... . . 271 

Erib of conflicting Authority : . . • . 272 

Uncertainty of the Law . . • • • . 273 

Constmctive Jurisdiction • • • . . 275 

UsuiTAtions of Authority . . . • • . 277 

Liability of Europeans •••••. 281 

Non-Liability of mtiyes . • • • . . 283 

Proposed Amalgamation of the Buddur and Supreme Gouts • 286 

Naxite Jxtdoes . . . . • • • 287 

Principal Suddur Aumeens . • » . . 287 

Qualincation for Minor Judgeships . • . . . 289 

District Judges . . • • • • . 291 

Suddur Court in North-West Provinces . . . 292 

Ua OP English Lahguage IN Comofl Of JuflXiOB . . 293 

lCi8CELLANE0tj»— Oppicbsing OP THE iNBiAir Aunr . 295 

Want of Officers 296 

Officers on Staff Employ . . . • .297 

Systems proposed . • ... • • . 298 

IBienefits of proposed System . . . . .299 

Acceleration of PromotiflB • • • • • 301 

Begimental Allowances • • • • . 303 

Boon to the Army ...•».. 304 

"KVZZITEANa"— TaX0NS17CG£88I0K • • • .305 

. Alienations of Bevenue . • • • • • 307 

Proposed Measures .;•••. 310 

OanrsxiON OP GoYEBNMEST SsKfiim WITH m Pbms • . 311 

Preedom of the Press . . . . • .312 

Tee Goyeknoe-General AND HIS Council • • • • 313 

Nomination of Vice-Presidents . • • • . 314 

Powers of the Goyemor-G^iani • • • • • 316 

The Supreme Council .«•••• 316 

Departmental Duties • • • • • • 317 

Bight op Adoption . • • • • . .318 

Hindoo and Mahomedan Law • • • • • 319 



<ZD((Ion(aI. 9(ftpattjfteft. 

Ok TitE Condition op the Island, op Jajcaica 
Enumcipation of the Slaves . . 

Masters and Laborers — ^Eeut fmd Wages 
Laborers' Settlements 
Liflnenoe of the Baptist liissionaties. . 
The Stipendiary Ma^trates 

On the Social Condition op the Pboplb . 
The Governor's Tour 
Deterioration of Property 
Want of Labor 
Labor and Rent 
Laborers' Settlements ' 
Lifluence of the Baptist MiflsionarieR . 
State of Property . . . 

Want of Labor— The Emigration* Question 
Thriving Conditon of the readantiy 
Evils of Party Spirit . 

The Labok Question . 

Independence of the Laborer . 
Progress of Reconciliation 
Wages and Rent 
PeeUng towards the Mother Country 

The Stifendl&bt Maoistsates 

Expediency of their ^pradual Absorption 
Effects of their Apj^mtment 
Spirit of the Laboring Population . 
Effects of a gradual Reduction of Magistrates 

The Govebnor's Salast ... 

Its Amount 
Expediency of Consolidation and Abolition of Fees 

Repokses op the Judicial System 

Vice-Chancellor and Assistant Judges 
Chairman of Quarter Sessions 
The Jamaica Bar . « 

Advantages op Conciliation* 

Inexpediency of disallowing Local Acts 
Evils of a Ruptura , . • 
Improved Public Feeling . 
Imperial Interference 

Constitution op the Local Govebnment 
The Coimcil 

The House of Assembly 

The Constituency ^ 


. 331 

. 322 

. 323 

. 324 

. 325 

. 327 

. 329 

. 329 

. 330 

. 331 

. 332 

. 335 

. 337 

. 338 

. 340 

. 342 

. 345 

. 348 

. 348 

. 349 

. 350 

. 351 

. 352 

. 353 

. 354 

. 355 

. 358 

. 359 

. 359 

. 360 

. 364 

. 364 

. 365 

. ^66 

. 367 

. 368 

. 369. 

. 371 

. 372 

. 373 

. 373 

. 375 

. 376 



The Law Officers • • . . 

BiBtribation of Patronage 
Independence of the Axemblj 

Pbison DiscmjNB . . » . . 

The Separate System 
Classification of Prisoners 

Health OP THE Tboops 

Arrangements for their Location on High Qround 
Bavages of the Yellow Perer on the Plains 
Mortality in the 82nd Hegiment 
Sanitary Measures . • . • 


Work Done .... 

Work to be Bone 

Akswsbs TO Jaiiaica Addbssses 

Answer to the St. Catherine's Address • 

Answer to the St. Anne's Address . 

Answer to the St. Thomas's Address 

Answer to the Missionary Presbytery's Address 

Answer to the St. George's Agricultural Society's Address 

Canada— State op Parties 
The French-Canadians . 
The Eeform Party • 
The Gonservatiye Party 
Difficulty of Neutrality 

The Stmbic op GoTEBincEVT 
Policj of Lord Sydenham 
Admmistration of Lord Sydenham 
Responsible Goyemment 
Lord Durham's Views . 
Union of the French and Reform Parties 
Eyils of Party Goyemment 
Rupture with the Council (Note) 

Resignation op the ExscuTiyE Council 
Motiyes and Causes 
The Patronage Question 
Rage for " Besponsible Goyemment" 
Arrangements lor a New CouncQ 
Charges against the Goyemor-General 
Oyertures for Reconciliation 

EfPECT OP Ibish Agitation on the T&anqxjillitt op Canada 
Repeal Agitation ... 

OrangeLodges .... 


Rzsxtlt op the Genebal Election 
Licidents of the Election • 

Contending Parties .... 
The Contest for Montreal 
The Contest for Quebec 









, 411- 

, 414 
, 415- 
, 416 

. 421 

. 422 

. 423 

. 424 

. 425 

. 427 

. 429 

. 431 

. 432 
. 433 
. 434 

. 435 

. 437 

. 439 

. 440 

. 441 

. 442 



Goyemment Saooeas in Upper CanadA . 
Triumph of the ConserratiTe Party 


Want of a Solicitor-General for Loyer Canada 
Contemplated Beaignation 

State of Pasties ik 1845 

The French-Canadian Partj 

Influence of the Boman Oafhoiie deny 

The Opposition Party in Upper Oman 

The Supporters of Govemment • 

The Irish Boman Catholics 

Want of Inducements to Public Li£B 

The L^;islatiTe Assembly 

Evils ofParty-distractiona . 


AvswEBs TO Addbesses • 

To the Town of Nil 
To the Township of ^^cai 
To the Ottawa District 
To the Brook District, Canada Wert 












Pages U and 42, for " bauicA,'* raad '^bantek/' 
Page 54b line 7 (introdoctorj noid),/&r "term of his i 

fwd ''term of the sentenoe." 
Page SSSf line 3 (introdoctoiy note},/w ** under his eofflmaod," 

read " under his charge." 


iThs annexed List of the difereni Ofices held by Lord Metcalfe, and the date* 
of hie appoinUment to them^ may be utefitl to the reader, a* indicating the 
potition which he occupied, at different periode, when he wrote the following 
papers, and in some degree the circumstances under which they were com- 

Assistant to the Eesident at Sdndiah's Court .... Dec. 31, 1801. 

Assistant in the Chief Secretaiy's Office Oct. 4, 1803. 

Assistant in the GoTemor-General's Office (partly in de- 
tached employ with the Commander-in-Chief) .... April 3, 1803. 

Employed under the Commander-in-Chief on the abolition 
of the Goyemor-General's Office , 1806. 

Eirst Assistant to the Kesident at I>e]hi Aug. 15, 1806. 

£nToy to Lahore Aug. 29, 1808. 

Deputy-Secretary with the Goyemor-General .... July 15, 1809. 

Acting-Resident at Sdndiah's Court May 15, 1810. 

Resident at Delhi Feb. 25, 1811. 

Pblitical and Private Secretary Jan. 29, 1819. 

Resident at Hyderabad Dec. 26, 1820. 

Resident and Ciyil Commissioner at Delhi, and Agent to 
the Goyemor-General in Rajpootana Aug. 26, 1825. 

Member of the Supreme Council of India Aug. 24, 1827. 

Governor-General of India March 20, 1835. 

Licutonant-Govemor of the North-Western Provinces . April 13, 1836. 

Retired from the service of the East India Company . . Feb. 21, 1838. 

Governor of Jamaica (sworn in) Sept. 26, 1839. 

Governor-General of Canada (sworn in) March 30, 1842. 

Bom Januaiy 30, 1785. Died September 5, 1846. 





[With, the exoeption of a memorandam written in 1804, rdstire to the 
advantages of locating a proposed subsidiaiy force at Kotah, and pnblislied 
in Ills Memoirs^ the following is the earliest political document of any im- 
portaace to be found among Lord Metcalfe's papers. It was writt^ in 
1806, at the age of twenty-one, when he was attached to Lord Lake's army ;. 
and seemingly drawn np for the perosal of his fiither. Embodying as it 
does, m clear, forcible, bnt not always Tery official langoage, the views of 
the WeQesley School, it illnstrates, in a very remarkable manner, the early 
political development of the old race of Indian civilians. The Elphinstones 
and Metcalfes— the Jenkinses and Adams— of the first years of the present 
centmy were ripe Indian statesmen at an earlier age than that which is now 
fixed for the first entrance of the new race into the pnUic service.] 

Sib Geobge Bablow has determined, from some motive? 
T^hicli he dengnates ^^ the fundamental principles of his adminis- 
tration/' to withdraw from all connexion and alliance with the 
states situated west of the Jumna, and to get rid of all our pos- 
sessions west of the same river, with the reservation of a strip 
of land along its western bank of a few miles' breadth. This 



determination has been so powerful as to supersede every 
other consideration. The advantages of increased resources, 
the military strength of our frontier, and even our reputation, 
is sacrificed to it. To every argument that has been urged to 
dissuade the Grovemor-General firom this determination, the 
same answer has always been given : ^' It is a fundamental 
principle of my administration, and to this all other considera- 
tions must yield." 

If the Jumna was a river of such depth as to form a boundary, 
some reason might be supposed for making a boundary of it. 
Bat the fact i^ it is everywhere fordable in all months except- 
ing those during which, in common with it, every rivulet 
swelled by the rains is impaa?able. The lands to the west are 
as fertile, the people imder good government would be as quiet, 
and the states with whom we have alliances are as good as else- 
where. What magic is it which shall make one bank of such 
a stream the object of dread and aversion, when the other is 
everything desirable ? Why should an alliance on one side be 
useless, when on the other it is 8aluta];y ? Why should in- 
flu^&oe to the right be dangerous, if to the left it is power and 
safety? Sir George Barlow in his closet, looking at a map, 
sees a Uaok line narking the coarse of a river; he draws his 
pencil along this line, and says, ^ Thus fiir shalt dioa go, and 
BO farther;" and this forms a fundamental principle. I can 
fancy no other cause for his astonishing determination to keep 
nothing that he can get rid of on one side of the imaginary line. 
But he may as well set his chair on the sands of the sea, and 
order the waves to stop ; for the influence of Britain will roll 
in spite of him beyond the Jumna, or else the Atlantic Ocean 
will be the Jumna which shall separate the states of India from 
the British Empire. This inflexible rule looks too much like a 
government of straight lines; it looks like a government which 
decides political questions by examining maps in a closet, with- 
out attention to the knowledge which is to be acquired by an 
extensive view of the whole field. 

Sir George's fundamental principle in this policy is, perhaps. 


put of that general principle at tlni moment in fiiTor ^th our 
inferB, of withdxairiiig from all external oonnexions, and con- 
fining OUT Tiews to the goronment of our own territories. It 
18 anerted ihat our force will dras be concentrated, our power 
compact, and omr empire at peace. Wovdd the human body 
be more Tigoroos by the applicaticm of an axe to its limbs? 
Would a ddlfiil auigeon, in order to increase its strength, cut 
off an arm ? It is as wise to throw away the power and 
influence whidi we actually possess west of the Jumna. That 
power and influence I believe to be an arm to the British 
Empire, which may be exercised with important advantage* 
The treaty of peace with Holkar, bad as it is, has left us in 
ponession of the acknowledged supremacy in Hindostan^ and 
has libented from Mahrattfi extortion and oppression those 
states which are under our protection.* The protection of 
these states against the Mahrattas (and ihere exists no other 
power against irfiich we can be called to protect them) can 
be no encumbrance. The relinquishment of all claims upon 
them being acknowledged by the Mahrattas in treaties, they 
would certainly refrain from attacking iheax unless tiiey were 
prepared to engage in war with us; and if they are willing to 
incur this riak, they may as soon make an incursion into oux 
territories as upon our aUies, or break any other artide of the 
treaty. Nothing can be easier than to keep those states quiet 
with each odier; say but the word> and they will be stilL Of 
this I have no doubt. Their confirmed habits of restraint and 
dependence make it certain. 

The assertion that these alliances are no benefit to us is not 
tone. They foarm a large extent between the Mahrattas and us. 
Under our influence tiiey are good neighbours. They make a 
good military frontier, b the event of war with the Mahrattas, 
hostilities are carried far from our territories, and we still enjoy 

* The mjacbief of this treaty has poora^ &o^ to Holkar, the aban- 

been completed by the Govemor- domnent of the Bajahof Boondee to 

Qc&ezal's subsequent acts, by the Hoftar's revenge, and the luptore of 

g^ataitoas oeaomi of Tonk Bam- the treaty of Jy^porsw— €. T. M. 



ihe advantages of a firiendly countiy in our lear. Tliefle 
alliances affi)id us all the benefit which is derived from influence 
and supremacy. Weak as Holland is, surely France derives 
advantage firom her influence over it. Hers is an influence by 
usurpation; our influence over these petty states is one of their 
seeking, and one which they will not resign as long as they can 
keep it. A proof of this is that the government, in order to 
get rid of the alliance with Jyepore, sets up a right, ialse, I think, 
and unjust, to dissolve it; and proposes to persuade the Bajahs 
of Bhurtpore and Macheree to resign their alliances with ua 
by ofiering considerable territory to them. 

The most important advantage to us from these alliances is 
the preservation of these countries from the Mahrattas, and the 
consequent diminution of Mahratta power, influence, and 
resources. India contains no more than two great powers, 
British and Mahratta, and every other state acknowledges the 
influence of one or the other. Every inch that we recede will 
be occupied by them. It is a new species of policy to increase 
our own strength by increasing the power of our rival and 
natural enemy. Suppose England to have an established in- 
fluence over Holland, would Ministers glory in their wisdom if 
they withdrew that influence and threw Holland necessarily 
under the oppression of France ? What is it that should 
make political wisdom in this country so opposite to what has 
been considered wisdom in Europe? I have occarionally heard 
something of a commercial policy belonging to the Company 
separate from its interests as a sovereign state. Without Al- 
tering here into the question how &r the Company may have 
benefited by becoming a potentate, and granting, without dis- 
cussion, the full justice of all the lamentations which are uttered 
on this subject by many worthy directors and proprietors, I 
must be allowed to say that it cannot now be helped — the 
evil is done. Sovereigns you are, and as such must act if you 
do not mean to destroy the power of acting at all, to demolish 
your whole corporation, your trade, and your existence. Exe- 
crate the memories of Clive and Watson, and those who first 


brought you from the state of merchants. Bum them in effigy, 
hang their statues, and blast with infamy those male&ctors. 
Your progress since has been inevitable, and necessary to your 
existence. ^^ To stop is dangerous, to recede is ruin/' said Lord 
Clive at an early stage of our power. We have arrived now 
at ihat pitch that we may stop without danger, but we cannot 
lecede without serious consequences. We have been made so 
strong that the idea of ruin cannot enter into my mind, and we 
may lose conaderable strength without immediately feeling the 
leas. This, however, does not make it wisdom wilfully and 
wantonly to incur that loss, and to impair that streng&. This 
does not make it wisdom to give power and resources to those 
who are our rivals, and will be again, if strengthened, our 
enemies. I find that I have entered on a subject that is too 
extensive for the purpose with which I commenced these notes. 
I repeat, you are, in spite of yourselves, sovereigns, and must 
be guided by those rules which the wisdom of the world has 
applied to the government of empires. 

I have heard much of the vicious consequences of the spirit 
of ambition and aggrandisement which has sullied our cha* 
xacter; I have heard, I say, much of this, but have seen nothing 
either of the vicious consequences, or imaginary causes. That 
our power, reputation, glory, have been aggrandised, I cannot 
deny. They have been proudly and Hobly aggrandised. I 
have also heard much of a charming notion of keeping our 
place in India and our tranquillity by a new system of gene- 
rodty, moderation, and innocence. 

This system, literally pursued, would be to give away as 
much as we can, to keep as little as we can, and to be as weak 
as we can. This is nonsense. To trust for tranquillity not to 
our power and influence, but to our moderation and innocence, 
IB pretty in theory, but would be very foolish in practice, par- 
ticularly applied to Mahrattas. To meet their ambition and 
enterprise with the language of peace, would be to preach to 
the roaring ocean to be still. For our security, we must rest 
upon our strength. Leave us as we are, but do not, by false 

6 THE POUOT or snt OBOBas maslow. 

and Bew doctrinei, diminiA the strangth wUdi we 
Let ua not cutabliah maxLins wludi aie eondenaied bj the hk- 
toiy of all ages. Our empiie in Indm is thI, and mnat be 
managed in ibe way of other enqiirea. We must exist as a 
gieat state. Without croaking, it may be obsenred that our 
government is upon a dangerous ejq>eriment| and we may have 
cause to repent of the operation ol the new pnncipleB. They 
hare done no good yet The assertion that we hare been 
immoderate and ag g r o B oi ve is very untrue. We have, I am 
surei been more moderate than any state pbM)ed in the same 
ciroumstances ever was before. I will be oontent to hare this 
question decided by the natives of this country. 

I do not like, in the eiieting policy, the incUnatton erident 
in the Governor-General's despatdies to reduce every qnes- 
iioa to the consideration of mere expediency» and to give no 
weight to character and honor; to put out of view our proud 
pre-eminence, and to act as a petty, weak, temporiang stata 
This is carried so far, and all objections are made so trifling 
when immediate convenience duects, as to amount in some in- 
stances (vide the despatches which assume the right to dissolve 
our alliances with the Bana of Gohud and the Bajah of Jyepore, 
without the consent of those allies), in my opinion, to a positive 
breach of fidth. This policy, at leasts operates to the injury of 
our reputation. The native powers of India understand the 
law of nations on a broad scale, though they may not adhere 
to it; but they are not acquainted with the nice quirks upon 
which our finished casuists would dnw up a paper to establish 
political rights. 

Our name is high, but these acts must lower it And a 
natural consequence is, that we shall not again be trusted with 

I would wish to see our government feelingly aUve to points 
of honor, and less tenacious of questions of argumentative 
light I would wish it to act in cases^ such as the two men- 
tioned, more according to the expectations which the native 
states are authorised to form, than to the letter of our own law. 


We aeiqr find a jqglifieation on aoeh qaostioiui in aotte 
of our oim books^ but £br ihe impcurtant puipoee of repoftatiQii 
it IS reqakite that we should be justified in tiie nund of India. 
In the cases^ howererywhichlhavementioned^weaie justified^ 
I think, nowhere. The aigumenta adduced aie faike (partifiii* 
larly on the Gbhud question), and it would not be diflSwilt to 
OTerthzow than by a j^ain stataaauat of &ct 

The Gbvemor^Gieneral, in some of his deapafohcB, diatinetly 
says that he oontemplaftes in the discard (tf the native pow«» 
an additional sooite of strength; and, if I am not mirtaVcn^ 
some of bis plaas go directly, and «ra Ju^fued to foment dis* 
cord among those states. To foment disooid seoxis to me 
barbaious» unwarrantabte, and monstious; and enen to contem- 
plate in it any source of strength is unworthy of our pre- 
eminent station. Such a poli^ at best can only be suited to 
petty estates. Applied to our empire in India it is extremely 
i^thy.* Lord Wellesley's desire was to imite the tranquillity 
of all the powefs of India with our own. How &ir» how 
beautiful, how ▼irtoons^ does this system seem; how tenfold 
fair, beautiful, and virtuous when compared with llie o4h» 
ugly» nasty, abominable cae. 

But I can contemplate no source <^ 8tr»g1ih in the discord of 
oontigooui powers* It appears to me that in oar advanced 
state of power no great ocntentionB can arise which will not 
soon reach and oitoD^e us. It is impossible completely to 
insulate ourselves, and we must be sulject to the sasoe chances 
which work upon states situated as we are. It is matter of 
astonishment that any person can think that it is in onr power 
to draw in our arms and separate ourselves entirely fiom the 
afiBdrs of India — ^that we can exist, great as we are, without 
dependent friend or foe — ^that wars are to londle and rage on 
every part of our extensive frontier, and that we shall not be 
moved by them. This is a new and, I think, mistaken noticsu 
It is our interest, I am sure (leaving out the question of 

* Lord WeUesley has censuTed gant reply to the Calcatta address in 
tins by anticipai^n. Fide hk de- 1804.--G. T. M. 


morality and Virtue, things not always admitted into politics), 
to promote the general peace. It is the only mae way of pre- 
serving tranquillity to ourselTes. The acts of the last six months 
not only deprive us of the power of preserving peace in India, 
but must operate to cause and encourage dissension. I am very 
sorry for it. 

Our present motion is retrograde ; I shall be happy when our 
governors will halt. This study to decrease our influence is 
funny. I cannot understand it. For my part, I wish to have 
our influence increased. It is generally sought for^ and I am 
certain in its operation it gives the most real and fssential 
benefit to all chie& and states, and to the subjects of all chiefi 
and states over which it is exercised. There is a loud cry that 
we are in danger from extended dominion. For my part I can 
contemplate universal dominion in India without much fear. 

I do not like the determined spirit of penury which is 
evident in this administration. Economy in a government is 
one of the greatest political virtues, but let the directors think 
what they will there may be too much of it if it is too parsimo- 
nious. It ceases then to be a virtue, and becomes one of the 
most absurd political follies, and one of the worst political 
vices. There is, I think, too much of it when it appears to be 
the ruling and sole principle of government ; when it is displayed 
in every public advertisement and introduced into every secret 
despatch; when deductions of pence and farthings are consi- 
dered more important than the fate of empires ; in a word, 
when the government entirely discards liberality. 

'^Mere parsimony is not economy; it is separable in theory 
from it, and in fact it may, or it may not, be a part of economy, 
according to drcumstances. Expense, and great expense, may 
be an essential part in true economy. If parsimony were to be 
considered as one of the kinds of that virtue, there is, however, 
another and a higher economy. Economy is a distributive 
virtue, and consists not in saving but in selection. Parsimony 
requires no providence, no sagacity, no powers of combination, 
no comparison^ no judgment. Mere instinct, and that not an 


instmci of the noblest kind, maj produce this false economy in 
perfection. The other economy has larger views." 

In a service like this, which is pursued for an independence, 
and to which the wealthy never have recourse, and in which 
services cannot be rewarded with honors, merit must be re- 
warded by situations uniting credit with emolument. It is in 
the nature of the human character to look to a reward. Without 
this hope there would be much less of zeal and public spirit than 
there now is. Self-love plays its part in our most dimnterested 
acts. Every government of the world has instituted rewards as 
well as punishment for the encouragement of public virtue among 
its citizens; and when a government loses sight of this principle, 
it will soon lose the power of rewarding any public virtue, for 
all virtue will be extinguished. When a man's conscience tells 
him that he has worked hard and merited well, he expects re* 

I look on the consideration of public service or public orna- 
ment to be real and very justice; and I ever held a scanty and 
penurious justice to partake of the nature of a wrong. I hold 
it to be in its consequences the worst economy in the world. 
In saving money I soon can count up all the good I do; but 
when, by a cold penury, I blast the abilities of a nadon, the 
ill I may do is beyond all calculation. 

Indeed, no man knows, when he cuts off the incitements to 
a virtuous ambition, and the just rewards of public service, 
what infinite mischief he may do his country through all gene- 
rations. Such saving to the public may prove the worst mode 
of robbing it. 

Individuals may repeatedly be disappointed, as in all states 
some must be, without any extensive injury to the public in- 
terests, because the hope which is the incitement remains for 
all; but when to withhold reward and distinction comes to be 
a system of administration, then the public interests will suffer 
injury, incalculable injury. There is reason to think that this 
is the case, from the apparent system of this administration. 
Its inflexible adherence to its principles of parsimony, and its 


bdaftbg difpkj of theni, laada ns to bdiera tiiat Ebenlitjr m 
exduded from Hb footbnkfj* 

If ihifl 18 tbD a», we maj tike die liberty of obMning^diat 
the piemt goTacmiieiit will not eseite setl, will not cacouage 
aUlity, ttid is no friend to enterpciie^ but e Buxe check to all 
pnbEc enecgies and spizitY and the coawqnenoeiiBBst be bad. 

Diitinct from the fiMites of pajcBunony, but operating with 
the same efieet^ is the eoldnesi and want of feeling of die go- 
Temment It does nothing with warmth and heart This may 
appear to be a fooliah objecdon, but wiU not prore to be so. 
Somedung more than oold app ro b a t ion is required to fioster 
great minds— 4he appfobatum dioold be hearty. Men who 
perform great actians want to be admired, and are not content 
with being approved. Men may serve under sooh a goveza* 
ment CGirectlyi bat the good of the state requires that they 
should serve zealously. Men will not serve zealously unless 
their government is aeabns to do them honor. I venture to 
pronounce that this administration will be coldly served. Lord 
WeOesley, firom the fire of patriotism which biased in his own 
breast, emitted sparks whidi animated the breastB of all who 
came within the reach of his notice. 

Onr present Governor is too oold in his owncharaeter to give 
any warmth to others; and this duumcterisdc of his private 
life seems to be a feature of his public administmtion. If the 
case could be supposed of a state in which public qpirit and the 
whole tmin of public virtues should be persecuted, condemned, 
and punished, it is not di£Scult to conceive that public virtnes 
would, in that state, cease to exist. And by the same rule it 
appean that if these virtues are slighted and n^lected, they 
wiU not flourish with the strength and beauty whidi is given 
to them by culture and attention. 

There are truly great patriots, who, under any circumstances^ 
wiU zealously labor for the intetests of their ooontry ; but some 
uncommon greatness is required to keep them in their righteous 
course under such obstecles as have been alluded ta Such, then, 
there are; but general arguments are applied to the generality. 

and these do certainly require the stimulants of Hope and Am- 

These loose, unconnected notes may serve to conyey to my 
fiither some of my ideas on the present admimstration. The 
subject is so extensive, that if I continued my observations, I 
should swell my paper to an enormous size. I am too lazy to 
put what I have said into any decent form; and after all, my 
thoughts can be of no importance. 

I respect Sir Creorge Barlow, and wish him well; but I 
cannot approve the principles which he professes and acts upon. 

Lord Wellesley's system was abandoned at an unfortunate 
period, when its success was nearly completed. If that system 
had been earned into complete operation, permanent peace and 
oooaequenl wealth would lunre been in our haiida. The aban- 
donment of that system, u an unlucky moment, tiuows India 
back into its former state of confhsioB and uncertainty. Our 
tranquilEty will again depend upon the will of either Sindhiah, 
Holkar^ or Bhoonsla; and our only hope of the continuance of 
it rests upon the notion that those chiefs, angly or united, will 
nerer daie to risk a war with ns. I hope, as madtk aa any man 
can, that the dread of our valor will alwap operate upon them; 
but I am convinced that an increase of their strength and in- 
fluence, and a diminution of our own, are not the best means 
of keeping alive their consciousness of our superiority. 





[The despatches written hj Mr. Metcalfe, during his mission to the 
Punjab, in 1808-9, are so nnmerons, that the extracts made from them can 
bat faintly illnstrate the extent and importance of the collection. Two of 
the most comprehensive letters in the series have, however, been selected— 
the first expounding the young envoy's views of the policy to be pursued 
towards Bunjeet Singh, and the other entering into a detailed account of 
the resources of the Sikh ruler. And when it is considered that they were 
written at the age of three-and-twenty, they will, I think, be regarded as 
veiy remarkable State-papers. A sketch of the drcumstanoes under which 
the mission was sent, and the objects to be attained by it, written some 
years afterwards* by Metcalfe himself, is prefixed to the letters J 

The objects of the mission to Runjeet Singh were to nego* 
tiate a defensive alliance^ and concert measures for the protec- 
tion of the Punjab and the British possessions in India against 
the apprehended invasion of Napoleon Bonaparte. This mis- 

♦ In answer, I believe, to the fol- 
lowing questions put to him by the 
Chief Secretaiy, m 1814, at the re- 
quest of Lord Mastings, when Met- 
calfe was in the Governor-General's 

"What led to the mission to Kun- 
jeet Singh P 

"What were the demands made 
by us on Bunjeet Singh, and what 
the ^unds of those demands ? 

"How were those demands met 
by Runjeet Singh P Were they dis- 
puted, and on wnat grounds P 

'' What was the final settlement, 
and the grounds upon which it was 

"Did that settlement expressly, 
or by implication, restrain the British 
Gk>venmient from extending its power 
beyond the Sutlej P 

" Did any of Mr. Metcalfe's de- 

rtches comprehend a general view 
the neffotiation and settlement P 
" What were considered the ad- 
vantages of having the Sutlej, instead 
of the Jumna, for our boundary in 
that direction P" 


slon was simiiltaneous with another sent to Giubuli with nmilar 
views as Telating to that oountiy. 

In the fibrst instance we made no demands, l)nt merely pro- 
portions for an intimate alliance for the purpose above men- 

Our propositions were met by the most stiiking display of 
jealousy, distrust, and suspicion, and by immediate endeavours 
on tiie part of Runjeet Singh to complete tiie subjugation of 
the countiy between the Sutiej and the Junma, to facilitate 
which he endeavoured to take advantage of the presence of a 
British mission to his camp, and for a time succeeded in that 

The character and the ambitious views disclosed by Runjeet 
Singh induced a change of policy on the part of the British 
Government. The expectation of making a friend of him was 
abandoned as vain, and it was determined to restrain him in 
that quarter in which he might be considered most dangerous 
as an enemy. 

Up to tUs period the Britbh Grovemment had not resolved 
to take the Sikh chiefs between the Sutiej and the Jumna 
under its protection, neitiier had it ever pledged itself against 
doing so. Runjeet Singh had been allowed to make great 
strides towards the subjugation of their country without oppo- 
sition on our part. All their applications for succour were 
neglected; and when tiie British mission arrived in Runjeet 
Singh's camp, several of the principal chiefs in question were 
there in compulsory attendance on him, as if he were tiieir 

When the British Government determined to check the 
extension of Runjeet Singh's power towards our own frontier, 
the demands made were^ that he should relinquish all preten- 
sions to sovereignty over the remaining chiefs between the 
Sutiej and Jumna, and evacuate all conquests between these 
rivers made subsequentiy to the arrival of the British mission 
in his camp. He was not required to abandon the territories 
between the Sutiej and Jumna prior to the arrival of that 


miflaion, nor to xanstste chaob ^pimaodj digporteaied ; bat it 
was demanded that he should not aend any aimy to the left 
bank of die Sotlcg, and that he ahould not xetain in hia poaaea- 
aiooa in that quarter more troopa than might be indiiyenaable 
for internal duties. It vras at the same time intimated to him 
diat ive intended to eatabliah & poat ai Loodhian^i and take 
the ehiefii and the comitiy wad&c oor protection. 

Theae demanda wen diluted by Bvnjeet Singh, on the 
gronnd that he had spent Uood and treasure in aduering the 
eonqoest.of the country between llie Sutlej and the Jumna 
for fseveral years, during which we had yirtually acknowledged 
his light by our abstinence from remonstrance or complaint 
He admitted that at the termination of the Mahnattft war, if 
we had planted a post nt Loodhiana, he should have acknow- 
ledged our right to do ao aa the anceeasora of the Mahratta 
power; but he denied our right to xeviTo at pleaanie an obso- 
lete claim, which he had satisfied himselfj fiom oor oondnot, 
we had entirely relinquished. 

The final settlement was tlie entire accomplishment of our 
demands; to which Runjeet Singh prudently yielded after a 
long struggle in n^otiation, and every prapar»tkm for re- 

That settlement, either expressly or by implicalaon, re- 
strained the British GoTemment from interfoing with Runjeet 
Singh's dominions, subjects, and dependants beyond the Sutlej. 
I do not recollect that it imposed any other restraint on the 
extension of the power of the British Govenunenty hot I must 
beg leave to refer to the treaty concluded at the termination of 
the negotiation. 

No one of Mr. Metcalfe's despatohes comprehended a general 
view of the n^otiation and settlement. His despatdtes from 
first to last reported the rise, progress, and termination of the 
negotiation, and rdated almost exdusively to that sulgeet. 

The advantages of having the Sutlej instead of tfaue Jumna 
for our boundary in that direction were considered to be many: 
first, as acquiring an addition <^ power and influence Sot our- 

ITS BE8ULT6. 15 

adves; seoondlj, as abBtnetiiig in a still greater degree power 
and influence &om a political enemy; thirdly , as preventixig tbe 
union of the Sikh nation under an aspiring ruler of extraordi- 
nary character; fourthly, as interpoedng between our frontier 
and thatof apower&l rival the territories of dependent states, by 
which war, whether ctBefome or def4»Brre, would be kept at a 
distance &om our country; fifthly, by the greater seonrity 
afibrded to the cqntal dty and imp<»rtant political post of 
Dihlee, to which, otherwise, the power of Runjeet Singh would 
have approximated within a few miles, affirding him the oppor- 
tunity of attacking it suddenly in the event of our being 
inTolved In war with oth^ powers; lastly, perhaps the assump- 
taon of our proper station as the protectors of the weak and the 
opposers of the oppressor, was not the least of the advantages 
of the arrangement, with refierenoe to its impression on all 


Norenber 6, 1808. 

Sib, — Altfaoqgh my several deq)atches have detailed all 
the ciicumstances worthy of mention that have occurred in the 
piog rc B B of the negotiation with Runjeet Singh, it will, I con- 
ceive, be proper to state to you, in a collected icNrm, all the pro- 
posals and stipulations which he advances. 

Tliese are as follows: 

First. Some sort of treaty of perpetual amity or connexion to 
be continued with his heirs. 

Second. The acknowledgment of his sovereignty over the 
whole l^kh country, or an engagement not to oppose his aggres- 
flions against the independent Sikh chiefs, and not to assist at 
any time any Sikh chiefs against him. 

Third. An engagement not to interfere in fitvor of the 
King of Caubul to prevent his aggression against the King's 


Fourth. Engagement that when the Britiflh annies shall march 
through his country to meet the enemy on the Indus or in 
Caubul^ ihe time of the march of the troops &om DiUee and the 
route of march shall be settled with his concurrence* 

Fifth. Engagement that the British forces shall evacuate his 
dominions after the termination of the contest with the French 
armies, and ihat the depot, &c., shall be removed. 

Sixth. Engagement that the misrepresentations of designing 
men shall not be attended to. 

Seventh. Engagement that cattle shall not be killed for the 
British armies in die Rajah's coimtry. 

Eighth. Stipulation presented, but subsequently withdrawn, 
that the British Grovemment will never entertain any Sikhs in 
its service. 

I proceed to ofier an explanation of each of these sepa- 
rately, in which I shall take the liberty of stating such obser- 
vations and suggestions as occur to me. 

First, some sort of treaty of perpetual amity or connexion to 
be continued with his heirs. I say some sort of treaty, because 
his views in respect to this are not very clear; indeed, he does 
not seem himself to have any fixed idea of the exact tendency 
of his own proposal He has neither proposed an alliance 
ofiensive and defensive, nor an alliance directly defennve, but 
has, in general terms, proposed to establish lasting and intimate 
friendship from generation to generation, with the addition that 
no state should be more favored than his; yet, after having 
requested me to make out a draft containing what I might 
conceive to be his object, he has kept that draft without com- 
municating to me either his assent or his objections to the 

An offensive alliance being out of the question, I had to con- 
sider to what extent I should be authorised to proceed in con- 
cluding a defensive alliance. A general defensive alliunce with 
Runjeet Singh, which should bind the British Government to 
protect his territories at all times against his enemies, might 
involve government in a perpetual state of warfare, for his 


upon oiheiB are so frequent and so muldpliecly that in a season 
of opportunity for his neighbours, he migKt be attacked on all 
sides. This, therefore, seemed to be also out of the question. 

In order to accede in every practicable degree to the pro- 
posals of Runjeet Singh, I prepared an article to be produced, 
if occasion should require it, binding the two governments 
mutually to aid in the defence of their territories, provided that 
the causes of attack upon the territories of either party should 
have proceeded from circumstances which had taken place in 
concert; further stipulatbg, that if either party should under- 
take any measures without the advice and concurrence of the 
other, it should not be entitled to call for aid to defend itself 
against any hostilities that might result from such measures. 
This article has never been communicated to the Bajah, because^ 
in fact, he has never applied for a defensive alliance; but it 
contained the utmost that I conceived myself authorised to 
assent to. 

I should have made a point of ascertaining the Rajah's real 
motives and objects in this proposal previously to this reference, 
but his impatience to move from Miterkote, and his general 
habit of evasion and delay, prevented any final and clear pro- 
position on the subject. From the language of aU the commu- 
nications received from him, and from his not stating any ob- 
jections to the draft which I transmitted to him on this point,^ 
I conclude that an engagement of strict friendship with hinv 
would satisfy him. The advantage which he proposes to derive 
from such a treaty is probably that of strengthening his power 
by the notoriety of the existence of these engagements between 
the British Gbvemment and him. 

Second. The acknowledgment of his sovereignty over the 
whole Sikh country, or an engagement not to oppose his ag- 
^rressions against the independent Sikh chiefs, and not to assist 
at any time any Sikh chief against him; — 

This is the great object of his views, and the principal motive 
of this reference. The subject has been brought to the notice 


18 THB xxsoroK TO BinnsKT suras. 

of gcyremment latdy in Tirioas ways; I propoee, tiieretbie, to 
oonfine m jvdf to lodal oonaid^BtioiiB. 

I take the liberty of exprefleing my opimon, founded upon 
ihe obBemttioiiB made in my piesent Ktaation, tliat, if it it in 
view to attach Runjeet Singh to the Britash Govmunent, and 
to make him a frioid by conciliation, the conoeanon which he 
requires is easentially neoeaaary for that pnrpoae. As long aa 
the Britiah Government appeara tobe die bar, and die only bar, 
to hia aulgngation of the SiUia and oonaeqnent aggraa d iaement, 
he will not, I oonceiTey be cordially attached to it; and if hia 
attachment is to be gained by any meana, none odier are ao 
likely to aecure it aa this oonceaaion, without whidi all other 
attempta to obtain his co-operation by conciliation would pio- 
bably be firuidess. 

Oonaiderations may be adduced from the actual state of 
the country to diminish the objections to die sacriBoe. The 
reserve hitherto held by government on this point, haa not 
prevented the gradual extension of the power of Runjeet Singh 
over the territories betweoi the Sudej and the Jumna. It has 
hitherto retarded the complete subjugation, but its eflbct as 
a check upon Runjeet Singh has diminished, and will continue 
to diminish* His encroachments have been progressive, and 
he has taken die opportunity, when a British Envoy was in his 
camp, to make them more remarkable and more exceasive than 
ever before. 

He has proceeded widi his whole force to Umballa, which is 
not fill distant from the post of Eumal; and there is reason to 
expect that he will not spare Jegadree, which is near to that 
part of the Jumna which is protected by the station Suhamn- 

Without reference, therefore, to the general question of 
the expediency of admitting the extension of Runjeet Singh's 
power, it appears that a refusal to make the dedanttion wUch 
he requires^ unaccompanied by a determination to oppose hia 
aggressions, would perpetuate his distrust of the British Gro- 

BtmrSBt^S AO€BES8IOKB. 19 

withoat nutaeially dieekmg the progress of his 

Two of tlie principal advantages of withholding the deok- 
lation reqmrod seem to be, firsts that govemTnent will be at 
liberty to come forward at any time when dieomstanoes may 
reqaire its interference; and, secondly, that the independent 
Sikh chieftare not oompeUed to rengn themselTes in despair to 
the soTere^nty 6[ Rmijeet Singh. 

With respect to the first of these, I beg leave, with the ut- 
most deference, to soggest as one of the grounds on which the 
sentiments which I am expressing are founded, that the right 
of selAle&nce cannot be altogether abandoned by a general 
deckration of non-interference. The same circumstances which 
would induce government now to oppose Runjeet Singh's pro- 
gress on the frontier, via., the dangerous opemtion of that 
progress againet the interests of the British Government, might 
authorise, or, on the permanent principle of self-defence, to 
interfere hereaft^, notwithstanding the declaration, if, as may 
not now be expected, his progress should become dangerous. 

Tliis is conceived on the presumption that government has 
it not at present in contemplation to oppose Runjeet Singh 
in his attempts to subjugate the SiUis. If I am mistaken in 
this presumption, the case is altered, but then it may be ob- 
servedt his oicroachmenta are already nearly as far advanced as 
they can be, and he is not likely to be checked except by im- 
mediate opposition. 

The other advantage of avoiding sudi a declaration to 
which I have alluded, viz., that as long as the British Govern- 
ment does not dedaie that it will never defend any of the Sikh 
chiefr against Runjeet Singh, these chiefs are not compelled to 
resign Aemselves in do^ondency to his sovereignty, must, I 
apprehend, be gradually diminished by his increasing unre- 
sisted aggressions, and it does not appear that any are led on by 
the hope of preserving their independence, and obtaining the 
eventual protection of the British Government, to ofier any 



united or steady oppontion to his aims. The greater nnmber 
have become companions of liis Harem in order to acquire 
influence suflDicient to ward off his blows from their own terri- 
tories, and for this purpose do not scruple to guide them, and 
virtually aid against others. Indeed, the original causes of his 
obtaining any footing in the country were applications made 
by some of these chieft for his asristanoe against others. 

I take ihe liberty of mentioning, that aU that I have said 
on this subject is under the supposition that it is intended to 
obtain the co-operation of Runjeet Singh against France by 
conciliation. I have, therefore, endeavoured to express and sup- 
port my opinions that some such declaration as that required 
by the Rajah to the degree that may be thought expedient, is 
necessary for the purpose of conciliation ; and that the with- 
holding of that declaration, unaccompanied by actual opposition 
to his aggression, will hazard the loss of all that is to be gained 
by conciliating him, without efiectually preventing the subjuga- 
tion of the coimtry between the Sutlej and the Jumna. 

Having submitted my opinion that, without this concession^ 
Runjeet Singh cannot be won by conciliation, it is my duty to 
state, to the best of my judgment, whether from my personal 
knowledge of his character, it is certain that this concession 
wiU completely attach him to the Britbh Government, and 
secure his cordial co-operation against France, or whether these 
points will afterwards be subject to doubt. 

They will always, 1 conceive, from the result of my per- 
sonal intercourse with the Rajah, be subject to doubt No part 
of his personal character presents any satisfactory assurance 
of cordiality, good faith, consistency, or hearty co-operation. 
For want of consistency and good faith he is justly notorious ; 
my despatches will have described repeated instances of deceit 
and evasion; he has no regard for truth, and can descend even 
to the violation of solemn promises; and the whole tenor of his 
behaviour impresses me most strongly with the conviction of 
his total want of principle. In the crisis when his exertions 
may be required, he wiU, doubtless, without regard to previous 


engagements, act according to his yiew of Iiis interests at the 

If ever the agents of French intrigue should find a way 
to his ear, he is a character well suited for them. He would 
probably soon fall under the guidance of a French negotiator, 
who would flatter his pride and vanity, raise ambitious hopes 
by unbounded promises, and work upon his credulity by any 
falsehoods. On his character no reliance whatever can, I 
conceive, be placed; but by the concession which he requires, 
the British Government will obtain any treaty that may be 
thought advisable, his aid in maintaining an intercourse with 
Caubul, the means of marching its armies to or beyond the 
Indus; and it may be expected that the measures adopted by 
the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council having 
completely anticipated the designs of France in this country j a 
progressive connexion will be formed with Runjeet Singh, 
which may not only entirely exclude French intrigue from his 
conncilB, but may lead to his conviction, in the hour of contest, 
that his true interests require the most vigorous co-operation 
against the designs of France; and circumstances, such as the 
offer of his territories on the part of France as a temptation to 
the King of Caubul, may bind him firmly to the cause. 

If in the intermediate time his course of measures and con-* 
duct should be such as to compel the British Government to 
change its system, and check his ambition, the evil attending 
the concession which he desires will not be irretrievable. The 
increased power which he wiU acquire by the extension of his 
acknowledged dominion to the bank of the Jumna, will only 
be formidable whilst unopposed. The increase of the numbers 
of his subject chiefs will increase the number of disaffected in 
his army, and they will not be less ready to join a power op* 
posing him than they are now. In explanation of this opinion, 
it may be observed that the chiefs to the west of the Sudej 
are as anxious to be released from his oppression as those to 
the east of that river are to avoid it; and that, notwithstand- 
ing the care which has been taken by him to prevent the ap- 

tt THB mSttOir TO BUX7XBT 

pioach of Uadue&tonieyeiitreatksibrpiotootMi^ 
sabmissioii to the British Grovemment, hare leached me firam 
ehiefi on the banks of the Indoa, as veU as thoae on the 

I have considered this question exehmrdy aa it relates to 
llie pofioj of fonning a oonnexion with Ronjeel Singh aa a 
bairier against the designs of Fraaoe. I am aware that it is 
before government in a more genend view, fi>r the Besidnt at 
Dihlee has done me the honor of oommnnioati]^ to me oopies 
of his late despatches to yon on this subject* 

I now beg leave to advert to the conduct which I have 
pursued during the agita&>n of this question on the nego- 
tiation with Bnnjeet Sing^. From the tenor of my inatmo- 
tioDs, and of your despatch to the Bemdent at Dihlee of the 
21st March last, I have conceived it to be the wish of govern- 
ment to xe&ain firom making any declaration expressive of a 
determination either to 8i^>port the independent Sikh chieft 
against Runjeet Singh, or to permit the subjugation of them 
by hiuL I have, therefore, endeavoured, since the first men- 
tion of the question, to induce the Rajah to refiain from agi- 
tating it, and I have uaed every argument that appeared to me 
likely to prevent the reference on this subject. 

My advice, however, has always been su^qposed to come from 
myself, and I have invariably declared that I had not received 
any instructions further than to ascertain distinctly ihe R^ah's 

If, therefore, it should be thought eiqiedient to grant re- 
quired conoession, it may be made in any way that may be pre- 
ferred. It may be made without condition, the Rajah being 
informed ihat tiie British Oovemment has never had any coi^ 
cem in the disputes between the Sikh ehiefi, and never has 
intended to interfere; or it may be granted to him as a cession 
of great importance, which can only be made on such conditions 
as government may be pleased to annex to it. Government 
is not committed in any way by my negotiation here to prefer 
either this or that mode, but can adopt any fine of conduct 


and any course of asgunnt thai may appaai to be most 

If h dioold be deteimined to gnuit tUa oonoBMBOB, I beg lea^ 
to solicit orders on the following points: 

1. la the dedaiafcioa to contain all that he seeiaa to lequire^ 
that 18, the acknowledgment of hia soyeveigi^y ovet all the 
Sikhsy and an engagement not to oppose the estaUiabment of 
hia sovereignty over them, or only the latter? 

There seems to be a considerable difference between &e first 
and last The fiiBi^ perhaps, could not be granted without 
injury to the right of those duefi who are still indq^mdent; 
ainoe it does not appear to be just to acknowledge his sove- 
re^ty over those who have nev^ yet acknowledged it» and 
over whom it is not perfectly established. 

2. Is the declaration to be verbal or written? 
Runjeet Singh will certainly wish it to be written. 

3. Is the declaraiaon» if written, to be part of a treaty^ or a 
sqiaiate engagement? 

It will, I conceive^ be equally acceptable to him in either 

4. Areanyezceptionstobemadeiniavot of any Sikh chiefs, 
and if so, what? 

5. Are the bonndi to which he will be allowed to proceed to 
be explained to him, and if so, what bounds? 

Icondnde that it will be deemed prop^ to explain to him 
that he is not to consider those parts of the British dominions 
whidi are held in Jageer by Sikh cfaoefr as included in the sup- 
posed dedaradon. 

6. Is the dominion of Koonjpoora to be induded in the con- 
oesrion, or reserved under the protection of the British Govern- 

The cause of my putting the last question is, that the canton- 
ment of £umal is in a manner dependent for supplies on the 
town of Koonjpoora, which, with its fort, is about four miles 
fiom that poet. Being in the pooession of a Patau family, it 
cannot jostly be claimed. 


I now proceed to the Bsjah's other objects. 

Third. An engagement not to interfere in favor of the Ejng 
of Gaubul to prevent his aggresnona against the King's d<Mni- 

On this subject I have lately been informed by Mr. Elphin- 
stone that he is not entrusted to oiSer the mediation of the 
British Government to the King of CaubuL The caution, 
therefore, which I thought ^it my duty to observe on this 
point has been unnecessary; but as no di£ference would be 
made in the state of afiairs here, by agreeing to enter into a 
positive engagement to the eflfect proposed, and as the n^otia- 
tion is at a stand on another question, I have at present no 
inducement to alter the language that I have hitherto held on 
this demand. 

The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh articles of his pro- 
posals can, I conceive, be easily arranged; but it will be very 
satisfactory to me to receive any instructions which the Right 
Honorable the Governor-General may be pleased to issue upon 
them, especially with reference to the mode in which it may be 
deemed expedient to comply with them. 

Eighth. Stipulating against the slaughter of cattie for beef 
in the Rajah's dominions; — 

A verbal assurance to this effect, if deemed proper, will, I 
imagine, be sufficient 

Ninth. Stipulation that the British (government will never 
entertain any Sikh in its service; — 

This has been withdrawn, but it may be brought forward 
again. It was mentioned as a condition of the Rajah's concur- 
rence in the proposed co-operation against France. It would 
be very satisfactory to have instructions for the guidance of my 
conduct in case that it should be advanced again. I conceive 
that the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council 
will not assent to it, and that Runjeet Singh, much as he may 
wish it, will not insist upon it. If it is mentioned again before 
me, I shall suggest that probably tiie British Government will 
demand from the Rajah as an equivalent that he shall never take 


into his service any Europeans, nor any of the natives of ih^ 
territories subject to the Honorable Company; and I think that 
that wiU be suflSicient to stop the demand, a^ the troops on 
vhich Bunjeet Singh places his chief dependence are from the 
Honorable Company's possessions; so are all the people employed 
in his intelligence department. 

I shall do myself the honor, in a subsequent despatch, to 
submit the best information that I possess concerning Runjeet 
Singh's country, army, power, and resources. 

Before closing this despatch, I beg leave to solicit the in- 
dulgence of the Right Honorable the Govemor<«General to the 
freedom with which I have offered my opinions on the points 
which are referred for his Lordship's decision. These I have 
thought it my duty to submit as the result of local observation, 
and I trust that in so doing I have acted consistently with his 
Lordship's wishes. 

One subject remains as yet unnoticed, on which it will bo 
very satisfactory to me to receive instructions. It relates to 
the eventual termination or prolongation of the services of this 
Mission. The suspicion and uneasiness at first displayed by 
Runjeet Singh at the presence of this Mission, seems to have 
subsided, but I cannot say that he has shown any eagerness for 
the continuance of it to an indefinite period. As his jealousy 
of the Misdon on its arrival was too remarkable to escape 
notice, I have never even hinted at the question of its continu- 
ance, and he seems designedly to have been silent on the same 


November 6, 1808. 

Sib, — ^It appears to me to be proper at the present time, 

under the circumstance of the reference which has been made 

to the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, to 

submit for his Lordship's notice aU the information that I pos- 


mm toaeandog Runjeet Siagh'a power. At the aune timey it 
k BeoeMoj to obeenre thet the ooadnet wUdi I haye thou^^ 
it my duly to ponue fliaoe my anival in the Bajah'a euiip^ in 
order to afyeata his jeehxiBiea, hetdepriTedmeof themeiaisof 
giving any Hunute or TaliiaUe intelligenee ; Smt, iaafteed of 
seeking informationi I have piupoaely zefiraiBed fimn all in* 
qninea; and what I httfe to offer is the zesolt oi wieaai obserfa- 
tioA and naaoaght cQmmnnicationa. 

His army first excxtea attention^ because his govnnaenti his 
power, his xesouicesi his policy, and his habits are aU military. 
His army is of two kinds: one looks np to him immediately 
as its commander, and the other is subordiaate to the several 
ohie& of rank who accompany hisL 

That whidi Sar the sake of distinction may be eaUed his own 
army, ooatains infimtiy, cavalry, and artiUeiy. 
Tbia infantry may be classed into regular and irregrolar. 
The r^ukrs are composed <^ the remains of the battalions 
that were formerly in the service of Sindhiah and other native 
powers, together with deserters or men discharged from the 
Honorable Company's territories. These troc^ have been 
formed into five battalions, four of Telingas, or Poorbeeas, the 
same men as the British S^>oys, and cme of Hindostanees or 
Bohillas, containing from two to four hundred men each. The 
whole number in ihe Rajah's service may amount to twelve or 
fifteen hundred men. A portion of (me or two battalions are 
armed with nmskets; the rest with matchlocks, to which I 
believe bayonets are attached, and all cany swords. I imagine 
that the men are not all dressed in uniform. I have never seen 
them in a body, but have seen several with coats in the style of 
the Company's Sepoys, but more without They have no 
caps, but wear in general a scarlet turban. These troops are 
paid in coin, which it is proper to remark, because it is the 
only part of his permanent army that is so paid. The pay of 
the privates is nine rupees per mensem, subject to a deduction 
of twelve annas on account of the paymasters and accountants 
attached to the corps, which is less by four annas than the dear 


fidd aBowuioe of the SepojB of the HononiUe Compftny's 

I cmiiot speftk as to the dkeipHiie of these troopi^ but a 
ceittm degree of legtahx discipliiie ia. common thiougfaont 
Iniim, in consequence of the multipKdfy of ooqpB of this do- 
scxiption established of kte yean in the serriee of the native 
powciSy sad those in the anny of Rmrjeet Singh are, I suppose, 
neither better nor woise than the genoraKty of those that are 
not under the management of European officers. These ba^ 
talions accompany the guns, and with them fonn the prindpal 
strength of Runjeet Singh — duit is, in his own belief ; and 
indeed, in the war of snbjugatian and exaction which he canies 
on against petty chiefs, they do form his principal strength; 
but any reliance on them in a contest with a power possessing 
a regular army would probably prove fatal to him. This species 
of force is of late introduction in his army. 

The irregular infimtiy is collected when required from the 
country. Of these there are two descriptions: those that are 
always entertained, and those that are levied on occasion. 
The former hold lands in exchange for thdr military service, 
and can always be caUed upon. The latter are hired, and 
receive pay in coin« Runjeet Singh levied a considerable nxmi- 
ber of these for this campaign, but finding the expense insup- 
portable, he dismissed them, to the number of about four 
thousand, at Fureedkote. The irr^ular infiintry are armed 
with matchlocks, or spears, or bows and arrows, but always with 
the addition of a sword. The number of these it would be 
dilBknlt to cakukte, as it might be increased to any amount 
firom the country upon an exigency; but the number that the 
Rajah could support for any length of time cannot be very 

The train of artillery which Runjeet Smgh parades about the 
country, and which, without fixing a shot, strikes terror into the 
minds of all and prevents the thoughts of opposition, consists 
of thirty-five or forty pieces of various sorts and siaes. In 
visiting the Rajah, I have occanonally observed in his camp 


some bzttBS gana, seemingly mx-poimdets, of a neat appeaianoe; 
otherwise I have not seen any of his artillery^ except fear 
heavy pieces, which on the morning of his march from Kussoor 
were marched past the camp of the Mission, evidently for the 
purpose of being noticed, as the other gons and the army in 
general marched by another and a better road. These guns, of 
which the Rajah is very proud, and which, under the appro- 
priate appellation of great guns, are bugbears to the unfor- 
tunate people, who would wish if possible to oppose his oppres- 
sion, are on carriages with three wheels, one small one bdmg 
fixed in the truck, and are without limbers; each is drawn by 
forty or fifty bufialoes; they are iron, and have the appearance 
of 18 and 24-pounders. 

The Rajah's attachment to guns, and his opinion of their 
weight, are both so great, that he will never miss an opportu- 
nity of obtaining a gun. If he hears that there is a gun in any 
fort, he cannot rest until he has taken the fort to get at the 
gun, or until the gun has been given up to him to save the 
fort. He immediately dismounts the gun from the wall, and 
drags it after him as an addition to his field-train. He has, it 
is said, procured three guns from TJmballa. He boasted to me 
once, that he had made the Rajah of Puteealah give him a fine 
gun which the Rajah wished to rescue for twenty thousand 
rupees. Exclusive of his guns, he has a number of swivels 
mounted on camels. His artillerymen are partly from Hin- 
dostan and partly natives of the Punjab. The Hindostanee 
artillerymen are the best; and without particular reference to 
Runjeet Singh's army, these are known to be generally skilful, 
brave, very steady, and devoted to their guns. 

The Hindostanee artillerymen are paid in coin, and the 
Punjabee in land. 

The cavalry of the army is numerous and well equipped. 
The horsemen are generally armed with a matchloc-k, in the 
use of which, as well as in the management of their horses, 
they are expert. Their mode of fighting is calculated to harass 
troops without cavalry. Individuals rush forward in numbers, 

bxtnjeet's cayalry. 29 

but scatteied so as to present no object of attack, halt, fire their 
jneces at the enemy, and gallop back again to the main body, 
which is kept beyond the reach of cannon-shot. Cavalry 
acting this way continually against a column of infantry on its 
inarch might harass it exceedingly; and in possession of a 
jangle or cultivated country through which an army might 
have to march, their fire might be very galling. I believe that 
the detachments which contended with the Sikhs in the Doab 
in the year 1804 and 1805, and finally expelled them, were 
much troubled by this mode of warfare. The Rajah, in the 
exhibition which he performed ii^ my presence, practised a 
manoeuvre of drawing up the small party of cavalry that ho 
had with him in a line, and kept up a continued and quick fire 
irom matchlocks upon a supposed enemy with great steadiness 
on the part of both men and horses. It would be impossible, 
however, I suppose, to execute the same manoeuvres either in 
great numbers, or in the confusion of the field of battle, and it 
could not be tried with any effect except against infantry 
inthout gims. Lands are assigned for the support of the 
cavalry; and the principal portion of the country is occupied 
by them. 

I have no certain means of judging what number the Rajah 
on an emergency could bring together. He had with him, 
when he marched from Kussoor, about 3000; and may have a 
greater number at present, as he has lately been joined by a 
detachment from the borders of Mooltan. 

The troops of the chiefs who attend him consist of cavalry 
and irregular infantry, serving for lands in the same manner as' 
the same descriptions before mentioned. 

The chiefs have no guns, for Runjeet Singh has establii^hed 
a monopoly of these — in other words, considers them always as 
the. property of the State. The amount of his force I cannot 
state with any accuracy. It is said, in round numbers, that the 
Rajah can, at the utmost, bring into the field 15,000, his own 
troops, including all descriptions, and that his chiefs can collect 
about the same number. 


It if seaioely neoesBaxy to obflerve that oommon report sweDs 
the amount of his army to a mnoh^gfeater aumber, and ihat 
he encourages the error. He speaks as if he had the dia> 
posal of hundreds of thousands. He talked to me one day of 
sending a hundred thousand to the assistance of the Rajah of 

I oonoeiTe that the following estimate exceeds, in some de- 
gree, the real amount oi his whole Ibroe : 

Reg^uhur infantry 
Irregular ditto 
Gavahy f 



Camel swivels 





This estimate camiot be quite accurate, but I believe it to be 
nearly so, and xather above than below. In the anny now 
with him there are not, I imagine, more than 12,000 fighting 

The resources by which the army is maintained are derived 
fipom contributions levied year after year upon those chiefi and 
places which the Rajah designs to subjugate. Since the rise 
of his power he has each successive year achieved some new 
conquest, which has, for that season, supported his army. To 
compare small things with great, his system is the same in 
this respect with that of the present ruler of France. His rest- 
less ambition^ and the weakness and want of union prevailing 
around him, prompt him to invade the territories of his neigh- 
bours; the service requires an increase of force, and the increase 
of force renders necessary another invasion of some other 
territory, as the resources of his own are not equal to his 

A country completely conquered ceases to be productive. 
Having levied heavy contributions, and supported his army on 
it for a period^ he gives it to a favorite, or some chief, vdbo, on 


leodiyiiig it, nukes a ocmsiderable present to &e Bajah. This 
oonntry is then left nnmolesfeed for the saloe of the chief to 
whom it has been giT^n, and the Bajsh's anns aie turned 
towards a new conquest. Unless a complete change should 
take place in his system, he mnst continae to invade new coon- 
tries, otherwise he will not be able to support his army, although 
he has only to provide money for his in&ntry, part of his artil- 
lery, and e x tr a ordinary levies of troops. 

It is almost incredible, yet it is asserted, that he has 
scarcdy any r^ular revenue fixNn his country. I have heard 
of one district which is rented for mxty thousand rupees per 
annum, and there may, and probably must be, some other 
under similar cizeumstanees; yet the instance was mentioned 
as an exception to die general state of the country, which 
is, for the most part, held in Jaidee for die maintenance of 
troops, or subject to subordinate chieft. Runjeet Singh is in 
consequence free from liie trouble and expense of <nvil govern- 
ment, and always at leisure to put himself at the bead of his 

For the support of the army on a campaign, it is his custom 
to take the field at those seasons when the crops are sufficioitly 
advanced to afford nourishment to the cavalry and cattle. One 
season is in September and October, and the other in Febmaiy 
and Maidi. The horses and cattle have no other food than 
what is obtained from the country. I am informed that he quits 
the fiidd as soon as the crops are gathered; the time is ap- 
proaching, and I shall probably have an opportunity of ascer- 
taining whether this account is true or not. 

His troops in general take the field prepared only for a short 
ca m pa ig n, and have no relish for a long one. They wish 
soon to return to tiieir home, and when the sum which they 
had brought from their villages for their disbursement is ex- 
pended, they quit the army. Many withdrew when Runjeet 
Singh mardied from Eussoor, and more when he directed his 
march towards the desert. The chiefs in particular are dis- 
gusted at being dragged from their domains to follow him on 


expeditions for his penonal aggrandiflement, in which tliey 
have no interesti but whicli, on the contrary, by increasing his 
power, draw tighter the chains that he has pot on them. 

His triumphs seem in general to be bloodless. His uninter- 
rupted success hitherto, and the large force which he carries 
with him, have the effect of pieventing opposition. Where 
he sees an inclination to oppose, he appears to act with caution, 
and not to be too eager in attacking. Where he thinks the 
instant and complete subjection of a chief or place doubtful, 
he is willing to temporise; content with a small acknowledg- 
ment of his superiority as a beginning, leaves the completion 
of his plan to another time, and by degrees gains his ultimate 
object He generally takes advantage at a favorable moment 
of any weakness or confusion in the petty states, occadoned 
either by internal dissensions, or the deaths of chiefis or other 
circumstances. In 1806 and 1807 he conquered the country 
called the Rae country, on the left bank of the Sutlej, the 
chief of which had died, and which was then in the feeble 
hands of the chief's widow. He has within the last few days 
taken possession of Umballa, which was exactly under the same 
circumstances. From Umballa he has proceeded to Shahabad 
with similar views, which was in the possession of the sons of 
Eurm Singh Nurumchi, who lately died. The Ranee fled from 
Umballa, and the sons of Eurm Singh fled from Shahabad at 
his approach. 

I have occarionally mentioned the disafiection prevailing 
among the chiefs of this country.* This is almost universal, 
and if at any future period the ambition and encroachment of 
Bunjeet Singh should compel the British Government to go to 
war with him, it might perhaps be taken advantage of to de- 
stroy effectually his power. Surdur Futteh Singh of Aloor 
has been supposed to be particularly attached to the Rajah, 
but he is in reality particularly discontented with him. Run- 
jeet Singh and Futteh Singh entered into alliance in early life, 

* The oonntry afterwards known as that of the protected Sikh States. 


and to tliis alliance the former is principally indebted for his 
extraordinary rise. The quiet character of Futteh Singh, who 
was the equal if not the superior in rank and power of Runjeet 
Singh, has yielded to the bold, commanding spirit of the other, 
and ho has been the ladder by which Runjeet Singh has 
mounted to greatness. He now finds himself not a companion 
and friend of an equal as formerly, but the nominal favorite of 
a master. The outward show of intimacy and friendship is 
preserved, but there is no confidence. He is not of the Rajah's 
council, nor is he entrusted with his secrets, but he marches 
with a considerable force in the train of Runjeet Singh, without 
knowing whither or for what purpose. Futteh Singh, in rank 
and consideration, in military force and tenitorial possessions, is 
the first of the chiefs of Runjeet Singh's army. He possesses 
the country east of the Sutlej, from Jaguaum to that river, the 
country in general between the Sutlej and the Beeas, and the 
country to the west of the Beeas as far as Umritsur. He has a 
very fair reputation, and is looked up to by the disafiected as 
the fit person to be put at the head of a confederacy to throw off 
the yoke; but he is evidently not a revolutionist; he is mild and 
good-natured, seemingly simple, and undoubtedly wanting in 
energy. This is the chief who was in Lord Lake's camp on the 
banks of the Beeas; he there acquired a respect for the British 
character, which causes him to look to the British Government 
with the hope of obtaining from it a release from the over- 
bearing tyranny of Runjeet Singh. As a matter of informa- 
tion, I have thought it proper to mention the circumstances of 
this chief, whose case may be entitled to attention with reference 
to future possible events, from the situation and extent of his 
country, and his personal character and disposition. 




[From a long and elaborate report to the Supreme Govemment on the 
ciyil admimstration, and more espedallj upon the rerenoe tSam of Delhi, 
theanBezedpaaeagesaretakeiL They are intfloded not oidj to ahow what mn 
the flj^tan pniBoed at Delhi, hot a]» to indicate the gCBond o^^ 
imter (A the great aabjeot of Bevenne administration. Metoalfe vaa one 
of the eadiest and the vazmest snpportera of the daima of the village 
Znmeendars ; and the opinions which he expressed at Delhi were consis- 
tently maintained and enforced daring his subsequent connexion with the 
Sapreme Qovenunent.] 

Past Stsisiis. — ^The aoconiitB of the incseaeiiig progress 
of our kad revenue in past yean are &r from nn&y<»able 
ID sppeanuioe. 

With zespect, however, to thia bnmch oirefeiuxe^ by fiur the 
most oonsiderable and most important of all, I should deceive 
the GovemoT-Gveaeral if I were to represent the tttuation of the 
landholders, from whom the revenue is collected, as being 
exactly that in which I wish to see them. 

Much discontent prevails among them^ which I attribute to 
the frequent recurrence of new settlements, attended by fresh 
demands for an increase of revenue. This is an evil which is 
always likely to attend short settlements, and which is unfor* 
tunately increased by the dutiful zeal of public officers to obtain 
the full dues of govemment at every settlement. 


Mr.Seto&*iiikoduoed ihe fljstem of village Bettlements, and 
the fiiat settlemeiiti mads by am European officer were made by 
me, luder Mc Seton'a inatructaona, when I was hia assistant. 

The first w9B a aettlemeni £x one year, and was made 
with some difficulty, owing to the reluctance of one part of 
the people to beeoiiie leqxmsibk for the payment of money 
rents, and of another part to pay any rerenue wfaateyer. The 
second settlement was for three years, and was made with 
greater ease. 

These settlementB were made purposely Ught, in order to 
conciliate and ^uxMuage the cuhiTatoni ; and the fiill due of 
goremment was not exacted, oa the principle that it was good 
policy to sacrifice a part» for the fiiture benefit both of the 
cnkiYatorB and the goverBment. 

The settlements, in every instance in which it was practicable, 
were made with the villages represented by the head men. 
Where it was found impossible to persuade the village land- 
holders to enter into engagements, the villages were giv^x in 
lease to iarmenL 

Subsequently to that pedod various settlements have been 
made in the several districts of this territory for two, three, 
four, and five years. 

In tiieae ktter settlements greater attention has been paid to 
the rights of government^ and the revenue has been con- 
sidenbly increased. But the continued increase has dissatisfied 
the landholders, and either from conceiving the amount latterly 
demanded to be excessive, or &om a desire to evade the pay- 
ment of the rent due to government, the landholders have of 
late, in many instances, declined the settlements proposed. 

When this has been the case, recourse has been had to the 
system of levying the rent of government by taking its share 
of every croff either in kind, or in a money valuation. 

I regret the necessity of these measures, both because I am 
af^irebensive of immediate ii^ury from them, and because they 

* Mr. Ardnbald Beton— MetcaUcTs predecessor at Delia— afterwards a 
member of the Supreme Cknmdl. 

D 2 


are destructiTe of the system which I have at heart; and nrither 
tend, in my opinion^ to the benefit of government, nor to that of 
the cultivator. It ia my present wish and intention to estap 
blish such a system as shall prevent a recurrence of the same 

This may be effected^ I conceive, by long settlements on 
moderate termsi in a manner explained in the subsequent part 
of this report 

Rights of the Village Zume^ndabs. — ^What men 
can have greater right than those whose ancestors have occupied 
the same lands and habitations from time immemorial ? who 
live on the soil entirely, and cultivate it at their own expense 
and by their own labour ; who receive it by hereditary succesdon 
or by purchase; who leave it to their children, or, if reduced to 
necessity, sell it or mortgage it; or, if they choose, transfer it 
by gift during their lives ? 

These rights are exercised by the Zumeendars, and have been 
exercised for centuries. If they be not sufficient to constitute 
undoubted property, they are surely sufficient to confer a 
paramount daim. 

Let it be supposed that these rights were authoritatively 
made to cease, and that another person were vested with pro- 
prietary right over the land, to sell or otherwise dispose of it at 
his sole pleasure, would it not be a great cruelty and injustice 
towards the Zumeendars? 

No other person could exercise a perfect proprietary right 
without the total destruction of the rights hitherto enjoyed by 
the Zumeendars. But with what pretence of justice could 
these rights be destroyed? 

It is to be apprehended that they have been destroyed in 
some parts of our territory by the creation of new rights in 
others ; but it is not my intention to discuss what may have 
been done on other occasions, though I conceive it to be my 
duty to advocate the rights of the village Zumeendars in the 
territory imder my superintendence. 


Notwithstanding the numerous revolutions which have taken 
place in this part of India, the rights of the village Zumeendars 
have generally been held sacred — more sacred, it seems to me, 
than any other property — and though numerous sorts of oppres- 
mon have been devised, it does not appear that any oppressor, 
generally speaking, has presumed to meddle with these rights. 

It is probable diat expediency has operated to secure them 
as much at the least as justice ; but be the cause what it may, 
it appears to me that the most clear and most distinct rights 
held in this part of India are those of the village Zumeendars. 

Arrangements occasionally take place which appear to imply 
either a misconception or a neglect of the rights of village 

There is frequently a disposition shown to establish the 
proprietary right of others t) the exclusion of village Zumeen- 

It was once proposed on the part of government to make 
Maliks of the village Mokuddums; in other words, to convert 
those who are deputies from the body of landholders for the 
management of the concerns of the village into absolute pro- 
prietors of all the lands of the whole village, to the entire 
exclusion and extinction of the rights of the great body of their 
constituents, the village landholders^ which would be dmilar to 
making over in absolute property to the individuals composing 
the Court of Directors of the East India Company all the stock 
belonging to the proprietors of the said Company; or to making 
a member of the House of Commons sole proprietor of all the 
lands in the county which returns him to Parliament. 

The sale of lands for arrears of revenue is a common instance 
of the little consideration in which the Zumeendaree rights are 
held by government. For trifling arrears of revenue, which 
might be realised in subsequent years^ the hereditary rights of 
fiimilies, which have existed for centuries, are annihilated, and 
a new right of absolute property established in favor of other 
persons, purchasers of the proprietary right at the public auc- 
tion; by which purchase the original proprietors or Zumeen- 

88 THE i.Ain> mcvjaiuiB or viesml 

dan mxui either become Hie lafaomi of the new ptopiie lo g, or 
quit theb Iioiues and lands, didr oountry and homef for erec 

The cuaiom of selling lands for arrean of levame has not 
yet fiMind its way into this distciet, and I trost Aat it never 
may be introduced. I hope and bdieve ihat it will aerer be 
neoesBaxy. Ezoq>t in extreme cases, sobh as actaalxebeilioBi on 
ihe part of all the Zomeendan whose property is to be sold, it 
iqipeara to be harsh and cruel, and is oertainly impopukr and 
disgusting, and a cause of permanent repnMush to o«r go?em- 

If the rights of the Zomeendan be admowledged, to the 
extent in which they hare heretofore enjoyed those rights, it 
will readily foUow that they are the rightful claimanfcB {<x the 
possession of any proprietary lights that the goremmeBt may 
deem it expedient op just to add&wledge in its subjeels; and 
the policy of confirming their present rights, and grantiDg 
them more than they at present are entitled to, will conse- 
quently be admitted. 

The present rights of the TiUsge Zumeendan appear to be 
the possessory properly of the land; bitt the rercniie or rent 
due firom the land is payable either directly to the government 
collector, or to a Jageerdar, Istimrardar, Teekadar, or any other 
intermediate person to whom the revenue or rents of tl^ lands 
may have been assigned. 

The additional right which it seems denrable to confer on 
the Zumeendan is that of paying the revenue, in all casee in 
which it is possible, directly to government, to the entire 
exclusion of such persons as those above named, in order that 
the profits of the cultivation may always accrue to those who 
are equally the hereditary posBesson and the actual cnkivaton 
of the land, and not to those who have no original or heredi- 
tary interest in the land, and who cannot cultivate except by 
the hands of the Zumeendan. 

The sacred, hereditary, and transferable right of pooBession of 
the cultivaton is admitted by some of the wannest advocates 
for the proprietary right of the government. 


It is l e nwftftMe thai Aem are not tiie greatest cneimeii of the 
Tillage 2SfiBieefidarB; tor these writers coDstantlj sopport tbe 
Tillage Zumeendns, nnderfhe denomznatioit of Sjuts, ot per- 
petual tenants of nio Chrwa. 

The greatest enemies of the village ZumeoidatB ore diose 
writers who, wiaiiing to adyocate the rights of prirate property, 
oppHed English ideas and systems to India, dassed die ddtovatoiB 
of India, the poor but lawfbl hereditary possessonr of the knd, 
with the hboien of England, and consigned their lands in 
absolute property to rich indiTiduab, because the latter seemed 
calculated to figure in the scheme for the settlement of India in 
the place of the great land proprietors of England. 

Whether the proprietary right of the government be affirmed 
or denied, the actual rights of the yiHagers seem to be ifnassail* 
able. If it be afSrmed, the ablest advocates for the proprietaiy 
right of the government nevertheless admit the posBeescny right 
of the cultivators as perpetual tenants. If the proprietary right 
of the government be denied or ceded, where can that right so 
reasonably rest as with the hereditary possessors and cultivators 
of the land? 

The right of transferring their land a an acknowledged part 
of the possessory right of the village landholders, and the con- 
firmed exerci£e of this r^ht is essential to secure 1^ benefits 
anticipated from the operation of the system recommended in 
this report. One of the greatest sweets of the good use of 
property is the power of acquiring more. The ability to pur- 
chase would be a great incitement to industry under a system 
which, by securing to every man the enjoyment and use of his 
land, would make the possession of it a source of consequencae 
as well as profit. 

The consequence and profit ariring firom this source are 
within the recollection of the inhabitants of this territory, and 
prevailed to a certain extent before the establishment of our 
government. It is remarkable that it waso ur government that 
destroyed tiiem, but firom causes which made it almost neces- 
sary to do so. 


The govenunent which preceded ua wete too weak to extort 
from the people the full dues of government; and in many 
parts of this territory the Zumeendars cultivated chiefly, if not 
solely, for their own benefit The principal landholders became 
men of consequence and men of wealth. 

It was not till after several years from our conquest that 
the Zumeendars of parts of this territory were thoroughly 
brought under government This was effected, during Mr. 
Seton's Residency, by the measures of mingled mildness and 
firmness which he directed. Still instances occur of the break- 
ing out of that independent and refractory spirit which was 
cherished by the weakness of former governments. 

Since the establishment of our government over the Zumeen- 
dars, our increasing demands for revenue in rapidly-succeeding 
settlements, and our power to enforce the payment of the just 
dues of government, have completely destroyed the conse- 
quence of the principal landholders, and impoverished all those 
who were formerly able to oppose the government 

The introduction of our government has consequently been 
disadvantageous to these people, and it is not to be wondered 
at that those of this description are generally discontented and 

It is, however, in the power of government to reverse the 
case, and to confer on these Zumeendars rights, privileges, con- 
sequence, and wealth, such as they never knew before. 

Their former wealth and consequence were precarious and 
devoid of security. Though they successfully resisted the weak 
local government, they had always the apprehension that a 
powerful army might be. sent to plunder them, and this occa- 
sionally occurred. They knew also that the government, if it 
could ever subdue them, even for a short period, would take 
advantage of the opportunity to fleece them. 

The natural consequence of this state of insecurity was, that 
money was spent as soon as acquired. Hence a spirit of extra- 
vagance arose, which still exists, and which it may require some 
time to remove. 


In exchange for this insecurity it is in the power of govern- 
ment to confer security. Instead of wealth lawlessly acquired 
by oppodtion to the goyemment, and hastily spent to avoid 
plunder, we may confer the power of acquiring solid, l^itimate, 
and lasting wealth, which shall be cherished, applauded, and 
upheld by the government; which shall be a source of conse- 
quence in the eyes of the people, and of flattering distinction 
on the part of the rulers. 

Then, instead of dissatisfied and disaffected landholders^ truly 
complaining that we have injured them by diminishing their 
consequence and their profits, we may expect to have land- 
holders bound to us by the strongest ties of self-interest, and 
acknowledging, £rom irresistible conviction, the incomparable 
benefits of our rule. 

System Pboposed.— I now proceed to describe the nature 
of the settlements which I would propose to have concluded 
with the village Zumeendars. 

Every village is inhabited, wholly or partially, by Zumeen- 
dars, or possessory proprietors of the land. These are the 
persons with whom the settlement ought to be made ; but as 
the number of them is generally too great for the transaction 
of business, a certain number of Mokuddums, or head men, 
being in general the men of the greatest property and influende 
in the village, act on the part of the village, agree to terms, 
»gn engagements, and transact negotiations. The village is 
bound by their acts. 

The Mokuddums, having concluded the settlement with the 
officers of government, are charged with the duty of collecting 
the revenue in the village. 

The collections in the village may be made in two ways. 
One is in the mode termed bautchy which is a proportionate 
asseasment on the lands of the several Zumeendars, with refer* 
ence to the amount of the whole revenue to be paid. Where 
this mode of havtch prevails, the Mokuddums have a claim 
to an allowance for their trouble in collectmg, which allowance 


28 termed Mokuddmnee. It may other be piid 1^ goifvm- 
menti snd thos fom a dednctkui from the reveooei or by ihe 
Tilli^, and thin fbnn an izKrease to the aa Bc maient . Another 
mode ia by tankue — that is, theMokuddoms collect &c gtyrem- 
ment diaze of the produce i& kind from the other ZaneenaaB 
and Ryuts. When this axiangement is pnetifled, the Mokad- 
donn, m &ct, become fiumen. The profit la thein, and the hw 
ought to be theirs also. They are suppoeed to profit ; mA die 
kbor whidi they undertake being for dkeir own adTaniage, they 
are not entitled to any other remunemtion. 

It is generally obserrable that, where the system of hamteh 
prcTsils, the constitution of the vilhge is democntii^ and the 
divifflon of property is nearly equaL Where the other practioe 
is customary, the village may be said to be gotemed by an 
oligarchy, and all the land| or all the influence, is in the hands 
of a few. 

In future settlements it would appear to be advisable to 
pursue the same plan with regard to the internal administration 
of the village that has hitherto been followed, and aiVer fixing 
the assessment of a village, to let the collectioDS be made accord- 
ing to the local rules and customs, without, however, preduding 
improvement and amendment when those be practicable. 

Thus, though it seems to be preferable that settiements diould 
at present be made with villages represented by their Mokad- 
dums, the time ma7 come when it will be preferable to make 
settlements with individual Zumeendars, on account of the 
revenue or rent of the land actually in their possesion. It may 
be expected that the dedre for these separate settlements will 
arise in the minds of the Zumeendars when their property, 
their security, and their conseq[uence shall be gradually in- 

Settlements should be made with villages for periods of ten> 
twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, or a hxmdred years; the longer 
perhaps the better. At all events^the periods should be suf- 
ficiently long to admit of considerable profit being made by the 
cultivators from their own labor and enterprise. 

This is the very, essence of the system proposed. If the 


ptiiiapal object wexe to eactort ligiAy ihe right (^ gorenuimtt 
on evesy acre of ddd^mtioii, it is poodble, thatlj able and oon- 
adeiate management on that system, a greatersevenne might be 
xealiaed for sometime to come; but then the lightest excess in so 
ddicat e a syBtem would be produetiTe of nmoas oozmequenceff ; 
and under the most farocable ciicnmstances the sitoation of the 
cnltiYEtoo would xemaia as it is at pvesent, withoat rise or im- 

Bbsults of ths Pjiqposxd Ststxh.— The system herein 
proposed, of giving to the cultivators greater security of property 
in their iands, and encouragement to kbor £dt their own ex- 
cbflrre^benefity would donbdeas, in the course of time, produce 
a great diange in the character of the agrieultunl class of our 

It does not seem to be diflScult to foresee some of the effects 
which must take place at no distant period from allowing the 
cuMvatar to reap tiie exdnshe benefit of his own labor during 
a long wfttkmept or lease* 

It may be anticipated that thej would show themselves both 
in the increase of cultivation and in the superior qualily of the 
pcodnoe. The person who befbie cnltivated one field, which 
^ ffp ^ to support his family and enabled him to pay the 
revenue of government, would cultivate mi^e, according to 
the extent of hia land and hia mesne. He whose land was 
already filled with cultivation, would set about increasmg the 
prodnoe, both by sowing more valuable crops, and by improv- 
ing the soil. Ilien would follow the stndy and the practice of 
the best modes of improving tiie value of land. Hie person 
vrix> had only one plough would contrive to procure severaL 
He who before had only cuhivated a Utile bajra or jowar, or 
other coarse gram, in the rainy seaaon, trusting to the rain of 
heaven for his aimual harvest, woold make a well, and secure 
a good crop of wheat, sugar-cane, or tobacco, or other produce 
yielding a rich return* 

At the expiration of tiie period of the settiement or lease the 


Tillage would be able to affi>rd an increaae of levenue, and the 
culuvaton would set out again on a new settlement with fiesh 
vigor and enterprise. 

The increase of wealth, joined to the secuiitj of property, 
would in some instances lead to amassing, while in others the 
acquisition of money would lead to a profiise expenditure. The 
wealth amassed by one would probably be dissipated by his 
descendants. The value of land, however, and landed pr oper ty, 
would increase. Numerous transfers would take place ; pru- 
dence would be rewarded by increase of property ; extrava- 
gance would suffer, but would, at the same time, encourage the 
industry of others. 

The love of comfort would increase with the acquisition of 
wealth ; a greater demand would prevail for the manufitctures 
and the productions of the arts ; the revenue of the govern- 
ment and the wealth of its subjects would alike be promoted by 
this process. 

From the security of property and consequent independence 
would arise much variety in character and situation. Each 
village would become a county town, and would have its sub- 
stantial land-proprietors, cultivating laborers, its fiurmers and 
tenants, its mechanics, its tradesmen, all following their respec- 
tive professions, according to the division of labor whidi self- 
interest and the increasing demand for all articles of comfort 
and luxury would suggest. 

Another effect to be expected from this system of settlement 
is a considerable increase of the number of our subjects by emi- 
gration from foreign countries. Our Zumeendars, for their own 
interests, would entice numbers to come and settle in their 
villages. The new comers would be the tenants of the village 
Zumeendars, and would enrich the latter and support them- 
selves at the same time, and eventually might acquire property 
in the villagei of which their descendants would become esta- 
blished inhabitants and resident landholders. 

It is proper to consider what would be the effect of such a 
system on the attachment of our subjects. It is evident that 


we do not at present possess their hearty affections. There 
is no reason why we should. There is necessarily a wide sepa- 
ration between them and us, arising out of our being foreigners 
and conqueroi8| and the difference in color, country, religion^ 
language, dress, manners, habits, tastes, and ideas. 

This is a natural obstacle which we have to get over before 
we can win their affections. And the only mode of getting 
over it is by conferring on them benefits which they must feel 
and acknowledge every day and every hour. 

Hitherto our government has not conferred any such benefit 
on the mass of our subjects — ^that is to say, the cultivating inha- 
bitants of our villages. The permanent settlement has kept 
them down in Bengal, and ensured their permanent depression. 
No system has yet been adopted in the Upper Provinces calcu- 
lated sufficiently to secure for them any permanent advantages. 

We should deceive ourselves if we were to suppose that the 
system of justice which we have introduced is acknowledged to 
be such a blesang as we conceive it to be. That it performs 
condderable good there can be no doubt; but, like most human 
institutions, it has its attendant evils. These are felt more than 
its benefits, and our Courts of Justice are generally spoken of 
with disgust, with ridicule, or with fear, but seldom, if ever, 
with cordial approbation and respect. 

It is remarkable that the natives discriminate between the 
character of British functionaries and that of our Courts of 
Justice. While they abuse the latter as scenes of injustice and 
corruption, where nothing is to be obtained but by bribery, and 
where plaintiff and defendant are alike plundered by native 
officeiB and native attorneys, they seem to acquit the British 
judge of any share in the nefarious practices which they attri* 
bute to his Court, and constantly appeal to the individual justice 
of the judge against the decree which they suppose to have 
been put into his mouth by the corrupt officers of his Court. 

Any discussion regarding the Courts of Justice would be 
foreign to the subject of this Report. The preceding observa- 
tions have been introduced merely to elucidate the remark 


whidi was pieviottd J made^ ftetiag that oar tvk had not yet 
confiened any audi benefit on our aubjecta aa, being admow- 
ledged by them from conTictiea, can focm a groud of atroog 
attachment anfficient to oyeroome the obafeadea impoacd by an- 
ginal differences. 

But if the effects whidi ha^e been anticipated be the leaolt 
of the system of vUkge settlementa piopoaed, we shall then 
oeitainlyhayeaclaim on the affectian of ihat nyieroos daaa of 
our subjects, the Tillage landholden. 

They will compaxe thdr own situaiioa with ihafc oi the eul- 
tivators living under other governments; th^ will acknow- 
ledge that we hare conferred on them unxivaUed adrantages; 
ihey will feel that their interesta are identified with ouza. And 
if once thia feding be establiiJhed, the oooaeqneni adTantagea 
would be immense* Instead of leqaiiing, as at jne s m t^ troopa 
to control our TiUagerSy we might depend on the latter for the 
defence of the country against foreign enemies^ and iixe a u pp o r t 
al the government in any case of internal distiufaanoe. 

It is, perhaps, impoasible to foresee all the remote effiwfci of 
such a system ; and there may be thoae who would aigne that 
it is injudicious to establish a afstem which, by ^y^ti^g a &ee 
and independent oharacter, may poasiUy lead at a future period 
to dangerous consequences. 

There does not appear to be suflicient reaaon to a^rehend 
any evil consequences, even at a remote period, firom the inlzo- 
duction of thia system. It rather seems that the estabUshment 
of such advantages for the bulk of our subjects ought to attech 
them to the government which confers the benefit. 

But even supposing the remote poanbility of the evil craae- 
quences which may be appr^ended, that would not be a 
sufiicient reason for withholding any advantsges firom our 

Similar objections have been urged against our attempting 
to promote the education of our native subjects; but how 
unworthy it would be of a liberal goveameni to g^e weight 
to such objections. 


The world is governed by an irresistible Power, which giyeth 
and taketh away dominion; and vain would be the impotent 
pradenoe of men against the operations of its almighty in- 
fluence. All that rulers can do is to merit dominion by pro- 
moting the happiness of those under them. 

If we perform our duty in this respect, the gratitude of India, 
and the adnifa&m of die ^wofld, wiB aoooBapany owr name 
through all ages, whatever may be the revolutions of fiiturity; 
but if we withhold bkssisoigs feom our subjeoto fiom a selfish 
apfwehennon of ponible danger at a remote feriod, ve ahall 
not deserre to ke^ oar dominioB; we ahail vwRt that revene 
which time has posibly in store for izs; and shall ML wim the 
mingled hatred and contempt, the hisses and execratiom^ of 



[The following private letter^ a copy of wliich I find withoat-date, bat 
which seems to have been written in 1826, after Metcalfe's second appoint- 
ment to Delhi, iUostrates the mild, bencTolent character of bis dealings 
with the people committed to his care. He was always of opinion that 
Mr. William Fraser, his chief assistant, whose energy and ability he admired 
and applauded, was too harsh and nncondliatory in his measures; and, on 
these gronnds, he declined to recommend his appointment to the chief seat 
in the goTemment of Delhi. He was subsequently, however, appointed 
Governor-General's Agent there, and held the appointment up to the time 
of his death by the hand of an assassin, instigated by Shumshoodeen, Newab 
of rero2ep6ie.] 


Mr DEAR Eraser, — ^I take advantage of being on board my 
boat, with a respite between the business I had at Dihlee and 
that which awaits me at Futtehghur, to make some desultory 
observations in reply to your interesting and friendly letters re- 
specting the revenue system of our territory. 

The difference between the system you follow and that which 
I would like to see established appears to me to be this: you 
insist on the full share of government, and make that your 
principal, if not your sole, object. I think that the established 
share of government is too much, that it ought never to be 
rigidly exacted, that the interests of government would be 
more promoted by taking less, and that the revenue would in 
time be more increased if the cultivators were allowed to enjoy 
in greater freedom the produce of their own industry. 

In making a settlement, we must, of course, take the esta- 
blished share of government as a foundation. But, in the cal- 
culations ensuing, I would lean to the interests of the culti- 


vatois, and make the teirma of the settlement light and easy for 
them. And by making the settlements for long periods I 
woidd hold out to them the prospect of great profit from their 
own industry. I think that the result would greatly enrich the 
goyemment by enriching the body of the people. 

I would avoid the practice of measuring the crops, that being 
a practice which is universally disgusting, and which, it appears 
to me, cannot fail of being so. Putting myself in the situation 
of the cultivators, I feel that I would, if possible, give up culti- 
vation in disgust if I could not raise a field of com without the 
collector's people coming to measure it, and exact the full share, 
and perhaps more than the share, of government. 

AH compulsory measures in cultivation appear to me to be 
bad; and whenever it may be necessary to bind people by 
penalties to cultivate a certain quantity of land, or certain sorts 
of grain, and not to cultivate in other villages, such measures I 
should lament as the bad effects of a rigid and violent system. 

I would depend for a future increase of revenue on the efiects, 
which I believe to be natural, of allowing men to reap the 
benefit of their own industry. I would let them cultivate as 
much or as little as they found it for their own interest to 
cultivate; and the sort of grain or other produce should be at 
their own option. The benefit which they would derive from 
cultivating their own land I should expect would render any 
restraint on that point unnecessary. 

No people labor so indolently as those who work in chains- 
and by compulsion. Hearty exertion is always self-willed, and 
with a view to self-interest 

The justice, the benevolence, the wisdom, the expediency, 
the necessity of a system of conciliation towards the Zumeendars, 
would appear to me to be indisputable, were it not that you 
apparently pursue one of compulsion. 

If you think that force alone is calculated for the manage- 
ment of these people, I shall respect both your opinion and 
your experience, but it will require strong proofi to con- 
vince me. 



The AflBerence in ze^oiue betifecn, a lig&t Ktfleomt 
lig^ one may not be raj gitat; but the difiiffeaee in < 
quences ia iacalciikble. A fiew thonwuiA rupees too mnch 
exacted maj ruin a diatmV ft^d dnve tlie inhabitanta to end- 

You appear to be eonTinced that jour aaseaaBieate hare be^ 
fior and modoate. That ihey have been fieur I hare na da«bt; 
but, jodgiag from the oonaeqnenoea, I riiould aiq>poae that they 
had borne hard on the people. Haa it not been a cobuboh 
pracdoe to adl cattle, jewela, and other fxoperty £or the vealiaa- 
taon of levenue? Haa not very general diatreaa been oocaaioiied 
in consequence? Does not the difficulty of realidng the revenue 
increase every day ? la not discontent prevalent? Have not the 
inhabitants in some inatanoes quitted their landai and in others 
reduced their culdvadon? Are not the number o£ ploagha dimi- 

One-half of the produce, as the shase of government, ia in 
itself^ I think, a heavy assessment. But this is fieqiKntly 
increased by the nuumes of calculating and fixing the money 
value of that share. Then come the additional burdena of 
Dustukaaa, Talukana, &c., of which you know the detail and 
amount better than I do* Considering that the cukLvatora have 
also all the expense, labor, and risk on iheir side, I eonfeas I 
wonder how they can bear such an aaKSsment. 

Tou are disposed, I believe, to attribute the prevailing dis- 
content to the refractory di^osition of the people, and you 
anticipate bad consequences from any att^npt to conciHate 
them. I am not myself disposed to yield anything to un- 
founded discontent, but I think that a mixture of conciliation 
and firmness is the system best suited even for refiractory 
people; and I dread nothing less than the ruin and depopula- 
tion ofour territory from a continual contest between the govern- 
ment and the cultivators. 

In proposing the settlement of '21 for the Northern Purgun- 
nahs, I was actuated by a wish that the revenue might not 
decrease; and in the view which I had of the subject I woold 


hate bewi aiAfifcd without nm laereMew You do not i^pear to 
tlie flime skatm that I do Ie0t the xevenue should 
»; and I aiuioiifllj hope that my fean may be orio* 

I ehonld itiE be satuficd with the settlement of '21 £br the 
Notthem PurgimiMhs, modified so as toequalise the assessmoita 
OB; the diftreni Tillages; bat if the people will agree to a better 
settfementy so mndi the better. Their pvofita» acocHding to my 
ideas, wiU. be dediTed firom the length c^ the settlement and the 
aecoxxty oC eajoymg the produee of their own kbcMr^ moce than 
from a moderate difference in the assessment Bat they do not 
seem to be incfined to agree even to the assessment of '21. 

With reflpeei to Hiirreeaiiay bdKeving that that eomitry 
ought to be brought £>Tward by light and indulgent settle- 
menisci could, without any aelf-rqxroach for breach of duty to 
the public^ candnde a l<»g settlement, even without aa accu- 
rate knowledge of the means of each Tillage^ becaose I believe 
that the infeieifB of goTemm^it will eventually be much more 
benefited by die confidauae and prosperity which a long and 
easy settlement would diiuse among the people, tiban by the 
eacactioit of the amount of its full share of the produce. The 
mc«e aocmate our knowledge, however, the better, provided 
that we do not too mudi alarm the people ia obtaining it. As 
yoo warned me against taking too Uttle firom Hurreeana, let me 
entreat you M)t to take too muclk I dreadthe effect of rigorous 
exactions, rqpeatad mcaauringp, be., &c, in that country. Its 
cultivation sad revoiue have increased under a lenient syatemy 
and I am apprehensive that the consequences of a harsh one 
would be injurioua to both. 

With, r^ud to wastelands, as long as we are trying, season 
after season, to extract the utmost firom every village, and are 
fighting with the Zumeendaxs to parevent their cultivating in any 
village but theii own> it would certainly be injudicious to let any 
waste lands ibr small sums on long leases, unless to people who 
would ei^iage to bring in. foreigners. But if the system be 
established which I wish to see, there will, perhaps^ be no 

E 2 


danger in letting waste lands for imall sonui at fini, as all the 
lands in the country being on long leases, people will have 
sufficient inducement to cultivate their own lands. The vraste 
lands may be brought gradually into cultivation without present 
detriment, and with great future advantage to the reyenue, and 
numbers of foreigners may be tempted to settle in our country. 

In short, my dear Fraser, I think that your system attends only 
to the present and neglects the future, sacrificing for our tem- 
porary and delusive increase of revenue the aflfections and pros- 
perity of our subjects, and, of coursei the real prosperity and the 
revenue of government. 

I have given you my sentiments candidly. I hare not the 
presumption to suppose that mine must be right and yours 
wrong; but every man retains his own till convinced that they 
are erroneous. I shall be happy to know your opinion of mine. 
Perhaps you may think them visionary, and be of opinion that 
the solid advantage of a present increase of revenue is worth 
more than all the golden prospects' that I have placed before my 
eyes. Perhaps you may think my plans altogether erroneous, 
and not calculated to produce the effects that I have in view. 
Whatever your opinions may be I shall be glad to know them, 
and I trust that good will somehow result from the discussion. 

Tou said in one of your letters that you did not give me 
credit for deference to your opinions in revenue matters. You 
were, however, mistaken. My deference has been practically 
proved by my abstaining from all interference, imtil from cir- 
cumstances my taking a part in the management of our re- 
venue concerns seemed unavoidable. Though I always doubted 
the expediency of some parts of your system, I had such 
an unfeigned deference for your superior knowledge, that 
I kept down my own apprehensions by a conviction that 
you were too well informed, too able, to go wrong. And 
though I was repeatedly forewarned that what has happened 
would happen, and though such forewamings agreed with my 
own secret apprehensions, I always assured both others and 
myself that it was not possible for such a result to happen 


whilst the zevenue department was in your hands. I felt that 
no one but yourself could do what you did successfully; but I 
was confident that you could and would carry us through- 
How could deference be more strongly exemplified ? 

With respect to the present state of the district and its 
future management, we depend, as before, entirely on you. I 
do not wish to trouble you with my interference. My great 
anxiety i% that confidence, and the animated exertion which is 
the result of a certain prospect of gain, may take place of that 
discontent, consternation, and despondency, which seem to pre- 
vail No one could do this so well as yourself, if ypu would see 
the question in the same light. « 

I have proposed to you in another letter that I should retain 
* under my separate management 

If this proposal be in the least disagreeable to you, you will 
of course tell me so without hedtation^ in which case I do not 
mean to press it. But as the arrangement concluded there 
may not altogether meet with your approbation, it is possible 
that you may yourself be glad to avoid having anything to do 
with it, and to leave it in the hands of its contrivers. 

* Obscure in MS. 



[The following letters, addressed to ike Chief Secrrtuy irlun HetaJfe 
ms Eetident at Hyderabad, were called forth hj the comments made upon 
the system he had porsaed at Ddhi by one of tlie members of the Board of 
Commissioners appointed to imreitigiAe said adnnxMer te cM afiurs oftbe 
Nortk-Westem FkOTiBoei. Aawng ctfaerdiys tiiifclit affSat him by 
Mr.Ihm, WM one tetibe effect UHtftkAdbttnarvk to |piai4k«^ 
to escape fisom pciaon by ^^nnMyng the «T>**iit^ iform of his aentcnce ; so Uiat 
one mai^ originaUy sentenced to seyen jean* imprisonmeni^ having been 
three times oonyicted of pimon-brealang, was lying in gaol under a sentence 
extendmg to fiftyHSX years. Metcslfe s defence of himself and Us vjtnoB. 
will be found in the two foDowBig ktten, tbelatterof wiueh was wiitfcai 
at Masnlipatam, when in yery bad health he was awaiting the aniyal of Uie 
goyemment yacht, which was to oonyey him, for the benefit of medical and 
surgical aid, to Calcutta. The yerdict passed by the Goyemor-General (Lord 
Hastings) on Metcalfe's general administration of the Delhi territory will be 
found in a note attached to the second letter.] 


[ExTBACT.] — ^It is with no incondderable concem that I 
find myself put on my defence with respect to the system 
imder which the territory of Dihlee was governed during my 
Residency, as I have always flattered myself that it was gene- 
rally approved, and that its success was undoubted. 

I never had the presumption to suppose that it was perfect 
or free from defect, or incapable of improvement. On the con- 
trary, I always considered it progressive, and open to amend- 
ment, as conviction and experience might dictate, and the altered 


8tafte of aoeietj sdmit. Aixxndis^y, &dibl .tine to &ne, It 
iinderwent modifieaiaaiia. 

It saened to me to vork ndl, and vheBa I^uiiufced Dililee, I 
mm vaaits tlie impmanon that it wae aoitod to the oboiact^ of 
the peo^ had iliesr gsaaeai oancaxzeaioeb and proBkoted their 

It now, ho f w owm^ tffpean to have atttai^ed the xmqualifiad 
mpK&uliaB. «if one of Ihe JKemben of the pDeaent Boaid of 
ComniiflBioBen at J3£fake, vhoiirvcigh^ 

If it waa the ahaasd and nusebSevon ayBtem which he de* 
SGTibei^ ii 18 aarprinng that for more than tvebe yeaaas, from 
Mr. Seton'a accession to the ReaJdency-to my depaitiiie, it did 
not attnM^t notice fiom the esik wfaach^ ia that case, it ought to 
have iaiifited. 

If that member of the Board Jaad been etatipned at Dihlee in 
the days when that syBtem gserw up, he would| lam inclined to 
thinic, have ^idken of it with less harflhnewt 

When the force at Dihlee was not anfficient to keep in awe 
the naghbouxang villages; when the Hesident's authority was 
openly defied within a few males of that city; when it was ne- 
ceaaary to dzaw a foioe from another disbict, aad [employ a 
battalion of infantry with guns, and a squadron of ca¥atry , to 
ffltahliffh the andioiEily of gavemment in the imrofidiat<ft Yici* 
mtf; when the detachment waa k^t on the alert by bodies of 
anned ▼illagexs menacing the pick^ and when Sepoys who 
stB^red were cut to pieces; when it was necessary to diaazm 
Tillages; and when swords wese HtomUy tamed into plragh- 
shares; when erery village was a den of ^eves, and the city 
of Dihlee was parcelled out into shares to the neighbouring vil- 
lages, of which each copartziership monopohsed the plunder of its 
allotted portion ; when a company of infantry was necessary to 
attend the oflicer making the revenue settlement, and even that 
force was threatened with destruction, and taunted with the 
menace of having its muskets taken as playthings for the 
villagem' children ; when to realise a single rupee of the ae^tb- 


ment then concluded, purposely on the lightest tenns, it was 
neoeflsaiy to employ a battalion of infantry with guns ; when 
to subdue a single unfortified yillage a force of five battalions, 
with cavaliy and artillery, was decreed necessary, and when the 
villagers, instead of awaiting the assault* sallied forth against 
this force, and for an instant staggered the advancing oolunms 
by the briskness of their attack, — ^if that gentleman had been at 
IKhlee in those days he would probably have been more indulgent 
towards a system which has brought the Dihlee tenitoiy into 
ilie state in which it was at the end of 1818. Of a later period 
I cannot of course speak. We had to combat against crime. 
The bulk of the population were robbers. We had to subdue 
a refiractory spirit before unused to submit to government. 
We had to conciliate, and at the same time control, a consider- 
able class of people more accustomed to command than to obey, 
and ready to wince under the slightest restraint 

If I am entitled to any credit for public services, it must rest 
chiefly on the successful management of the Dihlee territory 
during the seven or eight years of my Reridency, the most im- 
portant, the most efficient period of my life. I do not, I ac- 
knowledge, like to see that little credit snatched from me by a 
gentleman who, without experience of the past, hazards a 
sweeping condemnation on the system of my administration. 

If the Commissioners at Dihlee are now able to smile benig- 
nantly on what they call innocent forgeries, and to give way 
to sentiments of commiseration towards convicts — ^if they con- 
sider themselves at liberty to let loose criminals on society 
without dreading bad consequences — ^it is perhaps owing to the 
very system which one of them so strongly condemns and de- 
rides that they can venture to do so. 

I observe in the minutes of the Board of Commissioners that 
the object of punishment is asserted to be the reformation of 
the criminal, and that the release of a criminal who has not 
become reformed in a certain time is recommended on the 
ground that there is no use in retaining him in confinement, as 
he will never reform. What I should consider as the true object 


of pamahment — ^namely, the protection of the commimity — ap- 
pears to me to be excluded fix)m the view of the Commis- 
doners. If it were a matter of indifference to the community 
whether plunderers should be kept in confinement or let loose 
at large, I do not see why they should be confined. If their 
freedom do not injure society, I cannot understand what 
right we have to restrain them. For my- own part, I confess 
that the benefit of the community was the sole object of all the 
punishments that I ever inflicted ; which object was to be 
gained by double means — ^the actual removal of the individual 
ofifender from society by confinement, and the operation of ex- 
ample to deter others from crime. The recollection of punish- 
ment may sometimes prevent a repetition of crime, but, in any 
other point of view, I hold him to be a visionary who expects 
to produce moral reform by congregating hundreds of hardened 
villains in a common gaol. 

Light punishments for serious crimes appear to me to be ex- 
ceedingly impolitic and unjust towards the community. With 
much trouble and difficulty in prosecuting to conviction, the 
criminal is let loose after a short confinement to prosecute his 
depredations on society, and revenge himself on those who 
brought him to justice. 

I avow myself of opinion that punishment ought to be severe 
in order to be efficient; and that the community which suffers 
from depredation is a much more legitimate object for tenderness 
than the viUain who commits it. I intrude these sentiments on 
your notice, because they very much actuated my judicial pro- 
ceedings when I was Resident at Dihlee. 

Different crimes called most loudly for suppression at different 
periods. At one time night-robbery with housebreaking was 
excessively frequent, and measures of severity became necessary 
to suppress it. This crime is made light of by the Dihlee Com- 
missioners ; but in my opinion there is none against which the 
community more requires the vigilant protection of a guardian 
goTemment. The assurance of sleeping in securify is one of 
the greatest blessings that can be conferred on our subjects. 

$B juDidJLL ADMnxsnuncav or dblhi. 

ftilddiv and ftever would £ul, io poaub tint ckai of <aimt willi 
aevedlTf . Ai aBntker tkne, die zeoeiviiig nf •fcokn goods «h 
■> pBenlent m to AttOMt psrtieakr aotioe, and k beomeiieoe&- 
my to opezate agaiiMfc llist evil, and to break up the gmgi 
eanoeiaed ^ iL 

Ai one period die jttaDiq>tB aaede to faeeak prinm woe ipe- 
f aent and ahnaiing The deipegifce charecter of the [aimafii 
vithm the geol^ and the daring oounge and aotiiitf of dvir 
fiaends without, eaaaad nmndrrimhte appBeheBrim fv the aeea- 
zilj of die priaon. It waa o lw iuu i that to aptaehfladand eo^ 
vieicrinunaboooldbeof no permanent naevnleaBthejooiild be 
refcaiaad in confinement* The guavda wen alannedi and not 
vidunt came, fir asttempli wesa made to destroy them, and 
in aane isHtaneea aaooeaB&iUy. Along with odier aaeaBnrea 
adopted for the security of the gaol, an order waa iaaaed dot 
every prisoner esoaptag, or oonvioted of an attempt to escape, 
ahodd hffre has period of oonfinement doubled, and that erery 
prisoner giving evidence leading to a oonvietianof aconspazaigr 
du>uid have his ease fiivorably oonsidered. The latter part of 
dns anangement veqnired oantion, to prevent beii^ ioposed 
upon by fiEilse charges. But where the chaxge was proved, the 
infcraner was Teleased, or bad his term of captivity ehortened, 
and die coljNit underwent die execndcn of the former part of 
the order. Wben the term of die prisoner's sentence waa oon- 
rideraUe, die doubling <^ it makes a greater show dian in or- 
dinary oases, and bas been mnch commented upon by one of 
the members of the Dihlee Board. Yet, the order beaag in 
enstenoe, it could not widi any ftimess be relaxed in &VQr of 
the greater criminals; neither could it be sacrificed because 
some were so hardened as to repeat die ofifence again and again. 
Henoe, in some instances, the ultimate sentence of confinement 
extends to a length which must appear surprising where the 
causes ase unknown. It is, bowever, to be observed, that the 
power of eventually relaadng die severity of the sentence, wben 
the necessity of upholding the rigid enforbenent of die order 

omnoK oc liOBD HASxiKas. 59 

ni^bt ha^e ceMed, Temaxned witii iJie antkoiity^iliidk inpaBed 
it, or the successor of tiiat vathority; aoMl it was ^oie of ifae 
a^rantigesof the BytftenpoEBsed at IKhlee^ thrt afl^noBBireie 
open to <x>Trecdon, und that even if injortioe ipere aeeideBtaMy 
eommittedy it was not Brtemmuibfe- 


Sir, — I hsLYt the honor to acknowledge the leceipt of your 
despatch of the 25th S^tember. 

I am sensible that I ought to be satisfied with the favorable 
judgment which the Bight Honorable the Ooyemor-General 
in Council is giacionslj pleased to entertain of the general 
character and operation of mj administration* at Dihlee; but I 
cannot expect to find eveiywhere eo much indulgence and con- 
flideiation* Of this, the censorious remarks of the Western 
Boaxd* whether suitable or otherwise on the part of those 
gentlemen, furnish eridence. I jnust be jirepared for a rigid 
aentence on the particular dicumstances adduced, without re- 
ference to general merits or quali^Hmg circumstances. I taist, 
therefore^ that I ahall be permitted to offer a few additional 
observations in further eiylanation of those facts wliich are 
deemed obyectionahlej and that in so doing my conduct will 

• The Goyenior- General liad iiis talents and indefatigable ajmlica- 
writien, in a Judicial Keport to tlie tion. The reverence with which the 
Home Gorermnent, " it ii impos- natives behold the exeroiBe of sadi 
fiible forme to doae these obscxva- qiuJitiea has gone far to counter- 
tions without rendering to the cha- oaJance the frowardness of a restless 
meter of Mr. Metcalfe that tribute and unattached people. I trust my 
which it eminently demaDda. I have representatLon of a conduct so mate- 
had the best opportunities of learn- riaUv conducive to the advantage of 

ing the tenor of his conduct; the theCompanv cannot fail to recom- 
htnessy the patieDce, iht mo- meni Mr. Metcalfe m a partiailar 

delation^ the kiamiess wluch mark manner to the consideration of our 
an his proceedings towards the na- honorable employers." 
tives, are not less distinguished than 


be ascribed solely to xny anxiety to remove or prevent unfi&vor* 
able imprenons wbich may be formed. 

If one duty be more sacred tlian anotker, that of a judicial 
functionary, distributing punishment to his feUow-ereatores^ 
must be regarded as one of the most sacred kind; and I should 
be sorry, indeed, to believe that I had exercised such a power 
without due regard to its serious import and consequence. 

I have no pretenrions to infallibility of judgment, and no 
security against errors. But in proportion as these were fie- 
quent or rare, and outrageous or innocuous, I must have been 
unfit or fit for the situation which I held. It is a duty, there- 
fore, to myself and to the government which I represented, to 
endeavour to show that what is blamed is not so blameable as 
it may seem. 

The 3rd paragraph of my letter of the 16th of August lias 
been misapprehended. I did not conceive that I was put on 
my defence by government with respect to the judicial system 
of the Dihlee territory.* My expressions referred entirely to 
the attack made by some of the gentlemen of the Western 
Board. I was fully aware of the benevolent intentions of go- 
vernment in allowing me the opportunity of explaining the 
cases specified in your former despatch, and gratefid for the 
consideration therein bestowed. 

I am perfectly sensible of the justness of the remarks con- 
tained in the 7th paragraph of your last letter, and have 
deeply to regret that the record of trials in the Dihlee Court 
was not made more complete. The truth is, that my attention 
was devoted to the causes almost solely at the time of trial, and 
that it was only on particular occasions that I took pains as to 
the record. The reasons of my decisions were explained in 
open Court; but the record was subsequentiy such notes as they 
could take during the delivery of the sentence, and drawn up 
by the native officers from recollection, and tmless I saw special 
ground for correction it remained as they had prepared it. My 
anxiety was confined to the doing of justice. I did not think 

* See OMie, page 54. 


sufficienilj of the necessity of showing in after-times that justice 
had been done. I did not foresee the kind of scrutiny which 
my proceedings were destined to imdergo. Conscious of the 
rectitude of my intentions, I did not anticipate that a deficient 
record might, at some future day, be made the groundwork of 
an attack on the proceedings of the Court in which I presided. 
I now see my error. I see, too, that I suffer by it. If the 
operations of that Court, good, bad, or indifierent — ^if its effects, 
beneficial or otherwise— if the justice or injustice committed 
by it — ^in short, if its result as to the welfare of the community 
for whose use it was created — could be fiurly compared with that 
of cotemporaiy Courts, I trust that on the whole its character 
would not be depressed below par; but I do not suppose that 
it can stand the test of a severe scrutiny in search of defect?, 
especially of such as are connected with a want of regularity in 
forms which did not belong to it, or minuteness of record at 
which it did not aim. For such deficiencies I can only offer 
in extenuation the probably insufficient plea that a laborious 
personal attention to those details would scarcely have been 
compatible with the discharge of the various duties which I 
had to perform. 

In the lOth paragraph of your despatch, with reference to 
the punishment awarded to prisoners for escaping, or attempting 
to escape, from gaol, it is observed, that the question for con- 
sideration in the cases specified ought to have been, not as I 
had represented it, '^ whether or not a standing rule was to be 
relinquished in consequence of a prisoner's being so pardoned 
as to set it at defiance by continually repeating the o£^ce," 
but "whether the standing order, which had been found in- 
effectual for the purpose intended by it, and which in its 
operation had led to an embarrassment and disproportion of 
punishment probably not foreseen, should be revised and quali- 
fied in its application to particular cases.'' 

On this point I beg leave respectfully to submit, that if the 
standing order had ever appeared to me to be ineffectual, tiiere 
would have been no question in my mind as to its revision; it 
would instantly have been repealed; but though it was daringly 


Tklvted m some hwtanceis I meter dooUed ks geaeral effictt^. 
IfeveTjkwvereto be reviaed be cuMC ii had in aome lartwiie es 
been bfokea, no law could long be maintained^ Tbe qneataon 
iiyfim**^ in your deipaAch aa the pioper one, appean to me to 
be one which would naiunlly arise on a gOMial leriev of tbe 
caae, atei nnmeToiia inataneea of embaaaament and dia|»Po- 
portion of paniahmmtt but not aa one wtuch would oocux on 
the trial of indiTidnal offendeiiL On iaolated triab^ I think the 
moat pKofaaUi^ dctenninatbn would be thai which actwAjr took 
plaee — ft xeaolntion to uphold the lawagaiaat nhacdened sinner. 

I am not now defending the rule. It mny haire been a bad 
one. It may eventnaHy have proved an inefficaeioiia one. I 
only mean to i^resent, that if I had suppoaed it to be either 
the one or the other, I diould not have inatituted it, or should 
subsequently have abandoned it* I have seen it aaKrted to be 
un£dr to puniah priaoners for attenq)tingtoe8ci^. 1 need not 
say, for my proceedinga will have abown^ that I am of a dif- 
ferent opinion, and that I think it not only just to oppoaeeTeiy 
poasiUe barrier to the escape of a criminal, but due to the com- 
munity far whose protection and welfare he ia lestraaned. It 
is unnecessary, however, to trouble you with any detailed dk- 
cossion on this specnlative question. Oth^nviae I might allege, 
that my c^iaion ia supported by the law of "^"g^nd^ whieh, I 
believe, eondenna to death convicts who xetum from trans- 
portation before the expration of the term of their aentence. 
I do not propose to advocate this law; but it may be observed 
that it ia more severe than the rule whidi was establiahed at 
Dihlee, and that, like other lawai its occaoonal vioktion haa not 
necessarily led to its abolition. 

On the xneqvality of puniahment £br the, same offence, ad- 
verted to in the 11th paragraph of your despatch, I would 
submit that something may be said in its favor. The gr™^^w»l 
who is confined for a long period haa a greater induconenft to 
attempt escape than the one who ia detained for a abort time, 
and therefore requires a greater dread to deter him. No ad- 
ditional period of confinement could be fixed which could be 

- XQUJkUSATiQv OB FUKiaHiaDrr. 63 

eflficadgwrely and jaatly ap|Jicahlg to alL Wkatwonld be quite 
ini'iffiwriomg as a pie^entatLTe to pexaosa under seixteace for a 
long temi, might be eiueUj aeiFere ae a puniakmeBt on those 
GOBfined foe m. ahort one* For isataaeev eddkioBaL ^wnpwp^^, 
ment fiur a yeaz would be no object of feav to a hasdened 
crimiBal amdenmed fas fourteen.; but if a poor metdi, aen- 
tenoed to s nonth'a detentioa for aoiae pettj offence, wexe in 
wsntesmeaa to attempt an escape, his suiqpkmentary pmnah- 
ment would be twelve times as mudi aa hia ordinal sentence. 

On tlie whole, it maj, perhaps, be doubted whether there 
would not be a more real disproportion in the puniahment if it 
wese fixed, than if bweie piopOTtionafietD the oi^inal sentence. 
I beg to be understood, not as eontestiz^ the argument with 
government, but aa repxeaeniing what were s^ induoemenia in 
the ooozse which I puiEHtted« 

In the case of Rounhnn Khan, I trust that I diaU have lihe 
benefit of the following coBsidorationa: — I. That where there 
exists a diacredcnary power there is neoeaaarily room for a diE- 
£ere&ce <^ opinion. 2.. Thai .a judicial fimctionaiy esBeieiaing 
that power muafc be guided by his own. 3. That ii is impos- 
sible at a distant period to bring to view the parideolar eiicnm- 
stances which, maj have influenced the judgment at the time of 
pasting sentence. 4. That I must have been aatisfied, both of 
theactnalgniU of Roushun Khan, and of the heinousness of his 
offence, beibce the sentence was passed. 

In the regpatt of the Western Board on mj pcoceedinga in 
that casey Boushun Khan is represented as ^convicted on strong 
presnmption;" which I understand to be a translation of a Mar 
homedan kw term, mpamng that has gmlt was profed to tite 
a at iaf a gi bn of the Court : for I utterlj disalsm havii^ever been 
induced to inflict punishment by any sliong presumption, with 
re£aence to the literal signification of the words^ diort of satis* 
factory and convincii^ proof 

With these prdiminary ronarkst I shafi proceed to state tiie 
case of Boushnn Khan in the H^t m which it strikes me 
One of the police guards whose duty it was to protect the 


people from robbers, took advantage of his nigbt watcb to 
commit a robbery on a person deepmg in the supposed security 
of his protection. For this crime, proved to the satisfaction of 
the Court, and considered by the presiding judge as of a most 
heinous description, he was senteneed to imprisonment and 
labor for life, in order that the determination of the Court to 
inflict severe punishment for such ofiences committed by the 
servants of government might be made manifest, and that the 
community might be protected against the depredation of those 
who were paid at the expense of the people for their protection. 

I will not intrude further, except to remark, that I have the 
honor to concur entirely in the satisfaction expressed in the 13th 
paragraph of your despatch at the subsequent release of the 
prisoner after seven years' confinement. The purposes of his 
sentence had been accomplished, and mercy might be exercided 
without injury to the community. It would, perhaps, be bene- 
ficial if opportunities were oftener afforded, throughout the 
world, for the revision, after a time, of sentences, wherein the 
punishments have been awarded. at the discretion of the judge, 
with a view to prevention by the severity of example ; for 
however proper such sentences may appear to the judge at the 
time, it must often happen that lenity may afterwards be exer- 
cised without injury to the community— and that the original 
sentence may justly be deemed too severe, when viewed solely 
with regard to the individual and his actual crimor-though 
the same sentence at the time of passing it may not have 
been improper; inasmuch as that die individual who wars 
against the community by his crimes, becomes amenable to the 
penalty which the welfare of the community may dictate. 

Such are the grounds on which I would rest the vindication 
of my proceedings in the case of Roushun Khan, without pre- 
suming to dispute the superior wisdom of the decision expressed 
by government ; and with a perfect sense of the liberality and 
consideration which have been accorded in the view taken of 
the several subjects noticed in the despatch to which I am now 



[Before closiDg this series of papers relating to the internal administration 
of the Delhi Tenitories, it will be well to give the following summary of the 
resolta of Metcalfe's goyemment^ written many years afterwards by him in a 
minute recorded on the proceedings of the Supreme Council.] 

It may be as well to mention a few facts as characteristic of 
the spirit in which the former administration at Dihlee was 
conducted, and the discretionary power of the superior autho- 
rity exercised. Capital pimishment was generally and almost 
wholly abstained from, and, I believe, without any bad effect. 
Corporal punishment was discouraged, and finally abolished. 
Swords and other implements of intestine warfare, to which 
the people were prone, were turned into ploughshares, not 
figuratively alone, but literally also; villages being made to give 
up their arms, which were returned to them in the shape of im- 
plements of agricidture. Suttees were prohibited. The rights 
of government were better maintained than in other provinces, 
by not being subjected to the irreversible decisions of its judi- 
cial servants, when there were no certain laws for their guidance 
and control. 

The rights of the people were better preserved, by the main- 
tenance of the village constitutions, and by avoiding those per* 
nicious sales of lands for arrears of revenue, which in other 
provinces have tended so much to destroy the hereditary rights- 
of the mass of the agricultural community. In consequence,. 
there has been no necessity in the Dihlee territory for those ex- 
traordinary remedies which have been deemed expedient else- 
where, both to recover the rights of government, and to restore 
those of the people. 

When it comes to be decided whether the Dihlee territory 
has on the whole been better or worse governed than the pro- 
vinces under the Regulations, the question, it is to be hoped, 
will be determined by impartial judges, free from prejudice and 




[The following letter, which I find without date, hnt which seems to lure 
been written between 1814 and 1816, was elicited by inquiries instituted 
hj Lord Hastings relatiye to the defence of that kige tiwt of oocmtij 
then known as the Delhi Territory, oyer which Metcalfe had oomp&ate poh- 
tioal and administndiye control. About this time the Delhi lUwidflnt bent 
all the energies of his mind to the consideration of our military position in 
Upper India, wrote many ekborate papers on the subject, and wis one of 
the Goyemor-General's most trusted adrisers.] 


Sir, — I have had the honor of reoeiving your cieq[»tflh of 
ihe 16ih ultbno^ reepecting the fortifications dtoated in the 
ftenitories connected with the Beeidency of Dihke. 

If in Btthmitting my opinion, in conformity to your instruc- 
tions, I ocoadonally refer to cansiderations which may appear 
to be more of a military than of a political nature, I trust that 
I shall be excused, on account of the difficulty of patting mili- 
tary considerations out of view in the discuaeion of audi a 

The British posts, which in various degrees come under the 
head of fortifications, in the territories connected with the 
Besidenoy of Dihlee, extending from the vicinity of Muttia to 
the river Sutlej, a space of about three hundred .miles in 
length, and one hun<bed and fifty at its greatest breadth, are 
Loodiana, Kumal, Hansee, and Dihlee. 


Mj (^iBioa MBL dM utility of these ahall be oibmi^d sepa- 
rately with re|;aard to laadi; but, in the first place, I will ven- 
toK te «olicb the indulgence of his Excellency the Govemor- 
General to a few genecsl observatiaos and eacamples which 
aiie equally applicable to aU. These I take the liberty of 
BtatingL as neoeaaiy to «how the groundwork of the opinions 
-wliich I have io suhmil^ though I am awaie that nothing that 
I can 4ay wiQ add to ithe 4rt»e^th of the argument so forcibly 
aad ooBdnavely ui^ged by the highest authority in the extraot 
finm Sir Qmon^ Nugent's areports enclosed in your letter. 

The aeoessity of fortifications in conquered counftrles in 
contact with nations of military and predatory habits, who 
acknowledge no law hut that of force, and inhabited by 
subjects soaroely subdued, partly disaflbctedv impatient of laws 
and r^ulationB, used and jparone io revolution^ hardy and 
warlike, a^>ear8 to be indisputable. Such is the state of the 
territoriefi conneded with Dihlee with jegard to neighbours 
and .subjects. 

Before we detennine to dispense with fortifications entirely, 
we ought first to be sore that our power will, uadn: all circum- 
atanoes, be too smch respected, that the military character of 
the Native States is and will remain too despicable, and that 
our «oBquNed sul^^eots are too tm warlike, or too much attached 
to -our govemmeaty to render Buch preca'JTtions necessary. But 
that such sofipodtioas would be erroneous, numerous events 
and every day's experience must tend to establish. 

It must oooflsionally happen that countries inhabited by dis- 
affected subjects, eager to throw off the yokei, may be left 
irithout troops. In such a oase a fortification with a small 
gaizison is sufficient to keep the oountry, -which might other- 
wise be lost 

It must also occasionally happen that countries left without 
troops may be ^eKposed to ihe ravages of predatory foes. In 
such a case a fiutificarion would preserve our government in 
the oounitry^ though the enemy might overrun the phuns; but 
if we have neither tro<^s nor a fortification, the public autho- 



rities must flee before the moBt contemptible enemy, and 
districts may be taken from us by cavalry alone. 

This was the case in 1803. Five companies of infantry, 
having no post to retire to, capitulated to a body of irr^ular 
cavalry; the civil authorities abandoned their station; and the 
district fell into the hands of the enemy. The evil was soon 
repaired, because the Grand Army was at no great distance, and 
the recollection of the disgrace was obliterated by the spl^idid 
victories which followed in that campaign; but the evil and 
the disgrace would not have occurred had there been any 
fortified post for the small body of troops and the public autho- 
rities of the district to retire to. 

In 1804 and 1805, when our provinces were invaded by 
larger armies of cavalry, in all the districts overrun the civil 
authorities kept their posts, having the protection of fortifica- 
tions. In Aleegurh there was a government fortress and 
garrison. In Suharunpoor the civil authority took possession 
of one of the native forts, with which at that time the country 
abounded. Fortified houses gave confidence at Moradabad 
and Mynpooree, and a fortified gaol at Barelly. 

The experience of the past and the possibilities of the future 
would point out the expediency of having a small fortified post 
in every district, to which the local government might retire 
with confidence in the event of predatory invasion, there not 
being troops enough in the district to keep the field. 

Against such invasions in parts in time of war no army that 
our present resources will maintain can effectually secure us. 
With such posts in every district, which need neitiier be on a 
large scale nor expensive, though the country might be overrun 
for a time, the local government would remain, and we should 
be saved from the disgrace and injury of the temporary loss of 
a portion of our territories. 

Of the advantage which we have derived from fortifications 
in our military operations, several instances might be adduced. 
After the retreat of Monson's detachment in 1804, we should 
certainly have lost the right bank of the Jumna had we not 


posseflsed the fortress of Agra, and the walls, weak as they were, 
of Dihiee. 

The troops to the southward of Dihiee collected under 
the walls of Agra. They there awaited the arrival of Lord 
Lake with his army, and had time to recover from the 
sensation which Holkar's successes over Monson's detachment 
had occasioned, and which would probably have operated 
to a ruinous extent had not the fortress of Agra served as a 
rallying-point to our retreating and advancing troops. The 
exhausted remains of Monson's detachment would nowhere 
have found «refuge if we had not possessed the fort of Agra. 
It is impossible to say how much we were indebted to that 
fortress at that period. 

Nevertheless, the upper part of the right bank of the Jumna 
would have been lost to us if there had not been walls to the 
town of Dihiee. These enabled General Ochterlony and the 
late General Bum to make that memorable defence which led 
to the destruction of the enemy's army — & defence which could 
not have been thought of had not the ruined walls of Dihiee 
offered a foundation for hope. 

The value of fortifications in Europe is limited. They are 
not impregnable, and when an army cannot keep the field, 
fortresses generally fall; but in this country^ that is, in the 
present comparative state of the military skill of the British and 
the native powers, fortifications are to us of incalculable value. 
They are deemed impregnable in our hands, and enable us, at 
a trifling expense, to keep a country vnthout an army. Though 
a native power might obtain a temporary advantage over us in 
the field, the natives of India must make some further advances 
towards equality before they could attempt, with any hope of 
success, to wrest a strong fortress out of our hands^ if defended 
on our part with the show of determination. 

The fort of Rampoora was taken from Holkar in one day 
by a single battalion under Colonel Don. This fort, by the 
retreat of Monson's detachment, was left exposed, and remote 
from any support. Holkar, however, though victorious over 
oar detachment in the field, made no attempt with his enor- 


moos feroe to take Rompoon. Thie fort, and the owm ti y 
around it, remained in our possession throughout tbe war, 
though in the rear of the enemy's armj, and &r removed, 
during the most dangerous period, from the coH>peration of unj 
of our detachments. The garrison not only kept possession ^ 
the fort^ hut established our goremment in the country, aiid> 
even undertook several suocesrful expeditions. The fbrtifioh 
lions of Rampoora were of the gr e ate st utility during the war, 
and were ihe sole cause of our being able- to keep a vafaable 
part of the enemy's country, which otherwise must have fiilles 
into his hands immediately on the return of Monson's d!i9- 

Hoping that the preceding observations respecting i^ 
general utility and necessity of fbrtifioations in this part of 
India will meet wil^ indulgence, I proceed to submit a few 
remarks with reference' to the particular poets which are 
ntnated in the territories under the superintendenoe of this 
Presidency. These, 4n their present state, eonsist of an old 
ruinous brick and mud fort at Loodiana, some mud works at 
Kumal, a serviceable fort at Hansee, and the ruinous stone 
walls, with mud repairs, of the town of Dihlee. 

Loodiana is die most exposed, being situated immediately <« 
the boundary of one of the most powerful States of in^a. 
Numerous advantages attend our possessing a fort at Loodiana, 
some of which have been lately evinced. It renders dte troops 
of the cantonment of Loodiana available for purposes diflbrent 
£rom those for which they were originally stationed there. Ac- 
cordingly we find that, for the late campaign against tile 
Goorkhas in the hills, the infantry were withdrawn from Loo* 
diana, with the exception of a small garrison for the fort, 
without any apprehension existing in consequence for As 
safety of the post — the possession of the fort being sufficient for 
its security in any event — whereas, without a fort, a small 
detachment at Loodiana would be entirely in the- power of 
Runjeet Singh, that post being nine marches distant from any 
support, within four marches of his capital, aoidwitinn frve 

,43>yAif TAOBa OF A 7QBT AT. LOODIANA. 7 1. 

mikfrof one of his fartifimi posts and piinoipal stations. The 
foil o£ Loodiana has, in. other lespectSy. also been of gjraat. 
service during ^e late- campaign^ It was the d^>6t fox guns-, 
atojDBSv. and treasure for Genual Oohtedony's army. It wa& die. 
plaoe to which ha-seat his Goorkha pnsoneiB, and fioouL which 
he drew his sappliss^ 

In any war with Runjeet Singh, in the event, of offensive 
opeiBtiona on. oun part^ the fort of Loodiana wouldi be inva- 
hiahle as a depot,, at which we could, make all our preparations 
with Gonfidenoi^ within, a few maoches of the enemy's capital. 
Ll the event of such a state of affiurs as might lender it 
neceoBsry to act on. the defensive against Runjeet. Singh, the 
fort of Loodiana would occa8iQn.him much embarrassment: he 
would neither like, to attack it nor leave it in. his rear. If he 
should attempt, to take it he would probably fail, and the 
failuse might be decisively fatal to his views against us.. K he 
should leave it in his rear, the garrison might, cause him great 
annoyance in psoportion to its strength; it might even menace 
his territories,- and would,, at all eLventa, preserve the appearance 
of our government in. the country. 

Independently of any speculation on. a future war with Run- 
jeet Singh, die possesaion of a fortin the Sikh.territory, on this 
side the Sudej, is desirable,, and perhaps neoeasarjr., for the 
preservation of our supremacy over die country bordering 
on thai rirer^ under vaiioua circumstanoea which, may be con*- 

If it.diould be deemed ezpedisnt, for instance, to withdraw 
the great body of the troops at Loodiana. to a station. at which 
they would be more available for general purposes, die conti- 
nuance of a fortified fort would show that we were not with- 
drawing from die superintendence which we exercise over that 
country; for which purpose^ considering the character of die 
inhabitants, some o^ensible post seems to be necessary, and a 
small post, to be respeetable, should be fortified. 

Although the Sikh chiefs generally on diis side of the 
Sutlej experience great advantage from having our protection 


against Runjeet Sbgh, it is not the leas neoeasaiy to keep them 
in awe; for, having to render justice among them, and in many 
instances to enforce the restitution of unjust seizures, we neoes- 
saiilj offend those whom we check, and render them diaaflkcted. 
The appearance, therefore, of our power amongst them, either 
in the shape of a large cantonment or a fortified post, is, per- 
haps, indispensable. 

Moreover, the continuance of a post at Loodiana is requisite 
to prevent the gradual, and perhaps imperceptible, encroach- 
ments of the dependants of Runjeet Singh on this side of the 
Sutlej upon our dependants. The former would gain con- 
fidence by the removal of our post, and the latter would lose it 
The former might become presumptuous, and the hitter might, 
from fear, court the protection of Runjeet Singh. 

The fortified post at Eumal, trifling and inefficient as it 
would appear in Europe, is also of great value. It protects a 
magazine and depdt, from which those at Loodiana may at any 
time be replenished. It afforded great assistance to General 
Ochterlony during the late campaign, whose operations in a 
gi-eat measure depended on tiie supplies which he rec^ved 
from the magazine at Kumal, in ad^tion to those which he 
drew from Loodiana. The post at Eumal defends the boun- 
dary of our territories in that quarter. It operates on the 
Sikhs towards the Jumna, as the post of Loodiana does on 
those towards the Sutlej. With a fortification at Eumal the 
troops may be withdrawn from that station, and still the 
fortification will suffice to overawe our predatory neighbours 
in that quarter, and the disaffected of our own country, and to 
preserve the communication between Dihlee and Loodiana, and 
between the latter place and Meerut. 

As Eumal is a considerable station, and as buildings are 
going on there which show that it is to be one of the largest 
stations in the army, the existence of a fortified post there is of 
great advantage with reference to that circumstance, as afford- 
ing protection to valuable public buildings, and to the families, 
European and native, of officers and soldiers, as well as to shop- 


keepers and other inhabitants of the cantonment who may not 
accompany the troops when they march on -service. The 
confidence and security afforded by a fortified post induce all 
those inhabitants to remain without alarm under the protection 
of a very small guard. Without the fortification a remote can- 
tonment would probably be abandoned by the feeble part of 
the inhabitants after the fighting men quit it. The conve- 
nience which the security conferred by a fortification is at- 
tended with to the inhabitants of a cantonment is in itself of 
conaderable consequence, but another advantage concomitant 
with this is of greater importance, namely, the prevention of 
the alarm and agitation which the abandonment of an established 
cantonment^ on account of the march of the troops^ would occa- 
sion in the neighbouring coimtry. 

If there were a small fortified post at every great military 
station it would be of the greatest service, for in time of war 
great cantonments, if unprotected, invite attack. The destruc^ 
tion of a principal British cantonment would operate on the 
public in the same manner as the destruction of a capital city, 
and ought to be guarded against. A large army cannot be 
spared for this purpose. Next to that, a fortified post would 
afford the best protection. 

The fort of Hansee has some advantages, in common with 
the fortified post of Eumal, and others like Kumal, peculiarly 
its own. It is our frontier post towards the Bhuttees, the 
Shekhawatees^ the people of Bickaneer, and other petty States, 
all of a warlike character and addicted to predatory habits, and 
requiring an appearance on that distant frontier to keep them 
in awe. 

The experience of the last campaign has shown to a demon- 
stration what was before sufficiently evident to reason, that we 
cannot expect in time of war to keep a field force over every 
part of our frontier, and next to a field force, a fortification, 
which can be garrisoned by a small number of men, is the best 
protection for a country. It gives confidence to our adherents, 
and overawes the disaffected. Hurreeana, in particular, requires 


apMt of tliis.nBiora».both fiaom ka espoMcL atoolioa andfixim 
tha charaotgr of ite inhnbitontti. 

WhoL the BhiittBM^ took Futtftabad fisom, us in I804r«, 
HamM dieoksd thor fiiriher progneat ; and whidn. we flttaokad 
tlie.Bhntteeay in 1810, Hanaee was our d^t, and tho point 
fieom irhisk oar army marchad on that suooeaBful 6iqp«dition. 

Theie oircumatanees are aufficient to evinoe the utility of 
Hanaee; Jta importance on a grand scale, with » inew to 
posfliUe.e^rents, in oonsaquaiGe of its position, has been deady 
ehowa in Sir Geoige Nugent^s convincing report Ita gneat 
local adTantage, under existing cireumstanoeat I conoeiTe to be, 
that it would enaUe us to retain the country of Hunaaana 
against &seign incnision and intmnal insusreolion, though, all 
troops, except its garrison, be withdrawn.. The £brt of Hanaee 
ip also to the station of Hansee what the post at Kumal is to 
the station of KuBBaL 

With reference to the advantagea- which the stations of 
Loodiana, Kumal, and Hansee derive fiam the possessldn of 
fortified posts, I cannot refirain from expoasamg my regfet lliat 
there is not one also at Rewaree. That station, when the 
troops an withdmwn, is much eiq>oaed, and remote fiom sup* 
port. A fortified post would be very valuable for the purpoass 
already mentioned. Grokulgurh, a neighbouring native fbrt, 
has occasionally been occupied when there has appeMced to be 
a neceanty for precaution ; but occasional precautions of this 
nature are injiuibus, because they indicate and excite, alarm. 
The permanent occupation of a fortified post would tend to 
confer both real and imaginary security in times of danger,, and 
could never excite alarm. The efficiency which it would confer 
on the troops at the station, by rendering them di^Kisable 
without hazard, is another point worthy of consideration. 
Gokulgurh, the place above mentioned, is, perhaps, too fiir 
distant from the cantonment of Rewaree to answer fi>r all 
the purposes for which posts are usefuL 

I now proceed to submit a few observations reiqiecting' the tar*- 
tificadon of Dihlee. Qn the expediency of keeping Dihlee in a 


de£eiiflibbstataIdo notpropoaeto tawnbleyon wkh aajreniatk. 
Thai 8iiily}«ct has been fiillj disBiuaBd in Sir Geoxge Nugoat'a xa*- 
porty nJieKiii the policyvesqpedkney, and neaeaDtjr of preaerang* 
80010' Bort of £9]ii60atian.8een»ta'bemo8ta8ti8fiwU)r3y andc^ 
duahcdjdioinL kaeenaa tbilrtiiere h&^ebeendiflfannceaofaB^ 
timentiegaidingTaxioaa planB> whick luvre'baen propoaed for the 
fbrtification of DiUee. It appears to be generally admitted».that 
to fortify DiElee in ft ayatematLoi and pexfeot way, would ob/u^ 
sion a goaater ezpendkore, than the leaonroeB of goTemment 
can witk oonTeniencB anpply £ar ihia pni^ae, and the real 
qneatanr seama to be whether the present fbrtification shall be. 
rqxuxed and improved^ Cfr all idea of making the. place de&nr 
sible be abandoned^ and the wall be allbwed to &11 to total 
ndn. I hope that the former pr opoatiDn will meet widi fay oi> 
able atteniaon^ aa I think that the altematiye is on every ai^ 
connt gready to be deprecated;. 

In Yentaring to aubmit my opinion on such & subject, I trust 
Uiat my intention will meet with indulgence, thouj^ my pre- 
aumptaon be Uameable. The old stone wall might be repidied. 
with atone aod masonry, aoid would form ayery respectable de* 
fence for Dihlee against our native enemies. If Imay be per- 
mitted to judge, idle xepaos of the old wall with stone work ia 
preferable by fiur to the patahmg with nrad work, which haa 
been, adopted, I anppose, on grounds of economy. The stone 
work haa infinitely a moie ieq>eetablfi appearance^ and givesa 
better idea ^£ stsengtii... The mud; work being patched, on the* 
old atone wall,, haa not that Aicknea^ which is requisite to confar 
on mnd work the d^^aee of solidity and dumbility of which it is 
capable. Mosaoyex, the mnd works being sloping, and not higher, 
are more accessible than the stone wall^ and are frequently made 
nae of^ aa a more conveni^it way of going in and out of the 
town dian by the gates. The rtone wall would be a secure 
piolactien against cavalry. It. would be perfectly defenoble 
agajnat escalade; It would not, it iatroe, stand much batfe^^ 
ing^ but it would stand aa much aa the present mixture of 
mud and stone. At the worst, there are abundance of maaona in 


Dihlee, and if a breach were made it would be cut off in one 
night by running up an inner wall This is not mere conjec- 
ture, for the thing was done during the last nege in the manner 
described. The expense of repairing the stone wall could beasoer- 
tained by calculation. The late eyer-to-be*lamented Lieutenant 
Lawtie submitted, I believe, an estimate to the Presidency. It 
would, I iraa^e, in the end, be found cheaper to repair the 
stone wall with its original materials than to patch it with mud. 
Stones, it should be mentioned, ready cut, are procurable with- 
out expense in some places close to, and generally not fiir from, 
the walls. If the monthly allowance of 500 rupees, which is 
at present granted for mud repairs, were applied without re- 
mission to the gradual and thorough repair of the stone waU, I 
am of opinion that it would be more economically^ as well aa 
more usefully^ laid out than it hitherto has been in mud works, 
which constantly require renewing, whereas the stone wall, 
once thoroughly repaired, would be very durable, and would 
not need much repair afterwards. The fortification might be 
improved by a ditch, which could be dug without expense by the 
prisoners or the convicts from thegaoL The late incomparable 
Lieutenant Lawtie had also another plan for the improvement 
of the present fortification, which I will not do injustice to by 
attempting to describe. He submitted it, I conclude, to the 
authorities at the Presidency, As far as I could judge of such 
a plan, it seemed to unite the greatest economy with the utmost 
practicable improvement short of an entirely new and scientific 
fortification. Lieutenant Lawtie was as zealous and disin- 
terested in the ordinary duties of his office at Dihlee, as he 
afterwards proved himself to be ardent, indefatigable, heroic, 
and devoted in the arduous labors of the field. 

If the stone wall of Dihlee be repaired and maintained in a 
defendble state; if the fortifications of Loodiana, Kumal, and 
Hansee be retained; and if a fortified post be occupied at 
Rewaree, the stations connected with Dihlee may, in times of 
emergency, supposing them to remain in their present strength, 
furnish eight battalions of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, 


and the greater part of Skinner's horse, for field serrice, leaving 
two battalions of infantry and the provincial corps of Nujeebs 
for the garrison at Dihlee^ and a party of horse to check pre- 
datory incursionSy or keep order and tranquillity in our districts. 
This supposes that the fortifications of Loodiana, Eumal, 
Hansee, and Bewaree may be occupied by provincials or 
Nujeebs, or veterans or recruits, or whatever may be thought 
most expedient at the time. Without fortified posts in this 
eztenave country, it would be dangerous, if not impracticable, 
to withdraw all the troops for field service. 

This consideration is in itself a great recommendation, but it 
is not the only one, of these fortified posts and works. How, it 
may be asked, would the late campaign have been carried on, 
had we not possessed the fortifications and magazines of Loo- 
diana, Kumal, Suharunpoor, and Dihlee? — had there not been 
any magazine higher than Agra, as was the case before 1809? 
Where would General Ochterlony have drawn his guns and 
stores firom? Where would he have sent his prisoners? To 
what quarter would he have applied to replenish his wants? 
Where would Colonel Mawbey have sent his requisition for a 
battering train when one was found to be necessary at Ka- 
linjur? Where would the field hospital of General Martin- 
dale's army have remained in security? 

The only objection to fortifications, I believe, is their ex- 
pense. I do not know what expense the fortifications men- 
tioned may have occasioned, but the services which they have 
rendered in this single campaign must have more than compen- 
sated for any expense which they may have caused. 

Of the great utility of fortifications there seems to be abun- 
dant proof. That they cannot be, or ought not to be, insup- 
portably expensive, is shown by the number of fortifications 
possessed by petty Native States. The State of Alwar boasts^ I 
think, of having fifty-two forts. I do not mean to vouch for 
the accuracy of this number, but the number of forts possessed 
by that petty State is notoriously and without doubt very 
great. The petty State of Bhurtpore, in a small country, and 

78 lOLiTABY DsraarcB <nr the nsLHi terbftobt. 

witii ^eiy KnitedTeflouraa^ muntaiiiBlbiir finfts of the fijoit mag- 
ostade and celebrity, besides otheis of inferior note, aond is con- 
iauully inoreaanig the nnaher of ils ferrificaitiaai. 

If these petty Steles, irilii liicar limifted lesonsoes, can: 
tain nwnemis fortificatienB, the expenae of tbeir 
auat he wiAon Tnodenrte limits alaa. Jkad can it be said that 
tlie tew fartificatTCffw at present maintained by A» Hanoiable 
Company axe too nsmenius for the extent of their donuiioos, 
and too expensive irith vefiBrenoe to their xesomoes ? It will 
rather be found, I coneei^ve, that the expenses of onr gofvem- 
ment on aooount of fortifications aie trifling, and ont of pro- 
portion compared in^ the magnitode of ov territorieSy re- 
sources, and general expenses, and that of all the fasanches of 
onr expenditore tUs is the one ivhioh, men ^un any odier, 
iklk short, in the expense incurred, of the impoKtance and 
uliHty of die object in view. I fear, however, dutt I have 
afaeady exceeded the bounds within which I oi^ht to have 
confined fByeelf. 



[Tnmsinitted to Lord Moira in 'November, 1814.1 

[Hie disastroQB commeneement of ihe Nepnul war, and eBprnAtSkj the 
fnhm at -Kalmiga^ ithen General OyiB^ie was HEbd at the hmi ei his 
men in an attempt to cany the fortnsB l^ a coup de itoM^ induced Metcalfe 
to dam up the following pi^per for the perusal of Lord Hastings. He was 
of opinion that the English in India had been rendered OTer-confident by 
past successes, and that it was desirable, above all things, that the Govern- 
ment should never close its eyes to the dangers of our poahion. Se often, 
rt ihisiime ae «t a^nbeaqiNnt peiiod, oQmmentediqNni liieseicknigeis, and, 
as will Beaeen Jmw ftac, inaiated upon the neee aaitj i of maintaiiuufraa the 
oi4y pKventiv^.aniBflbttent militaiy force.] 

Our unfoortunate iiulare at the formerly despiaed fort of 
Kalungtt, aUas J^alapaBee, in the Valley of Deyra, rendered 
more lemaikaUe than preceding failures by the death of the 
heroic Oeneial Gille^ie, is one of a series of events which, 
although they have taken place at long intervals^ ave all of 
the same chacacter, and have all sprung from the same causes 
— canses which demand the serious attention of government to 
a aubjeot vitally important to our interests in India. 

£very successive failure of this description is more disastrouSi 
on account of its influence on the stability of our power, than 
on account either of the lamentable fall of brave men or the 
temporary derangement of the plans of government, much as 
both these effects are to be deplored. 


The present opportunity is taken for attempting to bring tliis 
subject to notice, in the hope that the recollection of the cir* 
cumstances of our recent disaster may procure some attention to 
opinions, which cannot derive any weight from their owner, 
which would probably be disregarded in a time of peace, and 
might appear ridiculous in a career of uninterrupted victory. 

These opinions were first excited by personal observation in 
the field, and have been strengthened by attention to subsequent 

Our empire in India has arisen from the superiority of out 
military prowess. Its stability rests entirely on the same foun- 
dation. Let this foundation be removed, and the fabric 
must fall to the ground. Let this foundation be in the 
least shaken, and the fabric must totter. Whatever delusions 
may prevail in England respecting the security to be derived 
from the afiections of our Indian subjects, and a character for 
moderation and forbearance with foreign Native States, it will 
probably be admitted in India that our power depends solely on 
our military superiority. 

Yet there is reason to apprehend that our comparative supe- 
riority is in some measure diminishedi in consequence of a 
general increase of discipline, experience, skill, and confidence 
on the part of the military of India. 

The failures at Nalapanee, Kalunga, Ealinjur, Eumona, and 
Bhurtpore, are events which particularly call for attention, and 
may be considered more important, from forming almost a 
system of failure, than from any of the unfortunate losses or 
immediate evib attending each siege. Let them prove a warn- 
ing for the future, and good may arise out of evil. 

At Bhurtpore, four assaults and the greatest exertions of the 
united armies of Bengal and Bombay were ineffectual against 
a straggling and extensive walled town, situated on a plain, 
with a dry ditch, which the activity of the enemy converted 
into a wet one before the breach, and defended by men whom 
we used to call a rabble. 

Our failure on that occasion may be attributed partly to the 


difficulties which opposed the attack, aad partly to the fimmess 
and activity of the defencei and partly to ^e presence of a large 
enemy's army under the walla which embarrassed our opera- 
tions, and partly to the want of confidence on the part of our 
troops after the first check. 

But certain reasons were assigned for our failure at Bhurt* 
pore, haying reference solely to the mode of attack, and it was 
understood at the next si^e — that of Kumona — that these sup- 
posed fitults would be avoided by a more scientific course of 

Accordingly, at Kumona, we made our approaches regularly, 
but the result was failure. We were defeated in the assaulty 
and were indebted to the courtesy of a rebel Zumeendar for 
permission to bring away our dead. The fort was subsequently 
evacuated for obvious reasons, but our failure in the storm was 
complete, and our loss, as must be the case, in all failures, 

Eumona was a petty fort on a plain, with a dry ditch, held 
in contempt before we attacked it, and not much thought 
of since it came into our possession. There was a garden 
attached to it which was converted into an outwork, and occu- 
pied by the enemy. We attempted to take the garden, but 
fidled there also. 

The next remarkable attempt to storm was at Kalinjur. 
Thia was a hill fort without a ditch, consequently of a different, 
description firom Bhurtpore and Eumona. Here also we failed 
completely in the assault, though we afterwards obtained pos» 
sesnon of the place by negotiation. Kalunga, or Nalapanee^ 
eeems also to be a hiU fort without a ditch. It is at present 
undecided whether our failure at this place is most to be attri- 
buted to the insurmountable nature of the obstacles, or the 
determined resistance of the enemy. It probably may justly be 
attributed to the united effects of both causes. And as it is 
evident, from some circumstances, that but for the determined 
reastance of the enemy the place might have been carried, so 
it may be hoped that all their resistance would have proved 

82 ON THE BoinugniiBBrr or jrosnnxD places. 

ineflbetoal, had not ike other obitedes been difficok to ear* 

The fiulnraiat Samee, &&, have not beeo aUaded to, beeanae 
these took place before the Mahxatta war^ and Ae xeooUec^n 
of them was swept away by the gloiknis Ticftotiee of that bril- 
liant and fortunate period. The oommenoenient of our sys- 
tematic fidlures may be dated from the unfinrtmmte aege of 
Hhnrtpoiei where a great portiim of our military fione wis 

It is true that since that period some sucoessful aasanlta have 
taken place, but they cannot be put in competitioa with the 
fiulures alladed ta 

Three inHtancew of sucoeas at present occur to reocdkction: 
one under Colonel Hawkins^ in Bundelkund, in 1806; the 
capture of Bhowanee by Colonel Ball; and Colonel Adams's 
exploit last season. 

On the first, a part of his Majesty's I7th headed the storming 
party; and the affidr was oonoeived with decision, and achiered 
in gaUant style; but the defience was, I bd&eve, lumgnificant, 
compared with the defence in the instances of fidlnie alluded to. 

The affiur at Bhowanee wasa brilliant one, and an important 
one for our reputation, for the people of Bhowanee were 
thought invincible; but in reality Bhowanee was only a large 
Tillage without guns; and, in &ct, the affiur was a battle on the 
plain, for the people, not trusting to their weak defence^ or 
despising defensiTe warfare, sallied forth to meet us. 

Colonel Adams's assault appears to have been a very able and 
gallant operation, but the difficulties which were encountered 
did not, it is imagined, equal those which we met willi in the 
instances of failure before mentioned. 

In each of the instances of failure described, the European 
troops — ^that part of our army on the character of which our 
power in great measure depends— were employed and defeated. 

In each of these instances diflferent reasons have been aaaigned 
for our defeat. Some have attributed it to the insurmountable 
nature of the obstacles; others have affirmed that the troops 


yielded to alann ou the first check, and would uot advanoe, 
though the obstacles were not insuxmountable. 

The fidhire in each instance has excited notice for a time; 
but die impreasbn occasioned by it in the minds of the Biitidi 
community has gradually worn out. No measures have been 
taken sufficient to provide a remedy for the evil, the real cause 
of which has been overlooked, and we have proceeded to fresh 
attacks with the same chances of failure as before. 

The real cause of our repeated failure seems to be, that our 
opponents now are better able to defend themselves against us 
than our opponents were fcnmerly; consequently, that we have 
not the same superiority on these occasions that we formerly 
poonssed, nor have our troops the same confidence. 

The sight of a white &ce or a red coat is not sufficient now, 
on all occasions, as it once wa% to make our adversaries flee in 
disnay , and abandon defences in which they have well-grounded 

£ither the gradual and imperceptible circulation of know- 
lege has given them a better mode of defence and greater re- 
sources; or the charm which ensured us success is dissolved; or 
firom some other change of circumstances we are less invincible 
than we were; for certain it is, that there have been occasions 
on which the backwardness of our troops has been complained 
of, and whatever may have been the iomiediate cause of their 
defeat, they have repeatedly turned their backs on die walls of 
foes who, in theory, would be considered conteipptible, and 
who to this day are compared by some writers in England to a 
flock of sheep. 

This is a subject which cannot be taken too much into deep 
consideiation. On our military superiority our power entirely 
depends. That superiority is lessened by every defeat. 

The evil has gone to such a length already, tiliat» on sitting 
down to a mege, a repulse may be judged not improbable, in 
the event of an assault, according to the usual mode of pro- 

It is true that our superiority in the field has not yet been 



called in question by any untoward event, and as long aa we 
retain our superiority in the field, our power may be conadered 
secure; but repeated fidlures of any kind must aocustom our 
troops to defeat; must diminish iheir confidence in themaehres; 
must increase thdr respect for their enemies; and must lay the 
foundatiofl for great reTcrses of fortune. 

Often has the fate of India depended on a single army; often 
again may the fiite of a great part of India depend on a ungle 
army ; and if every by any combination of unfortunate accidents, 
such scenes should be exhibited in an army in the field, haying 
the fate of our empire in great measure attached to it, as have 
occurred more than once in storming parties, and even in con- 
dderable detachments, our power might recdive a blow from 
which its recovery would be questionable. 

The object of this paper is not, however, to antidpate future 
disasters, but to bring to notice the real causes of past misfor- 
tunes, in order that remedies may be provided against them in 
future, and that the dangerous consequences to which a con* 
tinuation of defeats would lead may be prevented. 

These causes, namely, the increase of confidence in our op- 
ponents, and the diminution of it in our own troops, seem to 
have been entirely disregarded. 

If we pay sufficient attention to these points^ the remedies 
may doubtless be applied which will prevent many future 
failures. But if, as heretofore, we disregard the important con* 
eideration alluded to, we shall proceed to future assaults as to 
former ones, without better precautions or resources, and the 
consequences will be frequentiy the same, tending ultimately to 
tiie most serious evils. 

It is desirable, in the first instance, that the favorable reports 
received beforehand relative to the weakness of an enemy's 
fortresses, and the inefficiency of his troops^ should be listened 
to with caution. 

Men of sanguine dispositions give iavorable reports, and 
anticipate unqualified victory — ^without refiecting on the 'possi- 


faOity of difliculties and the chances of fJEtilure — ^because it is in 
their nature to do so. 

Other men, not sanguine, are generally very loth to express 
an nnfinrorable opinion. There is always the chance of success. 
Enoonraging intelligence is always the most agreeable; and 
men do not like to subject themselves to the reproac^ of being 

We are apt to despise our opponents, till from defeat we 
acquire an opposite sensation. 

Before we come to the contest, their powers of resistance are 
ridiculed. Their forts are said to be contemptible, and their 
arms are described to be useless; yet we find, on the trial, that 
with these useless weapons, in their contemptible forts, they can 
deal about death amongst their assailants, and stand to their 
defences, notmthstanding the skill and bravery of our army. 
If we were not misled beforehand by a flattering persuasion of 
the fiusility of conquest, we should take greater pains to en- 
sure it 

It is very desirable that, in general, our troops should not 
be carried up to the assault where the obstacles, natural or 
artificial, of the fortification, such as may not have been cleared 
away during the siege, may be rendered utterly or nearly in* 
surmountable by a resolute defence on the part of the ganijson. 
Heroism, widi the aid of good fortune, may sometimes ac- 
complish wonders; but it is dangerous to trust too much to 
heroism or good fortune. Fortune is fickle, and soldiers are 
men in whom the love of life, or the awe of peril, must at times 
prevail, however subdued in general by valor or discipline. 

A angle accident may frequently determine a contest, and 
give victory to us or our enemy. 

If the first efibrt of valor prevail not, it is rare that a repeti- 
tion of attacks proves successful. Ardor and enthusiasm are 
necessary to enable troops to go through a difficult attack. 
These are checked by the first serious repulse. The troops, 
persevering in the same attack, are afterwards, under the in- 
fluence of a sensation which destroys their energies and pre* 


Tenti BXj aidinated exertkm — ^lo wUdi is not onooinmoiily 
added a sense of shame, which prevents flight— and under the 
operation of these difloent feelings theysometiines stand to be 
shot aty to no good purpose, or roll aboot here and there in 
masses of eonfusion, theb officers urging them on, but an un- 
controllable sensation keeping them back. 

It is therefore deorable that greater .attention should be 
shown, than heretofore in general, to the neoenitj of providing 
a road for an assault as free as possible from all obstacles, except 
those which may arise from the braTerj of the enemy. 

Our troops, though, after the repeated defeats that we have 
met with, they cannot feel that unlimited confidence which was 
alike ihe cause and the result of their former invincibility, have 
still the idea that they have only to get at the enemy in order 
to show their wonted superiority. 

It is dangerous not to give them an easy road to meet the 
enemy. If, due attention being given to tlus important point, 
our troops nevertheless fail, it will be no good to shut our eyes 
to the conclusion that our enemies in India are often as bmve 
as men can be,— at least in defensive positiona. 

In order to efiect the object proposed, armies should not 
adyanoe to the attack of forts without ample means of d estroyin g 

It is derirable that a large battering tram, with eveiy equip- 
ment for a siege on a large scale, should accompany ev^ army 
that may have to attack forts. 

This may appear to be an mmecessary caution, as it will pro- 
bably be supposed that the measure suggested must be ob- 
viously adopted on all occarions; but, in fiust, it finequently 
happens that our equipments in this respect are very deficient, 
and by no means adequate to secure the object in view. 

We have on our side the science of Europe, and we oog^t 
to bring it into play. Economy in this department is ruinous. 
We ought to be lavish of the contents of our arsenal^ and 
saving of the lives of our men. We ought to make ddbnce 
impracticable and hopeless. We ought to overpower 


•noe by the ▼a atnoo s of our means. Tliongh soch weuKxnB 
wexe not neoesBBiy fonneily, tbejliave become so bya ohaage 
of cixonmstanoeB. Our feimer ^mmderftil soooess arose from 
causes wkidi have oeased to exist, or do not piewl in the same 
degree. We ought to substitute — ^and we have it in our power 
to sabstitate — other souroes of victory suffidently potent, 
though of a di£ferent nature. 

l%ere is a braach of equipment in neges which might be 
made more use of than it is at presoit, to the great annoyance 
of ihe enemy, and frequently to his total expulsion. A great 
nnmba of mortars and an abandant supply of shdls should be 
attached to every besieging army. 

There are many situations in which, firom the natural diflt> 
culties of the position, an aaeault cannot take place widiout 
oonaderable hazard o£ fidlure. In such oases, an -inceaant 
shower of shells, day and night, might make the place too 
warm for the garrison, and obviate the necessity of a storm. ' 

There are other occasions in which it may be desirable to 
avoid the delay of all die operations of a siege ; and an sodi 
occanons bombarding day and night might accomplish the object 
in a short time. 

lliere are some atuations for which this mode of opemtioa 
is peculiarly suitable; (or instance, ihe small hill forts of the 
Goorkhas appear to be of this description, and had Ealunga been 
bombarded isy and night for as many days as we were before 
it prior to our attempt to storm, it is probable that we should 
not now have to lament our disastrous fidlure at that place, and 
the loss of our gallant general and his brave ccmapanions in 

On all occadons dids will prove valuable auxiliaries, fiem 
the great annoyance which they inflict on the enemy; and even 
in the event of fiiilure in an assault, they would be of the greatest 
importance, by keeping up the agitation and alarm of the 
enemy, and preventing his acquiring confideDoe^ or indulging 
in triumph after his success. 

Had there been a sufficiency of mortars and shdls to phy 


opon Ealunga day and night, even after tlie nnfertonate attenpt 
to rtonni it is ponible that the enemy might have been com- 
polled to Bunrender or evacuate the fort, notwithstanding the 
confidence which he may have derived fix>m his aaooenful de- 

Decided effects have occasionally been aoo(»nplisbed by 
shelling; — 

The defenders of Eumona, after evacoating that place, 
retired to Ghmowree, with the apparent intention of de£»id« 
ing it Had we laid siege to Ghmowree as we laid si^;e to 
Kumona, we might have had a repetition of the delay and 
disaster which occurred at the latter place. But Grunowiee 
was shelled day and night, and the garrison was driven out, I 
beUevCf in two days. 

A amilar circumstance occurred afterwards at a fort not &r 
firom Agra. The engineer made his approaches, and there was 
the appearance of a long and doubtful siege; but in the mean 
time it was judgedproper to annoy the enemy with shells, and 
the place was evacuated before the breaching batteries were 

Incessant shelling annoys the enemy within the forty tries 
his courage and patience throughout the si^, and, operating 
on a number in a confined space^ its effect must be severe in 
causing him a great loss. 

By the ordinary mode of attack the enemy is not much an- 
noyed during the siege, and if he has courage to stand the 
assault firmly, he has every chance of success firom the advan- 
tages of his situation. 

On some occasions it may be wise, for the speedy accomplish- 
ment of a great object, to risk a hazardous assault. The capture 
of Aleegurh by a coup de numif being the first operation of the 
Mahratta war in this quarter, had a decided influence on the 
subsequent events of that campaign. In like manner, the 
capture of Kalunga would have had a most beneficial efiect on 
the subsequent operations of the Goorkha war. But we had not 
the same good fortune. 


Even, however, when an attempt' at a an^ de mam fail, if 
our army have the means of carrying on rigorous operations, 
the sensation occasioned by the fidlore will quickly subside. 
But an army after such a failure, without the means of annoy- 
ing the enemy, is in a most melancholy predicament A person 
miist have been in an army on such an occasion to judge pro- 
perly of its feelings. 

The individual who has ventured to put these thoughts to 
paper has not the presumption to suppose that he can suggest 
the best plan for conducting sieges with effect. All that he 
aims at is to lead wiser heads than his own to the consideration 
of the true causes of the disasters that have too frequently oc- 
curred, and the best remedies to be applied. 

If there be any foundation for the reasons which have been 
asngned for these disasters, namely, the existence of increased 
knowledge, skill, and confidence on the part of our enemies in 
general, and the diminution of our comparative superiority in 
war&re, it must be admitted that the subject demands the most 
serious attention. 

It demands attention even beyond the actual subject-matter 
of this paper, for if it be true that the military disdpline, skill, 
and confidence of our enemies is in any way on the increase, 
we ought to turn our attention to the state of our army alto- 
gether, and inquire whether it is sufficient for the purpose of 
securing our interests in India; we ought, further, to examine 
the principles of the policy prescribed by the authorities in 
England, and ascertain whether, with reference to the state 
of things supposed, it is a policy the best calculated for our 

The writer of these remarks has his mind oflen occupied by 
these subjects, but fearful that he has already been guilty of 
presumption, he is not bold enough to venture at present on 
such a wide field of discussion. 

He does not, however, shrink from briefly statbg his opi- 
nions on these subjects to be, that an increase of our army is 
highly expedient, and perhaps absolutely necessary, for our 


exitfawm in Lidia; and that we cnf^ to gofcm onr poli^ by 
different ooPBJdafirtKWMi fiooi ihooa ^ndea xi^Qiats uie otueu of 
iho gorenuMBt at nomai 

CiupowerinLidiaxeitoonoiirmiKtuyaiiperiaDlj. Itkna 
no foundation in ifae afla ot Jo ne o£ onr waibjecU. b 
denTO support fzom dio good-wiU or good fidtk of < 
bonis. It can only be nphdd by onr nulitny 
that poB^ is best suited to our sitoation in India wUdi tenda 
in the gxeatest d^ree to inoesaa onr nuHtuy power by all 
means consistent with jsntwe. 



lAMffust 14. 1826.] 


SiBr-* • • . • Idl ihe 4l8t pttragiapk of the political 
letter to Bengal, 2l8t of Jaxraaiy^ 1824, I am blamed for the 
employment of European officen in the Nizam's affiurs, after 
elati]^ my objections to " the appointment of European mar 
nagen in ihe aevexal districts.'' 

It seema that in attaching tiiia bkme to me there has been an 
ovenight of the nide dififarenoe between the aj^intment oi 
Bnropean managers in the difltricts, and the employment of 
European officers in the Hizam's affidis. The former measure 
was never adopted by me, and the latter* was in full play before 
my adnrinistratJon at Hy dembad. 

I extended the employment of European o£BcerBy but was 
not the first to introduce it; and in sereral respects I limited 
their fimetions^ and prohibited the ezeroise of indefinite autho- 
rity which they had before possessed. 

Under the ammgements which I introducedy tihe Bendent 
was the channel of conveying to European officers employed 
in the Nizam's service the orders of the Nizam's Gksvemment 
recetved from the Mimster; and the mode in which our inters 
ference was exercised was invariably by the advice and influence 
of ihe Resident with the Minister. 


Tlie oommumcationB which the European offioen employed 
had neceeBBiily to carry on with the native anthoritieB in the 
several districts, went through native agents, sdected and ap- 
pointed exclusively by the Nixam's Minister. 

Nothing can be more erroneous, and to me, fiom local 
knowledge, nothing can be more preposterous, than the ascribing 
of our interference in the mzam's affiurs to me as its author. 

Our interference in every department was ordered by the 
Govemor-G^eral in CounciL It was exerdsed by my prede- 
cessor, accordmg to his discretion, in the way whidi he deemed 
most expedient The European officers employed under him 
issued orders by their own authority. This practice ceased 
under my arrangements, and evexy matter was submitted for 
the orders of the Nizam's Grovemment. When I first arrived 
at Aurungabad, the court of justice established by my prede- 
cessor used to hold its sittings at the house of the British agent 
at that station, and he presided at the trials. This practice was 
discontinued by my orders; and in fact, whatever notions may 
have prevailed to the contrary, it was my continual study to 
uphold the authority of the Nizam's Gbvemment, and to pre- 
vent the exercise of undue power by European officers. 

But in order effectually to check oppression, which was the 
sole legitimate object of our interference, it was necessary to 
forward complaints of extortion in the revenue department, and 
to ascertain how the affidrs of that department were conducted. 
It was also necessary, for the safety of the government firom 
ruin, to look into the finances. 

Ostensibly, my predecessor had attended to both subjects, 
but the Minister had succeeded in rendering his measures nuga- 
tory. The Minister, no doubt, intended the same by mine, for 
his assent to them, in the first instance, was ready and cheerful, 
and they were as much his own measures as any can be which 
are adopted by the advice and influence of another. But when 
those measures proved efiectual in really checking extortion, 
they touched him on the tenderest point; and he became a 
willing tool for the intrigues of Messrs, W. Pahner and Go., 

AMomrr of intebfsbencs* 93 

who dreaded the e£^t on their interestB of the measures which 
I proposed in the financial department 

Hence alone the damor raised by a party respecting my in- 
terference in the Nizam's country. Hence I am fUsely described 
88 the author of our interference, when I was only the faithful 
and moderate executor of the orders of my own goTcmment. 

My despatch from Hyderabad of the 2nd of February, 1821, 
is the first which develops my views respecting the a&irs of 
the Nizam's country. 

Therein I announce my intentions in the following terms: — 
^ Every branch of administration will in time require investi- 
gation; but those points to which I propose immediately to 
turn my attention, are, first, the reduction of the expenditure 
of the government within its income; and, secondly, a general 
settlement of the land revenue for a term of years, ia the mode 
of village settlements, including arrangement with the heads 
of villages for the introduction of a system of police." 

This is not, I think, the language of a person who doubted 
the intendons of his government as to the extent of his inter- 

The rest of the despatch is in the same tone. It goes on to 
say, afler remarks on the probable effect of these measures, ^^ I 
can hardly reckon on the zealous support of the Minister in 
either scheme, but I do not despair of his acquiescence; and if 
he will acquiesce, I am ready to take on myself the labor and 
odium of the task." 

This announcement is plain enough. It contains the essence 
of our interference in the Nizam's country. We were to obtain 
the Minister's consent to measures for the public good, which 
it was known that his personal interests and disposition would 
not aUow him cordially to relish. We were to reform his 
administration of the country through him, but in spite of him, 
by our influence over him. 

Nothing could be more clearly indicated than this is in the 
preceding extracts. There is no attempt to induce a belief 
that the Minister would be b cordial co-operator in the pro- 


po0ed xefonnt. His probftble rebotaaoe is avowedly antid- 
pated. His constrained acqaieaoeiioe is all that is presaiiied. 

The same letter states : ** To insist on good faith bdmg 
kept by gOTemment and its agents with the cultiTatoiSy widi 
legard to all engagements ; to take caxe that tiie government 
and its agents do not exact more than the acknowledged riglils 
of the government, — these are objeots the sa o e ussf ul aooom- 
plishment of which would go fiur towards the restoialioii of 
prosperity^ and for which I shall never hedtate to esEeraao 
direct intcderence in every part of the coontiy, for withoat it 
they would never be accomplished.*' 

There is no disguise in this language. It shows openly what 
I conceived to be my powers under the instructions of Liord 
Hastings; and it was after line receipt of these unreserved 
declarations irom me, and at a later period, that his Lordship 
wrote to me as follows:^ — ** Let me take the opportunity, my 
dear Sir, of saying to you how gratifying the prospects are 
which you hold forth respecting ihe inqprovement in onlfzva- 
tion and comfort of the Niaam's territories. I feel keenly the 
duty of rendering our influence so beneficial; and I thank jroii 
oncerely for the generous energy with which you prosecute the 

What relates to European managers and the employment of 
European oflSlcers in the same letter is as follows: — ^The most 
efiectual, and perhaps the only sure mode of introducing a 
reform into the country, would be by the appointment of Euro* 
pean managers in the several districts; bat this I consider to be 
prohibited by my instructions, and not desirable if it can be 
avoided, inasmuch as it Would be tantamount to taking the 
government out of the hands of the Nizam and his Ministers. 
I do not think, therefore, of submitting any vecommendatioir to 
that effect, unless I should find, after a fair trial, that my own 
efibrts, with such aid as I can procure from the servants of 
the Nizam's Government, prove unavailing. The occasional 
interference, however, of the European officers of the Kaam's 
service, for the prevention of oppresdon and breach of fidth on 

amouht of intbkfxbbkgil 96 

the port of local authoiitieB in the TOanitjr of their lespectiTe 
posts, 18 indispenflable, and lahall, without ecniple, haveiecouiae 
to this asmstance whenever it may seem necessary. Indeed, I 
have already acted on this piinxnple in several instances." 

^nie interferoice which I exercised never eacoeeded in prin- 
ciple the scheme above avowed* The employment of European 
officers of the Niiam's service, for the prevention of oppression 
and bieadi of faith on the part of local authorities, was ihe 
utmost extent of that interference. 

If it was admismble and desirable in one part of ihe Nizam's 
coimtiy, it was equally so in all, where the same opproseion and 
misrufe prevaifed. Whatever officer was so employed first be- 
came an officer of the Niaaun's service. 

The employment of officers in inspecting and superintending 
the revenue settlements had solely in view the prevention of 
extortion — an object which was unattainable widiout a know- 
ledge of the terms of the assessments. No part of the coUeo- 
tions ever passed through the hands of on Euxopean officer. 
There were native managers in every district. There was not 
an European manager in any district And during my Besi- 
deney the native managers were selected solely by the Nizam's 
Minister, without any recommendation on my part in any one 
instance; whereas, previously, the native managers of districts 
had been recommended by the Reodent in several instances; 
an interference which, if it had not been stepped by me, must 
soon have taken the government of the country eflEectuaUy out 
of the hands of the Nizam's Ministers. 

I mention these difieiences of oonduct because, as I have 
been attacked as the author of a system of unbounded inter- 
ference, and Mr. Russell has ludicrously jdned in the czy, it is 
due to myself to show the real state of the case, which was not 
only that the interference which I exercised was limited and 
defined, but also that I restrained and put bounds to the inter- 
ference which was exercised before my administration. And 
the more dosely the matter be examined, the more surely it 
will be found that the sole olyject of all my inteiference was to 


check oppreanoii and extortion; and that the aaBomption of 
power or patronage, or direct gOTenimenti formed no part of 
my schemes. 

I trust that I have said sofficient to prove to the Honc»ible 
the Ooort of Directors that the employment of European officers 
in the Nisam*s provinces had preceded my nomination to the 
Bendency of Hyderabad ; that I avowed my intention of con* 
tinning it in the eailiest of my despatches on the Mkam'saffiuxs; 
that I never did more than extend that use of Europesn 
officers as seemed necessary for purposes of check; and that I 
never appointed European managers in any district 

If I have succeeded, in satisfying the Honorable Court on 
these points, I shall, I trust, remove the impresnons under 
which my conduct was blamed in the 49th paragia|di of the 
general letter of Slst January, 1824. 

I legset very much the erroneous impressions which vppeu 
to have prevailed to a considerable extent in England n^arding 
the interference exercised by me in the affidrs of the Nizam's 
Government; because, whatever may be the merits or defects 
of the system which I adopted, in carrying into e&ct the 
orders of the Marquis of Hastings, it is quite certain that it can- 
not be justly appreciated unless it be rightly understood. 

At Nagpoor we took the government completely into our 
own hands, and the country was managed entirely by European 
officers, posted with fuU powers in the several districts. Iliere 
was not, in short, any native administration, and the interferoice 
which we exercised was nothing less than absolute undivided 
government in the hands of the Resident The consequence has 
been a state of prosperity and comfort throughout the country, 
highly honorable to the British name, and to the distinguished 
functionary who has introduced and conducted our system of 
interference in that region. 

Oar interference at Hyderabad, although very beneficial, does 
not in its effects come up to the complete success which has 
attended our measures at Nagpoor; neither could it be expected 
that it would, for it is in its nature much less efficient. 


At Hyderabad the native government remains unmoved. 
Native managers govern every district. European officers of 
check are employed ; but their duties are limited in practice 
almost ezdufidvely to such as have prevention or correction for 
their object; they .exercise no authority without the co-opera- 
tion of the native managers of districts, and have no orders sent 
to them by the Resident without the previous concurrence of 
the Nizam's Minister. 

This ia manifestly a very difierent state of things from that 
whidi has existed at Nagpoor. At Nagpoor the Resident's in- 
terfence was the exercise of all the powers of absolute and un- 
divided government. At Hyderabad the Resident's inter- 
ference was a continual struggle with the vices of the native 

What the effect of our interference at Nagpoor may even- 
tually prove, if it be at any time deemed proper to transfer the 
government to the hands of the Rajah and native Ministers, the 
native government having been intermediately subverted by 
the assumption of the chief powers of rule in the hands of the 
Resident and European officersunder his orders, remains to bc- 
seen* The contingency has no doubt been, as far as possible,. 
provided for; but at Hyderabad, if fortunately the establishment 
of an honest Ministry should hereafter enable us to withdraw 
our checks without fear of the renewal of Chundoo Lall's un- 
principled extortions, the native administration would be found 
imtoaehed in all its branches, not the smallest wheel of its 
machinery having been displaced. 

The defect of the Hyderabad system of interference I take to 
be, that, from its limited nature, it necessarily falls short of 
perfect efficiency, as to its beneficial consequences, because it 
is exposed to a great degree of counteraction from the native 
administration. Its merit, I conceive, lies in doing the 
greatest possible good with the least possible degree of inter- 
ference, and in tending to uphold, unimpaired, the Nizam's 
Government, while it checks the vices of his profligate Minister. 
It is, in short, a temporary expedient for the salvation of the 



country, vrluoh may be withdrawn whenerer there be any 
flecnxity that the evik oi oppieonon and eodoitian, voiaegrj 
and niin« lb? which it waa deeigned as a remedy, will not be 


Gamp BeeruD, Kb. 2i, 1886. 
Mt dbab Martin,-— I am obliged to yon for your letter 
of the S7th ult., and condder it as a IdndneaB that yon oom- 
mnnicate with me legazding your prooeedingB. Yon speak of 
having shaped a course for yourself somewhat difieient fiom 
that which I pursued. You do not, however, say in what the 
difference consists. You mention an immediate oommimica- 
tion with the Minister, in a manner which hnpUea thai you 
regard that as constituting a diflfeience. Thorn does not appear 
to me to be a diflbrence of any importance. I ooramunieated 
immediately with the Minister, until I was so disgusted by his 
perfidy and falsehood, as gladly to assign the trouble of person* 
ally combating them to my assistants. The more you have 
immediate communication with him, the more appidiensive I 
should be of your being deceived by him ; fer he has the 
plausibility ascribed to Satan, and will assuredly deceive those 
the most who most trust to him. Notwithstanding the friend* 
liness of your letter, it conveys to my mind^ combined with 
other circumstances, erroneously perhaps, an idea of a change 
in your opinions respecting past occurrences at Hyderabad. I 
have seen, in a letter from a perscm there, who is almost a 
stranger to me, addressed to another who is no friend, that you 
are understood to be a great admirer of ^^Mr. Bussell's system.'" 
What is precisely meant by that term I do not know; but it is 
evident that something opposite to my mode of proeeeding is 
intended. I hear also that you have> in the most public 
manner posnble, avowed your respect and admiration for Bos« 
sell's chflffaeter and conduct; Airther, that you admire Ghundoo 
Lall, and defend the conduct of Sir W. Bumbold and Mr. 


W. Palmer. I ask myself, can all this be tnie? Isit poeedble 
that 70a can have imlnbed sentiments which would warrant 
such constructions?. If you have, I r^ret the change most on 
public grounds, for I can hardly think tiiat the Resident at 
Hyderabad can entertain such opinions without injurious con- 
sequences. I shall r^ret it also on my own account; for I 
would lather have had my opnions confirmed by yoxu:8, and 
should have been proud of the alliance of our names in what I 
believe to be the cause of truth, honor, and right principle; 
but I shall have my consolation, even if I stand idone, and 
shall not be ashamed of my singularity, in the opinions which 
I entertain, and the oonduot which I pursued, on Hydera- 
bad affidn. I must seem to you to speak with more certainty 
as to your sentiments than anything in your letter would 
justify. The fiu^t is, that you are already set down by the 
partisans of corruption as the patron of that cause, which I had 
for five years to combat; and you and Russell are classed 
together, by his friends, in contrast with your humble servant. 
My regret exceeds my surprise. I am well acquainted with 
the state of opinions at Hyderabad. I can conceive what feel- 
ings you will have found established there, and how and by 
whom you will have been beset. The Residency has come 
into your hands in a very different condition from that in 
which I found it You have not seen what I saw; you have 
not had to feel what I felt; you have not been exposed to 
what it was my duty to combat Tour opinions on one side 
could not be so strong as mine; and you will have been assailed 
by an overwhelming mass on the other. I shall, I acknow- 
ledge, observe your course with anxiety. Do not misunder- 
stand what I have said. I giveto you what I claim for myself, 
and what I condemn odiers for not allowing me— I give you 
credit for exercising your judgment with perfect integrity of 
motive. I admit and maintain that you must take your own 
opinions for your guidance, and as you think, so must you act. 
I shall never doubt the excellence of your intentions, however 
^'ide the difference may be between your sentiments and mine. 




Every man mufit follow his own. Mine on Hydeiabad aflbin 
are fixed as a rock; and if those of all the world were against 
me, that circumstance would not shake me in the slightest degree. 
I do not see cause to retract one word that I have ever said or 
written against the abominable corruption which prevailed at 
Hyderabad. I have said, and it is now in print, that it tainted 
the whole atmosphere. The expression was scarcely figurative. 
It was almost literally true, for go where one might, the smdl 
of it was sickening. If you have leisure and inclination, I 
shall be happy to compare sentiments with you on all points. 
I am too interested in Hyderabad affiurs not to have the incli- 
nation; and I will make the leisure, whether I have it or not. 
It may be otherwise with you; and, if so, do not suppose that 
I wish to propose what may be disagreeable. With respect to 
my own sentiments, I am willing that they should be thoroughly 
sifted, and exposed to any ordeal. I am so strongly convinced 
of their justness, that I dread nothing but misrepresentation 
and misapprehension. Before I conclude, allow me to thank 
you for the consideration which you have kindly shown to- 
wards those to whom I had promised appointments in the 
Nizam's service. 


Sir, — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
despatch of the 4th of May, transmitting copies of correspond- 
ence with the Resident at Hyderabad, relative to the progress 
of operations for the improvement of the Nizam's country. 

The interest which I must naturally take, both in the results 
of past proceedings in that country, and in its future prospects, 
will, I trust, be deemed a sufficient reason for the submission of 
a few remarks with reference to the contents of those documents. 

The general result therein described of our interposition for 

* The original of this paper is without date; but it seems to hare been 
written in the summer of 1826. 


the amelioration of affidn in the Nizam's territories is highly 
satisCsuitorj, as well as the prospect of future advancement in 
proq)erity. I do not propose to trouble yon with any detailed 
obseryationSi either on these matters generally, or on those 
particular points on which I have the honor of entirely con- 
curring in the opinions expressed by the present Rodent. 
My remarks wiU be confined to those questions on which I see 
ground to entertain sentiments in some degree differing from 
his, or which may seem to call for some explanation on my 

In accounting for the alleged partial failure of some of the 
village setdements conducted by British officers in the Nizam's 
country, it appears to me that too much stress is laid by the 
Resident on causes which did not operate injuriously to any 
great extent; namely, the supposed inexperience of the officers 
employed, and the assumed inequality of the assessments, when, 
in reality, the counteraction of the Minister, the exactions of 
his officers, the want of vigilant superintendence in some places, 
and local influence advei]^ to the success of the settiement in 
others, were the effectual causes of failure wherever it has 

Speaking of these setdements generally, it is acknowledged 
that tiiey have rendered great benefit. To them alone do I 
ascribe our success in checking the extortions of the Nizam's 
Minister and his local officers. By no other proceeding could 
that object have been accomplished. Without limiting the 
demand on each communis, and ascertaining the limit, we 
could not have prevented tiie licentious exactions which pre- 
vailed. That prevention was the main object of the measure. 
In proportion as we have accomplished that object, our plan 
has succeeded; in proportion as we have failed in that object 
our plan has failed. 

The success has been so extensive, notwithstanding the nume* 
rous obstacles which were adverse, that, although in this, as in 
almost every other arrangement ever adopted, it may be un- 
questionably true that it has not in every particular instance 


^oalty soeoeeded, the general chanMsler of the Bieemure may 
gaffer undue dispaiagement by magnifyixig de&ctB whidi, al- 
though undeniable in some degree, were in bid very little, if 
at all, instnimental in producing any failure thatmay haire been 

There was no oonoeit that, in roperinlaiding Tillage aeltle* 
ments, we were introducing any improyement on the inetitu- 
tione of the oountry. We were only following an eatabliahed 
mode of aasesBing the revenue common to Indian Govenunents, 
and familiar to the cultivators of the Nizam's dominions. 

If the Minister oould have he&a depended on, he did not 
need instruction from us in forming revenue eetllftmcntH. We 
merely did what he would have done, if he had cared fox 
anything but the power of eztracldng the utmost piocnxable 
sum of money; and by limiting his demand within fixed 
boundaries, the great objeot of our village settlements was ac- 

It seems to me to have been too readily admitted that the 
inezperienoe of the offioers employed in the first settlement has 
to any serious extent affected the operation of that arrange- 
ment. They were necessarily inexperienced. So are thoee^ for 
the most part, who are now employed. So^ firom the nature of 
the service, officers empbyed in civil duties in the Nizam's 
oountry are generally likely to be when first called on to dis- 
charge those duties. Butitdoes not strike me that our first set- 
tlements in the Nizam's country went wrong in any great degree 
firom the inexperience of the offioers ^nj^oyed. What they 
may have wanted in experience was mote than counterbalanced, 
in my opinion, by their talents, zeal, and judgment 

There are two modee of making village settlements; and, 
with attention, either may be mastered in a short time, without 
the advantage of previous experience. 

One, very detailed, in which every minute particular neces- 
sary to the defining of the amount of the Government right to 
a hair, is accurately learned and recorded by the ft«ft««i^^g 
officer, through personal examination and labor, on the spot. 


TinBj from the time which it requires in ezecntioii, could not 
haTO been used with e£bct in our fiiBt aettlementB in the 
Nizam's country, and never, perhaps, can be, to any extent, by 
the tew European officers theteta employed. Neither does it 
seem to be very necessary, if the general value of assets be 
known with moderate conectnesB, although highly useful as a 
reBouice to adjust disputes and prevent imposition* 

The second mode is, to be guided by the village accounts, 
and the general knowledge of aasets possessed by the officers of 
Government and the village people, taking advantage of all the 
information to be obtained on ihe spot, without the delay of 
measuring and appraising every separate field and acre; and 
this, I am of opinion, will generally be found sufficient for the 
purposes of an ordinary village settlement, the only danger of 
very serious consequence to be guarded against being that of 
over-assessment, and even this, if fidlen into, being susceptible 
of an easy remedy, iqpplicable at any time. 

lliis mode was the one adopted by the officers employed in 
the first settlements in the Niaam's country. They had the 
officers of the Government to advocate the Government rights, 
the viUagers to plead their own, the accounts of both parties, 
with the records of past assessments and oolledaons, to refer to, 
and local information and evidence to assist their judgment. 
I see no reason to suppose that the means were not generally 
efficient for the end; and if the inezpmence of the officers 
then employed was neoessarily to preclude a just and equitable 
assessment, I do not know what means are even now provided 
to secure that object in the settlements which are to come. 

Wherever the settlement has had £dr play, the result, I be- 
lieve, will be found satisfiictory ; but the mere forming of a 
settlement must have been delusive where it was not main- 
tained by vigilant superintendence ; and wherever the settle- 
ments may seem to have failed, the true causes, I venture to 
say, would be found in the absence of local superintendence, 
and in the consequent counteraction of the officers of the 
Niaam's Government Wherever, fiK>m inattention, the system 


of eztordon has been able to make head, the real iailare k ifi 
our neglecting to nudntain our cjieck, and not in the defects of 
the settlement. 

The most favorable specimen of the results of our village 
settlement would be found, I conceive, in the districts super- 
intended by Captain John Sutherland, and subsequently by 
Captain Eric Sutherland, for those districts have had the 
benefit of continued able and vigilant supervision. 

An inferior state of prosperity I should expect to be found 
in the Aurungabad division, where, although able and zealooa 
officers have been employed, from the deaths of three super- 
intendents, the illness and absence of others, and consequently 
frequent changes and introduction of new agents, portions of 
those districts were for a long time almost abandoned to the 
Minister's subordinates, so that neither, probably, has the set- 
tlement been faithfully preserved, nor have its defects, which 
ought to have been watched in its progress, been remedied* 

I am far from supposing that the setdement was universally 
free from defects. What settlement that has ever taken place 
in the Company's territory can boast of such a character? But 
the main defects to be apprehended are over-assessment from 
error, or under^asscssment from fraud, for either of which 
the government always has the remedy in its own hands, and 
neither, with proper superintendence, can operate injuriously to 
any great extent. Under-assessment is no injury to the village; 
and against over-assessment at the time of setdement there is 
the security that the village community will not assent to an 
exorbitant demand; but if they do, and the assessment be ex- 
cessive, the defect can be remedied as soon as discovered. 

All the evib,' therefore, of such inequalities of assessment as 
may not unnaturally occur in an extensive arrangement, and 
have hitherto been found unavoidable in our own provinces, 
may be, and ought to be, rectified in the course of the superin- 
tendence to which the assessed villages be afterwards subjected; 
but if the requisite checks on exaction be neglected, and those 
whose sole object is extortion be allowed to work uncontrolled^ 


ihen not only will the defects of the settlement remain unreme- 
died, but ill its benefits will be lost 

In some instances, in the first settlement in the Aurungabad 
division, the assessment for the latter years of the period was 
run up to an amount greatly in excess of that of the first years 
of ihe settlement. This was done in the expectation of great 
efieots from the influx of prosperity; and the people agreed to 
it, either firom the same expectation, or firom mere short- 
sightedness, or from an idea that the arrangement would not 
last so long as the end of the term. The conduct of the Govern- 
ment r^arding these settlements required vigilant attention. 
It was my anxious desire that they should be scrutinised and, 
if necessaiy, revised; but I fear that the frequent change of 
superintendents prevented the execution of this intention; for, 
whenever it was taken in hand, some death, or other unavoidable 
acddent, prevented its completion. 

In the eastern {md south-^stem divisions, the influence of 
the district officers enabled them and the Minister in concert to 
thwart the successful accomplishment of the object of a village 
settlement. The main object was to limit exaction from the 
several communities. The object of both the parties above men- 
tioned was to render exaction unchecked and unknown. The 
European superintending officer was not armed with the powers 
necessary to enable him to counteract such a combination; and 
the natural consequence was, that our interference was not so 
successful in those districts as in others where the influence of 
the hereditary district officers was less predominant. 
' I do not concur with the Resident in attaching any material 
consequence to the circumstance that in many instances in 
these districts the officers designated Putwarees were the inter- 
mediate negotiators of the terms of assessment fixed on the 
separate villages. Those were the only head men existing in 
the villages, and were, for all practical purposes^ the local 
Patels. In whatever respect their actual character may have 
been inconsistent with the original one of their office, that was 
an effect of a state of things preceding our interference, and not 


xvBulting from it. We found tfaem the sole lood Tilkge 
manageiB, and, in dealing with the Tillage oonmunuliei aepa- 
Eatelyy had none otheci to i^^7 to. 

What mode of settlement may be best ion die aonth-eaafeem 
and eastern districts, with zefiBvenoe to the natore of their culti- 
vation, and the overbearing influence of the district oBoaa, is 
a question on which doubts may justly be enteitaiaed; and I 
am much disposed to hold the same opinions that aie ezpceased 
by the Besident on that point; but whatever mode be adopted, 
unless it be one which shall give us the power of knowing the 
extent of demand against each community, and of preventing 
exactions in excess to that limits we shall fidl in the object of 
our interiexenoe. Village settlements were recommended by 
the advantage which they seemed to secure of putting that 
power into our hands. 

I cannot acquiesce in the supposition that our village settle- 
ments actually deranged the connexion of the diattiot officers 
with the village oommunities, which seema to be inqdied in a 
portion of the Berident's report; for in those parts for which 
the village settlement was best suited, whese the influencft of 
the district officers was least predominant, the settfemmt 
scarcely in any degree a£Eected the zektions of the parties, the 
district officers being engaged in carrying it into execution aa 
a measure to which they were accustomed, while in those parts 
in which the district officers had usurped an overbearing 
power, they contrived, in combination with the Minister, to 
render the settlement neariy nugatory. 

That the evil of inequdity in the settlements was not very 
notorious or conspicuous, may be fairly argued, fix>m the fiust 
that the Minister proposed and, until urged, insbted on a oon- 
tinuance, for another series of years, of the assesement of each 
village as it stood at the termination of the period of the last 
settlement. The propodtion was injudicious, because advan- 
tage ought to have been taken of the terminatbn of the 
former settlement to correct its inequalities and imperfections 
in a new arrangement; but it must be admitted that the 


Ifiiiister ivho made that pro|K)eitkHi9 and who has never been 
accaaerl of ignoxanoet could not have had on his mind any im- 
prasdon of the psvalenoe of any vexy mbchieyouB inequality 
in the MPcmmenta, He most have heen satisfied, suppoeing 
the proposition to be anoere, that the actual a uB u ssm ent was 
adequate to the lawful claims of the GoTemment, and, never- 
tbetesB, not oTerborde&some for liie people; and nothing more 
SBtisfiMsto^ can be said in &Tor of any settlemoit. 

The Beodent bears a similar testimony to the general aoca- 
xaey of the fiist settlements. In noticing the increasing rate 
on which they were formed, he observes, that the amount of 
the first year's assessment has been folly paid for every year, 
bat that the amount of arresr for the whole tearm generally 
coincides with the augmented demand for the same period. 
This would argue, if no allowance be made for bad seasons, 
^nbezzlement, and n^leot of superintendence, that the assess- 
ment for thefirst year was wonderfully accurate ; and^ if due 
aUowance be made for those drawbacks, it may fiurly be 
inferred that, with good seasons and vigilant supervision, the 
augmentatiQii might have been realised. As it is proposed 
to continue the highest rate of that augmentation in the 
ensuing settlement, it must be admitted that it is not deemed 
too high for the improved resources of the country; and I am 
inclined to believe that, on examination, it would be found 
that the augmented assessment hitherto has very generally 
been realised from the villages, whethw brought to the credit 
of the government or not. The latter point depends on the 
vigilance of superintendence, not on the assessment itself; the 
accuracy of which is to be judged of from what the villages 
have actually paid without injury. 

These results of the first settlements, indicated by the Minis- 
ter's proposals and the observations of the Resident, are more 
fimnable than I could have hoped to see established ; and 
wherever any failure has occurred, I am confident that it may 
most justly be attributed ^ther to the counteraction of the 
Minister and the district officers, or to the want of vigilant 


cbecki or to a oombination of boib cBcaaea, and not to defects 
in the settlement; because it was an indispensable part of our 
interference to remedy these defects when they were per- 
ceiyedi and they would have been perceived where a proper 
superintendence and check were maintained. 

The officers engaged in effecting the first settlements are 
entitled, I conceive, to the highest praise, and I am sony to 
see their services disparaged by ascribing to their inexperience 
what other causes have been much more active in producing. 
Those who come after them have the benefit of their labois, 
without the same difficulties which they had to encounter. 
All the substantial good done in the Nizam's country has pro- 
ceeded from the village settlements; and if we underrate their 
value, there is some danger ihat we may throw away the ad- 
vantages which they have caused. 

It seems that the Mmister has spontaneously proposed to re- 
gulate the assessment in the ensuing settlement by the standard 
of the past, instead of levying the increased rent, which would 
have been warranted by augmented assets. 

I am at a loss to understand this proposal as coming firom 
the Minister. It appears to be an unnecessary sacrifice of the 
just rights and lawful resources of the Government, which, the 
expenditure being in excess to the income, is not intelligible. 
It is quite incompatible with his real character to relinquish 
anything that he expects to be able to exact To limit his 
demand to the amount of the last assessment, is also inoon- 
sbtent with his repeated complaints to the effect that the last 
assessment was too low. He must either, therefore, be con- 
vinced that the amount of assessment is as much as can now be 
levied with justice to the country, or he must have some 
sinister motive in the proposal; and a desire to have a resource 
for underhand exactions, distinct from the revenue brought to 
account, is not an improbable one. I acknowledge my scep- 
ticism, founded on several years' intimate observation of his 
character, as to his sincerely intending to confer a boon on the 
people by a voluntary surrender of the public revenue. As this 


object, howevery is pretended, I trust that his counteraction of 
it will be prevented by the vigilance of the Resident and the 
local superintendents. 

Of the measure itself I do not perceive the advantage. The 
expiration of the last settlement afforded an opportunity for 
remedying any defects which might have existed in it by a new 
adjustment of the assessment. There was no necessity for 
presong hard on the people. The Government might have 
been as liberal as it could afford to be. It might have relin- 
quished as great a portion as possible of its lawful demand; it 
might have made its boon to the people, if that was really the 
object, as extensive as could be, consistent with the public exi- 
gencies; but there was no reason for throwing away the oppor- 
tunity of equaliang the burdens of the assessment by a new 
adjustment; nor do I perceive any sufficient for rejecting 
the benefit of an increase of revenue, if it could be obtained 
under a just and moderate assessment. 

It is^ however, clear to me, supposing the Minister to have 
had no worse motive for the proposal, that it proceeded^ not 
from a dedre to relinquish just revenue, which was merely the 
color which he chose to give to it, but from an apprehensiveness 
that a new settlement might possibly reduce the actual assess- 
ment. This is the most honest motive that he is capable of 
having entertained; and to his mind, always haunted with tho 
dread of a diminution, from the operation of our interference, 
of means to support his expenditure, it was not an unnatural 
one. Its working is traceable in the manner in which it was 
dengned to carry the proposal into eSect. 

At first, every village, without regard to actual assets, or in- 
equalities of assessment, either proceeding from original error, 
or firom changes in circumstances, was to have had precisely the 
same burden continued: and this scheme was for some time 
persevered in, notwithstanding the representations of the local 
superintendents, European and native. Had it been finally 
carried through, the consequences obviously must have been, 
that in villages where the assessment was in any degree too 


high, thoee villages would be oppreand and nnned, and ibe 
govenunent would lose its lerenue; while in Tillages imder- 
assessed, the goyemment would not recover its just rights, nor 
recompense itself for the loss sustained in those over-assesBel. 

The ccimction ihat such consequences were inevitable eoold 
not be permanently resisted; and the scheme was so fiur aban- 
doned as to admit a readjustment of the assessment of viUagea; 
but it was at the same time resolved that no diflforenoe should 
take place in the amount of the revenue of each Purgunnah. 

If this mode were not fully as objectionsble as the odier^ it 
could only be less so on the supposition that no general over- 
assessment had taken place in any Purgunnah. Of this I am 
not sure; nor is the suppontion oonastent with the notion of 
any great defects in the first settlement; bnt even if that be 
admitted, it is still fiur fix>m improbable that diflkrent par- 
gunnahs may have been unequally assessed, or that unevea- 
nesses requiring levelling may since have arisen; and on the 
same grounds on which it is desirable that the asNsnnent of 
villages should be equalised, it is not less so ihat the assessment 
of Purgunnahs also should be equalised. 

If we suppose the case of a Purgunnah actually over«ssesndt 
the equalisation of the assessment of the villages of that pur- 
gunnah must lead to the over-assessing of alL Such an asBsaa- 
ment^ it is clear, could not stand ; and unless remedied in time, 
would end in ruin to the Purgunnah and loss of revenue to the 

The right course, on the terminati(m of the old settlement, 
manifestly would have been to e£fect a new one on just and 
moderate principles, according to assets^ If increased revenue 
had accrued to the Government, I do not see that it would 
have been objectionable, conmdering its exigencies; but that 
might have been relinquished, or taken according to dream- 
stances. At all events, the opportunity would not have been 
lost of equalising the burden and alleviating the pressure 
wherever it might be unusually severe. 

That this obvious course was not followed| can only, in my 


mind, be aoconnted for bjr ike sapposition already suggested, 
that the Miniater iras apprehensiye of loss of revenue from a 
new flSHesBment according to assets; not, peihaps, from a doabt 
of the snfficiencj of assets, bat from a fisar that the officers 
employed might be too Hberal to the people in fixing the 

On the scheme adopted for the new settlement, while the 
trouble of a fresh assessment of all the Tillages in each Por- 
gunnak is to be gone through, in order professedly to equalise 
the assessments of yiUages^ neither will the assessments of Par- 
gnnnahs be equalised, nor will those of villages with relation to 
villages of other Pmrgunnahs. Unless, therefore, the assess* 
ments of Purgunnahs be already equal, the assessments of vil- 
lages most remain unequal At the same time, the posmble 
benefit of increased revenue will be thrown away, and no ad- 
vantage will be gained beyond that of equalising the assessment 
of villages with relation to villages in the same Purgunnah; an 
operation, after all, of no certainty, unless a perfection be antici- 
pated in the new settlement, which never, perhaps, was yet 
found in any village settlement, and for which a minuteness of 
informatioii ia necessary which can hardly be expected, con- 
sidering the mass of work to be done, and the paucity of 

If it is to be understood, as I brieve, that revenue which 
might have been obtained wiih justice and moderation has 
been relinquished in the new settlement, although the needless 
sacrifice may be lamented, it is gratifying to reflect that the 
fault is on the right side, and that the loss of reveirae to meet 
the demands of expenditure is a Kght evil compared with the 
fatal consequences of over^assessment 

The plan proposed by the Resident for the gradual reduction 
of the number of district officers is reccnnmended by the coo- 
sidentioas which he states; but there seems to me to be reason 
io doubt the expediency of our urging it as a scheme in which 
we take an interest; for its operation, which from humane and 
considerate motives is to be gradual, must be so tardy, as 


Bcaioely to have any eflbct during the period in which onr in- 
terference may be neceBaaiy, the day, I hope, not being im- 
measuxably remote when it may cease; and we cannot after- 
wards calcukte on a steady perseyenmce on the part of the 
Nizam's .Government in a systematic proceeding to which 
powerful interests will be opposed. In the mean time, the pro- 
gress of the measure will injure established privileges and con- 
ceived rights, and cause discontent in the whole class aflfected, 
the shafts of which the Minister will artfully throw <^ from 
himself upon us, while the connexion between him and them 
for the counteraction of our good intentions will be more closely 
kni^ and his co-operation in the measure itself will not pro- 
bably be cordiaL 

I conceive, therefore, without questioning the utility of the 
object, that our interference in this particular is likely to be 
inefficadous for good, while the evil to be removed is not of so 
crying a nature as to render our intervention indispoisable. 
The power of the district officers varies much in degree in the 
several parts of the Nizam's territories where di£brent practices 
prevaiL It may be usefully or injuriously exerted* Their 
embezzlements may be checked, their influence may be kept 
within proper bounds, by due vigilance. The cordial co-opera- 
tion of the Minister is, however, necessary; and their power is 
most mischievous and least assailable when exerdsed in league 
with him, to prevent the establishment of sure checks on irre- 
gular exaction. 

The judicial arrangements contemplated seem to be unex- 
ceptionable in theory. How they would work in practice is 
uncertain; and I confess that I entertain apprehensions adverse 
to any attempts to introduce new schemes of our own con- 
trivance, the permanence of which beyond the period of our 
actual interference cannot be relied on. As long as our inter- 
ference be confined to tiie prevention of manifest oppression, 
and to the support of the institutions which exist, we do good 
without innovation, and, at the proper time, can restore the 
entire management of tiie country to its sovereign in a state of 


unquestionable improrement, its machinery repaired and put in 
order, without being a£iected by change; but if we aim at legis- 
lation and the introduction of new systems founded on our 
theoretical notions, the practical e&ct is uncertain, the sincere 
concert of the Ministry for the time being cannot be secured, 
and it is most probable that our innovations will be subverted 
whenever we withdraw our interference, which ought always 
to be conducted with a view to its eventual cessation, and as a 
temporary course forced on us by necessity for the cure of 
obvious evils, not as a prelude to the introduction of our per« 
manent legislation into the country. 

I cannot profess to place much confidence in the accounts 
received from the Minister, as to either receipts or disburse- 
ments. In whatever particular he may have had an object in 
deceiving, he vrill, I have no doubt, have suited his account to 
his purpose; but the rendering of any account in any detail .is 
a considerable step gained, and lays the foundation for future 
check and control The success of the Resident on this point 
is of the highest importance. 

In the accounts, such as they are, it is impossible to avoid 
noticing the excessive proportion of the expenditure which 
passes through the hands of the Minister, his son, relatives, 
and dependants. In this Mahomedan State the holders of the 
public purse are almost entirely Hindoos. The Mahomedan. 
nobles, possessing any considerable share of advantage, do noL 
exceed three or four, including the nominal chief Minister. 

This state of things is not unnatural, under the circumstances' 
which have produced the entire usurpation of the powers of the 
Government by the Hindoo deputy. My motive in these re- 
marks is an anxiety that the same things may not be prospec- 
tively perpetuated by our influence, and that it may be borne 
in mind that the advantages held by Chundoo Lall's relatives 
and dependants are conferred by him during his temporary 
usurpation, but are not possessions which they are entitled to 
retain after the cessation of his power. I anticipate that this 
precaution will be found hereafter not to have been superfluous; 


for before now plenf have been agitated whieh fleemed to hafe 
in view the bereditaiy eaooenion of Chimdoo LellV eon to the 
abeolateaatocracywUohthefiithernowboUa; and socli plena, 
I have no doubt, continae tofonn a part of CSrandoo LalTs Bpe- 

The Reeidenty in notioing the Nimn^a conduct regarding a 
loan from the privy pune for the aervice oi the State, vemarks 
that it indicatea a aepaiate view of hia own inteieata, aa diatinct 
from thoae of hia Oovemment 

Hia view could acaroely be oiherwiaei oonuderii^ that he has 
80 long been excluded from any ahaie in hia Govemmentv that 
every attempt which he haa made to aaKrt hia aovereign li^ts 
haa been cruahed, either by our direct interpoaition, or by the 
aucceaaftd menace of it on the part of the uaorping Miz^ater, 
and that the Prince ia merely a State pensioner in hia own do- 

From thia condition of thraldom he might now, perhaps, 
emancipato himself, widiout opporition on our part; but it has 
been too long established to be eaaily caat off Hia mind, 
although not naturally, perhapa, incapable of fidfilEng the 
duliea of hia atation,muat have been affected by long deprearion 
and aeduaion. Nevertheless, he ia '* more ainned against than 
amning," and I can hardly imagine a situation more entitled 
to pity, or more calculated to disarm censure, than that of a 
prince so held in subjection by a servant, supported by an irre- 
ristible foreign power. 

The further reduction of the rate of interest at which money 
is raised for the use of the Nizam's Oovemment, by our inter- 
vention, to 9 per cent, is an additional refutation of those 
absurd falaehooda by which it was attempted to bolster up the 
character of the ruinoua loana from Measrs. W. Palmer and Co., 
to which their acquired influence gave all the eSect of our 
guarantee ; while tiie fitct stated by the Resident, that the 
Bliniater cannot borrow at a lowerrate tiian 24 or 26 per cent., 
ia a lamentable proof of the total want of credit attached to hia 


The Resident seems disposed to speak rather ^vorably of 
Chundoo Lall's conduct and disposition, and I respect the liberal 
spirit which induces him to do so. I can readily conceive that 
the conduct of that Minister may have really improved. He 
has seen the discomfiture of the interested intriguers who in- 
cited him to oppose and counteract our measures of reform. 
He must by this time be sensible that those measures do not 
proceed merely {torn a local Resident, acting with doubtful 
support, but emanate from the Gtovemmeni, to whose protection 
he is indebted for his power. Still I apprehend that his nature 
cannot be changed. Our interference is a check on him, and 
he cannot cordially relish it. I should &ar that too great con- 
fidence in his professions, smooth demeanour, and fiuale com- 
plianoe, might lead to a relaxation of that wholesome distrust 
and watchfulness which I conceive to be necessary to guard 
effectually against the vicious habits of his administration. All 
that has been gained might be lost by an injudicious reliance 
on his dnoerity. We have a powerfiU security in the acut^ 
nesB and distinguished ability of the present Resident; but 
ChnndooLalTs manner is winning and persuasive; his language 
18 plausible; and to avoid being deceived by him requires, per^ 
haps, those proofi of his faithlessness which the period of his 
straggle against our measures brought to my knowledge, and 
imprinted indelibly on my memory. 

We cannot safely forget that his long maladministration 
formed the necessity for our interference; that this now rests on 
the same ground; and that it mig|it at once be withdrawn if 
we could depend on the oncerity of his professed desire to 
govern the country without oppression. No one doubts his 
ability; we do not pretend to instruct him; nothing, in short, 
but the vicious character of his administration renders our inter- 
ference necessary. Ab we cannot trust to his oncerity so fax 
as to leave him to govern without control, we have the same 
ground for apprehending the too great probability of the 
opesation of his underhand counteraction whenever the oppor* 
tonity m&y be afforded, by any relaxation on our part, of our 
just mistrust and vigilance. 




[Tnittmitted to the GoTemor-Genenl, Lord Amhent^ June 8» 1824.] 

Our gi^t success in India has induced the systematic haUt 
of despising our enemies, and thence we ate liable to disasften 
and xeverses from which otherwise we might be preserved by 
the actual magnitude of our power and extent of our resooroes. 

Our Indian Empire is owing solely to our superiority in aims. 
It rests entirely on that foimdation. It is undermined bj evexy 
reverse, however trifling, and would not long withstand any 
serious indication of weakness. 

All India is at all times looking out for our downfall. The 
people everywhere would rejoice, or fancy that they would 
rejoice, at our destruction; and numbers are not wanting who 
would promote it by all means in their power. Our ruin, if it 
be ever commenced, will probably be rapid and sudden. There 
is, perhaps, no other power on earth, judging from the super- 
ficial nature of our tenure, between whose highest elevation 
and utter annihilation the interval would be so short. *^ Aut 
.Gffisar aut nullus." From the pinnacle to the abyss might be 
but one step. 

The fidelity of our native army, on which our existence dc- 
pends, depends itself on our continued success. Its courage 
and confidence must be fed by victory, and would not survive 
repeated defeat and disaster. 

These sentiments are not new. They are applicable to all 
.times in our Indian history, since our power became predomi- 
nant. They lie dormant, perhaps, in days of peace and appa* 


lent security; but tlie slightest disaster rouses them into .active 

The Goorkha war taught us a serious lesson on this subject. 
Though> ultimately successful, it commenced with numerous 
failures of various descriptions. The superiority of our troops 
over the Goorkhas became doubtful, Zr^ to speak more plainly, 
the superiority of the Goorkha troops in mountain warfare 
seemed to be manifest, and a coiresponding sensation was created 
in our army. 

Owing to the character of the enemy, more than any other 
cause, our several divisions in the first campaign, excepting 
those of Sir David Ochterlony and Colonel Nicolls, proved in- 
adequate to the purposes for which they were destined, and it 
became necessary to reinforce them. Tlie judicious caution of 
the former, and equally judicious energy of the latter, imder 
different circumstances, closed that campaign with -victory, 
which otherwise would have terminated, as it commenced, in 
general discomfiture. 

Referring to the events of those days, it is a matter of con- 
gratulation that the divirion ordered to penetrate to Elat- 
mandhoo, in the first campaign, did not make the attempt, for 
if it had entered the hills in the weak columns directed to 
advance by different routes, it is not improbable, from what 
we afterwards learned of the character of the enemy, that our 
several detachments would have been cut off and destroyed. 

Our success was ultimately considerable in the first campaign, 
during which, however, we had, I believe, about forty battalions 
employed against the enemy, in numerous divisions. 

Li the second campaign we took warning from the errors of 
the first, and the war was terminated by directing a large and 
apparently sufficient force — not less, I believe, than sixteen thou- 
sand men, including three regiments of Europeans — against the 
enemy's capital, which operation brought him to submit to the 
peace which we dictated. 

The Burmans have commenced the war with us in a manner 
which perhaps was little expected. They have the advantage 


of first soocesB, and we hare the difladvantage of dinater, wUdi 
18 likely, in however small a degree it may have taken place, to 
be of worse conseqnence to ns than it wodd be to ai^ other 
power in the world, becatise omemitting socoeflB is afanoat neoes- 
sary for our existence. As yet we only know of the deatmction 
of Captain Noton's detachment. If after this ihe Bommns be 
checked without furliher success on their part, the doud may 
for ihe present pass over, to bunt on some future day if we do 
not adopt the requisite measures of caution to guard against a 
repetition of such disasters. But if ihe Burmans contimie in a 
triumphant conrse for any connderable lengih of time, ihe con- 
sequences cannot be f ore s een . 

It is evident that we have an insuffideney of troops widiin any 
moderate distance of the scene of invanon, and that die pr o gr e ss 
of the enemy has carried alarm to Dacca and even to Oalcatta, 
where alarm has not been felt fi:om an external enemy since the 
time of Surajah Doula and ihe Hack-hole. 

To oppose this apparently unexpected invasion, we are diiveo 
to ihe necesdty of reinfordng our troops in danger by eepazate 
small detachments, which, if they cannot immediatdy form a 
jxmctiion with the corps to be released from jeopardy, may be 
separately cut off 1^ ihe enemy. We want a laige coUeeted 
force to drive ihe enemy from our country in the first instance, 
and act afWwards as may be deemed advisable. 

The efiect of our expedition by sea against ihe Barman ter- 
ritories cannot be reckoned on with any certainty. We must 
not trust to that alone, but should adopt such measures as 
are rendered necessary by ihe circumstances in which we are 

We are engaged in a contest with the Burmans on ihe whde 
lengtb of the eastern frontier of our Bengal possesrions. Our 
enemies appear not to be deficient in either spirit or numb^B; 
and we must bring numbers as well as spirit to oppose them. 

We ought to cany twenty or thirty ihousand men to Aat 
fiK>ntier— or whatever number, more or less, may ensure undis- 
puted success. We cannot retire fix>m the contest with eidier 


honor or uaSatyt xmlrm we deady Q8tfd>UaIi our eoperioiitjr to 
the oonviction of our enemy* and of all powea who are speo- 
tatoxs of the game. 

With two effident and diapoflaUe annies of ten or twelve 
thousand men each, complete in every necessary aon and every 
xequinte equipment^ and especially abundant in ordnance, one 
in the northerns and the other in the southern division ix£ the 
hostile boundary, ezduaive of the usual guards of statbns and 
depdti^ we may expect to be able to drive the enemy before us; 
but if the service should demand more than that foioe we must 
provide it. 

The «q»dienoy of invading the enemy's country fiom Ben* 
gal, the ibroe fit for that undertaking, and the detaib conse- 
quMt on such a deaign, aiepcnntsfor oonsidemtiontaadxequiie 
for dedaon more knowledge than I can pretend to possess; 
but whether we invade the enemy's country or defend our own, 
we muat exert ouiselves to establish our superiority beyond 

The troops required on our Bengal frontier may be collected 
from the upper provinces under the Bengal Presidency, and 
frosn the Madras and Bombay Presidencies^ or the itoofB of 
those Prndeodes may be used to relieve those of Bengal in. 
the interior of India* 

To mpfij die place of those fionished from the northeniand? 
western pvoviaees of oinr Bengal dominions^ an additienal fineoe- 
mnst be raised lor eernee during the war, lor our Bei^^al army 
is very much aoatteied in small bodies, and it is not safe to 
kaw any part of the country destitute of tmops in tinw of 
conttsotioa. The Madras territories are mive, oompaot, and 
nofe^ theieforo^ better able to spue troops without lepladng 
them; but a considerable force has ahready been sent £Bam that 
Presidency on the expedition, and it mighty pediaps» be ne- 
ceawry to replace ferther drnfW by additional levies af 80m% 
description for internal duties. 

The most speedy mode of supplying an apparent^ and even- 
tually a real increase of force, is by ^e formation of temporary 


battalionii, compoeed of detachments of two or mote oompames 
from each battalion not employed on actual service, the vm* 
cancies in the battalions furnishing the detachments to be re- 
filled by recruiting. This measure was had recourse to par^llj 
in the Ooorkha war: battalions were formed from flank com* 
panics of corps, and the deficiencies in those corps occasioned 
by that operation were filled up. Thus an apparent increase 
was at once produced, and a real increase in the most speedjr 
manner possible. After the war, the detached companies xe» 
turned to the respective corps to which they permanently be- 
longed; and the supernumerary Sepoys were absorbed by de- 
grees in the standing army. The same process adopted gene- 
rally at the three Presidencies would give a very conaderable 
increase, with the shortest practicable delay and the least pos- 
mbb inconvenience. 

Another mode of raising a temporary force is by levies, or 
extra battalions, which may afterwards be fully officered, if the 
necessity continue, or be absorbed in the permanent corps of 
the army after the exigency shall have ceased. 

The expense of an increase of our force is an obvious ob- 
jection; but no war can be carried on without expense, and 
those measures are, in the end, the least expensive which tend 
to prevent disaster, and bring the war to the most speedy 
termination. A few more battalions stationed in Chittagong 
would have prevented the invasion of the Burmans in that 
quarter; and we shall probably lose more, merely in a pecu- 
niary sense, exclusively of higher considerations, from that 
invasion, than we should have lost by the previous levying of 
many additional battalions, if this had been deemed necessary. 

In such a war it would seem to be a proper measure to have 
an efficient force at the capital: at least the full complement of 
the station in times of peace. It is to be hoped that Calcutta 
will never be in real danger; but the presence of a powerful 
force would prevent those alarms which, spreading everywhere 
from the capital, are abundantly mischievous. It would also 
enable us speedily to reinforce any point menaced, and would 


have been of great service, most probably, on the first occur- 
rence of the present invasion of Chittagong. 

It is not pretended, in the hasty remarks herein thrown to- 
gether, to suggest any plan of operations against the enemy, but 
merely to call attention to the belief, strongly impressed on my 
mind, that there is real danger to our whole empire in India 
from the slightest reverse at any point whatever, if it be not 
speedily and efiectually repaired. The intelligence spreads like 
wildfire, and immediately excites the hopes and speculations of 
the millions whom we hold in subjugation. It therefore be- 
comes a most important part of our policy, at all times and 
under all dicumstances, to prevent disaster by precaution, or 
to check it when it has occurred by exertions suited to the 
occasion. The Burmans have now caused the necessity. Let 
us put forth our strength to prevent further misfortune, and 
crush the evil before it be fraught with more extensive injury 
and greater peril. 

(Trom a letter written, at a Bomewhat later period, to Lord Amherst, the 
folloiriiig passage is extracted, chiefly because it indicates what I have often 
heard doubted, that our dealings with so remote a power as that of Bormah 
have mnch effect upon the minds of the princes and people of Upper India. 
«' roar Lordship," wrote Sir Charles Metcalfe, " will probably have heard 
from varions quarters that the Burmese war has excited the strongest sen- 
sation throughout Lidia. Everything of an unprosperous character has been 
exaggerated and magnified. Delay in decided success has been represented 
as entire failure and disastrous defeat. Our real victories and the exploits 
of our troops have been unnoticed, while the most wanton and extravagant 
reports of our i4[>proaching downfall have gained credit. I have seen a native 
p^ier stating that the Commander-in-Chief had been killed in an action with 
the Burmans near to Calcutta, and that your Lordship had put an end to 
yourself by poison. All this, I conceive, may be attributed as much to the 
wishes as to the expectations of a people who are accustomed to devolution 
and versatile in their opinions, and who loathe our rule as that of Aliens in 
Country, Blood, Color, B^ligion, Habits, and Feelings. The multitude have 
of course been worked upon by the malicious practices of the designing. 
Decided success, however, will work a wonderful change in their notions of 
the stability of our power. On every account I hope and trust that your 
Lordship's measures wiU be crowned by the perfect submission of the enemy, 
and the conquest of an honorable peace, attended by security on our eastern 





Qamoui. QoBsnow o» LmatrMMOB w m 0«- 
ouim ov OTHBE Staom.— It if pwwin-d to te ««w«2 
aoknowladgMl. a. a geaenl principle, thM *e <»^ i-* to 
intstfewinflieiiitemiaaffiunof otharStrtw; «»dtli«M»" 
emdaed by th« repaired OJdeii of Ae Court of Diw»t«. 

But we are contmually compeUed to deviate fiom tta« roie, 
which is found untenable in practice ; and the deviation is 
generally laactfoned, and »ometiine« directed, by fte •»& •»- 

F^lartuioe, it eeema that interfewnoe to prevent tih« ewb 
of a dimuted ioocewon hat b«m woendy aaAotiMd, in v» 
temptation of ihe event of Sindhiah's death, aMioogh o«t ia- 
terf^ce in the affldn of his Government !« leas obviowj 
necessaiy than in cases where our supremacy is openly avowed 

and adknowWged. „ . _ ,. 

We have by degiees booome die paramoont State of la*a- 
Although we ewxrisedihe powers of this supremacy i» »My 
instances before 1817, we have used and saeetted them more 
generally dnoe the extension of our influence by the events of 
that and the following year. 

It ihen became an established prinmple of our poUoy to 
TH f i io^in tranquillity among all the States of India, and to pw- 
vent the anarchy and misrule which were likely to disturb the 
general peace. 

Sir John Maloohn's proceedings in Malwah were governed 


by ASb pxiaeiple, as well as those of Siv David Odhteilony in 

In die caseof snooemon to a prindpality, it seems clearly in- 
emnbent on us, vnAt lefeienoe to that principle, to xefuse to 
acknowledge any but the lawful sneoessor, as otherwise we 
flhoold throw ihB weight of cor power into the scale of nsor* 
pation and injnstioe. Our influence is too pervading to adndt 
of neutrality, and 8u£ferance would operate as BoppOftL 

¥rhether we ought to interfere in the formation of an admi- 
nistration for tiie government of a country is a much more die* 
putable question; and such are the evils of this land of inter* 
ferenoe, tiiat we ought, I conceive^ to avoid it whenever this he 

Interference of this nature must be disgusting to the head of 
the Government, whether Prince or Regent, Either, as at 
Hyderabad, ihe Minister, supported by our power, will become 
the sole rukr, to the esEolusion of the Prince, or, as at Jyepoxe^ 
tiie first opp(nrtnnity supposed to be finrorable will be seiaed for 
ejecting the Minister. 

Our original interference at Hyderabad in the nomination of 
a Minister has led to the neceoity of further interferenoe in 
the internal affidn of the Miaam's Government; and such is 
the natural consequence of the previous step, as we undoubtedly 
become lesponrible for the misrule of an administration which 
is imposed on a country by our influence. 

In order, therefore, to avoid ihe gradual eaetension of our t&i* 
teifaence in all die internal concemB of foreign States, it is of 
' an dungs most necessary to refirain fiom setting up a Minater 
who is to be supported by our power. 

If the Prince be' of age, he ought to have ezblusiv^y the 
regulation of his Ministry. If the Prince be a minor, the oon- 
stitution of each State will point out ihe proper person to 
exercise the powers of Regency during the minority, and that 
person, for the time, must stand in the place of the Prince. 

Such misrule may posribly occur as will compel us to inte^ 
fere, diher for the interests of the minor Prince, or for the pre- 


serration of general tranquillity, the exiatenoe of wbidi is 
endangered by anarchy. In such an extreme caae^ the defx>- 
sition of the culpable R^^ncy, and the nomination of another, 
according to the customs of the State, with full powers, would 
be preferable to the appointment of a Minister, with our sup- 
port, under the Regency; for this latter arrangement can hardly 
fail to produce either a divided and inefficient Goyemment, or 
an odious usurpation. 

With respect, therefore, to all States over which our supre- 
macy extends, our duty requires that we should support the 
legitimate succession of the Prince, while policy seems to dic- 
tate that we should, as much as possible, abstain firom any 
further interference in their affidrs. 

These observations do not apply to States beyond the sphere 
of our supremacy, such as those of Lahore and Nepal These 
are situated without the external boundaries of our Indian 
dominion. We are not imder any obligation to guarantee the 
legitimate subcesaon in those States; neither does policy seem 
to demand that we should interfere in any way in Xhgic con- 
cerns. We would not, it may be presumed, hastily recognise 
an usurpation in either of those States; but we should not 
be called on to interfere to prevent it, unless the tranquillity 
of our own territories were actually menaced. 

But with regard to those States which are within the belt of 
our supremacy, and consequently under our protection, in- 
cluding the States of Rajpootana, Malwah, and the Dekkan, 
we cannot be indifierent spectators of long-continued anarchy 
therein without ultimately giving up India again to the pillage 
and confusion from which we rescued her in 1817-18. 

We attempted to act on the principle of non-interference 
after the peace of 1806. We had succeeded to Sindhiah as lord 
paramount of the Sikh States between the Sutlej and the Jumna; 
but we abstained from exereising the authority which we had 
acquired. Some of these States had internal dissensions which 
they called on us to settle. We replied that it was contrary to 
our system to interfere in the affiiirs of other States. The dis- 


appomted parties applied to Runjeet Singh. He was not loth ; 
and after feeling his way cautiously, and finding no opposition 
fiom us, gradually extended his power and influence over the 
whde country between the SuUej and the Jumna. It became 
the principal buaness of our negotiation with him in 1808-9 to 
remedy this mischief, by throwing his power back beyond the 
Sutlej, which was accomplished with considerable difficulty, 
great reluctance on his part, and a near approach to war. 

Bhustpoeb. — Supposing the principles above stated to be 
correct, our duty with regaid to the succession at Bhurtpore 
may be easily defined. 

We are bound, not by any positive engagements to the 
Bhurtpore State, nor by any claim on her part, but by our 
duty as supreme guardians of general tranquillity, law, and 
light, to maintain the legal succession of Rajah Bulwunt 
Singh to the Raj of Bhurtpore; and we cannot acknowledge 
any oiher pretender. 

This duty seems to me to be so imperative, that 1 do not 
attach any peculiar importa^ice to the late investiture of the 
young Rajah in the presence of Sir David Ochterlony. We 
should have been equally bound without that ceremony; 
which, if we had not been under a pre-existing obligation to 
pM^intAin the rightful succession, would not have pledged us to 
anything beyond acki^owledgment. 

The lawful Rajah established, Bhurtpore may be governed, 
during his minority, by a Regency such as the usages of that 
State would prescribe. How this should be composed can only 
be decided by local reference. 

DooTJun Saul having unquestionably usurped the Raj, seems 
to be necessarily excluded from any share in the Regency or 
administration, and his banishment from the State, with a 
suitable provlaon, will probably be indispensable for the safety 
of the young Rajah; the more so if, as I suppose, Doorjun 
Saul, by the custom of that State, is next in succession to 


Bi^ah Bnhnmt Singh, and ooimqiienUy ihe aokuJ 
nimpdve to the Guddee. 

Msdhoo Singh stands at present in a different predjaamcnl 
from his brodier. Originally engaged with Doorjim Sanl in 
the violence which estohMshad ths power of the latter* he has 
now separated himaelf from him* aflfeoting to denonnce hia 
osorpation, and to uphold the right of the infant Bajalu If 
MacUioo Singh be mneere in theae psofessioni^ be may redeem 
his past fitult, and may be useful in re-establishing the Grovem- 
ment of Rajah Bulwunt Singh, in which case it might not, 
periiaps, be necessary to exclude him from the administBation. 
If, indeed, securities could be established fiir die safety of the 
young Rajah, it is possible that an admimatration imder 
Madhoo Singh might be more efficient than any other that 
could be formed for the manag^nent of affidrs during the 
minority. There is reason, howerer, at present to misfenist 
Bfadhoo Singh, from his past conduct^ and the character given 
of him by Sir David Ochterlony. 

If Dooijun Saul persist in his usurpation, and retssn poases- 
sion of Bhurtpore, it will be necessary to eject him by foroe of 

Madhoo Singh, in that case, will either join his brother in 
opposing us, in which event he will be subject to the same ex* 
elusion from the Bhurtpore territory, or he will act with us <m 
the side of the Rajah, which would give him a chum to consi- 

If Doorjun Saul be disposed to relinquish his usurpation 
without making resistance, and to retire from the ^urtpoire 
territory, he might wish to stipulate that the same &te should 
attend Madhoo Singh. We are neither bound to agree to this 
stipulation, nor are we under any obligation to rgect it It 
would, perhaps, be premature to determine now what should 
be done in such a case, as much might depend on ciroumstanoea 
at the time, and the intermediate conduct of the parties. 

If we be compelled to have recourse to force for the establish:- 


meiii of the Toung Bigah, sad find both the bfothan opposed 
to ufl^ it will then be necesBary to exclude both Dooijun Saul 
and Madhoo Singh born ihe texritories of Bbnrlpoie» and to 
cstoblirti a logeiDej dazing the Rajah's minority, composed as 
nay be most confonnable to the onsloms of the State 

Dooijnn Sanl, finding us determined to support the right of 
the young Bqah, may propose to xelinqnish his usurpation of 
tha Bq, and^pulate fi}r oonfirmation in the Begenoy. This 
would be a continuation^ in a modified shape, of the usurpation , 
which he eflfected by violence in oontempt of our supremacy. 
It would not be possible to obtain any security for the safety of 
the young Bigah if Doorjun Saul, who is either the next heir, 
or at least a pretender to the Sajt were Begent. Even if these 
diffifmltjes were surmounted, for the sake of a quiet termination 
of our embarrassments, it is by no means certain that such would 
be the eflEect Madhoo Singh seems to have possession of half 
of the eountryf and to be extending his power. Of the four 
places of note which belong to the Big— Bhurtpexe^ De^, Wer, 
and Komer— -he has already seised on De^ and Komer;* and 
there is no symptom that Doorjun Saul will have the power to 
put him down. To exercise our own power by force of arms, 
in order to establish the Begency of Doorjun Saul and subdue 
his rival, Madhoo Singh, would make us subservient to the in- 
tsrests of a usurper, who has no daim to our support from 
cither charaoter or conduct We are not called on to espouse 
the cause of either brother, and if we must act by force, it would 
seem to be desirable to banish both; but of the two, Madhoo 
ffingh seems to be the most respectable in character, and the 
greatest fitvorite with his countrymen. It might be as difficult 
to take Deeg from Madhoo Singh as Bhurtpore from Doorjun 
Saul; and in any poiut of view the employment of our arms 
in siqiport of the Begency of Doorjun Saul would not seem to 
be a fitting result of his usurpation, and the indignity oflbred 

* This was a mistake. He bad seized Deeg and Kama, but not Komer.— 
C. T. M. 


to US by the violenoe which he committed in defiance of our 

It seems difficulty howeyer, to determine more at present 
than that the succession of Bajah Bulwunt Singh must be 
maintained, and such a Regency established jduring his minority 
as may be prescribed by the customs of the State, with due 
security for the preservation of his safety and his rights. Every 
other point appears to be open to discussion ; and it is poanUe 
that a nearer view of the scene may suggest sentiments and 
plans which do not occur at a distance. 

•Ulwur* — There are two questions with the State of Ulwur. 

One refers to the revolution by which the illegitimate son of 
the late Rao Rajah was ejected from his participation in the 

The other regards our demand, hitherto neglected, for the 
attendance of the persons charged with instigating the aasasn- 
nation of Newaub Uhmud Buksh Khan. 

This demand having been continually urged by our repre- 
sentative, it is a point of honor to insist on compliance; and 
if it be necessary, we must proceed to the extremity of war to 
enforce it. 

If it be complied with without that extremity, the inquiry 
into the charge might be conducted at Dihlee by the Resident 
or one of his assistants, not in a Judicial Court, but at the Re- 
sidency. It will be an embarrassing investigation, and the 
greater probability is, that suspicion will continue to attach 
without sufficient proof of guilt. In this case the pardes ought 
to be released; but Uhmud Buksh Khan will not be satisfied 
without the punishment of those on whom his suspicions are 
fixed. He is a man of strong passions, and will not understand 
how men can be released, in consequence of want of evidence, 
whom he believes to be guilty. 

Supposing our differences with the State of Ulwur, on ac- 
count of this demand, to be amicably adjusted by its compli- 
ance therewith, it does not seem to be positively incumbent on 


US to interfere for the restoration of the illegitimate son of the 
late Bajah to his participation in the Baj. 

His ejection might undoabtedly be conridered as offensive to 
our sapremacy, after the application by which our sanction was 
obtained to the arrangement which established his participation; 
but as we never approved that arrangement, and expressed our 
doubts of its success, reserving a right to support any other that 
might seem better calculated to promote the interests of the 
State, we are at liberty, if we choose, to recognise the sole 
sovereignty of Bao Rajah Benee Singh, and to sanction a suit* 
able provi&on from the State for the illegitimate son of the late 
Rao Rajah. 

If, however, the perverse conduct of the Court of Ulwur 
should compel us to have recourse to arms, in order to enforce 
our demand for the surrender of the persons charged as insti- 
gators of the attempt to assassinate Uhmud Buksh Khan, we 
shall then be fully at liberty to resume the territories granted 
to the late Rao Rajah, and either to reannex them to our own 
dominions, or to form them |^into a distinct principality for his 
son, either of which measures would be a just punishment to 
the present Rao Rajah for the contempt with which the Court 
of Ulwur has lately treated our supremacy. This contempt has 
been shown by the subversion of the arrangement for the go- 
vernment which had been established with our sanction, by the 
evasion of -our demand for the surrender of the persons charged 
with instigating the assassination of Uhmud Buksh Khan, and 
more than all by the subsequent nomination of those persons to 
the most important offices of the State. 

Jtsfobb. — ^At this Court, a Mokhtear, or Prime Minister, 
appointed by our influence, has been ejected by the Regent 
Ranee; but his ejection was countenanced by our representa- 
tive, and the arrangements consequent thereon have since been 
sanctioned by the Governor-General in Council. This matter, 
therefore, is for the present' settled. 

It seems probable that the misrule of the Ministry set up by 



Ihe Sumflinoe liie opnlaon of the Mokkteflr, ^rili •mtudlj 
compel UB to farther intaferenoe'; but? thb, it » lioped,. m^ aot 
be mnaaSbJ^ymaamarp, and it is ¥017 denmble lint itriunld 

Otic neszt^ iai m i fitrom i ff , if randeivd mavoidaUe, most {»- 
bftblj be far ibe semovai of llie Senee fioin anthonty;, and Oe 
labftitiiitiDn' of floaother xegnoj. 

At pNHBt the* RflBOt flhowB a stooiq^ imdinoftioir to veed 
Jhota Ram^ wlio> wae expded by our influenoe. Sfaemld be ' 
pnfligeinliiiB'deRgn, andoontuiue toinist onrdbmandfiarbis 
lemovid, we ahall be bound to enfiaoe it by war; inrwUdi 
event we shall be entitled to insist on the establidmnat o£ a 
better legencfT. 

If die intdligence leeeived by Colonel Raper of tinnipposed 
death of the young Bigahy and of the intentbn of the RiBiBe to 
impoee a*8pn]ion8 boy iithis plans- be aonilmned^.a usw^ofliluai 
will anse; lit may be now briefly stated,, that we can: cadj ac- 
knowledge the legitimats soocener, whoever he mqr be. 

If llie Bqah be! stilLalive, a question must aoou aoae oir tiie 
sabjeot of Ub publio appeannoe and falure guvrdiainidp. It 
aeems that after At lUgah reaohes a oertain age^ Ae goaidian- 
ahip and rule of the Banee properly terminates^ and tfaalt the 
young Bajah ou^t to be brought forward, in public Dtnbar 
and deliyexed over to Ae guardiandiip^ of one of ^ the diieft of 
the State, who then becomea Regent. IflhiB be Ae Iffwof Ae 
land, it would seem to be oar du^to support it is < 
with the chiefe of the* State. 

On the whole, it appean that these may be;eventiud 
of war with each of the three States mentioned. With Bhurt- 
pore, if the sucoeasion of the Rajah Bulwuut Singh be opposed; 
with Ulwur, ifi our demand for the sunender of the personB 
accused of instigating the assassination of Newanb Uhmud 
Buksh Khan be continued;' widi. Jyepore, if Jhota Bom be 
recalled and retained by the Ranee, in defiance of our remon* 
Strances and demands. 


Desirable as it undoubtedly is that our dififerences with all 
these States should be settled without having recourse to arms, 
there will not be wanting sources of consolation if we be com- 
pelled to that extremity. 

In each of these States our supremacy has been violated or 
slighted^ under a persuasion that we were prevented by entan- 
glements elsewhere from efficiently resenting the indignity. 

A jdisplay and vigorous exercise of our power, if rendered 
' necessary, would be likely to bring back men's minds in that 
quarter to a proper toote; aad tibe oqvlnte of Bhurtpore, if 
efiected in a glorious manner, would do us more honor through- 
out India, by the removal of the hitherto unfaded impressions 
caused b j our former failure^ than any othei: event that can be 

It doca Bot wteuk to be neoeBuy to awnBrblff o«r force in a 
field array until it be proper to make use of it in consequence 
of tfte figure of our negotiations; for although the proximity 
of an anny m ibe field woidd give great wdght to our de- 
mands!, it m^ht also ezeite uBKnuided alaraui, and cause hostile 
preparatioii^ wlodi woidd most probabfy tenninate is war, 
from restiesBiiess on botii ndev and impatienee on our part. 

We msy try the effiset of negotiation first; and if this sfaonld 
fail^ we may conscth our own comrenience with reference to 
season, as te nie tme at wmcn we are to enforce our demands, 
the faoHty of bringing together oar means, and any other im- 
portant eoBsidemtkiBA. But if no suflieiest cause of delay in- 
tervene, it is undoubtedly denrable that the failure of our 
negotiationa AouM be speedily followed by Ae enforcement d 
oor demands* 

[This paper was drawn iip„ at the request of Lard Amherst^ in the antomn 
of 1825, when Sir C. Metcalfe was at the Presidency, on his way to Delhi, to 
take charge of onr somewhat embarrassed rehitions with the petty neigh- 
bouring Shites. The poficy whieh be reoomsaended was adopted by the 
SvpreamQafweamaA; Mid the caplan ef Bhartpora ad the nkaifmm ef 
Dlwar woe tha reanUa^] 




[The following letter was addressed privately to the Political SecreUiy, 
with reference to some passages in a letter from Mr. WeUesley, who was 
then Resident at Scindiah's Court, suggesting the measures whidi he consi- 
dered it would be expedient to pursue on the anticipated death of that 
Prince. The event, however, did not take place before the foilowiog Mardi.] 

Camp, Nov. 21, 1826. 
My dear Stirling, — ^I have this instant received your 
letter of the 15th, with its enclosure from Wellesley, or rather 
an extract from a letter from him. It does not appear to me 
that the preparations and precautionary arrangements which he 
suggests are either necessary or desirable, until we see that we 
shall have to act. His recommendation seems to presuppose 
that the result of dissensions in Sindhiah's Court, afler his death, 
would be a union of his whole army for the purpose of attacking 
us — a contingency which seems very improbable, as an e&ct 
from such a cause. We might make work for ourselves by 
stirring prematurely; and it strikes me that it would be better 
quietly to watch the course of events, and act as circumstances 
may require. Unless afiairs take a turn which may compel us 
to interfere, for the defence of our own interests or the preser- 
vation of tranquillity where we are bound to preserve it, I do 
not see that we have any concern in what may take place 
at Sindhiah's Court. It is impossible to say that we may not 
eventually be dragged in by any commotion in any State in 
India, but we are as likely, I think, to cause it — ^t. e. our being 


involved — as prevent it, by assuming an attitude of ostensible 
preparation. Should action eventually become neoessarji the 
Nagpoor force is available, and might join the Saugur force 
in eastern Malwah. The Jalna force is perfectly disposable, and 
might join the force at Mhow. The Nusserabad and Neemuch 
forces might combine and form a respectable army in Bajpoo- 
tana. These three armies might act, either separately or in 
union, for the execution of any measures which might become 
requisite in Malwah and Rajpootana. The troops in our own 
country might be directed from the Etawa or Agra firontier as 
might be expedient. Should such a state of things arise, and 
force us, who want only peace, to such extensive warlike opera- 
tions, we should, I hope, secure a recompense. If a state of 
preparation for eventual early movements on so great a scale 
would, as doubtiess it would, entail heavy expense, it will be 
best, I conceive, to avoid such preparations until we see that 
such movements cannot be avoided. We are beset by a strange 
fatality in India, if we cannot at any time remain undisturbed 
by the troubles of otiiers. But it may be so, and the expected 
occasion may prove it. 

Wellesley's plan of taking Sindhiah's districts in Malwah 
under our special protection, would infallibly involve us here- 
after in interference at the Courts which may be established in 
succession to Sindhiah, in support of those who may have 
obeyed our injunctions. Our superintendence of those districts 
might, I tiiink, be confined to strong recommendations to pre- 
serve peace, and suitable intimations that we would act against 
those who might disturb the tranquillity of those districts which 
we are bound to protect. Should such disturbance actually 
take place, we can tiien act as may be expedient. On the 
whole, it seems to me that our best policy, at present, is to look 
on quietly, and to appear to look on quietly. But on the occur- 
rence of Sindhiah's deatii, should there be then reason to appre- 
hend disturbances in Malwah, the Mhow force might be unob- 
trusively reinforced from the Bombay side in the first instance, 
ss proposed by Wellesley, and if circumstances become more 


liom of bedi taamm^ j<'"''j o' t i an i rl/f vaaU, I ftnati gbe 
oi an ofWirfififainDg fiiiQe ai diai qnzAcE. Icb: 
ooaflB J iie that pMMfaMp puBptafatioaii dwirfthh 
IflMTcliedfhanJyqponlUiMflOiaig. Ase 
kts been |Mitially ^nneJ, in widtii wt baiw lad ao ooncen, 
Jittringftde,Ife«,in iM^iili fioa ihe It Ok 
■on (X JnoU lUm flBQ ni8 kraner JBiMinB CdM^ 
knt I donbt ki jvalky. InMeiiUb«iKyQioent oariiotksfii^ 

%* In the preceJGng papers Sir Omrles Metcalfe^s (^cial 
career is traced and SiuArated, up to the lime of his appointm^it 
to the Supreme Council of India. A few BlisceOaneous papers 
and extracts, from public and private letters, are, lowever^ sub- 
joined, in further illustration of this, the first stage of his public 
Cfe* One passage only among the private extracts (on the 
Afiairs of Rajpootana) vras vnitten at a later period. 



'The necessity of marking some alterafion in our coinage, which 
is impoeefl on the f3'oyenunentl)7 the Tooent discovery df the 
firauds occasioned \>j llhe continuance df the olfl stamp on the 
new coin^ seems to present a fit opportunity for reconsidenng a 
question which has l)eenl)erore agitated : Whether 'it is advisable 
to continue to coin in -the name of the late SSng of Dihleei 
Shall AQum, or to substitute an inscription or stamp more ap- 
propriate to our own sovereignty? 

The present coinage appears to be objectionsfble on the fol- 
lowing groundff: 

First. We disavow our own sovereignty, and coin in the name 
of a power wliich does not in reality e^st. 

Secondly. We coin in fhe name of a King of SQilee dead 
and gone; thus neither asserting our own actual sovereignty, 
nor even paying the compliment to the nominal king, whom 
by other acts df our government we profess to acknowledge. 

Ab lar as ihe ^ving pageant is concerned, we set adde liia 
auihonty as much by ueing the name of his predecessor as if 
we pot any otiier inscription on our coin ; and it may be stated, 
on ihe authority of Sir David Ocbteflony^ l!hat the ^ng con- 
siSers (he present Furruckabad coinage as derogatory to his dig- 
mty; — ^more sc^ perhaps, {ban if the inscription were in a lan- 
guage which lie would not understand, or less personally ezclu- 
Bive to him, by excluding also ihe name of Ins predecessor. 

Thirdly. The present inscription on our coin imports thtft it 
is struck ^t the mint of Moorsliedabad;— ranother fiction, the 


meaning of which is, not only that we aie incapable of ocnning 
in our own name, bat that we aie also unworthy of having a 
mint in our capital, and that the principal coin of the Brituh 
Empire in India must issue from the provincial mint of the 
Newaub of Bengal, the nominal Vioeroy of a nominal King. 

Thus professing to acknowledge a living King without poweri 
we coin in the name of a dead one, who, when alive, was equally 
powerless, and pretend to issue bur coin fix>m a provincial mint 
which does not enst. 

And all these fictions we employ, apparently for no other 
purpose than to keep alive the recollection of a power which 
lias passed away, and prevent the acknowledgment of our own 

If these objections are correctiy stated, and worthy of con- 
sideration, it would at the first view appear that the stamp of 
the coin ought to be changed; but to such a measure there may 
be objections, and it is proper to consider what they can be. 

The objections that might be urged against a change in the 
stamp of tiie coinage are perhaps either of a political or of a 
financial nature. 

Politically, it may be said that we ought to continue to coin in 
the name of the dead King, from a regard for tiie feelings of 
our subjects. 

Financially, that either the new or the old coin might be de> 
preciated in consequence of any change in tiie inscription. 

With respect to the first, or the supposed political objection, 
it can hardly be imagined that nine-tenths, or at least a great 
majority, of our subjects — ^the Hindoo population — can caxe 
about the continuance of the fictitious royalty of tiie Maho- 
medan dynasty; and admitting that the pride of our Mussul- 
man subjects is nourished by it, neither does it seem to be 
necessary that we should succumb to their pride, nor does it 
appear politic to study to keep it alive. 

Too much, perhaps, is admitted in allowing that tiie bulk of 
even our Mahomedan subjects care much about the stamp of 
our coin; and if it be true, as stated, that the Newaub of 


Lucknow coins with his own stamp^ it is a suflScient proof that 
we are upholding a nominal royalty which Mahomedan powers 
are ready to throw off. Tippoo*s conduct long ago furnishes 
another ground for the same conclusion. 

But, speaking generally, either the natives do attach conse- 
quence or they do not to the inscription of Shah AUum on our 
coinage. If they do, it is surely of importance that they should 
know without disguise who are their masters. If they do not 
attach consequence to that inscription, why should there be a 
difficulty about changing it ? 

With reference to the supposed financial objection, it seems 
to be very improbable that the new coin would be depreciated 
in consequence of a change in the inscription. Let the coin be 
good, and of the Same intrinsic value. Let it be received at all 
the public treasuries at the same rate with the old sicca rupee, 
and it will immediately occupy the same place in circulation. 

Neither does it seem probable that the old coinage would 
lose its value if it were to continue, as it of course would, to be 
received at the public treasuries at the same rate. 

The present coinage bears the date of the year nineteen of 
the reign of Shah Allum. 

It is probable that the original motive for maintaining a fidse 
date on the coin, and the name of a King defunct, in opposi- 
tion to the practice of the country, according to which the 
name of the living King and the date of the passing year should 
appear, was a desire that our old and new coinage should be 
uniform, so as to mix together in circulation without any de- 
preciation of one or the other. 

If this was the motive, the rule was good, so far as it went, as 
long only as it was strictly observed. It is obvious that the 
slightest alteration destroyed the uniformity and defeated the 
purpose for which it had been maintained. 

An alteration actually took place at the last coinage, when 
the size of the rupee was enk^ged. It does not appear that, 
in consequence of this change, any depreciation of the old or 
new coinage has taken place; and it is remarkable that the 

IS8 TBB oontASc cp noxiA. 

mfymimiiwf mkiekhMoammdhm y aB oio d finmoi 
warn an Mteiniag yrediely die old dfeHBf^ wind!, not filing op 
die imWgwd qpaoe of illw new mpee, lus left sn nnooonped 
border, ivhich can be cnt ecmnf «o j« rte red&oe ike uitdoMic 
^dbe'of dieoiew eoin, and at Iks ea»e time gpvest the exact 
appeesiiioe d£ tike 'cdd cuimbcjl 

Hie oiigiiial pnspaee lof waUaraitf is, therefiMe, ^hQ% lort, 
or only As Ibe y me a tw e d attbe rkk «f the dq a cttata m of the 
vkdie of the <qUL eoaenqr by the aid of the aafpam who are 
busy in destroying the value of the new mpae. 

It eiionld be aemembend thai the flIighiBat depactoR ixom 
iiaifiiiiailji ia ita oonapkite deatrvdaGa, and that aa fiur aa the 
vaifbonxty oflhe cdd aoidjieiwfiucieBey bad auqr advantage £»- 
aKrly, tiiat Jidvantegeiuui abeadykeen done jvway aa eSactnaUy 
aaifdie form and inaBrq>tioii had been emtbeiy •changed. 

it muif be aaid tkat the pmaeat eainage anaweiB.aIl the pur- 
paaos'of mnsency^ aad that the people know on lo po a atac the 
leal ponrer^ thevefeore that any dmage ia uaalesa. The aame ob- 
servation might «pply to all "die finoBaaad tokens of sovereign^ 
m att oountrieay and by a parity of xeaaoning it would be unob- 
jectionable to issue the coin of the British .iealm:&om Ike Hint 
of London ia the name nf the Empeaor *of finsna or Miqpoleon 
BoBiqparte, beoanae the Xiord Mayor and Aldermen know that 
Qnorgethe ThiivdSa kii^. 

It as lemarkdbk that 'ooins cf vaxiaus .kinds are ianed at 
MaAraa — it may be so .tikewise at Bombay — ¥rith wnioiis 
stamps, exobding the onaoriptaon «f the IGng of Dihiee. Why 
should not that take place at Cakmtta which ia unatgectian- 
able at Madiaa? 

It ii still move xemarkabb that the Court of DiBeatoa have 
sent oatio Madras a eopper coinage stamped with the Acms of 
the Company. It wonld be aa offence to the dignity of the 
Honorable Company to argue that their arms mi^ be good 
enough iar copper, but will not do for olver :and gold. 

Tlie advantages which m^^ be looked for fixoa a chaste of 
Ae inacriplSon on ikid coin axe theaa:: 

1. The aaoertion of our own sovereignty over British India, 
and the gradual extension over the minds of our subjects of 
ihoee feelings which attach to ihe conviction of declared and 
acknowledged supremacy, combined with solid power. 

2. The extinction of the nominal sovereignty of the Ma- 
homedan dynasty for ever over our provinces, and the progres- 
nve abolition throughout India of the idea of. its existence, 
which our example now mainly upholds. 

It is probable that, in imitation of us, the Princes of India 
would soon coin, either in the name of their real sovereign, the 
liiMiii OuwwunBufc, 4ir nese 'pvc'bably in ^Aicar own, which 
would km iMSinly molqedfiQailfcle wrAdn &err r e sp e tllve do- 

9. The iBcreaaed Sfficiihy of £EtIse cwung. 

Tlie natives can eanly imitate the present inscription on our 
ccnn, wlucli is in fhe Persian character ; but such would not be 
the case if the stamp were similar to that on English coins. 

Tor instance, if a change were to take place, there mi^ht be 
on one side of the coin the King's head or the Royal arms, with 
fte ususl inscription, Geoif^usRex^ &c., Ac.; on the othei^ the 
Company's arms, encircled by their motto, ^* Auspido 'ReffB et 
Semrtos AngTiffu** The intrinsic value of ihe coin nqght also 
be maxked in Pernan and Hindostanee or ^engsllee characters. 

Such a coin it would he mucSi more difficult to counterfeit 
Attn the present, and tiie^counterfcat would l>e mncli more easily 

* nbwMiwritlmwJaBJMaMr JBdMag ttrt #b faw r w mp letdy 

was Political Secretanp Lord Hast- embodiea Us (owa mmmoABim tht 

iDgB endoiBBd the oiif^bul dntft 'wiCh 9i(bjoct. 
iif apiiwhstiWj 



Gentlemen appointed to the civil senrioe of Bengal, as soon 
after theii arrival in Calcutta as may be proper, with reference 
to the season of the year, shall be sent to stations in the pro- 

They shall there be placed under the control of civil Aino- 

They shall not be appointed to any office until they become 
qualified to enter on its duties. 

Until declared qualified, they shall be examined, and the 
state of their proficiency be reported, every two months, by the 
civil functionaries of their respective stations. 

During the period of probation, they may have such employ- 
ment given to them by the functionaries under whose control 
they may be placed as may aid in qualifying them for the 
public service, subject to such restrictions as may be hereafter 
directed in regard to the nature and mode of employment. 

The examinations to which they shall be subjected shall be 
conducted with a view to ascertain their qualification for public 
service, by a competent knowledge of ^e written and collo- 
quial languages chiefly used in public business in the pro- 
vinces in which they are to be stationed. A knowledge of the 
grammar of those languages will be requisite. Beyond which, 
a facility of conversing with the natives of the country, and of 


reading, comprehending, and tranBlating business papers, will 
be considered the proper test 

Every student is expected to become qualified for the public 
service within twelve mondis; and those who may not be qua- 
lified at ihe expiration of fifteen months will be removed from 
the service, according to the orders of the Court of Directors. 

After qualification, each civil servant will be appointed per- 
manently to an office in or beyond the provinces. 

No one shall be appointed to an office in Calcutta until after 
three years* service away firom ihe Presidency. 

The salary of a civil servant, during the period of probation, 
shall be 300 rupees per month. After qualification, he shall re- 
ceive the salary of the office to which he may be appointed, 
subject to the general rules of the service on that point. 

Notwithstanding appointment to office, in consequence of 
reported qualification, every civil servant holding the rank of a 
writer shall be liable to removal from office if he be at any 
time ascertained to be disqualified by a want of competent 
knowledge of the requisite native languages. It shall be the 
duty of his official superior to report such disqualification to the 
Oovemor-General in Council, who will direct such further exa- 
mination, and report as he may judge proper; and on proof of 
disqualification such person shall be reduced to the situation 
and subsistence-allowance of a servant out of employ, until he 
can recover the requisite qualifications. 

The students at present attached to the College of Fort 
William who may not be declared qualified for the public ser- 
vice before the abolition of that institution, shall be subject to 
these rules, with the exception of that which relates to the 
period of removal from the service, on which point they will 
come under the separate order already issued, and of that 
regarding examination, with respect to which they shall have 
the option of being examined in the manner latterly customary 
in the College. 

With regard to students who may arrive from England after 
the abolition of the College, the only admissible exemption 


from snjpart of these Jidoi iriU Win tlftcaMft of ihoaeiife 
may have a father or other yery tmm adk wtMtii^nmimg in 
Calcttttas thttb will imdeztaketo praM0l»hM af <i |ii*ftwwfc of the 
HCPCDMiTy yialifaataonfl, hi B«di cmh the wtwiilpnitp Msjr pm 
the time of probation widt tkesx sdadveft sl fiiik»tt«, HLi^Ki 
to nmoval at the plleaiiixe of the Gfjfteramea^; hoi wface q«ft- 
lified and appointed to oflbaev muty^likeall oAen^pn^eeeiinto 
the provinces. 

Any BtndeiDt on hia wtnval fiooin Bn|^awJ may dain a& ex- 
amination, and if fimind qvalfied, will beanpoiniedianedietdky 
to an oflBfie in the provinces. 

Students arriving' fronu England at a season wheat, k me j he 
deemed nnadvisahle to order their znstset wmtmL to Ae pso^ 
vinces, shall be placed nnder the conftiol of civil SmueAmamam 
at the- Presidency , on the same fbetiog aa if ■*^*^^>«»*^ m ike 
provisoes, until the season of removaL 

Cases of certified inability &om. ackness will be taken iute 
conHMoTKrion^ in extension of the peescribed period of probatieo. 

The time occupied in travelliDg by dawk to skationo m 
the provinces will be allowed in addi^n to Ae pKseriibel 
period. Any other n»de of travelling by kad or by watB 
may bo made conducive to study, and need not obateest it. 
The time, therefore, thus occupied will noi neoessariiy be al- 
lowed, and unll onlj be taken into eonaLdentioni, WKtmimg to 
circumstances, in cases which may appear tih moiit tiset indid- 



iHaBcn&iTX OF ouiL Position us India.^— << The plans 
confitantly in the contemplation of the Goyemment at home for 
the reduction o£ our military expenses, in India, seem to be 
founded on. the eiconeous supposition, that our Indian Empine 
is in a state of perfect security, that we have no. dangers to 
^piehend from external enemies or internal disaffection, and 
that we may reduce our. military force without fear of the con.- 
sequent overthrow of our power* 

^^ For those who take the preceding view of the state of India, 
it will W something new and unpleasant to leanvnot only that 
our military force cannot be reduced without the danger^ nay, 
the certainty, o£ the loss of our dominion^ but^ moreover, that 
we muat. considerably increase our military establishments^ or 
expect the consequences which those rulers suffer who n^lect 
to provide for the safety of the empires entrusted to them. 

^^ Until the. Government at home be convinced that our 
ntnalion ia India is beset witk dangers,, and that we have still 
to make fivther great exertions, to secure our safety, there ccm 
be little hope that we. shall long retain the dominions that 
we h*ve acquired. 

'* Oar dtuation in India has always beeu precarious. It is 
^11 pKcaiioas, not less so perhapa at the present moment, by 
the fauk of the system prescribed by the Government at home, 
than at any fiormer period. We are still a handful of E!a- 
ropeana governing an iaunense empire without any firm hold 
in the eooatiy , haviag warlike and powecfiil enemies on all our 


firontien, and the spirit of disaffection donnant, but looted 
nniveisally among our subjects. 

" That insuperable separation which exists between us and our 
subjects renders it necessary to keep them in subjection by the 
presence of a military force, and impossible to repose confidence 
in their affection or fidelity for assistance in the defence of our 
territories."— [Dsem&er, 1814.] 

Thb Natiye Abht. — " It may be observed that the tried 
services and devotion of our Native Army furnish a proof to 
the contrary of the preceding assertion. Our Native Army is 
certainly a phenomenon, the more so as there is no heartfelt 
attachment to our Government on the part of our native troops. 
They are, in general, excellent soldiers, attached to regular pay, 
and possessing a good notion of the duty of fidelity to the 
power which gives them bread. There is no reason to appre* 
hend their general defection as long as we continue tolerably 
successful. But if the tide of fortune ever turn decidedly 
against us, and any power rise up able to give good pay regu- 
larly, and aware of the use to which such an instrument may 
be applied, there will then be a general proof afforded of that 
want of real attachment in our Native Army of which at 
present numbers of persons are not convinced." — [^December , 
1814.] y 

Colonisation. — " It is impracticable, perhaps, to suggest 
a remedy for the general disaffection of our Indian subjects. 
Colonisation seems to be the only system which could give us 
a chance of having any part of the population attached to our 
Government from a sense of common interests. Colonisation 
may have its attendant evils, but with reference to the con- 
oideration above stated, it would promise to give us a hold in 
the country which we do not at present possess. We might 
now be swept away in a single whirlwind. We arc without 
root. The best affected natives could think of a change of 
government with indifference, and in the North-Westem Pro- 


vinces there is hardly a man who would not hope for benefit 
from a change. 

" This disaffection, however, will moet probably not break out 
in any general manner as long as we contmue to poaseas a pre- 
dominant power, and it has only been alluded to as one source of 
weakness^ and a necessary object of attention in the considera- 
tion of our situation." — [December^ 1814.] 

Results of the Fibst BIahbatta Wab. — ** It was not 
the natural consequence of the Mahratta war that our power 
should be in a precarious state. The war was replete with 
advantages, and a perseverance in the same policy which guided 
us through that war would have saved us from our present 
difficulties. Some r ev er ses checked the pr og rc s B of our arrange- 
ments, and finally the abandonment of the policy on which the 
operations of the war were conducted rendered its snoceas in- 
complete, and left to be accomplished at a future period what 
ought then to have been accomplished, and imtsi be accom- 
plished before we can ccmtider our power to be in a state of 
security. It was the abandonment of the policy which would 
have settled all India; it was tiie retrograde movement made 
at the end of the Mahratta war; it was tiie system pursued 
since that period, according to orders fiom home, that brought 
about the eyistang dangers. Witiiout discnasing these questions 
minutely,* it ia evident that aince tiie Mahratta war powers 
haye risen up, and gained atiength, which did not exist before 
in any formidable state, and tiiat our territories are in contact^ 
and our interests dash with thoeeof several of these powers that 
must be r^arded as enemies. The increase of our force has- 
not been proportionate to the increaae of territory to be de« 
fended, and embamssments to be encountered.'' — [DeCf 1814.} 

Extehsioh of Tebbtiobt. — << According to the system 
prescribed for our conduct in India, we are bound to be horror- 

* Hie reader will ibd tliem diseiiased in the that paper of the seikf , 
" Poiii^ of Sir Gecnse Badow." 



atnick at ihe bare idea of an increase of terrifeoiy . Yet, imks 
we can raise additional resouroes in our present dominiotna, it is 
only hj an extennon of territory that we can obtain an increase 
of revenue for the support of our necessary expeuses. 

^* It may be objected to an increase of taritofy, that it is 
often att^ded with an extension of embanassmentSy leading to 
an increase of expense beyond ihe amount of the additional 
revenue. It is sometimes so, and sometimes otherwise, accord- 
ing to circumstances. If by the extennon of territory a State 
extend its frontiers, and come in contact with warlike powea 
with whom it never clashed before, then an increase of territoiy 
may become a source of such expense as will absorb more dian 
the additional revenue derived from the addition of terr ito iy . 

" But if the extennon of territoiy improve the frontiw — ^that 
is, render it more defensible — if it make dominions less divided 
and more compact — if it unite distant parts of territories and 
relations, and establish communications betwera pomts before 
unconnected — ^if it make the whole of the forces and res o mrces 
of a State more available and more easily to be brou^t together 
to any given point, then an increase of territoiy, so far from 
being attended necessarily with an increase of expense, might 
enable a State to reduce its former expenses, and would, at all 
events, give an accession of strength, and affiird payment for an 
addition of militaiy force, without bringing on any concomitant 
source of weakness. 

" The preceding observations apply retrospectively and pro- 
spectively to our rituation in India. We have made acquisitions 
of territory, such as those described under ihe first suppodtion, 
as the present extent of our frontier, combined with tiie multi- 
plicity and perplexity of our foreign reUtions, will show.*'— 
[December, 1814.] 

Impolicy op a Wab with Sind.— "Few things can be 
conceived more impolitic than a war with Sind. Not to 
apeak of the expenses of such an undertaking, its unprofitable- 
ness if successful, and the chances of fisdlure inseparable from all 


human enterpxifle^ it isneoessaiy to olra^rvei that even the moat 
prosperous result of a war with Sind would tend to involye 
us in disputesi jealousies, enmitieSy intrigues, and negotiations 
in tlie coiuitnes beyond the Indus, and might lead to incalcu- 
lable embarrassments. A war, therefore, the very suocess of 
which would be injurious, it behoves us most studiously to 

" We may be destined, and may be eventually forced, to 
burst beyotid the Indus, and establish ourselves in countries with 
which at present we have no connexion ; but it is incumbent on 
us to tiy to avmd such an issue by all means consistent with our 
honor. Our policy clearly is to confine ourselves to the con* 
aolidation of our power within its present sphere, and to avoid 
being entangled in the politics of new r^ions."— [J^rom a 
Paper teritten m 1819 or 1820.] 


negotiation or contest with such a power as Sind, we are sure 
to be misunderstood. They think now that we have designs 
upon their country. They will be confirmed in that belief if 
we go to war widi them. If we retire from that war without 
exacting an indemnity for our expenses, the motives of our for- 
bearance will be misunderstood and misrepresented. The results 
of our enterprise will be considered and described as a fidlur^ 
and attributed to a fear of those powers whom the Sind Gb- 
vemment may have excited, or will a&ct to have excited, 
against us. It is necessary, therefore, that if provoked to war, 
we should make them feel our power, for we should never gain 
credit for our moderation; and it would be desirable, in this 
point of view, to keep all or a part of their coimtry, were it not 
that it would be extremely impolitic to extend our territorial 
possesnonsin that quarter. 

**If Sind were an external state of India, such as Sindhiah's, 
for instance, our course would be clear. We might make our 
demand, and if it were not agreed to, we might send an army 
and prosecute hostilities until our terms were submitted to; if 



necenary, we might keep a whole or part of tbe ooimtry, and 
the acquiddon would not inyolye us in any new difficulties. 
But as the extension of our power in Sind would decidedly 
bring upon us a multitude of new embarrassments, it is our 
duty stoulfastly to avoid every connexion with that country — 
above all things a war, which is likely to lead to the worst Idnd 
of entanglement" — [/iWi.] 

A War with Sikd obnoxious to the Home Gk>- 
YBRNiCENT.— *' There is another point of view in which this 
question should be considered. The Gh>vemment of India has 
to report its proceedings to a superior power. It must not only 
act rightly, but it must act so that its measures shall seem right 
to higher authority. We may be sure that a war with Sind 
would be greatly deprecated by the Government in England, 
which would not be pleased to see precipitation in preparations 
having a tendency towards so imdesirable an event If an 
eventual war with Sind be inevitable, it is, nevertheless, a duty 
which our Government owes to itself to show that every effort 
has been made to avoid it, which will not be conceived if we 
begin with preparations for an invasion of Sind." — [Ibid,'] 

Evils op Extension towabbs the Indus. — " Our policy 
is against a war with Sind^ or any extension of our engage- 
ments in that direction .... Before the events of 1817-18, 
we had two sets of boundaries in India, which might be termed 
our exterior and interior boundaries. Our dominion was in 
shape similar to a horse-shoe. The space within the horse-shoe 
has been filled up by our power. The advantage already visible 
is immense. We have got rid of the dangers on what were our 
interior frontiers. These frontiers no longer exist The prodi- 
gious increase which those events have given to our strength on 
our interior boundaries will be manifest hereafter. But we re- 
quire time to consolidate our power in the space which we have 
occupied in consequence of those events. Nature and fate per- 
haps decree that we cannot remain stationary. But before we 
advance let us wait for the fulness of time." — [/Mtf.] 


[These last extracts are made firom the draft of a paper^ drawn up in 1819 
or 1820, for Lord Hastings^ when Metcalfe was Political Secretary. A 
party of Sdndians^ on their way through dutch to Bombay^ had been at- 
tacked by a body of onr people in pursnit of plunderers ; in reyenge for 
which the Scindians devastated a village in Catch. This affair well-nigh 
occasioned a war between the English and the Scindian powers ; bat the 
amicable conndlsj fostered by Metcalfe, which prevailed at Calcutta, averted 
hostilities for a time. He lived, however, to see and deplore the ruptore 
which sobsequently converted Scinde into a British principality.] 


Regular and Ibbeoulab Tboops. — ^^I think irregular 
troops most useM — most neoessary at times; better tHan re- 
gulars, and always less expensive. I think that we have too 
few of them, and ought to have more. I am sure that we shall 
have more whenever we have anything to do, and that we shall 
then repent of having disbanded those we had. I think it very 
wrong to raise corps one year and to turn them adrift in the 
next. From what I have said, you will guess that I had no 
conoem in our late reductions here. Indeed, I raised my feeble 
voice to procure further consideration to the question, but it was 
not heard; and I was provoked to see that those who pressed 
these reductions the most, did not do so because they thought 
we could spare troops, but because they thought a reduction of 
the irregulars would lead to an increase of the regulars. I am 
for every increase of the Army that our finances will bear, and 
all my notions of Indian politics begin and end in a powerful 
and efficient Army. But Irregulars must, I imagine, be a con-^ 


finned part of our system; and I do not like ^dismiaeing any 
class of soldiers that have done their duty to our satisfaction." — 
lOctOer 14, 1819.] 

^* Lord Corkwallis's School.""—*' I am perhaps an- 
gular in thinking that reductions might be made with success 
in all branches of our dvil administration. The axe should be 
laid to our judicial system. Our revenues might be improved. 
Our civil expenses reduced. But nothing of this kind will be 
done as long as the caste of Bengal councillor shall remain un- 
changed — so cautious, so devoted to precedent, so fearful of 
alteration. At all events, Lord Comwallis's School must first 
wear out, who think that all perfection is in the regulations of 
1793."— [Octoier 14, 1819.] 

MiLiTABT Men in Civil Employ. — "If you do not re- 
main, and I succeed you (in Central India) aa at present thought 
of, I should wish all your hands to remain on every account. 
I have no thought of introducing young civilians. Young or 
old, they would not be fit fi>r the work. I would always wish 
to deal with military men. I was bom in the Bengal Army. 
Most of my friends are in it^ and I have, from circumstances, 
associated more with military than witii civil officers since I 
came to India, so that I should enter on a fidd bringing me in 
contact witii tiie Army with much confidence of harmony and 
good fellowahip, though I am ' a d— d civilian,' as poor old 
Lord Lake used to call us."— [To J^ John Makobn, June 4, 

ReFOBK of cub StBTSM of GrOYEBNHENT. — " As tO a 

general reform of our system of rule, that question has always 
appeared to me as hopeless. Our rulers at home and oouncilkaEs 
abroad are so bigoted to precedent, that I never dream of any 
change unless it be a gradual declension fix>m w(»8e to worse. 
I have, therefore, no settled speculations on that head, and 


what I have are "wild and undigested. In the first plape, every 
Company's servant should come oat a cadet. There should be 
no separate civil service. Men should be selected for civil 
duties according to fitness^ remaining soldiers nevertheless. 
Onr piesent Bengal judicial system should be knocked on the 
head. Revenue, ditto. Some mode should be discovered of 
upsetlangy with justice, the Permanent Settlement in all its parts 
— ^the most sweeping act of oppression ever committed in any 
coimtEy) by which the whole landed property of the country 
has been transferred from the class of people entitled to it, to a 
set of Baboos, who have made their wealth by bribery and 
cofntption in the management of our provinces. Similar in- 
justice has made rapid progress in the Ceded and Conquered 
Provinces, owing to the abominable system of selling proprietary 
rights for arrears of revenue. Dihlee is the oxily portion of the 
Bengal territories where the rights of the real proprietors or 
hereditary occupants — ^the village cultivators — ^have not been 
invaded by our nefarious regulations, the whole code of which, 
being founded on ignorance, ought to be destroyed. To return 
to my speculations. Revenue and judicial, and, when practicable, 
military powers also, should be exercised by the same person: 
union, not division, should be the order of our rule. Con- 
fidence, not distrust, should be the engine to work with. An 
efficient and sufficient army (much greater than our present 
one if we could pay it) should support and, if forced into war, 
extend our powers. Strict economy in everything else should 
go as far as possible to the payment of the army. Colonisation, 
without being forced or injudiciously encouraged, should be 
admitted without restraint" — IJune 29, 1820.] 

Natiyb Aoemot. — "I return Briggs's letter. He has 
touched on a vast subject. Shall we ever contrive to attach 
the native population to our Government? and can this be 
done by identifying the interests of the upper classes with our 
own? Is it possible in any way to identify their interests with 
ours? To all three questions, if put to me, I should answer 


< No^ Is it true that saoh a host of fine iUlows as 

* Sir John Malcolmi Mr. Elphinstone, Sir Thomas Mmno, sad 
Sir Edward Golebrooke are united in the same opinions ?' If 
they were, it wotdd be almost tieason to dispnte them. B«it 
what are their opinions? and are they capable of ex e ca tia n? 
It is not enough to say, ' GKye the natives large penaons and 
large estates.' What is to pay our army if we alienate our 
revenues ? Could we dispense with our army and trust to sup- 
port of the upper classes ? Gk)d forbid that we should tiy the 
experiment ! 

*' I confess that I distrust Native Agency. There is no eadi 
being, I feel perfectly sure, as an honest Native Ag^t fixHn 
Cape Comorin to Gadimere, and ihey who confide in them axe 
sure to be deceived. But we must make use of them, for we 
can seldom do without them ; and they have a right to kind, 
respectful, and gentlemanlike treatment. 

^^ Mr. Chaplin is not the only civilian who is a Mend to the 
Punchayut system. I am a passionate admirer of it, and wish 
to see all the judges in the land sent to the right about 

*' My general creed is confined to two grand specifics, ^ Army 
and Colonisation' — the last, because in my mind it affords the 
only chance of our having in time a population of interests 
identified with our own. I would give up Colonisation, be- 
cause its success is not to my mind infallible, if I were sure that 
our Army would always be faithful; but drawn as it must be 
from a disaffected population, it is wonderful that its feeling is 
so good, and it is too much to expect that it will last to eternity. 
Wh^n I say that I would give up Colonisation, I merely mean 
as a system of salvation. I would never agree to the present 
laws of exclusion with respect to Europeans, which are un- 
natural and horrible to my fancy." — [^September 7, 1820.] 

The Mutiny at Barrackpobe. — ^^ News has come fix>m 
Calcutta — you have already seen it in the papers— of the blackest 
hue and the most awful omen, such as for a time miist neces- 
sarily absorb all the faculties of a man anxiously alive to the 


daogen which heeet our empire in India. I allude to the mu- 
tiny at Barrackpore. A regiment of Bengal Sepoys, ordered 
to Chittagong to form part of an army to he opposed to the 
Burmansy refuses to march, separates itself from its officers, turns 
the major-general of the station off the parade, quits its lines, 
marches to the race-course with forty roimds in pouch, and 
there threatens to resist any attempt to bring them to order ! 
AU expostulation failing, two King's regiments which happen 
by chance to be within call, the body-guard and the artillery, are 
brought against them. The mutineers refuse to lay down iheir 
arms, are attacked, make no resistance, and flee. About 70 — at 
first said to be 450 — are killed on the spot. Six more (vide 
Gazette)^ I have heard, have since been hanged; others brought 
in prisoners and in chains in the fort. About 100 taken prisoners 
in the first instance. Now what does this mutiny proceed from ? 
Either from fear of our enemy, or from disaffection to our Gt>- 
vemment. The Sepoys have always disliked any part of Bengal, 
and formerly no corps marched thither from the Upper Pro- 
vinces without losing many men by desertion. They detest 
the eastern part of Bengal more than the western; and the 
country beyond our frontier they believe to be inhabited by 
devils and cannibals; the Burmans they abhor and dread as 
enchanters, against whom the works of mere men cannot pre- 
vail. What does all this amount to in brief but this — ^that we 
cannot rely on our Native Army? Whether it be fear of the 
enemy or disaffection towards us, they fail us in the hour of 
need. What are we to think of this, and what are our pros- 
pects under such circumstances? It is an awful thing to have 
to mow down our own troops with our own artillery, especially 
those troops on whose fidelity the existence of our empire de- 
pends. I will hope the best. We may get over this calamity. 
It may pass as the act of the individual mutineers. The rest 
of the army may not take up their cause. A feeling may be 
roused to redeem the character thus lost. But we shall be 
lucky if all this turn out exactly so; for there is no doubt that 
the feelings which led to the mutiny were general. Open mu- 


tiny, indeedf was not oonfined to the 47th: 200 of tiie 62nd 
seised the colon oftheircorpi and joined; 20menof the 26th 
seised one color of their corpe and joined the mutiny. What 
mm the rest of the regiment about if twenty men ooidd oommit 
this audactoua outrage ? The whole bumness la rerj bad; and 
we shall be veiy fortunate if it lead to nothing more. But we 
are often fortunate; and the mind of bum is an inexplicable 

" Sometimes these violent ebullitions of bad feeling are suc- 
ceeded by good conduct; let us hope that it may be so in this 
instance; and let us take warning not to rely so entixely on one 
particular class of tioops. More olBcers» more European regi- 
mentSy and a greater Taxiety in the composition of our foroe, 
seem to be the only remedies in our power to countersct the 
possible disa£fecdon of our Native Infimtry ; and whether our 
resources will enaUe us to cany these remedies to a sufficient 
extent is doubtful Enough of this for the present. It is the 
most serious sulgect that could hare roused the anxiety of those 
who^ like myself, are always anxiously alive to the instability 
of our Indian Empire."— [Aimmier 19, 1824.] 

Allowancbb of the Htdsbabad Restosnct. — ^^I 
must bid adieu to the hope of ever seeing you at Fezn-hill. I 
shall dearly not have the means of occupying that place credit- 
ably, if ever I go home; and I never shall go home until some 
urgent necessity may compel me. By a minute examination of 
my accounts, I have ascertained that I have been spending 
much more than my allowances ever since I came to Hyderabad, 
of which I was not before aware. The following is the result, 
carefully produced by actual calcuUtion, after every possible 
deduction. From Ist September, 1820, to 30th April, 1824: 

Sicca Kupees. 
Average Monthly Expense . 10,220 

Monthly Income 8,053 

Monthly Excess of Expenditure 2,167 


The woiat is, that I see no xemedj for the fittnie. My present 
^lan is to send home irfaat money I have, to be secured there 
for my children, and to stay in India myself as long as I haye 
health and ftcolties. If the reports of my coming into Council 
be confirmed, I may be driven home at the end of my term, 
for I should not likato descend to serve again in the crowd 
after forming a part of the Govenmient. With these prospects, 
it win be a refief to me to find that I am left undisturbed at 
Hyderabad. And it will be arelief to me tofind that I am not 
to be separated firom my friends in this quarter." — [December 6, 

I&REGUI.AB HoBSfi.— [To LoRD Ahhebst.]— ^ The kind 
allusion made by your Ixndship in your favor of July 1, to the 
order of Govenmient regarding the gradual reduction of our 
Irregular Hone, encourages me to submit your attention to a 
part of that order which seems calculated to destroy the efifect 
of your intended indulgence, to ruin the efficiency, and crush 
the sprit of all the troops employed in that branch of our esta- 

^' I advert to that part of the order which provides that every 
trooper shall be discharged whose horse may die, or be dis- 
abled, or in any way become unfit for service. 

'^One consequence of this clause is, that the service becomes so 
extremely precarious as unavoidably to lose all hold in the 
attachment of the men. No one can reckon on his livelihood 
foraday. Hishorse maybe killed or disabled by any accident, 
or die by sudden disease, and the provision to which the trooper 
heretofore confidently looked for his support will instantly oease. 

'* Another consequence is, that no man can be expected to 
perform his duty. Any exertion of his horse may tend to an 
accident which will deprive ibe rider of his bread. The object 
of the latter of course will be to save his horse, and duty will 
necessarily be n^lected. 

'' Another consequence is that the best men in the service are 
as liable to discharge as the worst, the oldest soldiers equally 


with the youngest. It has already oocnned since the issiie of 
the order that men who have been repeatedly wounded in the 
service, and whom it could never have been your Lordship's 
intention to dismiss, have been discharged in consequence of 
the death or disability of their horses. 

** The effect of this part of the order on ihe Irregular CSavahy 
must be so universally detrimental and destructive, that I doubt 
whether the immediate reduction of that body to the intended 
peace establishment would not be less injurious. 

'^ If, however, this part of the order were reposed and rescinded, 
the continuance of a gradual reduction would, I conceive, be 
far preferable to one sudden and immediate; but the gradual 
reduction ought to take effect as men die, or retire, or render 
themselves liable to discharge, and not be dependent on the 
lives or deaths of horses; for it cannot be so without the greatest 
injury to the efficiency and spirit of the whole corps. 

^^ I am confident that your Lordship will not be displeased at 
the freedom with which I have offered my sentiments on this 
most interesting subject. The Irregular Horse have done their 
duty well, and shown a good spirit, and seem to be as well 
entitled to consideration as any other part of our army. 

*' I am very happy to learn that your Lordship has determined 
to visit the Upper Provinces. I think that you will derive 
both health and pleasure from the journey, and that your pre- 
sence will be highly beneficial. 

^* I had projected an excursion into Rajpootana and the south- 
westernmost parts of my superintendence, which was to have 
commenced in October, and was likely to occupy firom two to 
three months. I am doubtful, however, now, whether I ought 
to postpone it until I have paid my respects to your Lordship 
in these provinces, or imdertake it in the first instance and pay 
my respects to your Lordship afterwards. On this point I b^ 
your commands. 

'* I conclude that the arrival in Englandof intelligence of the 
honorable termination of the Burman war, and of the capture 


of Bhuitpore, will put an end to the discussions at one time 
agitated respecting the nomination of your Lordship's successor. 
The support which your Lordship has received from his Ma- 
jesty's Ministers is no less honorable to them than to your 
Lordship, for it proves them to have been above being influ- 
enced by the clamor to which the peculiar difficulties of the 
Burmese war gave rise." — [August 6, 1826.] 

Effects of the Siege of Bhubtpobe.^-*' I had the 
pleasure lately of making acquaintance with your son, who 
came as an amateur to the siege of Bhurtpore. I congratulate 
you on having such a son, and I also congratulate you on 
an event which has confounded the notions entertained by all 
India, of the existence of a barrier from which we might 
be insulted with impunity. By the fall of Bhurtpore, and the 
peace with the Burmans,. our power is at a higher pitch than it 
ever attained beforb ; and if the peace with Ava prove secure 
and lasting, and we have time to recruit our finances, we shall 
soon be in a moie prosperous state than in the most boasted 
periods of former days. But I fear that our hold on India is at 
the best precarious, and that we must always be prepared to 
straggle for the preservation of the power which we have 
acquired and now maintain solely by military prowess." — 
To Sir G. Bobmsanj April 24th, 1826.] 

Appoiktment to the Supbeme Council.— "I have 
received, and for ihe most part at the same instant, your kind 
letters of 5th and 11th April, in triplicate. To Mr. Majori- 
banks and yourself, and the other gentlemen of the Direction 
who have done me the honor to promote my provisional 
nomination to Couneily I must ever be under the deepest obli- 
gauon. But as I know not who opposed the proposition, 
or who were absent from the decision, I am equally ignorant as 
to who gave me their support ; your letters being the only 
communications that I have received from the India House* 


I regret that even one shonld deem me unworUiy of the 
appointment; bat perhaps I onght raiher to oonnd^ it tat- 
tanate that the minority was so smalL To yon, my dear Sir, 
who have shown so generous an interest in bcjialf <^a strainer, 
how can I soffidentlj express my thankfulness ? I will venture 
to assure you, that as a member of the Goyanment, the 
faithful discharge of my duty to the Company shall be the 
paramount motive of my conduct. I replied some months ago 
to your obliging favor of last September.'*'— [To Sir G. Bo- 
bmsan, September 24th, 1826.] 

Affairs of Rajpootaka.— Nok-Intxrfbbbxce, &a~ 
** The disturbances in Joudpoor and Eishengurh are bad Bymp> 
toms of the results of non-interference. There has probably 
been mismanagement on the part of our agents; peihaps an un- 
necessary or even malevolent bawling out of non-interferoioe, 
which may have led to the present state of things. The tolerar 
tion of Kuleean Singh's remaining at Dihlee when his country 
was thrown into confusion by his attempt to subdue his inde- 
pendent dependants is utterly unaccountable, and is a proof of 
gross neglect. Something of the same kind seems to have pate- 
vailed in allowing the Joudpoor Thakoors and Dhokul Sing^ 
to assemble and unite in the Jyepore territory, for which the 
Jyepore State ought still to be called to account. Tet the dis- 
turbances are in both cases essentially internal, and apparently 
proceeding from our non-interference in internal aflbirs. Do 
not suppose that I am ready to abandon that principle. On 
the contrary, I am of opinion that it has never yet had a &ir 
trial ; and I shall be without chart or compass if it be abandoned. 
But it must be owned that we have been veiy unfortunate. 
The contemptible imbecility of Kuleean Singh of Eishenguili, 
and the oppresnons and treachery of the Rajah of Joudpoor, 
have caused these disturbances. I shall be glad if the latter 
can get himself out of the scrape which he has brought on him- 
self; but if he calls for assistance, and submit his di£brences 


with lu8 chiefs to our arbitration, we shall be by treaty bound 
to ud him. Not that protection in such a case was contem- 
plated when the treaty was framed, but its terms will hardly 
admit of oar allowing him to be overthrown, althongh he is 
bound certainly in the first instance to defend himself. How 
contact with us seems to paralyse every State I Maun Singh 
was formerly able to keep what he had usurped, even against 
powerful combinations. Now, seemingly, he cannot stand 
against a few of his own chie&, having on their dde the name 
and person of the pretender. With respect to Eishengurh, if 
the Rajah do not acknowledge and fulfil his responsibility for 
the acts of his rebels as well as his followers, we must interfere 
between him and the former, and put an end to all disturbances 
in that petty State. Tou apprehend the spread of anarchy in 
consequence of these disturbances. It may be so — and nothing 
is surprifflng in India — ^but it will certainly be hard if we are 
to be involved in general commotion because two Rajpoot 
Rajahs quarrel with some of their chiefs. It will be a great 
blow to non-interference. It will be a proof that we have either 
gone too &r, or not far enough, in our superintendence of Cen- 
tral India. My opinion has always been that we have gone too 
far, and that we ought not to have posted our troops there. I 
remember the time when I could sit at Dihlee and hear ac- 
counts of disturbances throughout Rajpootana and Malwah, 
without our being in the least afiected by them ; and after we 
had put down the Mahrattas and Pindarees, and made our 
general treaties of alliance and protection, we should have done 
better, I think, had we posted our troops in a noble army on 
the Jumna, and interfered only on great occasions, when the 
cause might be worthy of us, leaving the several States to 
manage their concerns in general without us, forbidding, of 
course, any aggressions of one on another. This, however, is 
a new field of discussion, on which it is now useless to enter. 
Tou may be sure that I look to your quarter with no small 
anxiety, for I conader myself the only advocate of non-inter- 


ferenoe on principle — ^the only acWoeate, I may sayi of any prin- 
ciple of poUcy ; and if this principle be wrong, I have led the 
Goyemment into it. I wish that I had agents whom I oould 
rely on in carrying it into execution. I like the litde tbat I 
have seen of our new Governor-G^eral very much. He is a 
straightforward, honest, upright, benevolent, senmble man, who 
will, I trust, have the interests of the State at heart. He 
seems disposed to inquire and think for himself, and to avoid 
falling under any one's influence. I do not perceive that he 
has any fixed principles to regulate his Indian policy, and I can 
fancy, that if he should take a wrong view of my subject, he 
may be apt to persbt in error; but on the whole I hope ivell, 
and am pleased with what I see.''— [July 22, 1828.] 


Mtfim ^outuil MinuUn. 



[The papers contained in this section are .those written by Sir Charles 
Metcalfe, after taking his seat in the Supreme Conndl of India, up to the 
period of his final departure from the country. Principally written in the 
official form of 3^utes for perusal by his colleagues, and for subsequent 
record cm the Proceedings of the Council, they have been arranged under 
sereral heads, according to the department of Government to which they 
relate. I have prefaced them, however, with some general remarks on the 
condition of our Indian Empire and the machinery of its Government, 
written, apparently, not for official record, during the discussions preceding 
the passing of the Charter-Act of 1833. They contain a fair summary of 
the general views of the statesman, and serve as a key to much that fol- 
lows. . In some respects it will be seen that the suggestions which this paper 
contains have abready been adopted by the Legislature ; but a great por- 
tion of it is still applicable to the present state of affairs, and suggests: 
matter for future consideration.] 

.... What will the nation gain by taking India out of 
the hands of the Company ? An addition of forty millions to 
the national debt, and a territory that cannot pay its expenses. 

Yet, no purse but that of the nation will be able to support 
this ezpennve concern; for that of the Company cannot, afier 



the loflB of the China monopoly ; and, in fiict, has only done 
80 hitherto by borrowing. 

Borrowing cannot go on for ever ; and an attonpt to make 
India pay its own expenseSy under all drcuinstaneea, might 
cause the lorn of the country. 

Our hold is so precarious, that a very little mismanagement 
might aocompliah our expulsion ; and the course of events may 
be of itself sufficient, without any miemanagement 

We are to appearance more powerful in India now than we 
ever were. Nevertheless, our downfall may be short woiL 
When it commences it will probably be rapid, and the world 
will wonder men aft tlie suddenDflH witfi which oar immense 
Indian Empire may vanish, than it has done at the surpriang 
conquest that we have achieved. 

The cause of this precariouaneas is^ that our power does not 
rest on actual strength, but on impresmon. Our whole real 
strength consists in the few Evropean regiments, speaking 
comparadvely, that are scattered singly over the vast spaoe of 
subjugated India. That is the only portion of oar soldiery 
whose hearts aie with us, and whose oonalaacy caa be lelied on 
in tfaehour of triaL AH cor native estabB AbwId, nnMtaiy or 
civil, are the toUowers o« fortune ^ they aerve us fer Aenr liven* 
hood, and generally serve us well. From a sense of what is due 
to the hand that feeds them^ which is one of the virtuea that 
they most extol, they may often diqday fidelity under tiyiag 
ci r c unMtaw oes ; hmi m Aai inwasd feaU^ji tiiey partake noie 
or less of the universid dieaflbction which prevaib against us, 
not from bad government, but from natural and irresistible 
antipathy ; and were the wind to change— to use a native 
expression — and to set in steadily against us, we eould not 
expect that their sense of honor, although there might be 
splendid hiifannes of devotion^ would keep the mass on our 
side in oppootion to the common feeling which, with oaeview, 
might Sat a time unite all India fiom one end to the other. 

Empires grow old, decay, and perish. Onia in India can 
hardly be called <^ but asems destined to be short-lived. We 
appear to have passed the brilliancy and vigor of our youth, 


■mL it WBj be HatA we hzwe xeached s pvematore old i^. We 
bftire onaed to be die vooder tfatt we were to the nataTes ; the 
dMrat which OBcee&compaaBed m fan been disBolvcd, and our 
nbjeets have had timeto inquixe why they ha^e been eabdned. 
Ike eoliaeqiieBcea of the ixiqviry vny appear hereafter 

1£ these specnhriiniis are not devoid of Ibondationt diey aie 
Qfleftd in diverting cor minds to the contem{dation of the veal 
nalme of onr power, and in pseventmg s delnave bdief of its 
inpiegnahility* Oar greatest danger is not from a Rnssan 
inYadon, bat firom the fading of llie impreBekm of o«r invinci- 
biUty from Ae minds of the native inhabitants of India. The 
diaifieetion which would willix^ly root as oat exists abandantly ; 
&e conenrrenoe of dvcamstsnces sufficient to call it into geneiul 
ac^n may at any lime happen. 

The most obvious mofc of uliengthening our power in Ih£a 
would be by a large increase of our European force ; but as we 
could not find iimds for the consequent expense, that measure 
is impradicable. 

Wbedier we msintaxn or lose India, does not depend on its 
bang g ov erned in the name of the King or in that of the Com- 
pany ; our fate most piobably will be the same either way; but 
as long as we retain possession, we are bound to do all the good 
in our power to our subjects. Although the hope of gaining 
their attachment may be uttexly vmn, we may often mitigate and 
neutralise their disafrection ; and by the longer continuance of 
OUT rule, that feeling may be less predominant, as seems already 
to be the case in our oldest possesions, where the inhalntants 
have been habituated to our government for more than one 
generation. Etcu, however, under a certainty of permanent 
diaaffecdon, our duty towards the governed is the same. We 
are bound to give them the best goremment in our power. 

Will India, tihen, be best governed by continuing the channel 
of the Company, or directly by the Ministers of the Crown? 

As concerning the native population of India, it seems to be 
a matter of indifierencey for whatever improvements can be 
introduced into our local administration, may be equally eflected 


in the one caee or the other. Even now, India on all great 
qaeetions is goTemed bj the Board of ControL An j olmoitt 
improvement could be introduced if it did not violate die 
Ccmipany's Charter ; and it would only be necesaary in ^ 
new duurter to take care that no stipulationB were admitted 
which might preclude the power of improTement 

Although it seems to be a matter of indi£krence to the 
native population whether India be governed through the 
Company, or directly by the Ministers of the Crown, it is not 
so to another class of subjects. 

The Europeans settled in India, and not in the Company's 
service, and to these might be added generally the East 
Indians of mixed breed^ will never be satisfied with the 
Company's Government. Well or ill founded, they will 
always attach to it the notion of monopoly and exdunon; 
they will consider themselves comparatively discountenanced 
and unfavored; and will always look with desire to the sub- 
stitution of a Elng's Government. For the contentment of this 
class, which| for the benefit of India and the security of our 
Indian Empire, ought greatly to increase in numbers and 
importance, the introduction of a Song's Government is un- 
doubtedly desirable. 

It is also dedrable on anotiier accoimt. The enstence of 
King's Courts and a Company's Government produces the 
appearance of disunion in our administration. The relative 
positions of the Courts and tiie Governments are misunderstood, 
or are not what they ought to be. The judges themselves 
seem to conceive— -indeed, in some instances have openly de* 
clared — tiiat they are here purposely to check and control the 
Company's Government, and that tiiey are above the Grovem- 
ment, which can only approach their high tribunal as an humble 
petitioner. This state of things does not exist in any other 
country. Everywhere else the Courts of Justice, even where 
perfectiy independent, as they ought to be, in their judicial 
decitions, regard themselves as forming a part of the general 
administration of tiie country. Nowhere else would they 
dream of bringing the Government of the country into con- 

king's Ain> oompany's abmies. 165 

tempt for their own exaltation. This assumed superiority of 
the King's Courts is encouraged and insisted on by the 
European population not in the Company's service, and a 
wrong feeling on the subject will always exist until the differ- 
ence of King and Company be aboli^ed by the introduction 
of a Royal Government. 

The present difference between the King's and Company's 
armies is another inconvenience which the establishment of a 
Government directly on the part of the Crown would obviate. 
This difference is disliked chiefly by the King's oiEcers serving 
in India, who see those of the Company in possession of all 
Staff, offices, excepting the few belonging exclusively to the 
King's troops ; and are also precluded from numerous advan- 
tageous and honorable employments in civil branches of the 
service which are open to Company's officers. It is just that it 
should be so, while the two armies are constituted as at present, 
and entirely separate ; but if an amalgamation could take place 
without injury to either party, it is desirable that such distinc- 
tions should cease, and the establishment of a King's Govern- 
ment would tend to produce that eflfect. 

A King's Government is also the one which is most likely 
to be permanent, as the Company's hold under a charter must 
be liable to periodical changes and reversions, whether for re- 
newal or subversion.* 

These are the reasons which occur to the mind in favor of the 
introduction, ostensibly as well as really, of a King's Govern- 
ment ; and on the other hand, there do not appear to be any 
reasons of a permanent character in favor of the continuance 
of the Company's Government, as far as India alone is con- 
cerned. But, in the first instance, the natives, perhaps, dis- 
trusting the consequences of the change, would rather prefer 

* At a later period of his life, Sir Crown is in reality jfovermnent hj 

Charles Metcalfe, with a greatly en- a parliamentary majority, and Su* 

lar^d knowledge of European po- Charles Metodfe used to say, that if 

IxtuBSy saw occasion to modify the that were applied to India our tenure 

opinion here expressed in favor of of the counUy would not be worth 

the fforenunent of India directly by ten years' purchase, 
the Crown. GoTemment by the 


the oontiiwMnre of ihftt gOTenuMDi to -mtidi Aef kcre ] 
iccniilofniwi. And, as has been before TeamAaAy efciy air 
praremeBi m local aiiiiniahratiflm may be eflbeled ibxaa^ 
the medimm of a iinim»al CJompaajf^a fbm iiii m f t^ as -well aa 
Aioigb any other Iota. 

On the whole, the King's Government aeema pvefesaUe; bat 
whether the goraniiieiit be Ki^a or Coeapany'a, die proapect 
of ]inpK«>veiiieiii la not flattering. 

The revennea of India axe not equal to the au|i(Mri of ita 
expenaea^ and, jndgiag from paet ezperioaoe^ are not fikely to 
become bol We maj, and we moat, lediaoe onr ocdiaaiy 
ezpenditore within our ineoaae ; bnt we hare a heavy debt to 
diacharge, and we ha^e no aeeoiity againat fatue waE% which 
must incEcaae our financial difficaldeaL TlieBe ia litde hope of 
a permanent xeductioa of eatabUahmenta ; these ia a eoaAiDaal 
todency to increase. Seme bamdicB of vevemK aie hhcljF to 
fidl off ^ there ia no aatia&etQiy aaanrawoe of great inereaae ia 
any othera. The Sea Ciiatom% now ezoeedingly low, are oaa- 
ceptibk of improvement, but it can only be by levying higher 
duties on the trade with Enzope, to which the mevdiaata of 
England would object. There i% indeed, the remote proqtect 
of increaae of revenue firom the incnaaed influx of Eazopeana; 
but tfaia ia at preaoit inoculative ; and whether an incieaae ef 
revenue or an increase of expense from mate expensive eata- 
bhahmcnta will be the result of an exteoak» of the Earopean 
populatioa, ia nnoertain. 

It is, therefixre, to be apprehended that the Goremment will 
not poaaeaa the power of reducing taacattan, aa it will haxdfy 
have the naeana, with ita present revemie, of aupportix^ ita 
expenaea^ The f^xmer may be the leaa n^iretted, as the e&ct 
of reducing taxation inany afaape in which it would have to be 
accomplished, is far from certain. The only branch of our taxa- 
tion that can be called excessive is the Land Revenue, the dnef 
resource that maintaina the State* A reduction in this, justly 
apportioned, would contribute to the comfixt ol ihe raaas of 
our subjects, the village popiilation, but would not make them 

vmjcnciB a» xAXJOum. i(7 

wodlkf. IfappovtkwdiriaioiilgscUcBiendfltzkivqp^ 
jmioe^it irould mat even pmrnotetbtir comfert^lbat ifoaklinoflt 
pidbUy do tihem injiiiy. Hat leductm, lioiiii:v«ry idiateiv 
would be iti ooi»eqiieiifie% ive are not in a caodiliQB to sffixtd. 
Ovr GofcmiBeiit »iioi a mrtioaal CknnenHBenttfaaieanic^on 
the sflbclMim of ilviribgtets fcr defence ^gsm8t£M»^ 
It is tbeeone of aGovcnnoBtofer accmqiiefedcoiinlr)rtlMit 
it Gflnnot tRHt the people. Our salgeeli an intenal eneaaaeti^ 
nmdj at least fiiridiange, if not xipe Ibr insoneodoBt ^ the beat 
aifcctcd are pawve TOtariea of fiite. We cm retain our d«>* 
sideiable feree of Britiah troope^ tbe fidelity of our natiYe amy 
oonld not be xriied en* It irould be difficak to caknlate what 
fiwee predsely iaaeqaite;^ it is eaaytoaeethat^&r aecaiity,we 
bsrenottoonnidi* Itaeesn Aat weoagbtto nudntainaU that 
we can pay, and to pay them we require all the revenue that 
wecaniaiBe. AredoGti<Hiof taxation for any beneficial cooae* 
qneaee appeare to be hopehm 

Ko govemmen^ perhape, ever made a greater xednction of 
taaoilion, or, in oth^ woida, a greater sacrifioe of the light to 
acknowledged and usual public revenue, than did the Bengal 
Goyemment respectivdy in 1793^ in what was tetnied the 
permanent settlement of the land reToone. But what was the 
consequence of this sacrifice ? It did not benefit the mass of 
the population interested in land. On the contraxj, it psac- 
tically destioyed Aeir rights* It <»ily transftrred the revenue 
of goremment to serve individuals who had no title to it, 
without any beneficial eflfect on the public initerestiv » fiff as is 
peroqitible to eoramon observation. 

If reduction of tazatxon, and improvenrait as its cons&> 
qnences, are not to be expected, firom what other quarter laay 
improvenent be looked tos ? From non^ suddenly. It is to 
be hoped that our Government is gradually producing im- 
provement: that we are progressively enlightening the minds 
of the natives: that security is promoting wealth: and it may 
reasonably be expected that the increase of European settlers 


win hftTe very beneficial effiscts. But improTemeni oaa only 
be gradual. No change in the adminiatration of the Gorem- 
ment can produce any sadden eflfect The local Groveninient 
has always been disposed to impiove the condition of the 
people. Barring restriction on the settlement of Europeans^ 
which was most unwise, but has progresrively been modi 
rekzed, no obvious improvement for the benefit of the pec^ 
consistent with the recdpt of the revenue^ necessary for the 
maintenance of our power, has been, or would be, neglected 
under the Company's Gbvemment There has been no want 
of benevolence, either in the Grovemment or its executiTe 
officers; but the means of improvement are not obvious. 

The most obvio^, but that hitherto much disputed, is the 
admission of Europeans to settle and hold property in India. 
Their settlement has never been entirely prohibited, and lat- 
terly has been facilitated and encouraged; but the removal of 
remaining restrictions on their lawfully acquiring and holding 
property is necessary; and for their satisfaction, the cessation 
of the power possessed by the Government of sending them 
out of the country is indispensable. The ezistenoe of this 
power is dwelt upon by them as the greatest hardship to which 
they are subject They profess to regard it as destroying the 
value of all property, even if they were allowed to hold it^ and 
rendering their situation so precarious as to preclude the pro- 
bability that any one possessing capital would voluntarily expose 
himself to the danger of losing it by becoming subject to the 
exercise of this arbitrary power. These obstacles removed, 
and the settlement of Europeans allowed to take its natural 
course, progressive improvement is the result that may be 
anticipated. There must be added the abolition of those 
unjust distinctions which exclude the products of India from 
the markets of Great Britain and Ireland, the consequences of 
which abolition are at present incalculable, and may be im- 
mense. It is impossible to foresee to what extent the resources 
of tiiis productive country may be drawn forth by European 


cnfterprifle, ddll, and capital These axe our best prospects of 

The eztennve establishment of European settlers would give 
us also a strength in the country which we do not at present 
poness. We have no root Were our troops and ci^il autho- 
rities by any disaster driven out of a province, there would be 
no vestige of us left, — no part of the population interested for 
our return, or bearing any trace of our existence. It seems 
wonderful that the policy acted on in a conquered country 
should have been to ezdude our own countrymen from ac- 
quiring influence among the people. It may be too late to 
prevent the injurious effects of such a policy, as the operation 
of a more natural course must be slow, and the greater part of 
a century has been thrown away. 

The increase of European population will necessarily be ac^ 
companied by considerable changes in our judicial adminis- 
tration. Europeans must be made amenable to provincial 
Courts. It will probably be necessary to introduce functionaries 
who have had education and practice in English law. The 
distinction of King's Courts and Company's must be abolished. 
All must be united in one system, lliere must be a local code 
for India and a local Legislature. All our subjects, European 
Christian, native Christian, Hindoo, Mahomedan, foreigners, 
lie, ought to be under one code of laws in whatever concerns 
them in common, returning their own in whatever is peculiar 
to each sect. 

The East Indians, of mixed breed, ought to be placed on 
the same footing with British subjects. They are now held to 
be natives, and, although Christian, are subject to Mahomedan 

Whatever improvement may suggest itself as obviously bene- 
ficial and practicable, will no doubt be adopted, either at the 
time of that great change, or previously^ But it is less difficult 
to perceive that there are defects in the administration of justice 
thm it is to render it perfect. The present judicial establish- 

170 ifAcwniwcT ov noiUM i 

I Am miglit W needri for i 
juBtioe to the xuttive population aocording to their 
iBflh^* buk^ coBfteanlatiBff mi Meowa of 
ktioB^ iM «& hudly look to ft ] 
We mait uKvemdlj ptoride such CcxHts as wiD give m^ 
hctiaa to FMn|Hftn as veil aa aatim aabjeolB; and this Mf 
not be ptT^fH1^ laibatiX aa naonan of expeiHB. 

TIm) Police eftabUhmenti^ iiQB the MM OMe^ wm 
haw to ndoEgo great changci^ IhePoUee ai preaoiiiavB- 
dentood to be gCMrallj efident. liiBM dod>t»im8oaM» 
apeel% aaonxee of anaoyaiioe and cppteflBon to the people, v 
is akMst efeij part of our aadTS offidal eslaUklHDcata; imi it 
is ireiy difficult to rectify this evil Maay geadeaaea haw 
made the attempt with the best inlealioDS, bmi generaUy with 
little sooeesB. Posasr and the abuse of it sesm JnespaTable in 
onr osftive esliHinhnwuli. The theoreticsl remedy wbodi hat 
been fieqpiently advocated, is to raise the charactera of our na- 
tire servants by saigmenting their aUowanoeL The schssne is 
nnpraoticaUe, because it would be ndnoos, even if these were 
any hope of sneeess in its object; wfaidi aoay be doa b led 

Modi has been said of late of Native Agencyy which, if it 
be meant thereby to ezdude Earopeaa sopeiintendenee and 
vigilsaoe, seenn irisionary and utterly inpcsnUe. If it is to be 
oombined with Enropean dizectiooy the native agent must 
remain much the lame as he has slways been — ft sabovdrnnle 
officer with a moderate salary. We cannot affisrd to pay 
double fer native agency and European surveillance. All that 
has been written on the extension of the native agency is veiy 
indefinite and rather unintelligible. All our subordinate i^enta 
are natives. It is surprisiDg how little Europeans have beoi 
employed in the lower offices of the State. The use of natives 
in the exercise of conaideraUe functions in the judicisl depart- 
ment is great and increasing; but they misit r»naan subordi- 
nate and moderately paid. If it be intended to subetitute 
native for European agency m the higher offices^ the attempt 
will fail. When native agency predominates we shall be 


loatoftkeeonkiy. Wemaot lien bj the^viUof the 

ageiief Biat itiB oo6iip7 •& u^Kvtaat postian^ forwecmoot 
depead en tbe egenoj of natms. 

ThfBj hmwe never beat exclodeil fiom sn j es^iioTiiieBl in 
wUch i^ haa ■{q>eaxed tluit die/ could be eenrioeabk. Nor m 
li MCMumj nonv to enbde ifaem. KeiAer a il cicpedieBl to 
Sane ihtmk vmataEillj isto new enpkijiiicata for tie sake of 
ft them J > LetAcni beeaplofed wbezever it iadeemed deair* 
ftUe. Bstitdece aoiseemnatundtlmtdieinGreflee ofEmo- 
peue populatkn, snd tlie extRfnaion of Native Agency in the 
ofices^ flhoald adT«Ke together; The patrons of the 
i Ibaidljr be the adrocates of the other. 

It suit be dodbtod whether erea the Civil Service will be 
abb to ictam itv exdhnive privileges after the extensive esto- 
bBnhwent of Eozopean settLera. At present the whole adminis- 
trataon of the co u n tr j is condosted or superintended by the 
mcmbeis of this singiikr service, destined £rom the dawn of 
maihiood to the pwrformance of the most important duties. 

TIhj are mot geneially deficient in integrity or application to 
buriaeai^ or bcnevolenGe to die people. What is most wanted is 
heartfeb neaLfer thepuUic interest; scarcely, perhaps, to befound 
in any body of men. On the whole, it may be doubted whe- 
ther die duties peifbnned hj the Civil Service could be better 
pezfcimed nader any odier arrangeflsent by the same numbers, 
but die meoesnty of em^doying unfit men in hi^y important 
offices 18 pecntiar to this service, and demands correction. 

If all the young men sent out fi^r service in India were 
or^inaHy appoint^ to die army, the Oovemment would be 
able to sele^ those best qualified for the civil service, and on 
the disappointment of its expectations in any instance, could 
leCam a poaon unfit for civil buriness to duties more suitable 
to him. 

This am mg e meni» however, posribly might not agree widi 
the fhture drspfwal of the army, which ought to be t ransferr ed 
to the down. Its existence as a sepamie body, ealliag die 


Oompany master, and yet having no respect for the CSompany 
or Its authoriliefl, is incompatible with that spirit of sabordi- 
nation, and discipline, and loyal devotion, without which an 
army may become dangerous. The Company's army has always 
done its duty in the field nobly; and no army in the world, 
perhaps, has a higher tone in that respect But it exists in a 
state of continual discontent, from the comparison which ia 
ever before its eyes of the scantiness of military allowances with 
the large salaries of the civil service, and is driven almost to 
frenzy by any attempt to reduce those allowances already oon« 
ddered too small. Therefore, the late orders from home, re* 
ducing the batta of the Bengal army at some stations, besides 
being severe on present incumbents, were most \mwise, because 
they were sure to excite a feeling iar outweighing in mischirf 
any good that could possibly be expected from carrying them 
into effect. The Indian army, although it be taken under the 
Crown, must, nevertheless, continue in some respects a sepantte 
body — that is, it must be officered as at present by officers 
brought up in its own bosom. Officers fix>m the European 
portion of his Majesty's army ought not to be transferred to 
the direct command of native troops; but officers from the 
Indian army might be allowed to purchase, or to be removed 
into the European army, and the prospect of this at some period 
would form a bond of connexion between the two services, 
which would be strengthened by putting the officers of both 
services on the same footing from the time of their ceasing to 
be regimental officers— that is, from their promotion to be 
general officers, giving to the Indian officer the privilege in 
common with the European officer of being eligible to serve 
his country in the fields of Europe.* At the same time, the 

* There is matter in this for very in India b in F" g^w *<^ a dead letter, 

grave consideration at the present TVliatever seryioes he may have ren- 

time (Jamtary, 1855). Indeed, it is dered to his country on fields of 

one which presses earnestly for a Eastern enterprise —whatever may 

settlement. In Europe a Company's be his approved military RVill^ his 

Seer is an officer only by courtesy, experience in the field, his known 

e royal commission which he holos fertility of resofiroe, his coolness and 


Staff in India, and the employments now held ezclarively by 
Company's officers, ought to be common to both branches of 
the King's army; nominations to be made not at the Hor^e 
Ghiards, but by the authorities in India from officers serving in 
India, with the exception of general officers, who might be 
appointed either from home or from the service in India. 

The Indian armies of the three Presidencies could not pro- 
bably be united, under present circumstances, without consider- 
able inconvenience and dissatisfaction. Union is otherwise de- 
sirable, and would &cilitate any reduction of the army that 
might be practicable. Considering the composition of the 
native portion of the several armies, and the necessity of at- 
tending to locality in postbg them, the difficulties of a change 
seem to preponderate, but may not be insurmountable. If to 
be efiected, it would most easily be done after the transfer of 
the Company's army to the Crown, because then, such arrange- 
ments might accompany the measure as would lead the officers 
to regard themselves as members of the British army generally, 
and not as merely belonging to the army of a particular Presi- 
dency with isolated interests, which is the feeling that now 
prevails, and would render any attempt to join tiie three 
armies at present unpopular. 

oounge in {;reat and inuninent con- turning to account the available re- 

jonctnres, bu mastery over men — sources of a strange country as the 

vhaterer, in short, may be the great- officers of the Compan^s services. 

ness of his qualities as a soldier and None know better wnat it is to con- 

a commander, he cannot, according tend with such eyjls as bad roads, 

to the present routine system, serve scarcity of carriage, insufficient meaxis 

his country, except in or from hidia. of transport — and above all, endemic 

And yet only in India^ during the disease. Yet all the experience ac- 

last forty years, has anv military ex- quired by the Indian omoer, during 

perience been acquired Dv the British long years of active service in strange 

officer. I trust that I shall not be countries and difficult conjunctures, 

aocnaed of any undue partiality for cannot, under the present system, be 

the Indian services, when I say roidered avaikble for punK)ses of 

that the difficulties which our army European warfare. It must be folded 

in the Crimea has encountered are up and laid upon the shelf with the 

precisely those, in kind if not in Queen's commission, and endorsed 

degree, which officers of long Indian as " worthless on this side of the 

experience know best howlo over- Cape.'* 
oome. Kg men are so expert in 


Thif qmBtAaa may m wtmm «legrae depend on die 
detenniiialion of aaotberi mundyi ^riieAer llie pxeBeni dkwi- 
Bin of bdk iBio dietuct Praideiiaea, vidi the es^ 
ohiaecy of eefwrate QoytaaamemU ead Orwindk, flkall be warn- 

No ab^ GbTerameaii as the ladiAa GoTeamente aie at 
pieseAt conatiiiitod, would be equal io the Maaagemeafc of Ae 
detaik of iatemal admimatration of all the three Piendeaciea. 
Tbe SspMBie €k>Tenxment is not fiilly eqoal io it ia that of 
Bengal alone^ notwithitaiiding the aid of aevecd eaboidiBate 
Boarda; and would be moKe efficient for genecal pnrpoaefl if it 
were xelieved fir(»i tbe greater part of thoie detuki 

The Bystom of eepaiate PrBwidencieB fleene to woik weU» and 
to jnstifyan eniiie change wodid requiie aoBe olmous and 
great adrBntage which is not m— ifegfe- 

But it is undoabtedly desirable diat there should be an 
unity of antbodty, and that erory part of India abouU a ef«ry 
ntfed be under one Supreme Oovemment 

There mif^ be in eadi of the three PreBideneies of Bengal, 
Madras, and Bombay, a Deputy-GoTemor, with a Board 6x 
internal administrBtion ; and, over all, a GovenMr-Gcnersl widi 
a Supreme Council. 

This seems at first sight a more expensive arrangement than 
the present, but as the local Oovemments would be limited to 
internal administration^ the subordinate Boards whicb at piesoit 
exist in tbe several departments might be whoDy or partially 
dispensed wUh. 

Each Presidency might require a separate Commander of 
the Forcea^ but there might be a Commander-in-Chief of the 
whole, who diould be equally Gommander^n-Chief finr aH the 
troops, and not, as at present^ Commander-in-Ghief for the 
King's troops only, and eoramander of the Company's ibroes in 
Bengal alone. 

The Gommander^n-Chief ought to be a BBember of the 
Supreme Council, in which all important political and miCtary 
questions would be determined; but the oonnnanden of d»a 

^ovinauui-ca&BssALBHip* 175 

I ft e ri denc i ea need not be memben of ^» Fnndaicy 
Bonds, at ilie bnnhipm of ^ eoboidiiiate GoTenuneoti ivodd 
be eottfined chiefly to loeal ^tiI udmraistralioft, in wbich Ike 
conimandas of the forees eodd be of Ihde use. The local 
Bcwda migbt be anisted^if neocavij, witbiiiiliftuyknowieclge, 
by baying a mUkMry ana as aeeietej in the vflitarjr depart- 
mentyitt is already the case in BengaL 

The nomination to appointments, or what is designated the 
patwage in all the fecoes, ought to beknig to Ae oommaader- 
iiFchief^ and the patnuage of the tinee Cknremments to the 
GoTemor-General. This is necessary for the due inflneBoe of 
tlMse h%h aatheanties; finr, wItb o Mt the power of dispennng 
benefils, thqr wonld be of Httle oonseqnenoe, petacmallyy in the 
estiniatioB of the oonuunuty. 

Whenever cncBSBslanees wiU adnit^-that i% whenever the 
Gbvemor-General may be a general officer of eaffieient niK- 
tary lank^ it will be belter that he shodd abo be CMimander- 
in4Dhief. In this oonqueied erapiie, where &e amy forms so 
preponderatiBg a part of Ae ESnopean community, the eidst- 
enee ci a separaie head to the army creates a power which 
sometimes becomes a sort of livel to that of the Governor-Ge- 
neral. Either the CoHnBander4n-Chief aeqmres popakrity at 
die expense of the Governor-General, or both are unpopular. 
The periods of greatest discontent in the amy will foe found to 
have occnrred when the offioes were sepamte; the army has 
been best pleased when they have been united. 

The union of the offioes of Goveraor-Oeneral and Commander- 
in-Chief is not suggested as an arrangement in no instance to 
be deviated fiom. It is supposed that the junction of aatho- 
ritses wonld generally be adTsntageous ; but if a rule had 
existod excluding from the Governor-Generalship every person 
who oonU not be Commander-in-Ohief, we riioald have lost 
die administinlions of Lord Welksley and Warren Hastbgs. 

Hie Supreme GoTemment might connst of the Govemor- 
Greneral, the Oommander4n-Cfai^, and two other mraiben. 
Oivil or military servants from either of the three Pkesideneies 


to be dif^ble to the Supreme CoonciL More membea firam 
other profesnons might be added for l^gialatioii. One or more 
aeoetaxiesv as need might be, to be attached to the Supteme 
OoTermnent to be taken from any of the Preadenciea. 

The subordinate Goyemments might obnaut of a Depoij- 
Govemor and two membera of the Board at each PreaidenGj. 
The membera of the Board to be selected from the ci^ aer- 
vanta of the same Prendency. 

Officers of the Indian army to be eligible as well as officers 
of the British army to the offices of Commander-in-Chief and 
commanders of forces. 

The nomination of GoTemor*G^eral, Commander-in-Chief^ 
deputy-goTemorSy commanders of forces, members of ihe 
Supreme Council, members of Preddency Boards, and geneal 
officers on the Staff, to be made by the Home authorities. AU 
subordinate appointments to emanate from the GroT^nor- 
General or the Commander-in-Chief in India. The Oovem- 
ment at home must be careful to leave inviolate to the 
GoTemment in India the power of selecting its agents in the 
administration of the country, and to limit the selection used 
by us at present to persons duly qualified by local education in 
the civil or military service of the State in India. 

The Supreme (Government ought to possess the power of 
controlling and directing the subordinate Grovemments in the 
details of the internal administration of the several Presidencies, 
whenever it may see fit to interfere, as well as in every other 
respect. The Presidency Gbvemments, in short, to be thoroughly 
subordinate ; to report Uieir proceedings to the Supreme Gro- 
vemment, and to have no separate correspondence with the 
Home authorities, unless to convey intelligence when it may 
be useful for them to do so. Political, military, financial 
affairs, legislation, and all general interests would come within 
the peculiar province of the Supreme Government, which 
would be the more efficient for its duties by being relieved from 
the details of internal Presidency administration. 

The ordinary seat of the Supreme Government might be, as 


at present, in CSalcutta, which is certainly the capital city of 
British India. But if a centrical position be preferredi Saugur 
offiars itself as nearly the heart of India. It would, however, 
be inconyenient and expensive to make a new capital, and 
centricality of position is of less consequence, as the Supreme 
Government ought to have the power of moving wherever its 
superintendence might be most required. 

The subordinate governments also ought to have the power 
of moving within the limits of their respective territories under 
the orders of the Supreme Government. The seats of the 
subordinate governments would be naturally at Calcutta, 
Madras, and Bombay. Or if the seat of the Supreme Govern- 
ment were at Calcutta, that of the local government of the 
Bengal Presidency might be at Allahabad or Monghyr ; but 
this arrangement would probably throw on the Supreme Go- 
vernment the local administration of affairs at Calcutta, and 
so &r diminish its efficiency for general government by involv- 
ing it in internal details. 


Mdiiavji mt( 9olititaI« 


IMarck 6» 1830.] 

[In the Mowing paper the peenliiir TiewB of Sir dmrles Metoalf^ reb- 
tive to the dangen which, hi his eethnatioB^ at aU times threateDed the 
aecority of onr Indian Empire, are suggested rather than eofoteed. These 
opinions were not, however, enunciated in the spirit of an alaimiat ; but 
solely with the object of resisting an undue tendency to reduction, in all 
parts of the Indian Establishment, which was then manifesting itself at 
home. There was nothing which he more consistently advocated throughout 
the whole of his career, than the necessity of maintaTning the efficiency of 
the army, as the only real bulwark of our strength.] 

The Honorable the Court of Directors, in the 8th paragraph 
of their letter of the 18th of February, 1829, have been pleased 
to express a wish, that the grounds of an opinion, stated by me 
in a Minute of the 25th of February, 1828, had been more 
fully explained. 

That opinion was to the effect, that our army in India is not 
larger than what it would be desirable to retain could the ex- 
pense be afforded. 

With reference to the wish expressed by the Honorable 
Court, I proceed to explain that opinion, and shall commence 
by endeavouring to reply to the particular questions put by the 
Honorable Court, and herewith entered in the margin. 


1. Ib ii tbit tlw L The measores of the 'i/Urqpk of Hast- 
P^l^ niSS"^ "*8" ^■"^'^ entirely euoceflBftil in roppressing 
G<mmiieat of i&e ^e predatory powers, and tranqmlliflmg 

J*"^^^^.^**'^ CentiBl India, which were amoni? the prin- 
baye ilEaJed to pro- . , * , -, , ^ '^ 

dnoe thor expected «I»1 »«"te expected from these measnres ; 
resulti, and if so, hut ihe airangementa adopted for ihe com- 
^^ pletion of those objects led to an increase 

of oor anny. By occupying several sta- 
tions in Bajpootana and Malwah, we created a demand for 
additional troops, whidi our government was soon induced to 
supply. We estaWiahed what may be termed a military police 
throi^out Central Indiai with a view to maintain order in 
countries belonging to foreign potentates. This system will no 
doubt have advocates, and it cannot be denied that it has pro- 
duced the tranquillity which was desired. Nevertheless I must 
acknowledge myself to be of opinion that it was erroneous. I 
consider the stations of Nusserabad, Neemuch, Mhow, and even 
Kagpoor and their subordinate posts, to have been unneces- 
sarily occupied as permanent stations after the^war of 1817-18. 
We might have adopted another course. After suppressing the 
predatory powers, and remaining long enough to see that otgect 
fully accomplished, we might have withdrawn our forces within 
our own frontiers; we might have exercised through our poli- 
tical agents a general superintendence over the tranquillity of 
Central India, preventing the several states from attacUng each 
other, but also avoiding that minute interference which we 
have since exercised, especially in Malwah, in the affiiirs and 
internal police of every petty state. Instead of acting our- 
selves as police oflScers throughout the country, we might have 
required from the several states suitable exertions to keep the 
peace by their own means, and we might have organised rela- 
tions of mutual protection and subordination between the greater 
and the minor states, where necessary for general tranquilli^. 
Under such a system, we might have had occasionally to em- 
ploy troops in Central India for the restoration of broken 
peace, or the restitution of the rights of a weaker vidbted by a 



stronger power, bat the permanent drain in our army, wliidi 
now imposes on us a permanent increase of expense, would 
have been avoided. Were I asked whether or not I think a 
change to such a system still practicable and advisable, I 
should answer that I do not conrider it impracticable, and am 
not confident that it is unadvisable; but there is a great dif- 
ference between avoiding and abandoning a system. Abandon- 
ment is retrogression, which of itself is an evil in India, from 
the sensation which it excites, and the impresnon^ with which 
it would be attended, of diminution of power. Our system 
has been established. The expense of stationing our troops in 
Central India has been incurred: were we now to withdraw 
them, the people would regard the measure as a retreat and 
loss of power, and would be prepared for great changes. 
Unless willing to abandon our supremacy, we should probably 
at first have to act occasionally with vigor, and not without 
expense, in order to maintain our power, and prevent general 
disturbance. While, therefore, able to keep our army at its 
present strength, it will perhaps be as well to leave our stations 
in Central India untoudied ; but if compelled by absolute ne- 
cessity to effect a large reduction of force, the question of dis- 
pensing with those stations may very properly be taken into 
2. Is it that your 2. I am of opinion that this is, in some 

^^JT^ " ^°* degree, the case. It has been too much our 
distnbutcd ma way • r .. 

the most favorable practice heretofore to disperse our army m 
to its efficiency P single regiments, or small detachments, but 

not so much so of late as formerly. Were we to have our regular 
army brought together in large bodies at several chosen points, 
and exercised in field operations; were we to have a cheaper 
description of force for internal service, and to make more use 
of our invalids, converting them into veteran regiments for 
garrison duties, we might probably have a less expensive army, 
and at the same time a more efficient one for field service. 
But if any alteration of the distribution of our army were now 
suggested, we ought to remember that it is an expensive 


affidr to bufld new stations, and is more expedient to avail 
ouxselves of such cantonments as already exist. 

S. Ib it that our 3. There is no doubt» in my mind, that 
SSTi. wkS'JS: o" government is thoroughly unpopular; 
pvbff with the na- but this is because it is a government of 
*^1m«* ^ «q^e conquerors and foreigners, and not from 
serve the inteinal objections to our system of government, 
peace of the coimtiy? I do not mean to say that our system is 
popular; but I am not prepared to show that any otfier that 
we could adopt would be more so. 

Our Indian Government has always labored to make our 
system of rule palatable to our native subjects. Vaiious 
changes have been adopted from time to time with this view, 
and if any one could suggest any practicable improvement ob- 
viously calculated to render our sway more popular, it would 
no doubt be carried into effect. Our system differs from that 
of native governments principally in our more elaborate 
judicial and police establishments. Native governments of the 
present day trouble themselves less to perfect such establish- 
ments for the benefit of their subjects; but some have a system 
handed down to them from their predecessors, which works 
perhaps more efficadously than our own. Were I asked 
whether the increased happiness of our subjects is proportionate 
to the heavier expense of our establishments, I should be 
obliged to answer according to my belief in the negative ; but 
it may not be so easy for us, as for native governments, to 
dispense with expensive judicial establishments. Every day 
we are called on to increase them. To retrace our steps is 
difficult and might be exceedingly injurious. The probability 
is that we must go on to further expense. Every improve* 
ment of British India, connected with the establishment of an 
European population, will render the administration of justice 
more expensive to the State. The most costly part of our judi- 
cial establishment is the King's Court ; and the greater the 
necessity for English law, the more expensive will our Pro- 
vincial Courts become. It ought not to be an objection to our 


0yglem of govenuaent that its chief rhmmeiim^, at duftui- 
guishing it from that of nadve rule, la the outky of a giealer 
portion of the publio xevenae in oider to fuziiiflh jostioe to our 
aabjeots. WheD* therefore^ I admit that we do require a large 
anny topmenre the peace of the countzy, I asciibetfiiflnecGMitj 
not to our ayatem of government, but to the eaoBtence of our 
govenuneni We aie foreign oonqueroni^ agunat whom the 
antipathy of our native aubjeota naturally prevails. We hold 
the oountrysolely by force, and by focoe alone can we maintMn 
it. It is not that the internal peace of our own countiymi^t not 
poaaibly be preaerved with a smaller army, but we must be at 
all times prepared to oope with foreign hoatility and internal 
diaa&otiony and unleaa we have the means of subduing both, 
our rule must be very precarious. 

A. b ft thai oar 4. In all ihese reapects we am much the 
ttdStheocmditioM ""® *» '^^ ^^ always been. The strength 
neoeasaiy to the en- ofour army has been Ihnited generally by our 
idCd*^^!^;^ nflOMritiea. We have nttintttiMd omUy 
aitionr ThatwebaTe as great a force as we could pay, not hold* 
iSrSZL^ iagth.ttobetooin«oh,or«ren«Qough. 
in oar appr^enaioiia but wanting means to entertam more. I 

of danro. nicer in believe thia to have been the only aoale by 
our oalcDJations of , . , - . , ^ , , ,, •'^ ^ 

the means of avert- which hitherto we have been able to r^ur 

^^•^"^tiOTa late the extent of our army. At no period 

Botds^ less fertue in ts^i^^ I <^<^^ ^ Lidia has the army been 

resoiuo^, or less reduced on any other ground than ^e ne- 
conndent in them, -^ /• j • a^ 

andinounelTes? cesaity of reducing our expenses. At njo 

period has the belief prevailed that our 
force exceeded the exigencies of the vast empire under our 
control At no period has reduction been efiected without 
apprehension in ihe minds of men of local knowledge and ex* 
perience, and especially those who have seen most of foreign 
native states, that we were incurring a risk which ihe necesnty 
of the case alone would justify. After every war, reduction 
has been effected; but instead of continuing reduction through- 
out the state of peace, we have had recourse to increase, under 


an ihnittflci ac e ecflity, Iwfare the oocunence of another war. 
The fame neoearitjr which has hitherto fimited the extent of 
onr Mrmy, must eontbuie to do so. We cannot keep what we 
cmnot pay; and must enoonnter haaaards, rather than allow our 
escpenditiire contbmaBy to exceed onr income. But if any one, 
wdl acquainted with the state of India, and competent to discern 
the accidents to which we are fiable, were now to draw up a 
statement of the force rieqnxied for the maintenance of our 
power, without reference to financial difficulties, the probability, 
the cer tainty periiaps I mig^t say, is that he would fix it at an 
amount exceeding what we have. What Gommandeo>in-cfaief 
has ever pronounced the Indian army more than adequate, or 
has not repeatedly mged thenecenty of increase or the inexpe- 
dieocy of reduction? What government has ever reduced the 
army finxn any other motive than financial necessity? It can- 
not justly be supposed, that this universal feeling proceeds ficom 
a wanton desire to increase the army without cause. Who that 
is acquainted with the state of India does not at this moment 
fed that we should be ihe better for more European troops^ if 
we could a£R3fd to pay them? The time has not yet come, 
and probably never will come, when we can limit our military 
force in India by any otiier scale than that of our pecuniary 
resources, beyond which it would obviously be folly and ruin 
to attempt to maintain an army permanently, although in time 
of war, and during emergencies, it may be unavoidable. 

5. If there are *' I ^^ ^^o* ™®Wl *0 ^^^B^™® *^* *^® ^ *^ 
canseB, wlietber of be no difference between a war and a peace 

^^a^T^ZrF^^ establishment in our army in India. There 
nent operation, wmcn , x u -n i. 

render it unsafe, or always has been, and naturally ever will be, 

in aay rnpeet inex- ^ considerable difference. At the end ci 

pedientk to maintain . i 

somewliatsimflarpro- every war we reduce our army as much as 

poftioDt between a geems consistent with safety. Since the 

war and peace esta- , • « •» i . vi j r 

bKshment in India lart war, m the Bengal army, one-third ot 

whidiarensoallvob- our regular infantry, one-fourth of our re- 
SfSiol*^itL^ gnUr cavahy, one-half of our irregdar 
vnable &at the na- cavalry^ and one-fourth, I think, of our 


tare of radi peon- foot artillery, baye been reduced, ezdnavv 
g;;^,ta°;S.J^ of reduction, of lood«idp»Yincbl««p, 
pUinciS and otber charges. NererftbeleflB there axe 

peculiarities of pennanent operation in obi 
Indian Empire which widely distingnish it fiom any European 
state. It is an empire of conquest, and the hearts of the people 
are not with us. We must be prepared to meet sudden war&re; 
we must be able to oppose external enemies and to maintsia 
internal subjection. From the people we can derive no aid. 
We can have no militiai no conscription^ no press, no Tobmteer 
corps, no levy en masse in our fistvor in a case of emergency. 
Reinforcements from England might arrive too tardily. 
Recruits raised in India could not be manufactured into soldien 
soon enough. Our native army is composed of mere mer- 
cenaries, and must be trained for war before the exigeacy 
arises. There is another peculiarity in our rituation* We 
cannot reduce our army by regiments, that is, we cannot 
disband our officers and put them on half-pay as in Europe. 
No officer could be condemned to live on half-pay in the 
climate of India. The hardship, we know, is severe even in 
Europe. We cannot, therefore, raise a number of regiments in 
time of war, and disband them in peace. The full charge of 
the officers at least must be permanent; and although they 
might by degrees be absorbed in other regiments of the annji 
even that arrangement would be found very disheartening to 
the wbole body. It would not be difficult to establish as a 
system, that during war none but temporary regiments should 
be raised, and these might be assigned to internal duties, 
having no officers permanently posted to them, and not above 
three to do duty with them; but we have always been without 
any system long in operation, because our government is con- 
tinually changing. The system of increasing our army has 
been the only permanent one, for in that the whole army has 
always been interested, and no one has been able to deny the 
necessity. But the predominating cause which makes it im- 
possible with safety to place our army on a very low peace 


estaUiahment, is tlie precarioosnefls of our eodstenoe aa a power 
in India if we relinqiiiah the means of wiftititftining awe among 
oar aabjectSi as well as among foreign states, through the 
influence of a military force believed to be irresistible. Without 
this we should myite opposition, hostility, and insurrection, 
which, if sucoesBful, might spread like wildfire, and rapidly 
involTe our whole Indian Empire in conflagration and destruc- 
tion. The maintenance, therefore, of the largest army that we 
can afford to pay is perhaps the most economical system that 
we could adopt. 

The surprising circumstance that our armies have increased 
as our enemies haye been subdued, may be accounted for in 
scTcral ways: 

1. In time of war we have increased our force, and at the 
end of it we have found ample employment for a portion of 
the increase. 

2. Every successful war has extended our territory and the 
sphere of oui* superintendence, and caused a necessity for a 
larger force to cover a space more widely spread. 

3. A successful war has sometimes brought us into contact 
with new powers, of whom we pteviously took no notice, but 
by whom subsequently the extent of our army has been 
influenced always towards increase. 

4. Hie increase of resources attendant on successful wars has 
encouraged us to maintain the increased force of which the 
necessity has been admitted. 

5. It may be added that the increase has been found neces- 
sary sometimes when there has been no increase of resources to 
meet it, the necessity arising out of the character shown by 
the enemy in the preceding war. 

Instances may be adduced of the operation of these various 
causes. After the destruction of Tippoo and the revival of the 
Mysore state, we furnished a force to be stationed in the 
Mysore territories. The completion of our alliance with the 
Nizam increased the forces to be maintained in hb dominions, 
and caused troops to be posted in the ceded districts. Our 


ftUkaee with the Feuhwa in 1802 eanied a wabddiuj tone to 
be statJaiMwl penaaneiitly in hie tenitocief. Oar allkiioe intfa 
the Gnickowar had ft mmilar eSbet The moeeiB of the war of 
180S, 1804, 180fi| and 1806, eaoied ns to ooenpy aevenl 
miUtary statiosis bejond the Jamna^ and hroni^t ns islo 
oontact with the Sikhs, the Bajpooti^ and the Jaoti^ all wailike 
tribes, between whom and our firaotier the Mehratta poaea- 
riont before intenrened. The negotiationa of 1808 and 1809 
bron^ the Sikhs between the Sutkg and Jumna nnder oar pro* 
tection, and carried our military frontier to the Sntlej. Then 
the power of die mkr of Lahore in immediate eontaoi with ns 
becttue a new object of oar Tigihmt attention and prooan- 
tion. The Goorkha war in 1814, 1815, and 1816, made na 
acquainted with a fennidable power, whose military strength 
was pie^iooBly unknown and ^gr^oosly underrated. Then, 
for the first time in India, we had recourse to superiority of 
numbem to overpower the bravely and discipline of our enemy, 
oomlnned with the natural adTsntages of his defenrive poeitiona. 
At the close of that war we occupied the conquered HiU 
Provinces with new troops, andhned our fifontier on the plains 
towards Nepal with military stations. Our treaty of alliance 
with Nagpoor rendered it neoesnury to supply a subsidiary force 
for that state. The war of 1817, 1818, and 1819, led to the 
military occupation of Bajpootana and Malwah, induding the 
Saugur and Nerbudda territories, and caused the occupaticm of 
four additional large stations, as well aamany of a smaller dass. 
The Burman war, by the acquisition of Assam, Arrakan, and 
the TenasBerim coast^ has been attended with fresh calls lor 
troops. Until within the last few years our eastern frontier 
required only a native battalion, of which one wing was posted 
at Dacca and the other at Ghittagong. Let this force be com- 
pared with that which now occupies the same frontier, including 
our conquests from the Burmans, and the di&rence will show 
the manner in which our army increases by success. On the 
Bombay ride of India most of our principal military stations 
have been formed smce 1802, and we have by degrees brought 


oiiibq1t80 in oontBct with Siiid^ and nanowly escaped a war 
with that power, wliich, liad it taken place and been snccesBfiil, 
would baYe involved ns in new relations and. required more 
troope. The Bombay army has been greatly inereaaed since the 
war of 1817 and 1818, which can only be explained by ihe 
admiffiion that expansion of dominion reqnires extension of mili* 
taxy ooenpation; fiir otherwise, as the conquest of thePeishwa's 
tenitoxy did not bxing the Bombay Government into contact 
with any great power whose hostiEty m^ht be dangerous, 
there would not, primd fack^ have seemed to be any reason 
text the increase of its army. Neither was the Bombay Go- 
veanment tempted to this increase by any superfluity of re- 
sources; for great as has been its acquisition of territory by 
the PeUiwa's downfidl, there is an immense deficit in its income 
below its expenditure. Some supposed necessity must have 
existed, of which the local authorities must be held to be ihe 
beat judges^ for an increase which, in ordinary calculation, at a 
dbtanoe, would not perhaps have appeared to be either necessary 
or expedient I am not, for my own part, arguing that the 
Bombay army is too large for what it has to protect. I doubt 
whether, as a separate army for the service of its own Presidency , 
it is large enough. But it is possible that our army has been 
sometimes unnecessarily increased^ owing to our having separate 
presidencies, separate governments, separate armies, and sepa- 
rate ocHnmanden, when any actual exigency might have been 
provided for by a suitable distributicxi of the armies of the 
Presidencies, as if they had been one, for the general service of 

Every war has led to a permanent increase of our army. 
Sometimes our conquests have furnished resources for the pay- 
ment of that increase, sometimes not. If we had only external 
enemies to think of, the advance of our military frontier would 
not necessarily be attended with an increase of force. Our 
stations would in that case be removed from ihe old to the 
new firamtier. But the whole of our territory being a con- 
quered and hostile country, we cannot affiird to leave bare that 


which lemains in out xear. In 1803 our great military siRtioDs 
in the North- Western Provinces were on the Ganges. In 1806 
they were advanced beyond the Jumna, but we conid not le- 
linquiah our stations on the Ganges. Gawnpore renudns to 
this day one of our krgest stations. In 1809 our militaiy 
frontier was advanced to the Sutiej, and Meerut^ and sabse- 
quentiy Eumaul, became large stations of tiie headHjuarters of 
generals of division, with reference to the importance of tiie 
nortii-west frontier; but we could not abandon the stations of 
Agra, Muttra, and Drhlee, formed in 1806 witii a view to the 
powers of Central India^ and these are still connderable stations, 
although since 1817 Caitral India has been in a great measme 
occupied by our own troops. 

It is not my intention to argue that every station at any time 
occupied has been indispensable; but it is evident that it has 
been so considered, at the time of its formation, by competent 
authorities. Lord Lake advanced our stations to the Jumna. 
Sir G^rge Hewett made Meerut one of our prindpal stations. 
Sir David Ochterlony and Sir John Malcolm formed our sta- 
tions in Rajpootana and Malwah. 

Among the causes of increase in our army, it is evident that 
we require more men to do those things that could formerly be 
done with less. While we have been extending our dominion 
in India, several military powers have arisen, several disciplined 
armies have been formed. At first our discipline operated like 
magic; but the native powers have learned the art fiom us; 
and although we retain our superiority, it is not in the same 
immeasurable degree. Sindia's formidable force of disciplined 
infantry and artillery, as well as that of other Mahratta powers, 
was created after the establishment of our power in India. It 
was defeated by Lord Lake and by the Duke of Wellington, 
but not without hard fighting. It is probable that the army 
which won the battle of Plassey would have been overwhelmed 
at Assye. The Goorkha is another purely military power, 
which has got up and formed an army admirably disciplined in 
imitation of ours, without foreign aid, and thoroughly national^ 


and this entirely smce our goTenunent was established over a 
great portion ot India. About 1770 we sent five companies of 
SepoySf under a captaiui on a hostile expedition into the 
Nepal country. They took and kept possession of Mukwan- 
pooT and Etounda, and nothbg dared to oppose them. The 
Gk)orkha Government was not then established in Nepal. 
Were we to send five companies into Nepal now for any hostile 
purpose they would instantly be annihilated. To war with 
Nepal in 1814 and 1815 we employed forty thousand men, and 
in several instances failed. For the purpose of forcing an entry 
into Nepal Proper in 1815 and 1816, which we failed to ac- 
complish in 1814 and 1815, we had sixteen thousand men, 
including several European regiments, under our favorite 
general, and then the entry was efiected, not by any attempt to 
force the passes that were defended, but by a wise and fortunate 
experiment, which must, however, have failed had it been 
opposed, owing to which we turned the enemy and gained a 
footing in the mountains by a surprise. Many more improbable 
revolutions have happened than that. The Ooorkha power 
may some day lord it over the plains between the hills and the 
Ganges in consequence of our downfall, whether promoted by 
them or produced entirely by other causes. The power of 
Runjeet Singh, the ruler of Lahore^ is another which has 
greatly advanced since we came in contact with him. In 
1806 I was sent on a mission to his capital, not to him, 
although he was there, but to JesWunt Rao Holkar, who was 
encamped in the neighbourhood, and Runjeet Singh was then 
comparatively so insignificant that he was not noticed in the 
instructions that I received. His power, his army, his re* 
sources have firom that time to this been continually on the 
increase; not the Punjab alone, but Cashmere, Mooltan, 
Attock, Peshawur, and many other conquests of inferior note, 
have been subjected to his dominion: and if it were necessary 
to attack him, we should have to put forth our utmost strength. 
We should certainly use a greater force than we brought 
together in 1809, when a war with Runjeet Singh seemed pro- 

190 ]>sn&HOE ow ODB nrDiAir ^ainxB. 

baUe, and we should do to with good roMon, ■• Ub poiper hat 
vudj increMed* We should, beyond doobi, emploj ft Iftiger 
anny than that with which Ix)]d Lake ftdvaiioed into Ifae Pimj^ 
whoi he had the probable prospect of contesting with Holkar 
and Runjeet Singh united. Bunjeet Smgh has imitated the 
Mahiattas, and has his tioops discipfined by EurapeansL For 
obvious reasons he has pcefisEied Fienofamen and oUier fineign- 
en to BngHshmen. 

It is probably owing to a combinatioii of the several canses 
stated, but whatever be the cause, it is maniftut from all past 
eiqMrienoe that calls are oonstanily made at most of our stations 
for an addition of forces while no one of eiqieneooe can be found 
to say that what we maintaiH| on tfae*whoIe, is saperflnoosL 

That it may be beyond our means is another a£Eur, and if 
that prove to be really the case, security must yield to neoessty; 
and it will become the duty of our local governments to 
consider how, with the least injury, our army can be reduced 
within the limits of our resources. But this is the hut of our 
establishments that we can wisely reduce, and every other de- 
partment ought first to be subjected to every posnble retrench- 

It is of course almost impossible to say that a certain number 
of regiments are indispensable, or that a certain number are 
sufficient; but while it is doubtfiil that the force which we have 
is sufficient, there seems to be no better criterion for regulat- 
ing its extent than the amount of our resources. It is to be 
lamented that any permanent increase was ever admitted 
without a strict calculation showing that our means were com- 
petent to maintain it; which being shown, that oNnpetency 
ought not to have been allowed to be counteracted by increase 
of expenditure in other departments. This predaon, carefully 
attended to at all the Preddencies without deviation^ would 
have kept our expenditure within our income, ai^^i would have 
saved us Isom the embarmssment which we at present eaSex 
from the necessity of reduction^ and the difficulty of fw>lf^tiT!g 
the proper objects for its acoono^lishment. 



[1% 16, 1835.] 

[In this Ifinnte, irritten after Kr Ghorles Heiealfe had assumed fhe 
GoTeraar-GcBenlsliiis the qmiions nlatife to the maceanbj of our Indiaa 
Empin^ ^aneed at m the pieoeding piqper, are emphatioaUy aiid 1^ 
dfidaied. Lord William Bentinck had spoken more lightlj of thesedangers 
than the Indian dvilian oonld ooncdye to be justified bj a reference to 
all the circiunstances of onr actual position ;* but he had seen peril where 
Metcalfe could not see it, in the enlightenment of tiie people. The passage 
at page 197, rthUrt to the diffiision of knoirledge, irill be read With no 
ooBiman pleasue.] 

The Right Honorable the late Oovemor-Geiieral^ in a 
nunute dated the I3th March, has recoided his sentiments 
regarding the composition of the army of India, and the method 
to render it more efficient. 

In the commencement of that Minute his Lordship has 
entered on the question of the danger of our position in India, 
and although he has, I think^ underrated it in some respects, 
the sum of his remarks tends to show that we are in such 
danger as is incalculable. 

* There is no oarallel of this in of onrpooition* Lord Wellesley and 
the antecedents of Indian history. Lord Minto were much more sen- 
It 18 oommonlj the home-bred states- siUe of danger than Sir John fihoce 
man who is most alive to the dangers or Sir George Barlow. 


His Lordship is of opinion that there is no danger £pom 
native powers, because there is no chief with any semblance of 
military force; but this cannot be said of Runjeet Singh, nor 
of Sindia, nor of the Goorkhas (a nation of disciplined 
soldiers), nor of Holkar, nor of the Bunnansy nor of many 
other powers, who, in a greater or less degree as to each other, 
haye all the materials of military force according to their 
means, of which we might be made aware very speedily if 
there were any fiiTorable occasion for its display against na. 
We must not imagine, because we are now at peace and appa- 
rently invincible, that there is no military power that could be 
arrayed against us in the event of troubles and disasters. The 
difficulties that we had to contend witb^ and the exertions that 
we were compelled to make, when we had the Goorkhas and 
the Burmans singly to combat, ought to satisfy us that we may 
again be involved in embarrassments which would add greatly 
to the moral strength of every power in India disposed to 
enter the field as an enemy. Except the mental efiect, which 
may or may not have been produced by our ultimate success in 
our former wars witli these powers, they are as strong as they 
ever were; the Goorkhas, I believe, stronger, owing to their 
incessant attention to the perfection of their military efficiency, 
and to the admirable system by which every man in the nation 
is made a disciplined soldier. It may be said that they cannot 
cope with us in the plains, and single-handed; if we could 
bring all our resources against them, they most probably could 
not. This would not, however, be from any want of energy or 
of discipline on their part, but from our superiority in cavalxy, 
artillery, and every other arm; in some respects in skill and 
efficiency, in others in numbers. But neither have we any 
right to expect that the war would be single-handed, nor can 
we calculate on its being carried on in the plains. We must 
be prepared for an offensive war, in which the Goorkhas would 
have all the advantages of their mountains, and our difficulties 
be accordingly increased. A merely defensive war would be 
to us nearly the same as a defeat. It would be a change, and 


an evidence of weakness which our power could hardly survive. 
It IS not, therefore^ enough to say that one poweir, single-handed, 
is a match for us. We should hot be here, if any werie. The 
question is, can we conquer them all at once? for the power to 
do that is necessary for our safety. 

Our danger does not lie in the military force alone of 
native states, but in the spirit by which they are actuated 
towards us; and still more in the spirit of our subjects from 
one end of India to the other. We have no hold on their 
affections; more than that, disaffection is universal. So that 
vrhat to a power supported by the affections of its subjects 
would be a sUght disaster, might to us be an irreparable 
calamity. The little reverse which we met with at Ramoo, in 
the Burman war, sounded throughout India like our repulse 
at the first siege of Bhurtpqre, magnified and exaggerated as 
if it had been our death-knell. The Commander-in-Chief was 
said to have been killed, and the Governor-General to have put 
an end to himself in despair by swallowing pounded diamonds. 
Ramoo became so celebrated, that although the place is an 
insignificant one in the district of Chittagong, in our own ter- 
ritory, never before generally heard of, the word is now used 
by the natives as the name of the Burman Empire, or of any 
place to the eastward beyond sea ; and an idea of something 
formidable and dreadful is attached to it 

Some say that our empire in India rests on opinion, others- 
on main force. It in fact depends on both. We could 
not keep the country by opinion if we had not a considerable 
force; and no force that we could pay would be sufficient if it 
were not aided by the opinion of our invincibility. Our force 
does not operate so much by its actual strength as by the im- 
presfiSon which it produces, and that impression is the opinion 
by which we hold India. 

Internal insurrection, therefore, is one of the greatest of our 
dangers, or, rather, becomes so when the means of quelling it 
are at a distance. It is easy to decide it, because insurgents 
may not have the horse, foot, and artillery of a regular army; 


194 coKSTinmoK of the ihdiav abut. 

bat it becomes seriooa if we haTe not thoie mtteri a h at hand. 
Nothing oin be a ttranger proof of our weekxMflB in the abeeaoe 
of a miHtaiy fcioey even when it is not far removed, than the 
history of snoh insimeotionB as hare occoned. The oivil 
power and all semblance of the exislenoe of our govemment 
are instantly swept away by the torrent. We need not go &r 
back to show that in the neighbourhood of the metr(^K>Ii8 of 
British India, within a forced march from one of the kigest 
of our military stations, our government wss subverted through- 
out a considerable extent of territory; our magistrates, with all 
the power that they could collect, driven like chaff before the 
wind, and an insurrectionary authority estab l is h ed by a handful 
of mai proclaiming the overthrow of our dominion, and the 
establishment of a new dynasty in the person of the leader of a 
band of ftnatics. This state of things continued for several 
days, until the iosunection was suppresBcd by the application 
al military force, without which it is impossible to say to what 
extent it might have proceeded, so completely were the in- 
surgents masters of the neighbouring country. As the spirit 
of insurrection is catching, this affiur wss soon followed by an 
insurrection of the Dangur Colefl^ a race previously orderly and 
submissive, and remarkable for industrious and kborious habits 
out of their own country. No sooner had insurrection broken 
out than it spread like wildfire. Not a Cole in the country 
was free firom the infection. All the inhabitants of other 
descriptions, the Rajah and a few chiefi excepted, who had 
strongholds or military means for their protecticm, were mas- 
sacred or expelled. The officers of our administration and 
every sign of our govemment quickly disappeared. For a 
long time all the force that could be found on our part was not 
only inadequate to suppress the insurrection, but» although in 
able handsi could hardly resist it, and could not prevent its 
spreading, or do more than check it at one point. It required 
several months and a large force to put down this insurrection; 
but that of the Chooans, another wild race, soon followed, whidi 
baffled the first force and the second force employed, and k^t 
us engaged for many months also before it wss extinguished. 


Had all theee kaonectionfl happened at once, or aay of them 
at a time when we oonld not hare bEought troopB against them, 
they might haTO been exceedingly embarraadngf and the extent 
to which they might have proceeded, or the danger with which 
th^ might haTo been attended, cannot now be calculated. 
These things happened in oomitries which had been long under 
our dominimi; and although able reports have been written as 
to the causes, they hare never to my mind been satis&ctoiily 
explained, according to any motives or expectations by whidi 
men would rationally have been guided under the circumstaaces 
then esdsting. In each case, in my opinion, the actual cause 
was habitual disafibction, operated upon by the spirit of insur- 
rection, excited by false notions that the time was favorable for 
success. The allied causes elidted by investigation, if they 
were causes at all, were merely sparks applied to combustibles 
previously existing. 

I have noticed these circumstances at the risk of repeating 
what I have probably said more than once on former occasions^ 
because the prevalent disaflfection of our subjects, the uncer- 
tainty under wkaeh we hold any part of our Indian possesdons, 
without the presence or immediate vidnity of a military force; 
the utter inability of our dvil establishments to stem the torrent 
of insurrection, their consternation and helplessness when it 
begins to roar, constitute in reality the~ greatest of our dangers 
in India; without which a Rusoan invasion, or any other in- 
vasion, might, I doubt not, be successfully met and repulsed. 
The authority of the late Governor-General, in deriding in- 
ternal disaffection and insurrection, as if they were quite con- 
temptible, must have great weight, the more because it will be 
gratifying to our rulen to see such opinions supported by such 
authority. Diffoing totally from those opinions, I think it 
necessary to appeal to fiusts of recent occurrence. What hap- 
pened in the Baiasut, Bamghnr, and Jungul Mdud distcictSt 
may happen in any other part of our country, wiihout any 
other cause than the disaffection already existing everywhere. 

Persons unacquainted with our position in India might 



throw m our teeth that this disaffection is the oonseqiieiiee of 
bad govemmenti and many among us, connecting the two ideas 
toge^er, are reluctant to credit the existence of general dis* 
affection. But this feeling is quite natural without any mis- 
government Instead of bring excited by our misrule, it is, I 
believe, in a great d^ree, mollified by our good government 
It exists because the domination of strangers — in every reqiect 
strangers — ^in country, in color, in dress, in manners, in habits, 
in rdigion, must be odious. It is less active than it might be^ 
because it is evident to all that we endeavour to govern wdl, 
and that whatever harm our government does proceeds fiom 
ignorance or mistake, and not from any wilful injustice or 

Although Lord William Bentinck appears to desfnse the 
dangers of either foreign foes or internal insurrection in India, 
his Lord^ip admits some things which are quite sufficient to 
show that danger exists. He admits that we have no hold on 
the affections of our subjects; that our native army is taken 
from a disaffected population; that our European soldiery arc 
too few to be of much avail against any extennve plan of in- 
surrection. This is quite enough, and more than I have 
hitherto alluded to; for it is impossible to contemplate the 
possibility of disaffection in our army, without seeing at once 
the full force of our danger. As long as our native army is 
faithful, and we can pay enough of it, we can keep India in 
order by its instrumentality; but if the instrument should turn 
against us, where would be the British power? Echo answere, 
where? It is imposmble to support a sufficient army of Euro- 
peans to take the place of our native army. 

The late Gbvemor-Greneral appears also to adopt, in some 
measure, the just remark of Sir John Malcolm, that ^' in an 
empire like that of India we are always in danger, and it is 
impossible to conjecture the form in which it may approach." 
This sentiment expresses the reality of the case in perhaps 
the truest manner, and I will not longer dwell on this part of 
the subject 


His Lordship, however, sees further danger in the spread of 

knowledge and the operations of the Press. I do not, for my 

own part, anticipate danger as a certain consequence from these 

causes. I see so much danger in the ignorance, fenaticism, and 

tmrbarism of our subjects^ that I rest on the spread of know-> 

ledge some hope of greater strength and security. Men will be 

better able to appreciate the good and evil of our rule; and if 

the good predominate, they will know that they may lose by a 

change. Without reckoning on the affection of any, it seems 

probable that those of the natives who would most deprecate 

and least promote our overthrow, would be the best-informed 

and most enlightened among them, unless they had themselvesi 

individually, ambitious dreams of power. If, however, the 

extension of knowledge is to be a new source of danger — and I 

will not pretend confidently to predict the contrary — ^it is one 

altogether unavoidable. It is our duty to extend knowledge 

whatever may be the result; and spread it would, even if we 

impeded it. The time is passed when the operations of the 

Press could be effectually restrained, even if that course would 

be any source of safety, which must be very doubtful. Nothing 

8o precarious could in prudence be trusted to. If, therefore,. 

increase of danger be really to be apprehended from increase of 

knowledge, it is what we must cheerfully submit to. We 

must not txy to avert it, and if we did we should fail. 

His Lotdship considers our greatest danger to lie in an 
invanon from the north-west, led by the Russians. He sup- 
poses a force of 20,000 Russian infantry and 100,000 Asiatic 
cavalry to have arrived on our north-western frontier. Sup- 
posing such a case, with the time which we should have for 
preparation, we ought to be able to give a good account of 
the Russian infantry; eadly I should say, if there were no 
danger of internal insurrection at such a crisis. The 100,000 
cavalry it would be more difficult to manage, from tiie impos- 
sibility of collecting an equal force of that arm. But is there 
no impossibility of collecting such a force against us? I doubt 
the practicability of assembling such an immense body. Are 


•11 to be on one nde? la there to be no hostilitj to die Bos- 
nana in their piogreas? Is ereiy chanoe to turn up in thdr 
£iT0r? If it were poisible to collect such ft foco^ how is it to 
be fed end supported? At whose cost? Not ftt that of Basu 
or any other power, that being utterly imprscticahk from want 
of means. Solely then at the cost of ^e countiiea through 
which it had to pass. If this were posnble, it would at least 
destroy those oountriee^ and the Busaian infimtiy would be 
starred to death by the operations of its allied caTalry. All 
qieoulations, howerer, rq;arding our military defence against 
a Busnan inrasion may be sa&ly postponed until we know 
more on the subject. It cannot come on so suddenly as to 
pcevent preparation to the utmost extent that our resources will 
allow; and preparation for such an event must be on a much 
larger scale than any that our means could afibrd without the 
immediate approach of the events or for any length of time. 
Beserving suitable measures until we have reason to apprehend 
that we shall have to meet this danger, we have, in the mean 
time, without reference to such a course, amj^ reasons for 
putting our army on the most e£5cient footing, and for in- 
creasing it to any extent that our finances will bear. The 
measures proposed in the late Gbvemor-General's minute, 
appear to me to fidl far short of w:hat would be requisite at 
the cxisifl which he contemplates. 

Gonsideiing the possible disaffection of our native army as 
our only internal danger, and the want of physical strength and 
moral energy as rendering them unable to contend with an 
European enemy, his Lordship proposes that the European 
portion of our army should be one-fourtii, and eventually one- 
third, in proportion to the strength of our native army. He 
contiders tiiis as requiring a force of 30,000 Europeans in 
India. In the expediency of having at least this force of 
Europeans, even in ordinary times, I entirely concur ; that is, 
if we can pay them. But the limit to this, and every other 
part of our force, must be regulated by our means. If we 
attempted to fix it according to our wants, we should soon be 


witlwot the means of maiBtaiimi^ Tluity thoosand 

Boropean troops would be vastly inadequate for the puzpoae of 
m ooti ng the ima^ned Roasian invaflioni for we should more 
zeqiiire iSuropean troops in the interior of India at that time 
thaa at any other. To have our anny on a footing calculated 
for diat event is impossible. Our army cannot well be greater 
than it is, owing to want of means. It cannot well be less^ 
owing to our other wants. Such as it is in extent, it is our 
duty to make it as efficient as we can, with or without the 
proq>ect of a Russian invasion; and this is the only way in 
vrhich we can prepare for that or any other distant and un- 
oertain crisis. On the approach of sudi an event we must 
have reinforcements of European troops fiom England to any 
amount required^ and we must increase our native force accord- 
ing to the exigency of the time. We could not long exist in a 
state of adequate preparation, as we should be utterly ruined by 
the expense. 

In order to raise our European force to the proposed number 
of 30,000, of which 20,000 are to be infantry and 5000 cavalry, 
an addition would be required of 10,000 or 12,000 to our 
actual force. The increase of expense would, of course^ be 
great It is an increase to which I should not object, for it 
may be of vital importance, if we had the means of meeting it; 
but we have not And this is the difficulty which opposes us 
in every attempt at improvement. 

In order to provide in some degree for this additional 
expense, the late Govemor>General recommends that a cap- 
tain* be struck off from every regiment of the native anny. 
Having, in another minute, proposed the reduction of two 
subalterns in every regiment, to meet some other expense, his 
Lordship now recommends the abolition of a captain to meet 
this. If every additional charge is to be met in this manner, 
what will become of our native army? I cannot reconcile my 
mind to these proposed reductions of the European officers of 
that force. They are the life and soul of it. And to avow 
the necessity of increasing the efficiency of the native armyi 

StOO cokshtution of ths indiam ABinr. 

and in the Bftine breath to adrocate the expediency of redaciiig 
the Eozopean officera, appears to me to be an iuiacooimtri)k 
inconsbtency. This proposition is aooompanied by another 
for increaong the number of rank and file in every natiTe 
raiment to 1000. This latter measure is highly derirable; 
but| like every other good proposition, impracticable from the 
want of means. 

Lord William Bentinck maintains the opinion that tlieie 
are too many European officers with the native army, or that 
there is no necessity for so many. From what I have said 
above it will be seen that I cannot concur in that opinion. If 
we were to regard our native army as mere local corps, for the 
support of our civil administration in internal government, we 
might reduce the number of European officers; but we cannot, 
I conceive^ do so, while we expect firom the native army the 
efficiency of real soldiers against all enemies in the field, Euxo- 
pean or native. We must not reduce the number of officers 
who are to lead them to the charge, and on whcse energies 
their discipline and spuit depend. In any future necessary 
increase of our native army, either temporary or permanent, it 
might be well to see whether internal tranquillity and order 
could not be sufficiently preserved by corps partially officered, 
as local corps now are, and former levies have been; but with 
respect to any kind of regular force intended for field service, 
requiring the aid of perfect discipline, the absence of European 
officers would be a deplorable and, perhaps, fatal deficiency. 
To think of the occasion when our native troops may have to 
be led to the charge of Russian batteries and bayonets, and to 
propose at the same time to take from them their European 
officers, are incongruities which one cannot understand. 

The late Governor-General condemns our Indian army, in a 
sweeping sentence, as being the most expensive and least 
efficient in the world. If it were so, how should we be here ? 
Is it no proof of efficiency that it has conquered all India ? 
Is it no proof of efficiency that India is more universally tran- 
quil owing to our Indian army than it ever was under any 


native goyemment or governments that we read of? If our 
Indian army be so expensive, why do we not employ European 
troops alone to maintain India ? Why but because Europeans 
are so much more expennve that we could not pay a sufficient 
number? If our Indian army be so inefficient, why do we 
incur the expense of making soldiers of the natives ? Why do 
we not entertain the same number of imdiscipUned people who 
would cost much less ? Why but because then we should 
lose the country from the inefficiency of our native force ? If, 
therefore, the Indian army be preferable to an European force 
on account of its cheapness, and to other native troops on 
account of its efficiency ; if we cannot substitute any other 
force cheaper and more efficient ; how can it justly be said to 
be the most expensive and least efficient army in the wprld ? 
It enables us to conquer and keep India ; if it performs well 
every duty required of it, hard work in quarters, good service 
in the field, how can it be subject to the imputation of in- 
efficiency ? The proof of its cheapness and of its efficiency is, 
that we cannot substitute any other description offeree at once 
so cheap and so efficient. 

One important measure proposed by the late Governor- 
General is the entire abolition of the Bombay army, and its 
union, half to the Bengal, half to the Madras army. I am 
not aware of any advantage to be derived from this measure, 
except the saving that might be efiected by the abolition of 
the portion of the staff which would cease to be necessary 
when the Bombay army ceased to be a separate army ; but I 
can hardly think that this advantage would be sufficient to 
make the measure desirable. It would, I imagine, be a source 
of great discontent to the whole of the Bombay army, and of 
gratification to no one. If there were sufficient reasons for 
uniting all the armies of the several Presidencies in one, which 
I apprehend there are not, the Bombay army would share the 
fate of the others, and all would be amalgamated ; but while 
there are separate armies, and separate presidencies, I cannot 
see any sufficient motive for the abolition of the Bombay army. 


•ad the mfliction olibe woond wUdi woold thoebjr be ghra& 
to the feelingi of that body, and of the whok •ernceof that 
Fkendency. For aogfest a change tome Teiyimportnt benefit 
ought to be ihown, whieh is not at pieaeiit vmlie. Tbe 
amount of oonaeqaentiediiclion of eKpenaehasaotbeenilitedy 
and irould probably be insignificant oompazed with thefnagni^ 
tilde of annoyuioe» 

The junction of the Gej^ focoe with that of India appean. 
for unity of poweri to be dentaUe; but while the Govemment 
of Geykm is distinct there will probably be iaqpedimoits to a 
junctioii of the foroes. 

The introduction of Maky troopa into the Indian anny is 
• another question agitated in his Lradship's minute. I am not 
eompetoit to offer any dedded opinion on this 8nb|ect, fiom m 
want of sufficient knowledge of the Malay character. Hie 
general impresnon of it is unfaTOcable, but I have met with 
gentlemen accustomed to it, who speak highly of it. IfBlakys 
would make orderly and fidthfhl soldiers, I diould be inclined 
for their admimioiij on the ground that our native infimtry is 
composed too much of men of one class, actuated by one com- 
mon feeling, and that it is expedient to have a variety, in order 
that one description, in case of necesnty, may be naed to main- 
tain order in another. But this purpose would not be well ae* 
complished by the introduction oS less orderly, or less efficient^ 
or more expensive troops ; and what the Malays might prove 
in these respects, I do not know. There cannot be a more 
orderly body of soUiers in the world than our Bengal native 
infantry ; and caution ought to be exercised before we substi- 
tute for any portion of them another blass of men. 

It is proposed that a portion of the native armyshonld be 
light infantry. To this I see no objection. It was formerly, 
and is, I suppose, still the case in the Madras army. It was 
also at one time the case in the Bengal army; several Hght 
infimtry regiments were formed during the command of Oeneral 
Hewitt. That was because the French were supposed to be 


oomiiig. They were aftenrards zediioed. There is now a 
li^t rn&ntry compa&y in each v^pment^ eqiud in amoant in 
the Bengal army to nine regiments. Whether it be better to 
liave the light infimtiy aa a portion of eadi regiment, or in 
wpaiate r^;iment8, is a question on which I cannot pretend to 
oflfer a decided opinion* 

In all that Lord William' Bentinok says in fayor of that 
desGription of ou fbroe which is called irrq;ular, or still more 
impiKop^ly, local cavalxyi pediaps from its not being local, I 
have the honor entirely to concur, which I am always more 
hai^y to do than to difier fiom one whose mind has been so 
purely and anxiously deroted to the public welfiire. I r^rd 
the irregular horse as a most useful and valuable description of 
troops. I wish that all our natiy^ cayalry were of this descrip- 
ticm, and all our r^[u]ar cavalry Ekuropean. I do not mean by 
this remark to recommend such a change. All such changes^ 
even if they were generally desired, require great consideration. 
Our regular native cavalry has grown up as a branch of our 
estabUshment, has hitherto done its duty well, and ought not to 
be inconaderately broken up. But if I had to form a cavalry 
army for India, without the previous existence of the regular 
native troops, I would make the regular cavalry European, and 
the native cavalry of the same description as that body now 
termed the Irr^ulars or the Local Horse. I do not know that 
the late Govemor-Oeneral goes so far in his opinion on this 
subject, but in all that I have seen of his sentiments in appro- 
bation of that description of our cavalry I fully concur. 

I also ooncur in the opinions which he has expressed r^ard- 
iog the use which might be made of steam power to increase 
our military efficiency and insi^tft^f^ a speedy communication 
with Europe. But this and other expensive additions to our 
establishment can only be adopted when we have adequate 
means. Great improvements might easily be suggested, but 
where are the funds to come firom? Many are sanguine in ex- 
pectation of vast increase to our revenue from the future 


development of the resouroefl of India, but for the present, at 
leasty we must regulate our expenditure by the income wiiidi 
we hare. 

This consideration must render nugatory all schemes of im- 
provement which would be attended with any conaderable 
increase of expense; and to seek improvement in one quarter 
by positive deterioration in another is a most unsatisfactory 
mode of proceeding, and requires at least that the gain by the 
change, as compared with the loss, should deddedly prepcMide- 
rate, and be well ascertained. 

The concluding sentiments of the late Govemor-Greneral's 
minute are, that we are utterly unprepared to meet a Busman 
invasion, which I fully admit, and that we ought to be so pre- 
pared with the large sum already appropriated to our military 
expenditure ; which opinion is not so convincing, but very 
questionable: for if the same sum were sufficient to put us in a 
state to meet the supposed invasion, and that were the only 
danger against which we had to preparei it would follow that 
a great restriction in our military expenditure would be practi- 
cable, were it not for that expected event. But no one is able to 
show how this can be effected. 

With a view to that great crisis, his Lordship proposes the 
increase of our European force to one-fourth| and eventually 
one-third, in proportion to the whole army ; the increase of the 
regular horse to 20,000; the increase of each r^ment of 
native infantry to 1000 rank and file; and of each regiment of 
cavalry to 800; all measures highly denrable and proper, in 
contemplation of the expected invasion, but still inadequate, 
and intermediately sure to produce an immense increase of ex- 
pense, which would be utterly intolerable and ruinous. 

The only measures pointed out by Iiis Lordship as calcu- 
lated to meet this increase of expense, are the abolition of the 
separate staff of the Bombay army, and the junction of that 
force with the armies of Madras and Bengal, the result of which, 
apparently, would give little aid to the purpose designed, and 
would not even recompense the injury done to the feelings of 


the Bombay semoe in the destruction of a long-establifihed and 
efficient army; and, secondly, by the abolition of a captain in 
every native regiment at all the Presidencies, a measure which 
would deteriorate the efficiency of the main body of our army — 
the vexy force which it is our object to make more efficient — 
and, besides, have an eflfect on the minds of the European 
officers much more injurious than the saving produced would be 
advantageous. These measures, exclusive of their being objec- 
tionable, would be very inadequate in their results for the end 
in view, and we should find the expense, as before remarked, 
utterly intolerable. To increase the efficiency of the army by in- 
creasing its inefficiency, appears to me to be altogether a wrong 
course of proceeding. No proper resources for the increase of 
the army can be found in the decrease of the army. The two 
objects are incompatible; and the same things that make the 
former desirable or necessary, must make the latter impossible 
or inexpedient, unless it can be shown that we have super- 
abundance of force of some description, which cannot be done. 
We must not look to reductions in the army for the means of 
bearing expenditure which is rendered unavoidable by the ne- 
cessity of having a larger army. We can only look to our line 
establishments when reduction is absolutely necessary; and even 
there, nothing short of the total abolition of the civil service 
and its amalgamation with the army would be effectual, which 
could only be graduaL 

Having objected to the plan of the late Governor-General, I 
may be asked, how I would prepare against the supposed inva- 
sion from the north-west? I should say, that to prepare for it 
adequately is impossible ; we have not the pecuniary resources 
to place us in a state of sufficient preparation. What then is 
to be done? We must wait. The event is at present remote 
and uncertain. We must postpone our preparations until its 
approach be less doubtful. It cannot come so rapidly, in the 
shape imagined, as to deprive us of time for preparation. We 
may then draw from England any number of European troops 
required, whether it be a fourth, or a third, or half of the 


amount of our natiye azmy* We may niie the eo mp lemflnt of 
our native zegiments to any proper number; we may inoraMe 
our iirq^ular cavalry to 20,000, or a larger amount if expe- 
dient; wemay, by the formation of local eorpB, and lenea, and 
depdta, make our rq[ular army wholly available finr £eid aer- 
vioe; we must then make the exerftaona, militacy and finanrfnl, 
which the eadgenciea of the crioa will aqggeit, and our vitel 
interests demand* In the mean time, we mnat keqp our egqien* 
diture within our income, ebe, when the prophened event 
arrive^ it will find us in a state of the worst land of inefficiency 
— an inefficiency of resources which would be fintsl, without a 
single blow from the enemy. 

Let us, therefore, pause; let us maintain an anny on its pre- 
sent establishment, without attempting changes and zestdctioiftB 
hurtful to its feelings, and consequently injurioQS to our best 
interests. Let us make it as efficient as we can without a great 
increase of charge; let us watch our finances, and if they im- 
prove, and afford the means, let us i^ply additional funds to 
increase the strength and improve the efficiency of our axmy 
in any mode most advisable. Any outlay that we can afford 
for this purpose will be well laid out, and it is not necessary to 
think of the battle of Armageddon or a Russian invaaon to 
justify it But our miUtaiy efficiency in peace and ordinary 
times must be limited by our financial meana It is only in 
war and a period of necessity that we can venture to put out of 
calculation the di£brence between income and expenditure. 
Our financi al difficulties, actual and probable, are those which 
are most pressing; and military speculations leading to great 
increase of expense ought to be suspended until they become 
unavoidable, or until we see our financial prospects brightening, 
and light shining through its present gloom. 



[i% 8, 1836.] 

[Sir dniles Metcalfe always oonsiateatly maktained the inexpedienBgr of 
frittering kwvj out military force by disperamg it in detail at iaolated 
posia» xnafcead of ooncentratipg it in Luge bodies at particular points for 
pniposes of eziemal defence and internal secorify. The subject has already 
been touched upon at page 180. The soundness and sagacity of the follow- 
ing more detailed remarks will commend them especially to themHitaiy 

[Extract.] — There is no doubt that the dispersion of the 
army into small bodies is a bad mode of distribution, and that 
its union and concentration in large bo£es is highly desirable. 

When the army is dispersed in small bo£es throughout the 
country, it is difficult to collect a large force for any purpose. 

It is positively difficult, because every cantonment requires 
a force for its protection, by which the force to be assembled 
for field service must be diminished; and fiirther, because delay 
must be caused by the troops having to assemble fix>m distant 
points, instead of being ready to move in one body, in conse- 
qqenoc of having been previously united. 

tt 18 morally difficult, because, wherever troops are stationed, 
a general belief becomes established that troops are necessary 
there, and, consequently, a feeling of insecurity arises whenever 
the troops are withdrawn. If troops be really wanted in that 


pontion, they w3l be meet wanted when it is requiate to with- 
draw them ; for the collection of our army for any important 
senrioe is the signal for men's minds to think of change ; and 
troops will at that time be required where they were not re- 
quired before. It would be better that troops should not be sta- 
tioned anywhere in time of peace for local protection, whence 
it would be necessary to remove them in time of trouble. It is 
better that the people should be accustomed to the abaenoe of 
troops, than that the troops should be witiidrawn when their 
presence is most requisite for either protection or coercion. If 
they can be dispensed with when everything tends most to 
raise up danger, either from external foes or internal disafiec- 
tion, or professed plunderers, they can certainly be most easily 
dispensed with when all is tranquillity, and men's minds arc 
not dreaming of revolution. 

If we suppose a field force to be assembled from ten diflferent 
stations instead of one, ten times the force would be kept back 
in the former case to what would be required in the latter for 
the charge of the cantonments and protection of the posts 
before occupied. If, for instance, the forces of Nusserabad, 
Neemuch, and Mhow^ were required to form a field army, a 
regiment, probably, at the least would be wanted to keep 
charge of each cantonment during the absence of the main 
body— that is, three-elevenths of the whole body of infantry; 
but if the three stations were united, one r^ment, or an 
eleventh part of the whole, would be sufficient for the same 
purpose, and the field force would be increased by a fourth or 
fifth, or as ten is to eight. At the same time, three parts of the 
country would be excited by the absence of the troops to which 
they had been accustomed, instead of one. 

Concentration of force, however, must in practice have its 
limits. I^ would not be expedient, for instance, to concentrate 
the whole army of any Presidency at one point. It is obvious 
that the greater part of the country would in that case remain 
entirely unprotected^ and exposed to any disaster. Thus the 


disiribution of the army is a nice question. There must be 
concentration for one purpose, and dispersion for another; and 
afWr admitting that concentration is the right principle, it may 
be found that dispersion is the inevitable practice, for a reason 
which will force itself on the mind the more the subject be ex« 
amined; because the army is not sufficient for both purposes — 
that of forming armies for the field, for which concentration is 
desirable, and that of local protection, for which dispersion is 
unavoidable. All that can be done is to keep concentration in 
view, and avoid dispersion as much as possible. 

Were I undertaking to distribute the army anew, without 
reference to its existing positions, I should proceed on these 
principles: On every frontier where there could be a foe, I 
would have a concentrated force, a division of the army, com* 
plete in all arms, and at the least sufficient for defensive pur- 
poses on any occasion which might unexpectedly arise ; I would 
have similar forces in the interior, both as reserves and sup- 
ports to the firontier forces, and to secure internal tranquillity. 
Wherever it might be necessary to move any of these interior 
divisions, in support of the frontier armies, a sufficient force^ 
should be left or substituted for the protection of internal tran- 
quillity, because it is then that internal tranquillity most need» 

A calculation ought to be made of the force requisite for that 
purpose in each circle of territory, and that amount of force 
ought to be retained there in peace and in war, but especially 
in war, when it would be most wanted. All divisions or 
brigades of the army, intended either for field service against 
enemies, or for the preservation of general tranquillity in the 
interior, ought to be posted in the most convenient stations for 
the purposes contemplated, and for the health and supply of the 
troops, without reference to other merely local objects, in order 
that they may be available to move in any direction without 
the sacrifice of any such objects. The army ought to be dis- 
persed as little as possible for merely local purposes, but when- 
ever it may be necessary to post troops with reference to local 



oonaidBmtioiii^ the foroe to posted ought not to ezoeed die 
sftrangth xequiflite lor the purpose ia TieWy and ought never 
to be withdrsvni in tune ox trouble* . • • . Wlieiev%!i a 
angle rq;]nient ought to be stationed, unless it were for an im- 
portant military purpose for whidi the most efficaent des cripti on 
of force were deemed neoessaiy, a local corps would answer as 
wdl as one of the line, and would enable us to rdease the fine 
more from local duttesy and haTe a greater available foroe than 
at present. 

But it is almost idle to qwculate in this manner. We have 
not the pecuniary means for a sufficient increase of our annj; 
and if the distribution of what we have were attempted aooctd- 
ing to the principles stated, we diould find that we have not 
near enough. We are obliged to post our troops aoeording to 
local exigencies, and when we have a war we collect them as 
best we can, leaving local ezigencies to shift for theoudra. 
It would be wdil, however, always to keep in mind the expe- 
diency of distributing our army so as to have ihe gtestest 
possible amount of foroe available for field service in any 
direction, and not locked up for local purposes. We may not 
be able with our present foroe to do mudi in this way, but 
attention to the principle may enable us to do something. 




lOeiober, 1830.] 

A sense of duty induoeB me to ofier some remarke on the 
papers reoently xeoeiTed fix»ii Bombay regarding the contem- 
plated surrey of ibe Indus. 

The scheme of sorveying the Indus, under the pretence of 
sending a present to Bajah Runjeet Singh^ seems to me highly 

It is a tricky in my opinion, unworthy of oiv Govemihent, 
which cannot fiil when detected, as most probably it will be, 
to excite the jealousy and indignation of the powers on whom 
we play it. 

It is just sadh a trick as we are often falsely suspected and 
accused of by ihe native powers of India, and tiiis confirmation 
of their suspicions, geoefally unjust, will do us more injury by 
furnishing the ground of merited rq>roachy than any advantage 
to be gained by the measure am compensate. 

It is not xmpoinble that it may lead to wax. I hope that 
so iiiiiK^ciMiMTy and ruinous a calamity may not befal us. Yet 
as our officers, in the prosecution of their clandestine pursuit^ 
may meet with insult or ill-treatment^ which we may choose 
to resent, that result is possible, however much to be deprecated. 

It appean to me that there is no lugent necessity for the 
undertaking. It is more ilian probable that before we shall 
have to act on any infoiaiation that we may obtain, we shall 
have mare legitimate means of surveying the Indus. 

p 2 


The moBfc legitimate means would be the confleni of the Sind 
Gk}Temment, and the other Governments having dominion 
over that river. If there were real grounds to apprehend 
the approach of a Russian army, and if the rulers of Sind 
entertained the same apprehennon, they might be diq>oeed 
to look to us for protection, and would then willingly albw na 
to make any surveys that we might desire. But by antici- 
pating what is remote and uncertain, and to the rulers of neigh* 
bouring States imperceptible, we should pour our agents and 
surveyors, or, as they would consider them, spies, into their 
territories with every suspicious jealous feeling against us, and 
without any sense of common interest in our favor. 

If there were any urgent cause for undertaking the survey 
of the Indus at the present time, we might apply for permis^on 
to the rulers of Sind, although, if it were refiis^, which would 
be very probable, we should be bound to desist firom any public 
proceeding that would commit oiur Government. 

We might nevertheless, either with or without such previous 
application, send persons incognito to survey and obtain infor- 
mation, without any ostensible commission, and without any 
protection, leaving them to take the chance of such treatment 
as they might receive if detected in an illicit occupation. 

But to demand a passage for our officers under a fictitious 
pretence, and then to take advantage of the civility of the 
rulers of Sind to do that which we are conscious would not be 
allowed, appears to me to be ungenerous and unfidr. 

It must be remembered that the survey of the Indus or any 
part of the Sind country may give us the power to injure that 
State, may even assist us in conquering it, and in the course of 
events, is as likely to be turned to use for that purpose as ibr 
any other. The rulers of Sind, therefore, have the same right 
to be jealous of our surveys of their river and their territories 
that any power of Europe has to protect its fortresses from the 
inspection of foreign engineers. 

It is stated in a late despatch from the Secret Committee 
that we must not permit the rulers of Sind to obstruct our 


measures; in other words, that we are to go to war with them 
to compel submission to our wishes. With deference I should 
remark that such an assumption does not seem to be warranted 
by the law of nations. That surely is not an equitable policy 
which can only be maintained by the strong against the weak, 
and could not be asserted to a superior or equal power. But 
the assumption is an exemplification of what I have often 
observed in our conduct towards the Native States, and what 
appears to me the greatest blot in the character of our Indian 
policy, although I am not aware that it has attracted any 
general notice in England. However much we may profess 
moderation and non-interference when we have no particular 
interest of our own concerned, the moment we discover any object 
of pursuit we become impatient and overbearing, insist on what 
we require, and cannot brook denial or hesitation. We disre- 
gard the rights of others, and think only of our own convenience. 
Submission or war is the alternative which the other party has 
to choose. . 

Thus at the present time, because we have taken alarm at 
the suppoeed designs of Russia, it would seem that we are to 
compel intermediate States to enter into our views or submit 
to our projects, although they cannot comprehend them, and, 
instead of entertaining any apprehension of Russian designs^ are 
more apprehensive of our own, our character for encroachment 
being worse than that of the Russians, because the States con- 
cerned have a more proximate sense of it from the result which ' 
they see in actual operation among the realms of India. 

This course, which I trust need not be considered as actually 
determined on, seems to me both unwarrantable in principle 
and inexpedient in policy-— unwarrantable, because we have no 
right, from any alarms that we may take up, to interfere with 
the rights and sovereignty of other powers within their own 
dominions; and inexpedient, because it would tend to defeat 
our own proper objects, which ought to be a cordial union of 
feelings and interests with those States, if ever the crisis which 
we anticipate should arise. 

214 SUEYBT or THB IHD08. 

lite oftiue of this agitotion and hotiy in^erti^aliom brfoad 
our froatieiBy is a 8ii[qpomtioa that ire shall reqnixe miaHte in- 
fomatioii respecting all intennediale oountdes, to caaUe vs to 
cqpe with the BusBum power which is to asnsil us im India. 

It is proper, therefore^ to coi w de r what is die aatme of the 
danger that we have to apprehend. 

No one, I presame, expects that a Russian army is to start 
bam the pres»it ficontierB of Bnsauiy and make one ccmtinnerl 
march aoroai Central Asia, for the purpose of sttaffkiwg na in 
oar possesnons in India, 

Such an expedition seems next to impossible. The diffi- 
cokies of marching a regular arm j throngh the intermediate 
oonntries, of supplying and feedixig it, of repairing loams^ of 
replacing wear and tear, of preventing the savages of ^sease 
in new dimates — above all, in the case of BassiBythe impocti- 
oability of providing the aiormoos funda requisite for sodi sn 
undertaking — these are obstacles to the atten^t with a laxge 
army which seem insurmountable. 

Difficulties in some respects similar, and in others of aiK>ther 
nature, would attend the attempt by a small one. In addition 
to the reduction by sickness and losses by wear and tear, a small 
exmy might be resisted and destroyed by the troops of the in- 
termediate countries; or if a remnant of it should reach our 
frontiers, we should most probably defeat and captnxe it, send 
evexy man down the Ganges to Calcutta, ox down the Indus 
to B<Hnbay, and land them all prisoners at Portsmouth. 

The expense of a laige army could not be defiuyed by 
Bossia, and a small one we should annihilate. Bussiay besides, 
must be supposed to act with forethought. Is it to be imagined 
that Bussia would send an army to India^ to attack a formidable 
enemy possessing great resources, without first establishing her- 
self in the intermediate countries, and without knowing what 
her army would do in the event of success? 

The defeat of our force on the frontier, whatever might be its 
temporary or permanent effect on our power, would not make 
Bussia mistress of India. Her general would be much pnazled 


how to ad^ even after the most brilUant sacces^ and his aMen- 
lion would be mnchdiBtEacfeed. Cat offbyintervoii^coaiiliieB 
from iBinfogceinenta and lesovoe^ he would not find hia anej 
suppoKled by tiie tenitorjr which it might occnpy, and it mi^it 
dwindle awaj» and be ultimately deBtioyed, bom wasting and 
sidbiesi^ wi&ont maldog any piogien in the conqneitof India. 

It may safely be add, I conceiYe, diot a Bnaaian invaoooy in 
the way supposed, while the Russian frotttiers aie so leaiote 
firom our own, is an event so improbable, that it may be pro- 
nounced, as far as anything can, impossiMe. 

If we are ever to be troubled with aBassiafn invasion, it must 
be after an i^roziniation of oar frontiers; and whedxer this is 
to take plaoe by advances on our side or that of RuaB»— whe- 
ther she is to eonquor the intermediate countries, or acquiro in- 
flaenoe over them — whether the event apprehended is to oeeur 
in ten or twenty yenis, or in fifty, or a hundred — what revokL-- 
tions aro to take place in the mean time in the intermediate 
States^ or in India, or in Bussia herself or ihrot^^ut the whole 
wodd — in what quarter die is to make her attack, and what will 
be the state c^thhigs when she may make it,r— these are all mat- 
ters of such uncertainty, that it seems mere wantonneai to rex 
and akrm our neighboun by survejring their lands and rivers, 
I7 deceit or force, without dieir consent, and without knowing 
to what purpose. 

I do not question the utility, abstractedly, of the infermation 
sought; but the value of all that can be obtained, without the 
cordial sanction and assistance of the rulers of the countries 
to be explored, may be greatly overrated, and cannot, in my 
opinion, compensate for the odium which will justly attend the 
course that it is proposed to pursue* 

The most probable mode by which the Russians might 
attempt to assail us would seem to be by incitii^ the inter- 
mediate nations against us, by inciting tl^ Persians, Afghans, 
Beloodiees, Sikhs, &c., with themselves, for the pbnder of Hin* 
dostan, and by pouring all these masses up<»i u& The inoU* 
nation to reap booty in India is not wanting in the countries 


of those tribeo. Their traditions of the wealth obteined in 
former in^'sdons have left strong impiesnons in &Tor of such 
enterprises. The very monkeys in Oaubul are taught to flouriflb 
a sticky and evince delight when asked if they will maidi to 
Hindostan. Bat to produce the effect imagined, how many 
nations must be conciliated or subdued ! and if subdoed, not 
conciliated, how many rival and hostile interests must be recon- 
ciled, how many disturbances hushed ! The requisite combina- 
tions of circumstances seem extremely improbable, and a length 
of time would be indispensable. 

Among other uncertainties of this great question, is tliat of 
what our own conduct ought to be when the expetboi crisis 
shall arise. Whether we should meet the enemy half-way 
and fight the battle in foreign countries — ^whether we should 
defend the passage of the Indus and make our stand ther^ or 
await the foe on our own frontier, and force on him all the 
labor, and loss, and risk of coming the whole distance before 
we attack him — ^must depend so much on the disposition of 
intermediate countries, and other circumstances of llie time, 
that it seems utterly vain to determine even our own course at 
this remote distance from the event. 

We have no encouragement in bygone history to fimcy that 
we can foresee future results. What politidari has ever fore- 
told the precise course which events have actually taken? 
Tliat which we so confidently anticipate may never happen, or 
if it should happen, it may be in a mode totally unsu^iected, 
that would baffle any preconceived schemes of combination. 

Frodens fiituri tempoiis exitum 
CaligmosA nocte premit Dens, 
Eidetque si mortalis ultra 
Fas trepidat, quod adest memento 
Componere aequos. 

Twenty-two years ago the writer of this minute was em- 
ployed to negotiate an alliance against a French invasion with 
a Native State beyond our north-western frontier. A French 
invasion was our bugbear then, as a Russian one is now. 
Abdullah Mehrou, at the head of a French army, was reported 


to have reached Ispahan. But the Spanish insunection broke 
out. Sir Arthur Welleslej beat the French at Roleia and 
Vimiera. The vision of Abdollah Mehrou and his legions 
vanished, and we thought no more of a French invasion. 

If, therefore, I were asked what is best to be done with a 
view to a Russian invasion, I should say that it is best to do 
nothing until time shall diiow us what we ought to do, because 
there is nothing that we can do in our present blind state that 
would be of any certain benefit on the approach of that event. 

The only thing certain is, that we ought not wantonly to 
o£fend intermediate States by acts calculated to arouse hostile 
feelings against us, but ought rather to cultivate a fiiendly 

To insinuate ourselves with their consent into their terri- 
tories, under a false pretence, in order to do that which we 
know ihey would forbid, and which cannot escape notice, is 
surely calculated to offend ; while it so happens that, in order 
to cultivate. a fiiendly disposition, we could not do better than 
by avoiding any forced intimacy ; for either our character is so 
bad, or weaker States are naturally so jealous of the stronger, 
or our habits so distasteful, that no Native State ever desires 
connexion with us, imless it needs our protection. Excepting 
under circumstances rendering our countenance and aid essen- 
tial, we cannot oblige our neighbours more than by desisting 
from seeking intercourse with them. If the time should ever 
come when it is needful for them, they will eagerly solicit it. 
No rulers have ever shown their jealousy of us more decidedly 
than the Ameers of Sind, which feeling we are about to sti- 
mulate afresh by an act which will justify its past existence, 
and perpetuate its continuance. 

If the information wanted is indispensable, and cannot be 
obtained by fair and open means, it ought, I conceive, to be 
sought by the usual mode of sending unacknowledged emis- 
saries, and not by a deceitful application for a passage under 
the fictitious pretence of one purpose, when the real object is 
another, which we know would not be sanctioned. 


[/mm 8» 1838.] 

It does not oppesr to me that the eslablidiment of a Kitish 
agent at Caubul ia requisite or desirable in any point of tkw. 

Tlie professed ob[|eot of uie proposal is loO' luipiuvcmeBi of 
commerce. I bdievo Aat comnooe will take caie ef itself 
best withoot our direct intermence m the form of a Commer- 
cial Agency; and, if we sought to remove ezisliB^ obstede^ 
our eiSyrts would be more needed ebewlieie than at Osiibol, 
where the trade with IncEa already recexres eveiy poasble en- 

A commercial agent would unavoidaUy beeom^ from the 
time of his creation, a political agent. To the extension of oar 
political relations beyond the Indus there appears to me to be 
great objections. From such a course I should expect the pro- 
bable occurrence of embarrassments and wars, expensive and 
unprofitable at the least, without any eqmralent benefit, if not 
ruinous and destr u ctive. 

The appointment of an agent at Canbid would of its^ almost 
amount to an interference in the political affidrs of Aighanatan. 
It would be a sort of declaration in favor of the diief whose 
power is established at Caubul, in preference to his rivals at 
Gandahar, Peshawur, and other phoes. 

As a commercial measure, I consider the one proposed to be 
unnecessary ; as a political one, undesirable ; and, therefore^ on 
the whole objectionable. 

It will naturally be advocated by those who anticipate benefit 


from attempts to create an influence in the countries beyond 
the Indus. Expecting only e^il firom such attempts, I would 
refiain from forcing on an unnecessary intercourse. 

We have never, for many years past, been in want of intel- 
ligence of the state of affairs in Afghanistan. The stationing 
of an agent at Caubul, or any other place of importance, would 
of course render our intelligence more minute, but does not 
seem to be of much consequence with reference to that object. 

I entirely concur in tlie approbation bestowed by the Right 
Honorable the Governor-General on Lieutenant Bumes, and 
in his Lordship's proposal to communicate to that able and en- 
terpriBiig officer the satisfiietion of the Supreme Government. 

[Abfe. — ^Tliese two papers indicate the early period at which 
Sir Charles Metcalfe began to foresee the danger of our inter- 
ference, under however plausible a name, witii the afiairs of the 
countries beyond the Indus. He Survey of the Indus and 
the Commercial Agency at Caubul were thd prokffomena, so to 
spealr, of the great epic of the A%han war; and Metcalfe, in 
his correspondence both with LordTVllliam Bentinck and Lord 
Auckland, argued and protested, with equal sagacity and ear- 
nestnesSi against measures which could hardly fail to entangle 
us in such a manner witii the Trans-Indian States as eventually 
to evolve a great and calamitous war. He left India at a most 
unfortunate conjuncture. His services were never so much 
needed as at the time of his departure.] 



[Ifi^ 13, 1829.] 

The Honorable the Court of Directors have ordered that 
inquiries be made for the purpose of nsoertaining whether the 
officers employed at present in the performance of civil func- 
tions in the service of our native alliesi may not be withdrawn, 
and their services altogether dispensed with. 

I propose to offer my opinion on this question^ with reference 
especially to the territories of his Highness the Mizam; but in 
order to show the progresdve steps which have led to the em- 
ployment of our officers in checking the mismanagement, or 
rather, the plunder of those territories, it is necessary to take a 

When our connexion commenced with the State of Hydera* 
bad, mutual interests brought the two powers together. 

Both had something to fear from lippoo and the Mahiattas. 
Tippoo, although formidable to all the States of Southern India, 
was more especially our enemy. The Mahrattas, on the other 
hand, threatened destruction to the Nizam, and were more than 
once nearly effecting it 

The British Government, therefore, and the Nizam, had each 
a strong inducement to court the alliance of the other; and 
notwithstanding some dififerences, at one period, regarding the 
Northern Circars, the natural operation of similar interests 
maintained an amicable spirit, and tended to a more intimate 

Accordingly, in both our wars with Tippoo, we had the alliance 


and co-operation of the Nizam, and, although in the interval be- 
tween those wars our cautious and prudent policy prevented our 
exercising any decided interference between the Nizam and the 
Mahrattas, our relations with the former were nevertheless un- 
doubtedly serviceable to him in checking the latter, and probably 
had a share in saving the State of Hyderabad from destruction. 

The down&ll of Uppoo made a great difference in our rela- 
tions with this Court After that event the alliance ceased to 
have any feature of equality. Our protection was still necessary 
to the Nizam against the Mahrattas; but subordination to his 
protector was the price to be paid. It became our systematic 
policy to post our troops in the territories of our protected allies. 
All real independence was of course extinguished. The Nizam 
had to cede to us, in payment of the expenses of our subsidiary 
force, all the territories which he had acquired, as our ally, in 
our joint wars against Tippoo. 

Hie next important step towards the completion of the Ni- 
zam's dependence was our interference with regard to the nomi- 
nation of his Ministers. When first our negotiators appeared 
at the Court of Hyderabad, they had naturally sought to gain 
to our interests men of influence in the councils of the state; 
and those whom we did gain probably derived additional con- 
sequence from their connexion with us. There were then 
parties in the Nizam's councils, as in other independent States. 
l^ppoo, the Mahratta power, and the French, had each advo- 
cates; but the advice of the English party, or, more probably, 
obvious necessity, prevailed, and the salvation of the State was 
entrusted to the British alliance. 

The Minister during whose administration our alliance with 
the Court of Hyderabad was formed and perfected, was the 
celebrated Aam-ool-Omra, Aristoo Jah. He, however, was the 
Minister of the Nizam's choice; and whatever power he exer- 
cised was granted to him by his master, of his own free will. 
Entire confidence and mutual attachment existed between them, 
and it was not during the life of that prince that our influence 
was banefully exercised in the selection or support of a Minister. 


Brom the iame, hoverer, of the ooBipletioii of the mAmiamj 
alUanee, it leeinB to hsre beea oonflUered aa ewential tfatt the 
Mbister diould be in oar intemU^ nd Act we AobH nappori 
him with our inflnenoe. 

The MiflHn died before the MiniBtfT^ to wham onr aopport 
was ocmtinuedt and then became effioaoooa. It doea not aeem 
to have been oomideied that the Kinm who aiieoeeded ooold 
be allowed any option aa to the oontinnanoe or lemoYal of the 
Minister. OnrBeflidentgaTehisHighaeaBaelearimdentexidiBg 
of what was intended, by obeerving to him, on hia aooeaBon, 
that with such an ally as the British G o ve r nm ent, and aabh a 
Minister aa Aristoo Jah, hia Highneas's affiurs coold not fidl to 

Aristoo Jah accordingly remained Minister until hia death, 
keeping his master, the present Niaam, daring the whole time, 
in thraldom and insignificance, totally deToid of power. 

On the death of that Minister, the Nizam announoed his in- 
tention of taking on himself personally the manageaMnt of the 
afiairs of his Government. He naturally wished to avoid being 
again placed under a Minister independent of his authority. 

The arrangement, however, which he oontemplated for this 
purpose was objected to by our Government. We innted on 
the nomination of a Minister with full poweiB. We assnted the 
right of having a Minister attached to our interests, and, oonse- 
quently, of selecting one of our own choice, and, if requiaite, of 
enforcing his nomination. This extremity, however, was not 
necessary. Meer Allum, whom we selected, was appointed by 
the Nizam, and was sole ruler for life of hii master's dominions. 

The Nizam made some effort to obtain a share of power in 
his own Government; but this was unpalatable to the Minister: 
the Resident gave decided support to the latter. Hie Nizam 
retired from the contest in disgust, and has never since taken 
any part in puUic affairs, but has led a life of gloomy retire- 
ment and sullen discontent. 

Our influence, therefore, established the Minister at Hydei^ 
abad as a despotic ruler, without the consent of his master. In 

££iasr OF CHUNDOO LALL. 22S 

all BritUi mteanriB he was sabeerrient to the Britidi Remdent, 
and also im all priyate inleiesls which the latter dioee to advo- 
cate, la the management of the countzy the Miniater was 
abaolutey and had the support of the British Government 
against any opposition that he could, not subdue with the means 
at his own disposal Opposttion to him was treated as hos- 
tility to us and diaafieotion to the English alliance; and as his 
interests were, by our system, identified with our own, and our 
utmost injBuoice exerted in his support, it was scaioely posdble 
that his enemies should not become ours, although the same 
might have been as willing as he to court our fiiendship, had 
we not made ourselves obnoxious to them by supporting the 
single individual against all competitors for power in the State. 

After the death of Meer Allum, the Nizam again fimitlessly 
expressed an intention of placing himself at the head of affidrs. 
He was pressed to nominate a Minister, and the following 
extraordinaiy arrangement took place. Mooneer-ool-Moolk, 
nominated by the Nizam^ was made Prime Minister^ but it was 
stipulated that he should exercise no power in the State. All 
1^ power was given to the Deputy Minister, Chundoo Lall, who 
was patronised by us. So that firom that time, in addition to 
its sovereign prince, excluded from all concern in the manage- 
ment of his afibirs in consequence of our interference, the State 
of Hyderabad has had a Prime Minister in the same predica- 
ment, as another effect of the same cause. The subserviency of 
the real Minister to our will has rince been more complete than 
before: the supfdeness of his personal character, and the low- 
ness of his birth, aiding the natural effect of the dependence 
of his situation. 

The next great step in the advancement of our influence and 
interference in the Nizam's affairs was the substitution, in lieu 
of portions <^ his own aimy, of troops of all arms — cavalry, 
artillery, and infantry — ^raised, disdplined, and commanded by 
British officers. 

Our interference in the Nizam's army arose £rom an article 
of treaty, by which he is boimd to furnish a certain amount of 


auxiliETy force in the eyent of war with other powerB. The 
force fumiahed in former wars was not sufficienUy efliiaent in 
onr estimation. We h^n by a general saperintendenoe of it, 
with a view to improvement; but the result has been, that 
above forty lakhs per annum out of tiie Nizam's revenues are 
appropriated to the maintenance of a force commanded oitirdy 
by British officers, under the exclusive orders and control of 
the British Rendent. 

This arrangement could only have been eflfected through the 
entire subserviency of the Minister, for it must have been quite 
revolting to the feelings of the Court and of the chiefs of the 
national army. 

But it increased the personal power of the Minister, made 
him more than ever independent of the Court and people, 
enabled him more and more to triumph over his adversarieF, 
and rendered his extortions of revenue irrenstible. 

The subsequent history of the Nizam's country, and of our 
further interference therein, turns entirely on the character of 
this Minister, Chundoo LalL 

Hii reign, for so it may be termed — his sovereign and his 
principal in office being mere pensioners-— commenced in 1809, 
and continued absolute, and without any interference on our 
part in his managementy until 1820. 

At that period, so bad had been his misrule, and so dete- 
riorated had the state of the country become under his absolute 
government, that the Resident, Mr. Russell, although far from 
disposed to find fault with Chundoo Lall, was compelled to urge 
the Governor-General in Council to grant him authority to 
introduce a reform. The authority was granted. 

The causes which led to the admitted necesrity for our inter- 
ference in the Minister's management of the country are easily 
explained, and are such as would infallibly recur if the same 
absolute power, without check, were again left in the same 

Chundoo Lall's main object, from the establishment of his 
power, was to retain it. The instrument most serviceable in 


hiB view for this purpoao was money. He had money for any 
one whom he thought capable of aiding him. Besides his sub* 
senriency to the British Resident in all public measures, there 
was money in the shape of pension, salary, or donation, for any 
one whom the Resident recommended. Any gentleman sup- 
posed to haye influence, directly or indirectly, with the British 
GroTemment, could command a share of the reyenues of the 
Nizam's country. This was the origin of his layish waste of 
public money on Sir William Rumbold and Mr. W. Pal* 
mer and their connexions. Any natiye who was supposed to 
have influence with English gentlemen was also a fit object for 

Chundoo LalVs views were not, however, confined to English 
influence. Whoever could aid him at Hyderabadi whoever 
could injure him, all found access to the Treasury. To make 
friends or to buy off* enemies was managed by the same process. 
All were in pay. And many who might have been active dis- 
turbers of his administration, seeing little or no hope of effecting 
his removal, were kept quiet by a share of the public money. 
Superadded to these sources of excessive expenditure was the 
indiscriminate distribution of immense sums to mobs of beggars, 
for the sake of popularity. 

The revenues were insufficient to meet such excesses; and 
the expenses of a year of war, added to the increasing cost of 
the force commanded by British officers, augmented embar- 
rassment. Extortion and borrowing were had recourse to 
unsparingly, and to the utmost practicable extent. The former 
was augmented by the effects of the latter. Extortion and 
oppression went hand in hand ; desolation followed. 

It is remarkable that our interference was then for the first 
time exercised with a benevolent view to the protection and 
happiness of the Nizam's subjects. Every former act of in- 
terference, however subversive of the independence of the 
Hyderabad State, was dictated solely by a regard for our own 
interests, without any care or thought for the welfare of the 



people whom we had delivered ap to a ruler of our own 

The principal measures adopted in the first instance by the 
Resident, with a view to the improvement of the state of the 
country, depended for due execution on the Minister, and were 
consequently fallacious. It was not in his nature to become a 
check to his own extortions. 

But it was indispensable for success in our interference that 
some check should be provided, and this was the sole object 
of the arrangements subsequently introduced, which have been 
in operation for the last eight years. 

That purpose has been in great measure accomplished; and 
although it is very possible that of late the effect of our 
measures may have diminished from the decrease of wholesome 
distrust of the Minister, whose vicious conduct and incorrigible 
propensity to extortion were the real causes of our interierence, 
there is stilly I believe, no doubt that the imbridled oppression 
which before prevailed is greatly restrained by the checks which 

Neither the present Resident, nor the one who preceded me, 
entertain tlie same opinion of the Minister that I do. On the 
contrary, they both speak well of him. But it appears to me 
that their opinion is inconsistent with facts, and even with 
their own sentiments in other respects. For as all acknow- 
ledge Chundoo Lall to be an able man of business, I cannot see, 
if he were good also, and not possessed by the evil spirit of ex- 
tortion, what ground there could ever have been for our inter- 
ference. His notorious extortions and oppressions furnish a 
very intelligible ground; but those who are not sensible of 
their enormity, and who maintain that he is amiable as well as 
able, appear to me to be without a rational motive for intro- 
ducing or continuing our mediation. 

Nevertheless, Mr. Russell was the Resident who proclaimed 
the necessity of our interference; and the present Resident 
trusts to *' the active superintendence of European officers" for 
every improvement that is to be expected; maintains that '' our 


interference was rendered necessary by the maladministration 
of the goyemment;" and believes that the Minister, amiable 
as he considers him, '* might still require to be directed by the 
control of a superior guidance/' 

My opinion of Chundoo Lall was first adopted from what 
seemed to be the universal sense of the Nizam's country; but 
it was fully confirmed by my own observation and experience. 
To the general feeling of the Nizam's country, and to that of 
every officer employed in its interior with opportunities of 
judging, more credit seems to be due than to the favorable 
opinions above noticed, which, if allowed unquestionable in- 
fluence, would tend to mislead, and render that obscure and 
impenetrable which, rightly understood, is perfectly plain and 

The employment of European officers to check the native 
functionaries of the Nizam's dominions was forced on us by the 
unbounded oppression practised by the Minister, .Chundoo Lall, 
for the purpose of extortion. 

Our object has been in great measure accomplished. Oppres- 
rion does not exist in the same degree. But the continued 
efficacy of our interference depends much on the Resident. 
The surest way to render it nugatory is to place undue reliance 
on the Minister. I fear that its operation is even now afiected 
by that cause. Nevertheless, the checks which exist prevent 
the greater portion of the oppressions, which would rage with* 
out limit if our interference were withdrawn. 

The particular form in which our check can most bene- 
ficially be exercised, is a question quite distinct from that of 
the necessity of its continuance, and of less consequence. Mr. 
Martin does not appear to be an advocate for that which was 

Prom the sentiments which he has expressed, it would seem 
88 if our system of village settlements had been an innovation^ 
and a supersession of another system, to which, from long habit, 
the people were more accustomed. 

He supposes the class of district officers, whom he designates 



as Zumeendara, to have been the persoiia with whom zereoiie 
aettleoients had previouslj been generally condnded. 

It 18 proper to explain what the persona are thna denomi- 
nated ZumeendarSy to which term very diflSsrent meanings must 
be applied in different parts of India. 

They are the Desmooks and Despandeeas, or district revenue 
officers, having different designations in different places, of the 
ancient Hindoo Government, which existed in the Dekkan 
before the Mahomedan conquest They are stricdy offioeia, 
not the landowners or landholders of the country. They have 
neither that right in the soil which we have bestowed on 
the Zumeendars of Bengal, nor that which is possessed by the 
village Zumeendars of Hindostan. They are paid by a per- 
centage on the revenue, and by small portions of land, which 
they hold rent free. 

It seems probable that in remote times, before the Mahomedan 
conquest, they were the sole managers, on the part of the go- 
vernment, of the districts to which they belonged, and the 
intermediate representatives and agents of the people in ihdr 
transactions with the government; but this state of rule, if it 
evar existed, had been destroyed by the foreign government 
of the Mahomedans; and before our interference took place, all 
classes had been crushed by a tyranny, in which extortion was 
the only system that was allowed to exist 

The district ofBcers had, in some parts of the country, from 
local peculiarities, maintained or acquired a greater degree of 
power and influence than in others, so as to make no descrip- 
tion of their situation applicable with equal exactness to every 
part ; but nowhere did they present a spectacle or a prospect of 
any system of which we could avail ourselves to protect the 
people against extortion. 

Everywhere the government was represented by Talookdars, 
or district managers, who were contractors for the revenue, and 
in every other respect absolute. The Minister required from them 
a certain sum of revenue, and on that more and more, according 
to his wants or arbitrary caprice. If they paid, they remained 


despotic rulers of their districts, and suffered fresh demands. 
If they could not pay, they were removed, and others sent who 
promised more, and paid a handsome Nuzzurana in advance. 
The Talookdars, knowing how precarious was their tenure, 
had no other object than to extort the utmost as rapidly as 
posdble. If they thought it their interest to employ l^e Des- 
mooks and Despandeeas in their exactions, they employed 
them; if more for their interest to set them aside, they set them 

Had there been any regular system in existence of which 
'we could have availed ourselves, we should certainly have 
adopted it Never was a reform attempted less in the spirit of 
innovation, or more free from the conceit of invention. In 
fact, the system of village settlements was adopted, precisely 
because it was no innovation, and was the only system that 
could not be an innovation. For from one end of India to the 
other, among Native States, it will be found that whatever local 
authorities may intervene between the governments and the 
village communities, the land revenue is assessed on villages, 
levied on villages, and recorded by names of villages; and so it 
must naturally be in a country wholly parcelled out among 
village communities, and where there is, perhaps, not a single 
spot of ground, to whatever purpose now applied, which could 
not be traced in the ancient records as belonging to some vil-* 
lage, whether now in existence or otherwise. 

What is a village settlement but the affixing of the amount 
of revenue which each village community has to pay to the 
government? A process which must have been gone through 
at all times in the Nizam's territories, whoever performed it, 
although it was notoriously done without regard to the people, 
and without any adherence to engagements. 

I conceive, therefore, that the system of village settlements 
was less likely than any other that could have been devised to 
lead to innovation; and in the early settlements, of which I 
had cognisance, care was taken to prevent it in any way, unless 
the endeavour to secure to the cultivator the fruits of his in* 


dustiyi after paying the daes of his govemment, can properly 
be 80 called. The parties present at a settlement were the 
Talookdar, ». e. manager of the province, or an agent appcnnted 
for the purpose by the Nizam's Minister, or both of them; 
the Desmooks and Despandeeas, or hereditary officers of the 
district; the representative heads of the village conununities; 
and a British officer preading. The district manager, or 
Minister's agent, urged the interests of the Nizam's Govon- 
ment in favor of a high assessment; the village communities 
pleaded for a low one; the hereditary district officers were 
sometimes on one side, and sometimes on the other ; there were 
the accounts of past assessments and collections, and the state- 
ments of actual capabilities to refer to; the persons present 
were those best able to give information ; the settlement wss 
concluded by the mutual agreement of the parties interested, 
under the control of the British officer, by whom the result 
was attested, recorded, and reported to the Resident, the Mi- 
nister's agent doing the same to the Minister, who confirmed 
the settlement unless he saw reason to object to it 

It is very possible that some of these settlements may have 
been unequal, and that fraud and deceit may have been suc- 
cessfully practised; but still it is strange if the heads of village 
. communities sat in silence and saw their own villages over-as- 
sessed, and others under-assessed, without an eflfort to e£kct a 
more equitable distribution of the burden, notwithstanding 
every encouragement to furnish information. 

But supposing unequal assessments to have taken place, or 
equal assessments to have become unequal from subsequent 
causes, there was a ready remedy. An over-assessment could 
be reduced; an under-assessment, procured by false statements 
or other frauds, was open to revision. The only remediless 
case would have been an under-assessment in which there was 
no fraud, or deceit, or false statement. But such a one was 
not likely to occur; and if it ever happened, could not have 
done much injury. 

The real obstruction to the success of these settiements con* 


sisted in the rapacious disposition of the Minister, who, having 
onoe saoceeded in obtaining an over-assessment through the 
intervention of a British officer, could scarcely ever be induced 
to agree to a reduction of it. 

The same spirit, goaded by the necessities arising out of his 
wasteful and corrupt expenditure, has interfered with remis- 
nonSy however necessary from other causes. The first settle- 
ments, concluded under our superintendence, were followed by 
several successive seasons unfavorable to production, and re- 
quiring consideration for the cultivators on the part of the 
frovemment. Even during that period grain was getting 
cheaper. The fall of prices has been progressive throughout 
that part of India, requiring large remissions from all govern- 
ments. If our measures in the Nizam's territories had not been 
attended with a great increase of cultivation and production, 
the diminution of revenue must have been immense. Not- 
withstanding that increase, owing to the fall of prices, remis- 
sions are in many cases necessary. But to these the Minister 
never willingly consents. The collection of the revenue is en- 
tirely in his own hands. We have never interfered with it; 
and he now practises that extortion, which was before unlimited, 
by exacting the full amount of assessments, rendered excessive 
by low prices, although originally equitable. 

The Nizam's Grovemment must submit, like all governments 
that are landlords, to the unavoidable consequence of low 
prices, a reduction of rent; and has no right to expect tq keep 
up its land revenue to the standard at which it was assessed 
when prices were high, unless the increase of produce has been 
equivalent to the fall of prices. 

Mr. Martin has unintentionally paid a compliment to our 
village settlements in the Nizam's dominions, by objecting to 
them that they are made with village communities, and not 
with individuals as proprietors of each village, which he sup- 
poses to be the character of our village settlements in the 
North- Western Provinces under the Bengal Presidency. He 
ought to have been aware, that where a settlement is made with 

282 ArrAiBS of htdk&abad. 

an individual as aamimed proprietor of a village, the rights and 
property of the village comtnunity are annihilated; and that 
where it is made with the village conAmnnity, their rights and 
property are preserved untouched. 

I have dwelt so much at length on the subject of village 
settlements, because Mr. Martin's remarks seem to me Im 
favorable to that method of exercising a check on ezto7ti<m 
than they justly might have been. It was adopted as the onlj 
one likely to be effectual ; I still cannot perceive any other so 
likely, I am also of opinion that it is applicable, with suitable 
modifications, to all parts of the Nizam's dominions, althougli 
its accomplishment had been more obstructed in some parts 
than in others. 

But I am no stickler for any particular method, provided 
tliat our main object, which is to prevent extortion, be any- 
how attained. 

Mr. Martin informs us that he has abandoned the scheme of 
village settlements in Telingana, and allowed the former sys- 
tem of management to be restored. By the former system of 
management he seems to mean that the Minister is to collect 
as much as he can, through the intervention of the hereditary 
district officers. In fact, the village settlement was never com- 
pletely accomplished in Telingana. The district officers, who 
were interested in counteracting it, had, from local peculiarities, 
sufficient influence to do so, with the ready connivance and aid of 
the Minister. Nevertheless, the village settlement, wherever car- 
ried into effect, even in that part of the country, furnished some 
means of checking extortion. It gave a knowledge of a de- 
mand beyond which the Government had no right to exact. 
If this ground of check has been abandoned without the sub- 
stitution of any other, I must conclude that injury has been 
done by the change. If the power of check has been preserfed, 
I should not be disposed to object to the Resident's exercise of 
his discretion as to forms; for I consider the principal purpose 
of our interference to be achieved if we can prevent undue ex- 
action; and whatever interference may not be necessary for 


ibmt parpofle ought to be avoided. Interference is In itself an 
evil, to which we have had recourse solely in order to remove 
a greater evil — unlimited oppression, which we ourselves were 
instrumental in causing. 

On the whole, I see reason to apprehend that Mr. Martin's 
partiality for the Minister unavoidably diminishes his power of 
checking maladministration. There is no other reason what- 
ever for our interference than the total faithlessness of the 
Minister's character, and his incorrigible propensity to un- 
bounded extortion. To place confidence in him, and dis- 
T^ard the information of the officers appointed to check op* 
pression, would be the sure way to defeat the purpose of our 
interference; and if it has taken place in any sensible degree, 
is quite sufficient to account for any falling off in the operation 
of our measures which may latterly have been apparent to the 

I nevertheless am satisfied that our intervention does prevent 
the universal and unlimited extortion that would otherwise 
prevail, and therefore I should extremely regret the discontinu- 
ance of our check during the rule of the present Minister; for 
whose acts, as his power was established and maintained by us, 
we are undoubtedly responsible. 

The time may come, and may not be far distant, when we 
may relieve ourselves from this embarrassment. It is not to 
be expected that the present Nizam could assume, even if he 
were allowed to do so, the independent government of his terri- 
tories during the precarious remnant of his life of sickness. 
But on the accession of his successor, if the latter were to 
evince a character equal to the duties of his station — ^if he 
were to apply himself to the affairs of his government, and 
choose unbiassed hid own ministers^ we should then be at 
liberty to withdraw our interference, and could not be held 
responsible for any misrule that might ensue. 

If, however, we entertain this view, we must guard ourselves 
against what is likely to happen on the death of the Nizam. 
The present Minister will, of course^ endeavour to retain his 


poweri and will have many facalitiei for doing ao. Tbe Ren- 
dent, it is evident, if not otherwise instructed, would give him 
the fullest support. But even without that support he would 
have great advantages. The Minister's actual poasessioa of 
absolute power might have influence on the mind of an inexpe- 
rienced prince, raised from privacy and tedrement, it may be 
said from confinement, to a throne on which he had never pre- 
viously seen anything but a cypher, subordinate to the ruling 
Minister. The idea, too, which would be inculcated, that he 
was indebted to the Minister for his succession, would natu- 
rally operate in favor of the latter. The belief also of Chundoo 
Lairs connexion with the British Government, on which that 
of Hyderabad must acknowledge its dependence, would Anther 
aid him ; and it would be very difficult to remove the impres- 
sion that his nomination would meet our wishes, although we 
might not exert ourselves to eiTect it, and were even to declare 
our neutrality. 

It would not, therefore, be surprising if Chundoo Lall were 
continued in power by the next Nizam, without our recom- 
mendation. If the act were perfectly spontaneous, we should 
be relieved from responsibility, and might be at liberty to 
withdraw our interference. But if the choice were either 
directly or indirectly the efiect of our influence and supposed 
partiality, we should hardly cease to be responsible for the 
shocking oppressions which would ensue. 

At whatever period our interference in the civil management 
of the Nizam's country may be withdrawn, it must become a 
serious question whether our share in the military branch of its 
establishment ought not to cease also. 

It would not be right to leave a force under British oflicers 
to become the instrument of the oppressions of a rapacious 
Minister; and it would not be just towards the Nizam s Go- 
vernment to deny the aid of a force to which so large a portion 
of its resources is appropriated, if it were required for the 
proper support of the government. To judge of the occasions 
on which it might or might not be employed by the Nizam's 


autborifcieSy would re-create that interference in civil afifairs from 
which we are anxious to withdraw. 

The existence of a force paid by a Native State, but com- 
manded by our officers, and entirely under our control, is un- 
doubtedly a great political advantage* It is an accession to 
our military strength at the expense of another power, and 
without cost to us: an accession of military strength in a con- 
quered empire, where military strength is everything. The 
advantage is immense. But I cannot say that I think the 
arrangement a just one towards the Native State. The same 
circumstances which make it so advantageous to us, make it 
unjust to the State at whose expense it is upheld. 

The subserviency of the Minister at Hyderabad has rendered 
this kind of force in the Nizam's territories a sort of plaything 
for the Resident, and an extensive source of patronage at the 
Nizam's expense. The temptation is difficult to resist, and it 
is more to be regretted than wondered at that the expense is 
increasing. It appears, from returns prepared in the Secretary's 
office, that the military and civil allowances paid by the Nizam's 
Government to British officers amounted, according to the 
earliest report received from Hyderabad, under date Ist January, 
1824, to 11,11,098 Hyderabad Rs., the number of officers 
being 101; on the 28th January, 1825, to 9^16,260 Rs. for 83 
officers; on the Ist March, 1826, to 9,99,420 Rs. for 101 officers; 
on the 31st December, 1826, to 11,34,828 Rs. for 116 persons; 
on the 31st December, 1827, to 12,48,696 Rs. for 119 persons; 
and on the Ist December, 1828, to 13,49,880 Rs. for 123 persons. 
The necessity for this increase in the last two years is by no 
means obvious. The intermediate decrease in 1824 and 1825 
was no doubt owing principally, if not wholly^ to the absence 
of officers during the Burman war, who must, however, have 
returned by the end of 1826. 

It is not to be expected that we could withdraw entirely from 
all civil and military interference in the Nizam's Government 
with perfect and unalloyed benefit. 

We must be prepared for mismanagement in the civil admi- 


niitration whoever might be Minister : the loss of the ibioe at our 
dispoeal would be a positive dimination of our military strength; 
and in future wars we should again have to complain of the 
inefficiency of the auxiliary force which the Nizam is bound by 
treaty to furnish. We must also be prepared, if we withdraw 
our officers, to see the formation of corps under European or 
East Indian adventui^ers, such as fonnerly existed in the Nisam's 

Nevertheless, the restoration of independence to the Niaam's 
Oovemment appears to me to be an object worthy of our 
attention, and worth some loss ai.d some hazard, whenever it 
can be effectually accomplished. 

But it must be borne in mind that this independence has 
had no existence since the last century, and that at present the 
country is governed by a Minister who is not the servant of his 
nominal master, but, in fact, is our dependant, and whose 
oppression and misrule compelled us to exercise interference in 
his management with a view to check extortion. 

While such a state of things exists, it would, I conceive, be 
cruel and unjust to sacrifice the people again to his reckless 
rapacity by the removal of the check at present imposed, which 
in a great degree has proved efficacious, and, with a due dis- 
trust of the Minister^ would be more so. 

I should, therefore, recommend that no steps be taken at 
present to withdraw our interference in the management of the 
Nizam's country; and that we should wait until an opportuni^ 
may present itself enabling us to efl^t that purpose, without 
being responsible for any misrule that might ensue. 

In the mean time, we ought to prevent any increase of the 
expense of the military establishment commanded by British 
officers and paid by the Nizam's Government, and gradually 
to reduce the expense now existing. 



iJu^i 14, 1835.] 

fHiere is no subject which more frequently presses itself upon the 
sttention of Indian statesmen than the amount of interference in the 
affairs of the Native States which may be rightfully and expediently exer- 
cised by the representatiyes of the Paramount Power. Both in the public 
and private correspondence of Sir Charles Metcalfe this question is fre- 
quently discussed ; but the following passages, extracted from a lengthy and 
elaborate paper on the affairs of Jyepore, written as Govemor-Qeneral in 
1S35, embrace at once the most comprehensive summary of the whole 
Mgument, and the most mature expression of the writer's opinions ; and may, 
therefore, stand in place of all other discussions of the subject under the 
present head.] 

[Extract.] — ^The difference between the interfering and 
non-interfering policy is not that of interfering on all occasions 
and not interfering on any, because^ as the predominant power 
in India, interference is sometimes forced on us, however 
reluctant we may be to adopt it. The difierence is, that the 
upholders of non-interference avoid interference as much as 
poamble^ while the opposite party are rather disposed to avul 
themselves of every opportunity to exercise it ; see occasions 
for it which the others do not ; and assert the right of assuming 
it when the others would maintain that such a right does not 
exist, or is very questionable ; and in every case in which the 
question is, whether interference shall be exercised or not, or to 
what degree it shall be exercised, every one will naturally be 
biassed by his preconceived opinion on the general question. 


Both parties of course aim at the public welfare, and each ad- 
vocates that line of policy which it deems to be best 

The interference policy appears to me to be arbitrary. We 
interfere in the aflairs of foreign states as we like. We put up 
and put down princes and ministers at our pleasure ; set princes 
over subjects, and ministers over princes, as we think prop^. 
We do not allow the general feeling of the people to operate, 
but act according to our own notions of what is right and ex- 
pedient The bad tendency of this policy is manifold. It 
destroys entirely the independence of the foreign state, and 
paralyses its energies. It also throws the weight of our power 
into the scale of the government, and destroys the ability of 
the people to redress their grievances. It places us on the 
anti-popular side, and causes us to be detested. It relieves the 
native government from the necessity of conciliating its sub- 
jects, and of coui'se promotes oppression. While we give this 
injurious support to the government, we scarcely ever inter- 
fere sufficiently to prevent oppression and misrule, and can 
hardly do so without taking the government into our own 
hands, and thus putting an end even to the semblance of inde* 

Another evil of interference is, that it gives too much power 
to our agents at foreign courts, and makes princes and ministers 
very much the slaves or subjects of their will. An interfering 
agent is an abominable nuisance wherever he may be, and our 
agents are apt to take that turn. They like to be masters 
instead of mere negotiators. They imagine, often very .erro- 
neously, that they can do good by meddling in other people's 
aSairs; and they are impatient in witnessing any disorder 
which they think may be remedied by our interference, for- 
getting that one step in this course will unavoidably be followed 
by others, which will most probably lead to the destruction of 
the independence of the state concerned. 

It must be admitted to be an evil of the non-interference 
policy that temporary and local disorder may occasionally ensue, 
and must be tolerated, if we mean to adhere strictly to that 


principle. But this is a consequence which we naturally dis- 
like. We are not disposed to wait until things settle them- 
selves in their natural course. We think ourselves called on 
to interfere, and some bungling or unnatural arrangement is 
made by our will, which, because it is our own, we ever after 
support, against the inclination of the people, and their notions 
of right and justice. 

The true basis of non-interference is a respect for the rights 
of others — for the rights of all, people as well as princes. The 
treaties by which we are connected with Native States are, 
with rare exceptions, founded on their independence in internal 
affiiirs. In several instances the States are, with respect to ex- 
ternal relations, dependent and under our protection, but stiU 
independent in internal affiiirs. It is customary with the advo- 
cates of interference to twist our obligation of protection against 
enemies into a right to interfere in the internal afiairs of pro« 
tected States — a right, however, which our treaties generally do 
not give us, otherwise than as the supporters of the legitimate 
sovereign against usurpation or dethronement, in the event of 
his not having merited the disaffection of his subjects. 

There are, undoubtedly, extreme cases in which the inter- 
ference of the protecting power may be unavoidable. Instances 
of prolonged anarchy, a£^ting others under our protectioUi 
are of that description. It may be said to be a defect of the 
non-interference policy, that it cannot in every possible case 
be maintained. The same objection would probably be appli- 
cable to any system of policy. It need not prevent the main- 
tenance of non-interference as the system, admitting rare inter- 
ference as the exception. There must, however, be a non-' 
interfering spirit in the government and its agents, otherwise 
the exception will predominate over the rule. 

There are two classes of States in India with which we have 
relations — those protected, and those not protected — which may 
be otherwise described as external and internal States, or those 
altogether beyond our exterior frontier, and those encircled 
by our dominions, or more or less included within the sphere ' 


of our sapremacy. The internal States are, in a greater or lem 
degree, either specifically or Yirtiiallj, ander our protection, and 
it is to these that the question of interference or non-interferenoe 
principally refers. The States of Sind, Caubul, Lahore, China, 
Nepal, and Ava, are external States, free as yet from any pre- 
tensions of interference on our part in their internal affidn. 
But the spirit of interference would no doubt soon find cause 
for the exercise of its withering and mischievous infl.nenoe 
even in those States. If I recollect rightly, it has been recom- 
mended to me by our agents, east, north, and west. The 
sea being our exterior boundary to the south, is almost the only 
power that has altogether escaped the suggestion. We have 
laid the foundation for interference west and north-west by 
our treaties respecting the navigation of the Indus, which we 
are now about to promote by stopping it altogether. The 
question of interference at present, however, relates chiefly, or 
almost exclusively, to the internal States — ^those which by treaty 
or virtually are under our protection. With respect to these, 
we have no right to interfere in their internal affairs as long aa 
they can govern themselves, and are inoffensive to others. But 
prolonged anarchy can hardly exist without affecting neigh- 
bouring States. The continuance of extreme misrule and op- 
pression, if in the' least degree supported, as it sometimes is, by 
awe of our power on the part of the people, ought not to be 
tolerated. Unjust usurpation, not caused by oppression, forces 
us to take a part, for we must either acknowledge, and so &r 
countenance the usurpation, or we must refuse to aclfiiowlcdge 
it, and so far oppose it; and we could hardly follow the latter 
course long without proceeding further, or dissolving our con- 
nexion with the State so situated. These are cases in which 
interference may be either necessary or justifiable; and it must 
be remembered, that in any case in which external interference 
is required, it can only arise from us. Other Native States are 
precluded from it, if of the protected class, by their relations 
with us; if beyond the circle of our supremacy, by our intole- 
rance of their interference within it. Those remedies, therefore. 


for internal distraction, which are available in communities of 
States less under the supremacy of one protecting and overawing 
power, cannot here be had recourse to. The British Govern* 
ment is the sole referee where reference is necessary. Absolute 
non-interference on every occasion is consequently impossible. 
There is, neverthelessi a wide difference between a reluctant 
interference, when it is unavoidable, and a disposition to rush 
into interference when it is not necessary; and in this consists 
the diflference between the two systems of policy. 

The advocates for interference would probably maintain that 
it is right to anticipate mischief and prevent it by decided in- 
terference, and, as disorder will sometimes follow our adherence 
to non-interference, there would be much weight in that argu- 
ment, if our interference were always productive of good. But 
we often create or aggravate mischief and disorder by injudi- 
cious interference, and prevent a natural settlement of affairs, 
which would otherwise take place. One of the strongest argu- 
ments in my mind against interference is, that it is more apt to 
work evil than good. There is nothing in our political admi- 
nistration that requires so much circumspection, and caution^ 
and discreet judgment, as interference in the affairs of other 
States. A single mistake on the part of an agent may cause 
irreparable mischief; and the power left to agents on such 
occasions is immense. Almost everything depends on their 
judgment The effects of interference are anything but certain 
It is not, therefore, a conclusive argument in favor of inter* 
ference, although it is the best, that we may thereby prevent 
evil; for, on the contrary, we are just as likely to create it; I 
should indeed say, infinitely more so. And the evil created 
by interference is generally irremediable. It virtually, if not 
ostensibly, destroys the State to which it is applied, and leaves 
it only a nominal, if any, existence. 

As a diplomatic agent, I have had a part in carrying into 
efiect both interfering and non-interfering policy, and the result 
of my own experience has left two strong impressions on my 



mind — ^fint, that we ought not to interfere in the intennd 
afiurs of other States if we can avoid it; and, seoondlj, thai if 
we do interfere, we ought to do so decidedly, and to the foQ 
extent requisite for the object which we have in view. Onr 
attempts to interfese for the better government of other Statei 
have often been wretched fiiilures as to oar purpose, but have 
nevertheless had all the badeflSdcts of interference on the States 
concerned, as well as on the minds of other States. Where 
interference shall b^gin, and where end, and to what okgect it 
shall be confined^ and how that object ahaU be accomplished 
without involving further and unneceseaiy interference, are all 
nice points to determine. The question of intexfeience alto- 
gether is, indeed, the most difficult of any in Indian policy; 
but interference is so likely to do evil, and so Httle certain of 
doing good, that it ought, I conceive, to be avoided as much as 
possible. The evils of non-interference may certainly be such 
sometimes as we would not like to permit to continue, but their 
effects are generally temporaxy, and leave the State independent 
in internal afliiirB as before. The effects of interference are per- 
manent, and degrade the State for ever, if they do not destroy 
it. Another consequence of interference is, that it subjects us 
to the suspicion, which is always alive against us, and to the 
reproach of incessantly striving to increase our dominions, and 
to seize those of others. We have thus the evils of appropria- 
tion without its benefits. Such is the effect of our occupation 
of Shekhawuttee, Toorawuttee, and Sambur. A further evil of 
interference is, that it involves us, on account of other people's 
affidrs, in expenses which we can neither ourselves afford to pay, 
nor contrive to make others pay, owing to their poverty. 

On the general question of interference, therefore, it appears 
to me that the following would be proper rules for our 

1. To abide by treaties, and respect the rights of all foieign 
States, and not to interfere in their internal affairs when it can 
be avoided. 


2. Wlien compelled bj neceBsity to interfere, to do so with 
caiey that the State concerned may not be permanently affected 
in an injnrioiiB manner by onr measures. 

3. To interfere only so fiur as may be indispensable for the 
aooomplishment of the object which b die cause of inter* 

4. To interfere decidedly and effectually for the purpose re- 
quired, and not to leave it unaccomplished. 

5. All the cases of necessity^ for interference cannot perhaps 
be desciibed, but the following are those which most obviously 
suggest themselves: — 1. General disturbance produced by in- 
ternal disorder, but extending beyond the limits of the dis- 
turbed States, and affecting other States. 2. Prolonged anarchy, 
with its evil consequences to the people, without a hope of the 
State's being able to settle its own affairs. 3. Habits of depre- 
dation affecting other States, which last would be a just cause, 
not for interference merely, but also for war and conquest, if 
we chose to assert our right. 4. Unjust usurpation, devoid of 
legitimate claim, or opposed to the choice of the people, which, 
with reference to our supreme power, we must either sanction 
or put down. 

Applying these principles to the state of affiiirs at Jyepore, it 
does not appear to me that the case for interference in the internal 
administration of that principality is established. It is not a case 
in which absolute non-interference is practicable, because we have 
already interfered to some extent; but we may abstain from 
such further interference as is unnecessary. We cannot permit 
anarchy to prevail, and we must lend our countenance to the 
Government which exists, but we need not commit ourselves 
to prevent the establishment of a better, if a better or a more 
popular one can be formed with a prospect of benefit to that 
State. Actual interference in the executive administration of 
the Government is not required, for we do not hear of notorious 
oppression, or misrule, or want of power in the Government; 
and it could not, under any circumstances, be advantageous 



unless it were carried to sach an extent as wonld place the 
whole ezecutdve authority in our hands, confirm all the preva- 
lent opinions of our sjstematio encroachmenti and draw upon 
us all the odium of aggremon; a state of things which, instead 
of seeking, we ought, injustice to oursdTes, most studiouslj to 


lNavm6er 9, 1828.] 

[ExTBAGT.] — Having concluded my remarks on the contents 
of Sir John Malcolm's minute, I now proceed to submit my own 
notions on the general subject of that document — ^namdy, on 
the state of relations which it is desirable to maintain with 
Persia. He who offers objections to the views of anotiier is 
bound to exhibit his own, in order that they also may undergo 

I am £u from imftgiw^ng that the progress of Russia in the 
conquest of Persia is a matter of indifference to us. So £Eur 
from it, that if I could perceive any certain ground to conclude 
that Russia would be deterred from further progress by our 
entering into an intimate defensive alliance with Peraa, I should 
readily advocate such a measure. 

But I have no such expectation. It is not conastent with 
the independence and greatness of one of the largest empires 
ever known in the world, to submit to our dictation in its 
transactions witii a State with which it has always hitiierto had 
separate relations; and we cannot undertake the defence of 
Persia without regarding a war with Russia as a probable con* 

A war with Russia in defence of Persia, whatever might be 
its results in other respects, would most probably fail as to its 
original object, and Persia be subdued. At all events, I cannot 
conceive that it would be wise policy in us to lay the founda- 


tion of a war with RubbU by taking on ounelves the respon- 
ability of the protection of Persia. I would infinitely prefer, 
if neceasary, that Persia, which power has not the slightest 
daim on us, should be left to her fate, and that we should 
husband our resources to meet the evil when it may become 
inevitable; avoiding any premature anticipation of the struggle. 

Time works changes in all things — ^in empires as well as in 
smaller affidrs. It will work changes in Russia, in Perma, and 
in India. A few years hence a great difference may take place 
in the condition of all these oountriesw Our power in India is 
not stationary. It will become stronger or weaker. It is now 
essentially weak; if it do not become stronger, it will scarcdy 
be worth preserving; and it will be hardly possible to preserve 
it. But whatever may be the state of things at any future 
period, I cannot imagine the utility of precipitating a hostile 
collision with Russia; and that, too, in behalf of a powtf whose 
good fidth, in the time of our own need, could not be relied on 
in the slightest degree, and whose utmost aid to us would con- 
sist in her own preservation, which she could not probably ac- 
complish, against Russia, in the event of war, without, or even 
with, our assistance. 

Our true policy, therefore, it seems to me, is to devote our 
attention to the improvement of our Indian Empire, fostering 
its strength, without prematurely going in search of danger, by 
anticipating its due season. 

What ihen have I to propose regarding our relations with 
Persia? It is this: To maintain them on the most fii«dly 
terms that will not involve us in stipulations likely to lead to 
an unnecesiary war with Russia. There is no necenity for 
pretending indifference as to the fate of Persia. The interests 
of Persia and of British India are to a certain degree in union. 
We need not conceal that we desire her preservation. We need 
not hesitate to use our best endeavours to promote it by all 
means consistent with the maintenance of friendly relations 
with Russia. Nay, even occasions and events may possibly 
occur in which it would be politic to afford Persia active as- 


sifltanoe agiinst (haft power. But let us keep ourseiyes fiee to 
do what 18 wiaest and best under all circnmstances. Let us not 
embanaas ourselves by engagements which may be ruinous in 
th^r consequences, £br which Persia cannot make any adequate 
return, and winch, on her part, would not be kept one instant 
beyond their agreement wi& her own conyenience. 

The continuance of a inission at the Persian Court, for the 
purposes of maintaining our relations on the most intimate 
fix>ting of fidend^ip consonant with the policy premised, and 
of securing accurate knowledge of all that passes between Russia 
and Persia, seems to be proper and desirable; what should be 
the envoy's rank, and whether he should be accredited from 
the King or the Company, appear to be points of minor im- 
portance. For whatever influence we may possess in Persia 
must be derived, not from the official designation of the envoy, 
nor from the ezpensiveness of his establishment, but from the 
consciousness of Persia that our friendship is beneficial to her. 
With respect, therefore, to the footing on which the mission is, 
I do not perceive any very urgent cause for change. The less 
expense the better; but provided that the expense of our poli- 
tical relations in Persia do not exceed that of a first-rate Resi- 
dency in India, it may, I conceive, to that extent be tolerated. 
I am not sensible that there was any advantage in increasing 
the expense of the mission from what it was in the time of Sir 
Henry Willock's charge. 

The employment of British officers in the armies of Persia 
may prove useful, as circumstances may arise in which their 
local knowledge may be serviceable to their own country. In- 
formation appears to be wanting as to the allowances actually 
received by the officers so employed from the Persian Govern- 
ment. At present they draw from the Company full field-pay 
and allowances — ^a privilege which they alone now enjoy of all 
the officers not actually employed in the military service of the 
Company. If the allowances drawn from the Persian Court 
constitute, with the Company's pay, an adequate compensation 
for their services, they might, as to Company's allowance, be 


put on the same footing with til odier offioen employed hj 
foreign States. If, on the other hand, their Peiman allowances 
do not afford, with their Company's pay, any adequate com- 
pensation, they might retain their present privil^^es^ if the 
eventual usefulness of their local knowledge diould be deemed 
to justify their employment on those terms. 

Admitting the expediency of retaining a misnon at the Per- 
nan Court, and of allowing the employment of officers in the 
Persian serrioe, it neyertheless appears to be yery necessary 
that all our transactions with the Court of Persia should be 
constructed on a footing of equality ; and that the notion enter- 
tained by that Court, and hitherto practically sanctioned by us, 
of levying contributions on us, without return, should cease 
<o be nourished by our proceedings, when it would soon cease 
to exist Let Persia feel that we wish her well, and acknow- 
ledge a common interest, but let her not imagine that we are 
willing to pay tribute for the continuance of friendly xelations. 

Mtbtnut anlr l^tttrtctaL 


In their letter of the 27th of June, the Board define the 
land revenue of Indian Oovemments as consisting of a portion 
of existing land rent. It is not quite clear in this definition 
what is meant to be described as land rent. It may mean a 
rent received &om the cultivator by an intermediate landlord; 
or it may mean that portion of the produce which is termed 
rent, in the technical division of produce to partSy-tmder the 
terms, wages of labor, profits of stock, and rent. In either case 
it would, I conceive, be more coirect to define the land 
revenue of Indian Governments as consisting of a portion of 
the gross produce, for such is the fact. Go into any village 
and inquire what is the revenue or right of Government. You 
will be told that it is a half, or a third, or whatever it may be, 
of the crops. Tou will not be told that it is a portion of a 
rent received by some intermediate person, nor that it is a 
portion of a technical division called rent; but you will be told 
plainly, where it is described as a portion of anything, that it 
is such a share of the crop. It may be a fixed sum on par- 
ticular produce, or on the land itself; but if it be described as a 
portion, it will be a portion of the gross produce. I think, 
therefore, that in defining the land revenue of Indian Govern* 
ments as consisting of a portion of existing land rent, the 


Board, whatever they may mean, have unneoeaBaiily mystified 
the question, the Indian land revenue being generally a portion 
of the gross produce. 

I am apprehensive that the opinion of the Board, defining 
the State revenue to be a portion of rent, may lead to con- 
fusion in the assessments; the State revenue being a portion 
of the gross produce, of which portion the Government may 
either take the whole, or remit a part to the landowners as 
deduction fieom the demand, or grant a part to the perstMis 
employed in collecting it as payment for trouble, or a part to 
revenue contractors as compensation for risk, at its own option. 

These observations may be exemplified by what took place at 
the permanent settlement of BengaL The Government chimed 
what was supposed to be its lawful revenue, according to 
established preoedent| being that which a native governor 
would have been entitled to under the same circamstanoea. 
Then, firom that sum of revenue, one-tenth or one-deveoth was 
allowed to the revenue contractor, whom we nominated pro- 
prietor, as his income from his assumed property. He was pro- 
hibited from taking more from the landholdera under him than 
the Government share of produce, or fixed rates of aasenment 
prescribed as Grovemment revenue. That was the elected pro- 
prietor's renty and if the Government revenue had been a 
portion of the proprietor's rent, would it not have been atrocious 
that it should have been nine-tenths or ten-elevenths? Gould 
that ever have been termed, without ridicule, a portion? On 
the other hand, speaking of rent, not as the income of the pro- 
prietor, but as one of the technical divisions of the produce of 
land, can one-half of the gross produce, which is the most 
general division of the crop between the Government and the 
cultivator, be fairly stated as a portion of tiie land rent? What 
is the real fact in either of these cases? Not that the Grovem* 
ment revenue is a portion of the rent, but that it is a very 
large portion of the gross produce. And where is the utility 
of representing it to be anything else? When the Gk>vemment 
made perpetual contractors for the revenue in Bengal, and called 


them pioprietors, it did not take a portion of iheir rent; it 
took its own revenue, and gave them a portion out of it — that 
18, a tenth or an elevenlli. 


The Board adhere to the opinion that ByutwaTy or perma- 
nent field asBeasments, cannot be introduced into the Western 
Provinces; but I remain unconvinced on that points 

One reason asngned by the Board in support of their opinion 
is, that the r^alations require a settlement for the revenue of 
an oitiie village in one sum for a term of years. If a measure 
supposed to be desirable were impeded to no good purpose by a 
bad xegulation, nothing would be more easy than to remove the 
obstacle by a better regulation; but even under the regulation 
described, I see no impossibility in introducing permanent 
field aswannents into a village, of which the entire revenue 
might be settled in one sum for a term of years. The entire 
revenue of a village consists of the revenue of its separate fields. 
Every proprietor's field might be permanently assessed, the 
total of these assessments would fi>rm the revenue of the entire 
village, which might be settled for a term of yeais, duiing which 
the village proprietors might have the benefit of any new culti- 
vation; at the end of the term a permanent assessment might 
be fixed on the newly-cultivated fields, leaving the permanent 
assessment of the old fields tmaltered; unless in any instance it 
might prove to have been too high, in which case it might be 
lowered; the permanent assessment of the new fields, joined to 
that of the old, would form the new assessment of the entire 
village for another term of years, and so on. 

I only mean by these suggestions to explain in what mode 
I conceive it practicable to reconcile a permanent field assess- 
ment with a viUage settlement for a term of years, but I am 
not now recommending this plan as one that I would wish to 
see generally adopted. As long as a village community remain 


united and fnendly among themaelves, I dionld always legiet 
any interference on the part of Ghyvemment in their mtenul 
conoems; hut fiom the moment when litigation and dioeiiaoD 
begin to destroy the happiness and prosperity of the village, 
and to drag its concerns before our judicial tribunals, the fidi 
assessment, in my opinion, is the only remedy that will tacn 
the community from ruin, and preserve to every individnl 
his just rights. After a permanent field assessmait for eidi 
separate landowner, a village settlement for a term cl jma 
with the community would not be necessary, although, as above 
shown, the two proceedings do not seem to me to be iixeooD- 

The Board further remark that settlements in the Western 
Provinces can have no connexion with the assessment of fields, 
because the actual cultivators of the soil are not the parties 
with whom the officers of the Government have to deal. Here, 
again, I am obliged to differ from the Board. The actasi col- 
tivators of the soil, in innumerable instances, dther are, or ought 
to be, the parties with whom the Government officers have to 
deal. The real landowners and the actual cultivators of ihe 
soil are for the most part the same persons, and when that is 
the case, the actual cultivators are precisely the persons with 
whom the Government officers ought to deaJ, and with whom, 
individually and separately, field assessments might be made 
for each field. When the actual cultivators are not the land- 
owners, the same thing might be done with the landowners, 
leaving to them to settle wiUi their cultivators. But by land- 
owners I mean the village landowners, the actual owners of 
fields, not the overgrown creatures of our regulations, who, 
under the designation of recorded proprietors, or any other, 
falsely pretend to have the property of entire villages. I am 
only contending for the practicability of field assessments, not 
being able to agree with the Board in their sentiments to the 
contrary. I do not advocate field assessments, except where 
dissension has destroyed the unity and energy of the village 



The Board express the opinioni and as far as my knowledge 
goes I concur in it^ that the rights of persons connected with the 
land are not so complicated and various as has been supposed. 
They acknowledge two descriptions of proprietary tenures in vil- 
lage lands: one^ general, over the whole of the lands of the vil- 
lage; the other, particular, in particular lands. I understand the 
Board to mean, that in some villages the lands are the common 
property of the community of proprietors, and that in others 
the lands are separated into private properties of individuals. 
In this statement I agree, and I ¥rish that the Board would 
always bear in mind that the real landed proprietors of India 
are the members of the village communities, whether they 
enjoy their property jointly or separately; and that where 
village communities exist without the acknowledgment of their 
proprietary right, in one or the other of the modes mentioned, 
and where individuals, belonging or not belonging to the village 
community, and especially in the latter case, pretend to be sole 
propriei9rs of villages, there is reason to suspect misapprehen- 
sion or usurpation, and ground for revision, or at least for in- 
quiry. It may not be universally, as I suppose, but it will, I 
think, be found to be so generally throughout India, where our 
regulations and practice have not destroyed the native institu- 
tions, or where diey have not been destroyed by other means. 


There can be no doubt that the cultivation of Bengal must 
have greatly increased since the formation of the permanent 
settlement; but this is no proof that it would not have greatly 
increased, with good management, under other modes of settle- 
ment Cultivation has greatly increased in the Western Pro- 
vinces since they came into our possession, whether more or 
less proportionately, in comparison with Bengal, I have not the 
means of knowing, but the increase has been immense, and 


incxease of revenue has aooompiuued it» which of coune has 
not been the case in Bengal. Taking into account the greater 
difficulties that cultivation has to contend with in the Westem 
Provinces, I doubt whether it has not increased there as sur- 
prisingly in the same space of time as in BengaL The proba- 
bility, however, is, that cultivation will increase more under a 
permanent settiement than any other, although great increase 
may take place without it. 

But what was the price of the Permanent Settlement in 
Bengal? We not only relinquished the right of the Gtevern- 
ment to any further revenue from land, which was undoubtedlj 
a great sacrifice, but what was much worse, we destroyed all 
the existing property in land, by creating a class of proprietors 
to whom we recklessly made over the property of others. By 
the power of adhesion existing in Indian institutions, it is pro- 
bable that in many instances the ancient rights have not been 
entirely overthrown. The new proprietors may have found it 
their interest to maintain them to a certain degree. But they 
are virtually destroyed by the tide of property over the whole 
land conferred by us on those who had no pretensions to it, 
and they must ultimately be extinguished when it suits the 
interests of the regulation proprietors to give the finishing blow. 

The Board, in their admiration of the Bengal permanent set- 
tiement, designate the noble autiior of that measure " the great 
creator of private property in land in India." Private property 
in land in India existed long before Lord Comwallis, and his 
permanent settlement tended to destroy it. If I were tempted, 
in imitation of the Board, to designate that revered noblemaa, 
with reference to that measure, by any other title than that by 
which he is immortalised in the annab of his country, I should 
say, with the fullest respect for his benevolent intenticms, whidi 
never contemplated the injustice that he comnutted, that he 
was tiie creator of private property in the State revenue, and 
the great destroyer of private property in land in India; destroy- 
ing hundreds or thousands of proprietors for every one that he 
gratuitoudy created. 



INotfember 89. 1838.] 

fRie preoeding extracts, made from a long and elaborate paper on the 
liBud Eerenve of the Upper Prormoea of India^ afford a general view of 
8ir Caiarlea Metcalfe's (pinions on some of the more important questions 
oonneeted with the great snlject of Land Eerenoe. and are therefore in- 
serted as a preface to the more detailed disqoisitiona, oa indiTidnal points, 
which follow. The opinions expressed are suhstantiallj the same as those 
given, nnder P^ L, in the papers on the Eeyenne Affairs of the Delhi 

In offering some notes on the Minutes recently laid before 
the Cooncil, recorded by the membeis of the Revenue Board 
in the Western Provinoes, I diall preface what I have to say by 
a few words on a subject which has of late been often mentioned, 
and which occurs again in these documents; that is, regarding 
proceedings in assessment from the detail to the aggregate, or 
from the aggr^ate to the detail It seems to be supposed, 
because Sir Thomas Munro went back from the aggregate to 
the detail, that he had not, in the first instance, gone firom the 
detail to the aggregate. But it appears to me that every 
aggrq^ate must be composed of the detail; that every assess- 
ment must be founded on the detail; and ihat although the 
detail may be dispensed wiih when there is sufficient informa* 
tioB from other sources to make it unnecessaiy, stilly if accuracy 


be intended, the detail must be had leooune to in evexy new 
Sflsessmait The thing to be guarded against is the tendencsy 
of an assessment fonned rigidly on the detail to become exoes- 
mve; to prevent whichi allowances must be made in the aggre* 
gate assessment, which render it necessary to go back fiom 
the aggregate to the detail, in order to efiect the fiur appor- 
tionment of the assessment. It is remarkable ihat Sir Thomas 
Mimro should be constantly quoted on this point, wheai it 
seems dear that the system of settlement on which he ulti- 
mately rested was a distinct settlement for evexy field at esta- 
blished rates, without reference to any aggregate, and that the 
aggregate of any village or district assessment in his hands 
must have been the aggregate of these field assessments. How 
an aggregate can be anything but a putting together of details, 
I am at a loss to conjecture; and although loose settlements 
may be made, with an unobjectionable and even beneficial 
relaxation of the just demand of the Government without 
minute attention to the detail, it is only when the inaccuracy 
is on this side that it can be tolerated^ for, bending the other 
way, it would be ruinous. Even in such cases the aggregate 
must be the result of former details, and will be accurate so far 
as the actual details agree with the former, and will be bene- 
ficial or ruinous to the agricultural community assessed, accord- 
ingly as the actual details are in amount above or below the 
former. As no agricultural community can pay an aggregate 
of revenue exceeding the amount of the detail, it seems evident 
that every realised assessment founded on a supposed aggr^ate 
without regard to the actual detail, must be a relaxation of the 
Government demand, which, if not carried to too great an 
extent, is generally unobjectionable. I have been led into 
these remarks by the commencement of Mr. R. M. Bird's 
minute on the Rights of Rerident Ryuts, in which it seems 
to be supposed that the Madras mode of assessment was inde- 
pendent of a knowledge of detaik. 

I concur generally with Mr. R. M. Bird in his opinion that 
our Government has unnecessarily and uselessly, I would add 


unjustly, created rights in the persons of Zumeendars, Talook- 
dars, &c^ which did not before exist, and that the Ryuts or 
cultivators have the first claim to our consideration; but he 
appears to class all Ryuts or cultivators together as having 
equal and the same rights. On this point I differ from him, 
for there are, I conceive, cultivators who are owners of the 
land which they cultivate; others, who have a right of perma- 
nent occupancy without being owners; others, who hold lands 
on leases for defined periods; others, who are mere tenants at 
will from season to season. To assume, as Mr. R. M. Bird 
seems disposed to do, that all these classes of cultivators hold 
equally from the government and possess equal rights, would, it 
appears to me, produce great injustice, and destroy rights now 
existing and which have existed, not only before the establish- 
ment of our government, but from time immemorial. Although 
it may not be possible to lay down definitions which shall 
apply to all parts of India, I should say generally, that the 
ownership of the land is held by members of the village 
communities, either individually, in separate and distinct 
portions, or collectively, subject to internal arrangement; and 
that there are in the village communities some members who 
are landowners, and others who are not, and who may belong 
to any of the other classes of cultivators above described. It is 
with the acknowledged landowners that the government has 
to deal, although entitled, as revenue, to a share of every part 
of the produce of the cultivation, and it is from the owners 
that the other cultivators hold their lands, either permanently 
or for fixed periods, or from season to season at will. 

Mr. R. M. Bird appears to be of opinion that the portion of 
produce to be taken as revenue may be fixed by the mere will 
of the ruler. I cannot concur in that opinion. Everywhere the 
portion in kind, or the sum in money, due as revenue to the 
government, is understood and acknowledged, and the govern* 
ment which should attempt to exact more would be execrated 
as oppressive, and would most probably be resisted. It may 
be, that in former times, at some distant period, the demand was 



arbitrarily increased, but that which is now acknowledged is 
wonderfully uniform, considering the great space over which 
the same revenue system extends, whether under British, or 
Hindoo, or Mahomedan governments. The govemm^it may 
take as much less than the acknowledged dues as it will, bat it 
has no right to take more. The government may be said to 
have the right of committing any other act of oppression as well 
as this. The right of the government in land revenue is 
known and limited everywhere, but the tax is generally so high 
that it cannot well be higher. The question with our govern- 
ment must always be, how much it can be lowered oonastently 
with provision for the expenses of the State, but there is no 
difficulty, I conceive, in ascertaining what the right is in any 
part of India. 

Mr. R. M. Bird is of opinion that the Ryuts have a right 
to have their rents fixed by the authority of government (that 
is, the rents which they pay to the Zumeendar, or other fictitious 
proprietor, whom we now begin to designate the rentholder), 
and that the Ryuts have a right to occupy the land eo long as 
they regularly pay the rents fixed by government 

Both these questions must, I conceive, depend on the real 
situation of the Ryuts. We are apt to term all cultivators 
Ryuts, without regard to their different circumstances; but 
the citcumstances of those who are often included in that 
general denomination may be very different. If a Ryut be a 
* tenant at will, holding land from the owner, he has no right to 
have his rents fixed by the authority of the government His 
rents are fixed by mutual agreement between him and the 
owner of the land, and if he be dissatisfied with them, he may 
throw up his land on the termination of his engagement, and 
seek better terms elsewhere, or persuade the landowner to 
lower his terms. 

If the Ryut be a farmer, holding a lease of lands for a 
limited number of years from the owner, he is in the same 
situation as in the former instance, with this difference, that 
the mutual agreement is binding for a longer period. 


If the Rjut have a permanent right of occupancy in village 
lands, without being one of the owners, his rents are settled by 
the laws of the village; the same laws which confer on him a 
permanent right of occupancy. 

If the Ryut be an owner of land, his rents are fixed either 
by the government assessments, settled with the community of 
village landowners, or by that community — including himself 
as one — ^by internal arrangements after the settlement of the 
government assessment. 

If the Ryut be one of a community of landowners over 
whom we have established one of our fictitious regulation-pro- 
prietoiSy he then, I think, has a right to have his rents fixed by 
the authority of government, because, otherwise, his ownership 
of the land will in time be destroyed by the increasing de- 
mands of the regulation-proprietors, a result which we are 
bound to guard against, if we do not wish to commit great in- 
justice* Where the Ryut is a landowner whose right to deal 
directly with the government is obstructed by the intervention 
of our manufactured proprietor, I am of opinion that he is en- 
titled to that interference in his favor which Mr. R. M. Bird 
recommends. I would strictly defend the rights of village 
communities against the regulation-proprietors, and extend that 
protection to those who, by the village laws, have a right of per- 
manent occupancy, as well as to those who are owners of the 
land; but Ryuts who hold on lease, or are tenants at will for a 
season, must abide by their engagements with the landowners. 
Mr. R. M. Bird seems to be of opinion that there is no class 
of occupiers of land between the mere cultivating labourer and 
the regulation-proprietor, and that all Rjruts are alike, and in 
the same predicament. In these opinions he is, I conceive, 
mistaken, and I should expect that he would find all of the 
difierent classes of Ryuts that I have described in numberless 
villages in the Western Provinces. 

In Mr. R. M. Bird's remarks on the respect paid by all pre- 
ceding governments to the proprietary rights which exist in 
India, and on the destruction of those rights which is the con- 



sequence of our auction sales and manufactory of proprietors, I 
entirely concur, as well as in bis views of protecting the village 
communities against the encroachments of our proprietors; and 
from his remarks regarding Peishkust Ryuts, in the latter part 
of his minute, I perceive that he does not propose to extend 
interference to tenants of that description, in which, after what 
I have already said, I scarcely need add that I agree with him. 

I cannot do so in his sentiment that all resident cultivators 
are equally entitled to have their rents fixed by the govern- 
menty without reference to the term of their residence. Their 
right must depend on the nature of their tenure, and on the 
conditions under which they are residents and cultivators. 

If, for example, a cultivator has become a resident in a vil- 
lage^ under engagements with the Zumeendar or regulation^ 
proprietor, those engagements must fix the rent which the cul- 
tivator has to pay to the Zumeendar. It would not be just in 
such a case, on the part of the government, to step in and fix 
the rent to be paid by this cultivator to the proprietor, by 
mutual agreement with whom he has recently come to reside 
in that village. The proprietor must, of course, observe his 
engagements, whatever they may have been, but the direct in- 
terference of the government to settle the terms of their rela- 
tionship, seems to be entirely unnecessary. 

I need not say that I am no advocate for the regulation-pro- 
prietors of our creation. I consider their creation to have been 
an enormous error, which has not been attended by any benefit 
whatever ; but having created them, and declared them to be 
proprietors, we gave them, I conceive, after the reservation of 
the government revenue, all the rights of property that it was 
in our power to give—that is, all the rights tJiat did not pre- 
viously belong to others. We had no right to destroy the 
pre-existing property of others, in order to confer it on our new- 
fangled proprietors; we could not legally or justly give them 
a single field which previously belonged to others; but we 
could, and did, give them the right of the government in every 
field in their Zumeendaree, and we superadded the full pro- 


perty in lands not owned or occupied on a permanent tenure 
by others. Having done so, although we have a right and are 
bound to protect the ancient cultivating proprietors and occu- 
pants in all their rights, whatever they were, and ought to be 
ashamed of ourselves for not having done so, we have no right 
to step in between our proprietor and the cultivator of his own 
planting, on lands declared to be his own property, with a 
view to destroy the engagements which they have mutually 
entered into, and prescribe others of our own fashioning. 
** Give the devil his due;" I would let the regulation-proprietor 
have all his just ri^ts. It could never have been intended, 
when we created proprietors, that they were to be merely en- 
titled to a percentage on the rcA^enue. It was meant that Uicy 
should be really proprietors, which they are, and ought to be- 
in every case in which that would not affect the previous rights 
of others; but as we had no power — that is, no lawful power — 
to take away the rights of others, we have not given them one 
jot of those rights, and are bound to maintain the ancient pro- 
prietors and holders of permanent rights against those of our 
own creation. Thus, in village communities, although we may 
have put a proprietor over them, we have no right, I conceive, 
to allow him to infringe on the rights, laws, or customs of 
those communities, nor to exercise any greater degree of pro- 
perty or interference in the lands or internal afiairs of those 
communities than the government would itself have exercised 
if this incubus had not intervened. 

With reference to Mr. R. M. Bird's '* Note on Zumeendars 
and Putteedars," I shall at present content myself with remark- 
ing, that there is much in that ^' Note" in which I concur, and, 
considering the important situation held by that gentleman with 
respect to the revenue management of the Western Provinces, 
that I rejoice at the desire which he evinces to maintain the 
rights and customs of the village communities. On the subject 
of the regulation which he proposes, I shall only say that our 
legislation in revenue matters appears to me to have been 
hitherto so unfortunate, that I would rather avoid any legisla- 


tion that is not absolutely neceaflary; and (iirdier, that I am 
peculiarly appiehensiye of any legislation that might lead to 
interference in the village oommunities. As I do not consider 
the xegidation suggested by Mr. R. M. Bird is now before us 
for decision, I do not think it necessary to enter on a minute 
examination of its detuls. 

Neither do I think it necessary to otter any detailed lemazia 
on Mr. R. M. Bird's *' Note on Acceleration of Surveys, &c*' 
In many of his sentiments I concur. With reference to the 
36th paragraph, I do not comprehend why the mode of village 
management therein described as existing in some instances 
in the Dihlee territory, '* does not, nor can exist in the regula- 
tion provinces.'* I cannot see why it should not have existed 
before our rule, nor why it should be precluded by our r^ula- 
tions; and I think it probable that it does exist in some in- 
stances, unknown, perhaps, to the higher revenue authorities; 
for where a large village is divided into separate sections, each 
inhabited by a distinct community, the mode of management 
described is a very natural arrangement, each section consti- 
tuting in most respects a separate village. 

I have derived great gratification from the perusal of the 
^ Notes " by Mr. R. M. Bird, which have been above adverted 
to. They appear to me to evince great practical ability, and a 
aealous desire to promote the rights and interests of aU parties 
concerned in our revenue arrangements. 

From the remarks which I have already made on Mr. R. M. 
Bird's proposition to fix the rents payable by all resident 
Ryuts to their lands, it will have been seen that I concur in 
the sentiments expressed by Mr. Fane, in his minute of the 4th 
September, against that proposition as one of universal appli- 
cation. Landowners and permanent occupants appear to me to 
be entitled to have the rents payable to the regulation-pro- 
prietor fixed^ if they desire the intervention of the govern- 
ment for that purpose; but mere tenants on lease or at will 
must, I conceive, abide by their engagements with the land- 
owners, of whatever class the latter may be; and I see no reason 


for the interference of the government to regulate rents, which 
will more properly be settled by mutual adjustment. 

I also concur in the opinion recorded by Mr. Fane in the 
7th paragraph of the same minute, on the subject of expediting 
the revision of settlements. 

Mr. R. M. Bird's minute of the 22nd September, which 
concludes the series of documents forwarded by the Western 
Board of Revenue to the Governor-General on the 25th Sep- 
tember, does not appear to require much further remark. In 
that gentleman's sentiment, that *' the maintenance of rights of 
our own creation " cannot justify ^^ the destruction of rights 
which existed before our own name was even heard of in 
India," I fully and cordially concur; and as far as he would 
extend protection to those entitled to those rights, I should go 
along with him ; but he seems to me to be disposed unneces- 
sarily to extend the same privilege to classes who have no 
such rights, and who had them not before the introduction of 
our rule. 



IJune 29. 1832.] 

[Extract.] — ^For eettlements on long leases I have always 
been an advocate. A temporary loss of rerenue may be incurred 
in such settlements; but it is revenue put out to interest. The 
landowners have encouragement, and obtain the means to improve 
their products ; and the government revenue is eventually in- 
creased, together with their prosperity. If the land revenue is 
to continue to be the chief resource of our Indian Government, 
and the revolution which is to find a substitute has hitherto 
made no progress, that scheme of revenue must be the safest 
and the best which unites the improving prosperity of the 
landowners with the increasing revenue of the State. A sacri- 
fice of equitable land revenue, without a certain prospect of its 
return in some other shape, is an experiment which is likely to 
be attended with permanent injury. 

I am no advocate for annual settlements; but if settlements 
are to be made annually, the process will depend on the object 
in view. If the object be to take the right of the government 
in full, an annual scrutiny of the crops will be necessary, and 
the payers of revenue would prefer this method, in which no 
man would pay more than is justly due from him, to a fanciful 
settlement, according to qualities of soil, which may be very 
erroneous, very unequal, and to some ruinous. But if the 
object be to make a moderate settlement, the taking of actual 
produce as the equitable basis does not render a scrutiny neces- 
sary. The actual produce — the surest test of productive 
power — ^having been once ascertained, an annual scrutiny is not 
requisite, unless it be demanded by the revenue payers to pre- 


vent an apprehended over-assessment. This basis does not pre- 
clude any liberality or indulgence that the government may see 
fit to exercise. 

In making a settlement for a term of years, with actual pro- 
duce as the basis, it is not necessary to take the produce of the 
year of settlement as the sole criterion. A settlement for a 
term of years, which is an equitable adjustment of the demand 
of government during a period subject to vicissitudes, must be 
made with reference to so many considerations, that whether 
ascertained produce or productive powers be assumed for a 
general assessment with a community, the difference will be 
nearly nominal. But actual produce must not be lost sight of, 
for no community will be able to pay revenue on a classifica- 
tion of soils, unless the produce correspond. And if the settle- 
ment go into the detail of fields and individual payments, 
attention to the produce will be still more necessary, for no man 
will be able to pay more revenue than his produce will yield, 
however high his land may stand in the classification of soils. 
And whatever classification of soils we make, the collection of 
revenue in the village, unless the government interfere inces- 
santly and most obnoxiously to prevent it, will go on according 
to actual produce; and the attempt to prevent it will cause the 
dissolution of the village community. In the case supposed in 
the Right Hon. the Governor-General's minute, the village 
growing wheat, if assessed according to wheat, would very 
probably begin to cultivate sugar-cane, and having reaped a 
profit sufficient to recompense them for the labour and expense 
incurred in that operation, would at the next settlement yield 
a higher revenue with the same ease as in the first it paid a 
lower, and with more profit. The village producing sugar- 
cane, if equitably assessed according to that article, would pay 
its proper revenue with the same ease as a village producing 
wheat, and would not be likely to abandon its sugar-cane cul- 
tivation for any other less profitable. 

The classification of soils appears to me to be liable to great 
mistakes, and errors in assessments arc often productive of irre- 


mediable evils. The classification^ agreeably to thmr pToducstiyc 
powers and under ordinary culture, conreys no definite idea. 
A sugar-cane field, a wheat field, and a juwar field, adjoin 
each other; the soils are the same, but the wheat field and 
the sugar-cane field have been brought by the necessary labor 
and expense to their several degrees of superiority. Which is 
the ordinary culture? Whoever maintains that the State is 
not to derive benefit from the improvement of the cultivation 
in soils of the same quality, must answer, the juwar. Then 
must the assessment on all be reduced to that on the juwar? If 
this theory were put in practice universally, the greater part of 
the revenue would vanish, and India be lost. 


[December 20, 1830.] 

[The opinioxui expressed in the concluding part of the preceding extract 
had been previously enforced by Sir Charles Metcalfe in the following 
Minute, called forth by a despatch from the Court of Directors, declaring 
the unwillingness of that body to allow lands yielding valuable produce, as 
cotton, sugar, tobacco, ftc, to be assessed at a higher rate than other less 
productive soils. The object of the Court was to encourage the develop- 
ment of the resources of the country. To the objections raised on the score 
of loss of revenue, they answered, " We are aware that when a tax is 
abolished, the revenue which it yielded ceases to be received."] 

The basis of all our revenue settlements is the acknowledged 
right of government to a portion of the produce or crop of the 
cultivated land. When this is not taken in kind, it is com* 
muted for money; but the assessment is according to the value 
of the crops which the land generally produces. In this way 
the increase of the revenue and that of the agriculturist's in- 
come, the demand of the government and the cultivator's 
means of meeting it, all correspond. 

If the meaning of the Honorable Court be, that assessments 
are not to be made according to the value of the produce, or, 


in other words, that the assessment on land bearing raluable 
crops is to be reduced to the assessment of land bearing poorer 
crops, without any other change in the existing mode of assess- 
ment, then, I fear, a great diminution of revenue must be ex- 

If, on the other hand, it be intended that all land of a cer- 
tain quality shall be assessed at the same rate, whether it be 
cultivated with valuable crops, or poor crops, or no crops, in 
that case, I fear, there will be a diminution of revenue from 
the inability of the cultivators to meet the demand, and a great 
transfer of land from the owners to speculating adventurers, 
who will undertake to do what the owners cannot, and, conse- 
quently, a vast destruction of property, happiness, and rights. 

It often happens that a cultivating landowner is able to ap- 
propriate a portion of his land to the cultivation of sugar-cane, 
which is one of the most valuable crops ; but this being an ex- 
pensive cultivation, he may not have the means of extending it 
to all the land of the same quality, which therefore bears less 
valuable crops produced at less expense. If the government re- 
linquishes the customary assessment of the valuable crop, with- 
out increasing that on all land of the same quality, there must 
be a loss of revenue. If the assessment on all land of the same 
quality be raised to a fixed standard, without reference to the 
value of the crops produced, it may be much heavier than the 
former assessment made according to the value of crops, and 
the landowner may not be able to pay it. Then the collector 
will probably off^r the land to a speculating farmer, and the 
owner may be ousted from his land, to the destruction of his 
property, his rights, his respectability, his honest pride, his 
happiness, his comfort, and his subsistence. 

The land revenue is the chief support of our power in India, 
and it is dangerous to tamper with it. It is no less cruel to 
destroy the rights of the cultivating class of our subjects. I 
much fear that in one way or the other, if not in both, the 
orders of the Court of Directors may do much mischief, if not 
explained or modified so as to prevent such effects. 


I do not think that these orders, whatever may be their 
object, are either required or likely to be beneficial under this 
Presidency. In lands under the permanent settlement they 
cannot of course have any efiect. In lands already assessed for 
a term of years, they will be inoperative, because, during the 
period for which the settlement is fixed, the owners may culti- 
vate whatever crops they prefer, without being liable to any 
additional assessment It is only at the time of assessment 
that the orders can operate, and then it appears to me they 
must produce either loss to the revenue, or injustice to the 

As the Revenue Board at the Preadency, when we isne 
the instructions directed by the Govemor-Greneral to be con- 
veyed, may probably apply for expUnation, I am anxious that 
we should know more distinctly the precise intentions enter- 
tained by his Lordship, in order that we may endeayour to 
give effect to them. I beg leave, therefore, to propose that 
the matter be referred for his Lordship's consideration and 
further orders. 

If the value of produce is to go for nothing, and have no 
influence in assessments, what system of assessment is to be 
adopted ? What rules are to be prescribed for the details? I 
believe all existing rates of assessment on land to be founded 
on the estimated value of the produce of that land, varying in 
various provinces according to various circumstances, but all 
founded on the same basis, and having the same object If 
the value of produce is to be put out of the question, what is 
to be substituted? Is the lowest rate of land assessment to be 
univereally adopted ? or the highest ? or a medium ? Do what 
we will, the value of produce must be the groundwork o{ every 
land revenue settlement, and I am, therefore, at a loss to com- 
prehend the meaning of the Honorable Court's order,' which 
proscribes it as a thing not to be regarded. 



IJpril 15, 1829.] 

[The rerj able and important Minate from which the following passages 
are taken is too lengthy to be given in its integrity. It was called forth bj 
the contest then raging between the Supreme Coort of Bombay and the 
Govemment of that Presidency — a contest provoked by the usurpation 
of the former. The Minute contains an elaborate examination of the clauses 
of the Charter constituting the Bombay Court, and defining its powers ; 
and concludes with a suggestion for the amalgamation of the Supreme. 
Courts of Judicature with the Company's Sudder Courts at the three Pre- 
sidencies in a manner resembling the system proposed under the act of 1853. 
The paper is altogether very characteristic of Sir Charles Metcalfe's simple, 
but forcible style of argumentation. Of the circumstances which evoked it 
there is scarcely any difference of opinion in the present day.] 

It is necessary to determine \vhether, in matters of doubtful 
dispute, the Government or the Court of Judicature at the 
several Presidencies shall be supreme; whether the Government 
must in every case submit to any exercise of judicial power 
which the Court may assume; or the Court be restrained by the 
will of the Govemmenty whenever the latter may be sensible of 
political reasons of sufficient importance to induce its interference, 
either to resist a new assumption of power, or to suspend the 
exercise of one doubtful, or dangerous, which may have been 
before admitted. 

To me it seems quite clear that the supreme power ought to 
rest with the Government; and that in any case in which the 
exercise of the powers of the Court might be deemed injurious 


to the safety or welfare of the State, the Government ought to 
possess authority to suspend the functions of the Court, as re- 
garding that particular case, and the Court be bound to ac- 
knowledge and abide by the restrictive power of the Govern- 
ment, pending a reference to superior authority in England. 

In arguing for the possession of restrictive powers by the 
Government in India over the Court of Judicature, I only 
propose what, as I conceive, exists in every country in the 
world — a saving power in the Government, for the benefit of 
the State, over all parts of the governing machine, of which 
the judicial department is one. 

There is no danger to the national power in England from 
an undue stretching of the authority of courts of justice. There 
is no probability there that the courts can misunderstand their 
functions. But if there were any chance, either of error or of 
mischief, the Legislature is at hand to restrain or rectify. 

What the Legislature is to courts of justice in England, the 
local government in India ought in reason to be to courts here; 
that is temporarily, and until the result of a reference to England 
can be known. If not so perfect and satisfactory an instrument 
of control as the Imperial Legislature, it is the best that can be 
had on the spot. And unless it can be maintained that the 
Government must submit, whatever may be the consequences, 
to any extension of jurisdiction that any court of its own 
pleasure may assume, it must follow that a provisional and 
temporary restrictive power ought to be vested in the Govern- 
ment; for it can never be supposed that a disgraceful contest 
between the two powers, as separate and opposed to each other, 
ought to be exhibited to conquered India to excite the anxiety 
and fears of the well-afiected, and the hopes and ridicule of the 
disaffected and hostile. 

When such a contest commences, there are no means of 
stopping it, in the present state of relations between the Govern- 
ment and the Court. The Government cannot sacrifice its 
subjects to an assumption of power which it believes to be 
illegal. The Court, having once declared the assumption to be 


legal, considers itself interdicted from rejecting any application 
founded thereon; and from listejiing to any compromise, or 
suspension of the power. It regards and treats the members of 
the Government as so many culprits, who are punishable for 
contempt of the King's Bench. The feelings of the parties be- 
come engaged in the quarrel. Each thinks it dishonorable to 
yield. The Government will not give up its native subjects to 
laws and jurisdictions to which they have never before been 
held amenable. The judge conceives that he is supporting the 
independence of the British Bench, and maintaining a praise- 
worthy contest against lawless interference. The struggle is 
interminable, and may be renewed continually by fresh cases 
involving the disputed point. 

At this immense distance from the control of the mother 
country, there surely then ought to exist a local authority, 
invested with power to put a stop to these unseemly conten- 
tions. If it can be said, with any justice, that a court of law 
may push its authority to any extent, and that no apprehension 
of consequent mischief and anger can justify a government in 
refusing obedience, then let it be determined that the Govern- 
ment must in all cases submit to the will of the Court. It 
would be better that the supremacy of the Court should be ac- 
knowledged and known, than that room for contention should 

There are, nevertheless, reasons why the supreme power 
should rest with the Government, and not with the Court. 

The political power of a state exercised by its legislature is 
everywhere superior to the judicial, which is subordinate, per- 
forming only the functions conferred on it by the former, 
which are liable to any modifications that the legislature may 

Against this it may be urged, that the real legislature for 
British India is the National Legislature in England, and not the 
local government ; but, on the other hand, the local govern- 
ment, performing locally the functions of political administra- 
tion, approaches nearest to the representation of the distant 


home government; while the judicial court cannot properly 
represent the legislative power. 

Moreover, the occasions on which the Government and the 
Court are likely to be involved in disputes are when the Court 
is extending its own jurisdiction beyond its former limits, that 
is, assuming powers not before exercised. The check, there- 
fore, ought to be visited elsewhere; for we know from expe- 
rience, that the Court is not likely to check itself, the ezerciae 
and extension of power being at all times enticing to human 

The Court in such cases may be said to be the aggressor, 
and the Government on the defensive. It is more equitable, 
therefore, that the Court should be required to pause, than that 
the Gx)vernment should be compelled to submit to new assump- 

No new assumption by the Court can take place without 
drawing more within its jurisdiction our native subjects, 
already amenable to other courts established for their protec- 
tion. They can only look to the Government for defence 
against the exercise of power by an authority to which they 
have never considered themselves subject; they are entitled to 
this defence; and the Government ought to have the power of 
affording it. 

The restraining power, contended for herein on the part of 
the Government, should be exerted, of course, with due consi- 
deration and forbearance, and subject to serious responsibility. 

If it were deemed inexpedient to confer it on the subordi- 
nate Government of each Presidency, it might be confined to 
the Supreme Government; or the exercise of it by the subor- 
dinate Governments might be subject to the confirmation and 
revision of the Supreme Government, which course would 
rectify the possible errors of local irritation, without impairing 
the efficiency of immediate remedy. 

Next to the importance of preventing unseemly contention 
between independent British authorities in this distant region, 


by oonfemng somewhere the power of local supremacy, pend- 
ing a reference to England, it is very desirable that the powers 
to be exercised by his Majesty's Courts of Judicature, that is, 
the extent of their jurisdiction, should be accurately defined. 

Out of the want of clear definition and of general under* 
standing arise all the disputes which take place; for respecting 
the acknowledged customary powers of the Courts there are no 

It is unquestionably due to our native subjects that they 
should be informed to what Courts and to what laws. they are 
amenable. At present they are amenable to the Courts esta- 
blished in the provinces in which they reside, and subject to a 
modified code of native laws, both in civil and in criminal 
matters; but suddenly, by some legal hocus-pocus^ incompre- 
hensible to them, they find themselves dragged into the juris- 
diction of a Court of English law, armed with tremendous 
power, from which there is no reprieve; where they are beset by 
unintelligible forms and bewildering complexities, and ruined 
by intolerable expense. 

It never could have been intended by the British Legislature 
thai our Indian subjects should be amenable to two sets of 
Courts, and two codes of laws; but such is now the effect of the 
gradual extension of the jurisdiction of his Majesty's Courts, 
some of the steps in which have been imperceptible, or at least 

When his Majesty's Supreme Court was first established in 
Bengal, it was understood that its civil jurisdiction extended to 
claims against the Company and against British subjects, and. 
to claims of British subjects against native subjects in cases 
wherein the bitter had agreed to submit to its decision; and its 
criminal jurisdiction to British subjects and to persons in the 
service of the Company, or of any British subject at the time 
of the offence. 

The establishment of this power, independent of the local 
Government, was soon followed by disputes, disreputable in 
their dxcmnstances, and dangerous to the public safety. 


S74 jxTBiSDionom op the cbowk courts. 

Hm Ooort hnd not been long in ^ exoram of ils 1 
nhon it estandad ito pfaotaoil jmiediolion indjaeriwinately to 
aS mtinB, Bodiing mote bebg nuuimiry to proeine a ^imt 
againil my of dun tium an affidaTit that die pefson sned mm 
widtin tlie jmis&tion. 

nieooDeolion of rsvenne and the •dminiflntionof jialioem 
llMpioviBoeB weiBolxtrciotedl^initiof HabeaeOorpaB; and 
priaonen biought up by these writs were set at liberty l^ the 

Netthflr the g otw nm e nt enrciaed by the Company, nor that 
of Ae Newaub of MooiJiedabad, waa respeoled. Bodi weae 
deobured aaboidinate to the Conrt. Had the aaarped powen of 
the Court been allowed to prooeed wkhoot cheek or oppottdon, 
the Ooferiiment maat haTO been destroyed* 

The powers aaniraed, Ae pleas by wbidi they were main* 
tainedy the tone of 8elfHmperiorit)r, and of contempt for the 
local GoTcnunent, which mark the proceedings of die Goart 
at that time, are remarkably nmikr to those wUdi appear 
in the recent proceedings of the Court of Bombay. 

The proeeiMlingB of the Supreme Court of Bengal having 
been loudly complained against, its powers were restrained by a 
snbsecpient enactment. 

Since which, either from a better understanding of the inten- 
tioaaof the Legislatnre, or fiom nnitaalmodefataon in govemots 
and judges, or from the submission of goTemments to gradual 
but quiet encroachments, xmlil the present contention at Bom- 
bay, there has not been the same degree of misanderstanding 
and dispute regarding the powers of the King's Courts ; but 
it is evident, from what is now paaang at that Pxeajdency, and 
fiom what has before happened, both at Madras and in Bengal, 
that the seeds of dissension still exist in the undefined condition 
of the jurisdiction of all the Courts. 

The Courts at Madras and Bombay were estaUiahed at dif- 
ferent periods subsequently to that of the estaUishment of a 
Court in Bengal. The charter of the Madras Court differs in 
some degree from diat of the Calcutta Court, although intended. 

TMLwn r m nnosDionoai. 276 

sfOPidlf « 10 ccmfiBr ooiy tbe ntte powea. Tho BomlNiy 
dwrtc f M fcmiwiy I ppawmey on ihe model of tiiat of MadiM. 

Baadoi jnnsdiedoii ofcr aU BritUi 8iibjectt» the Courtf h»ve 
SB Mknonrledged jindbclklifln o^dr nathre aubiectt sMadiiig 
iriduB Ibo uppointed Uiinli of tlio mffeaX citM dengiuKtod 
PjBMdcjnciofc Hm duptHes wfaiek bvfe ooenmd, and ace 
ISkBtf to ooonr, te&r to ibe eztanl of the Ccoita^ joiiadiclioii 
arm J a tiv wtj ecti bejood thoie Unata. 

We bam mcd enstWe of India^ lately a lervaiit of tke King 
off Oade, bvt xettdiiig wkkm the Britiih firontiev for xefoge, 
arrested on a fiibe allfgalion of debt, ttaoy hundied mdlea 
away fiom Oakattat by an offioer of die Sttpfeme Court, and 
plaeed m the power off hia p ii alwide d eieditor and undoubted 
enemy, on iome kgal fiolioii of hie being a conafcmctiTe inha* 
bitant of QikwHa» in conaequence of dealingB with pattiea xe* 
a£ng thexew 

If aoch a plea bnnga natfrea within the juriadiotion of the 
Sopxeme Oovrt, there is not anexcantile native rending in any 
pert of India who ianotamenabley for all of them have eommer- 
eial agenta or dealittgi in Galontta. 

To call any one a constructiye inhabitant of Calcutta who 
hae never been within many hundied mika of the place, what- 
ever it jxmj be in law, seems an outnge against ccMnmon sense. 
And to arrest maA, a one et thai difltance by a writ from the 
Supreme Coort,-he never dreaming of his liability to such 
jurisfiction, beu^ at the same time amenable to provincial 
Conrts and provincMd laws^ must surely be considered as a gross 
vioiataon of natural jnatioe* 

It may be reasonably presumed that the L^pslature did not 
intend to oonfisr such jurisdiedon on the Court ; but we know 
dml it has besn assumed 

We have seen p r operty seised in the most remote provinces 
nnder the Bengal Fkendency as the property of a bankrupt 
firm of Calcutta, and made over whoUy to another firm of that 
place, on a bond, although creditors of the bankrupt finuj and 
Aimanta against it, were present in those provinoes; although 


S76 juBiSDicnoK ov the CBomx camoB. 

the traasactioiis on which they daimed took pkoe in those pxo- 
vinces; although the rexy pxoperty seised was piopeiiy theb 
own, never having heen paid for; although they were entirely 
ignonnt of the existence of those peculiar laws which at once 
took away their property and deprived them of all means and 
all chance of recovering any part of the debts due to them. 
Ihe awe of the Supreme Court detened the local authorities 
from attempting to maintain the right of the local creditora. 
Can any one say that this is justice to our native subjects, or 
that a Court a thousand miles distant ought to possess a juris- 
diction so partial to the feW| so destructive to the mass? 

We recently heard that a native, not residing within the 
Court's jurisdiction, nor amenable to it, according to common 
understanding on any other account, was to be tried before die 
Sling's Court on the charge of a crime committed beyond the 
limits of the jurisdiction, in order to establish the principle 
that all natives, notwithstanding those drcumstancefl^ m^ht be 
brought before the Court for trial I do not know how this 
matter ended; but if the trial took place, it was certainly a 
new encroachment, and will form a precedent for further ex- 
tenrion of jurisdiction. 

We have still more recentiy had occarion to observe, that 
landed property in the provinces beyond the limits of the 
Court's local jurisdiction is somehow brought within its juris- 
diction, that it is decreed away from one party to another, or 
attached and sequestered at tiie Court's pleasure, and that Euro- 
pean officers of tiie Court are appointed receivers of the rents; 
by which the regulations of the Government for the adminis- 
tration of the provinces are set at nought It is the opinion of 
the Advocate-General tiiat the Legislature did not intend to 
confer on the Court the powers tiius assumed, but that they 
have been too long exercised to be now successfully combated. 

The instances above mentioned have occurred in tiie proceed- 
ings of the Calcutta Court, where we imdoubtedly have able, 
upright, moderate, and conciliatory judges. 

What is here required is a clear definition of the extent of 


the CSouTt's jarifldictioii with rq;ard to native sabjectd xendotit 
beyond the limits of Its local jurisdiction; and It cannot be 
denied that this definition Is neoGBsaiy , unless It can be aflirmed 
that it is just to expose our native subjects to the operation of 
two sets of laws and of two Independent jurisdictions. . 

The Court at Madras at one time assumed the power of exe* 
cuting Its writs In foreign territories, acted on the assumption, 
and attempted to justify It by reference to Its charter. This 
erroneous conception of the Court's powers was reported to 
England. The opinion of high legal authorities was given 
against It, and communicated to the judges at Madras. The 
pretension has not since been revived; but there is nothing to 
prevent its renewal, If adopted by any judge In time present or 
to come. 

The Madras Court has assumed the power of destroying the 
sovereign rights of the Government by decreeing to others 
public revenue granted by the Company to an IndlviduaL The 
exercise of this assumed power, if unresisted, might alienate In 
perpetuity the whole of the public revenue, whlch^ In virtue of 
its sovereign rights, the Government might grant In aseign* 
ment under limitations as to time and persons. Moreover, the 
sovereign acts of the Qovemment, in the disposal of Its public 
revenue beyond the limits of the Court's local jurisdiction, being 
once rendered liable to subversion by the fiat of the Court, no 
security for the revenue or for the possession of India would 
remain. A limitation of ttie Court's powers on this subject, 
therefore, is also necessary. 

At Bombay, the Court has, within my recollection, sent Its 
baiUffi into a foreign territory to seize a subject of a foreign 
Grovemment No pretension of this kind, I Imagine, could be 
maintained by any Court. It may, therefore, be supposed that 
the act was committed by mistake, owing to false swearing. 
And It is remarkable, with r^ard to the proceedings of the 
King's Courts In India, that any writ, however Injurious to the 
Individual afiected by It, may be obtained by fitlse swearing. 
Two persons have only to swear that a native Is liable to the 


Oooptfi JiniididioiiyiadlMiiiqrbednggadtodie] 

ftom Ui hoDM, diilMift a IhfnwMMl Bulii, i& • oonnliy aad 

cKmiito extaemely diflmat, ahlKi^ 

degMe by kw aiMBibb to Am Conrt'i jandMoo. Tkb 

matter, in joilioe to oar satiTO aalgodBy fleftebly d fli a n d a a 

ranedy. Such ara tlia fisnat or paolioa of Ao Oom^ that its 

noit qMtlioDabla powen prior to trial wmf be wieUed with all 

dirir iimifCibility , at the diaoetioii of tha attomay^ widi little 

or no ohaok, or even knowladlga oa theptrt of tha jndgai* 

Oaeof the powaia xeoaatlyaMiniad by the Court at Bonbiy 
It iihat of rdaamBg natiTe oonTiotB oondmaaA aoeoidijig to lav 
by tfaoPiroviBoial Courts. Thiapowar baiiiga«i]iDad,it]aoBly 
ntntmmrj that one or two penoai awaar that aieh an one » 
illegally confined, and forthwith ifisaes a writ of Habeas Gocpm, 
ad dw ed to the magiitrate of tha diftriot, or tha gaoler, or 
aona officer of tha Provincial Court, ordering the bri^gi^g op 
of the oonviot before the King*8 Oonrt Tb» retam, that he 
has been sentanoed to imprisonment by tha Pioviaoiai Goiizt» is 
not deemed soffieient The King's Court does not reoognise 
the existence of any right in tha Ptorincial Court to punish. 
It professes to know nothing of the powem of such a Coort 
The PtoTindal Court itself most oome to trisl. It must be 
proved to the sataa&ction of his Majesty's justices that soch a 
Court ezists, and has power to pnmshf and that the GbTammant 
has the right to institute such a Court; dse, without fiirther 
ceremony, and as a matter of ooursSy the prisoner is released. 

The exercise of this power by the King's Court, wiih regard to 
prisoners sentenced by the Judicial Courts established through- 
out the interior of British India, seems to be quite incompatible 
with the independent existenoe of those Courts. Either the 
King^s Courts ought to be restrained firom interfering with 
separate judicial institutions which they cannot ^ciently con- 
trol, or tiiey ought to be connected and blended with those 
institutions in one united establishment for the due adminis- 
tration of justice. Their interference at present is neither no- 
oesMiy for justiosi nor, if necessary for that purpose, could it 

IwcftcAiuil under the pnmt fytfeemoirer die immsBM extent 
of teniloKy iolrjeot to Ihe Froviadal Coofti. li aniift now 
toad to prodnioe miMhiefooB couateaodoii, to iMaag into ecn- 
tompi Ihe looil Go^^anunent and ill judicial inarituia0nfl» and to 
impair the adminifltnlaQa of juatioe. 

Siadkr poweza were aanmed by the Eingfa Court when 
first eataUiahed in Bengal FnaoneEi of the FtavzoGial Courts 
weze then brought up in likemanner by wiitsof JQabeaa Corpos 
andzdeaaad. Bui mnoe the powera of the Court wexereatiained 
the pnetiee haa oaased* and its assomprion by the Court at 
Bombay doea not profeaa to be founded on thoae pieoedenia. 

Another power assumed by the King's Court at Bombay, 
but resisted by the Goremment at that Presideney, Js that of 
taking native wards out of the hands of their guardians and 
bringing them to the Freadency to be disposed of at the 
plaasme of the King's Courts neither the waids nor their 
goaidians being subgect to its ordinary jurisdiction. 

IF the Court possesses this power legally^ there is not a ward 
in Bcitidi India whose affiurs may not be brought within its 
jurisdiction : interested parties have only to swear that the 
ward is illegally detained by his guardian. The whole native 
p roper ty of our dominions may successively be drawn into the 
chanceiy of the King's Court, the Court all the while ae^ 
knowledging that its ordinary jurisdiction does not eactend over 
the parties. What is the difference, whether the jurisdiction 
be called ordinary or extraordinary, if it be assumed and eacer- 
ciaad. I£ it had been intended that the natives of India and 
their property should be liable to the jurisdiction of the King's 
Court, they would not, it may be presumed, have been placed 
under a separate jurisdiction. 

Every power exercised or assumed by the King's Court, or 
any other, is of courae professedly and intentionally for the 
purpose of rendering justice or redresong a grievance; but it 
seems to be forgotten that an extension of jurisdiction over 
those not before amenable to it may be oppreadon instead of 


Aoooiding to ihe present pnustioe of the Sng^B Gonrti^ a 
lUtiTe of the snowy moantftins of Himalaya, not amenable to 
the Court's juiiadiction, and utterly nnoonsdous of ihe errirtffiwy 
of such a Court, may be dragged a distance of twelye hundred 
miles or more to the swampe and jungles and stifling beat of 
Bengal, merely to show ihat be is not amenable to jurisdiction, 
and go back again, fortunate if his plea be admitted, and if be 
do not perish from the contrast of climate. 

If it be deemed really necessary that our native subjects, 
wiihout regard to distance of readence, should be amenable to 
a Court of ESnglish law, rules ought to be fiamed to let them 
know clearly that they are so, or how they may become so. 

But it ought never to be, that the jurisdiction should remain 
undefined, and subject to unlimited extension, at the pleasure of 
ihe judges. 

Who does not know ihatit isnati^al to human frailty to seek 
an increase of power? The judges are generally well disposed 
to extend iheir jurisdiction. The banisters and attomeys of 
the Court have the strongest inducements of personal interest 
to urge the extension, as their profit and their livelihood depend 
on the quanti^ of business brought within their jurisdiction. In 
reason, the Court ought not to have the power of determining 
its own jurisdiction. Tet it holds its power in tiiis respect to 
be absolute and indisputable. 

.... Enough^ I trust, has been said to show that we 
are bound in duty to give to our native Indian subjects greater 
certainty as to the jurisdiction to which they are amenable, 
and greater security against liability to two independent juris- 
dictions than they now enjoy. 

With a view to promote this object, I shall proceed to 
submit for consideration two schemes for the regulation of the 
jurisdiction of the King's Courts in India : one to explain and 
define it, under a supposition tiiat the Legislature has always 
regarded the Bang's Courts as having general jurisdiction with 
regard to British subjects; but, with regard to natives, a juris- 


diotaon limited accoiding to ckaBes and locality: the other, to 
amalgamate ihe Sing's Courts with the Fh>yincial CQurts of 
Judicature, in the case of its being deemed expedient to abo- 
lish the existence of separate and independent juzisdictionB for 
diflferent classes of subjects. 

With refexence to the first of these suppositionsy ihe juris- 
diction of the King's Court, regarding British subjects, as at 
present understood, does not absolutely need alteration. They 
are liable universally to both civil and criminal jurisdiction. 
Only, as to acts committed in ihe territories of native princes, 
it ought to be declared, in order to prevent the recurrence of 
such A claim as was once set up by the Madras Court, that ihe 
Courts ** have no legal auihority to cause writs or process of any 
kind, issued against European-bom British subjects, or natives of 
the British territories in ihe service of the East India Company, 
to be executed by arrest of persons, seizure of property, or any 
oiher compulsory method, within the dominions of native 
princes in alliance with the British Government in India." 
This was the opinion given by his Majesty's Attorney-General 
(the late Lord Grifford), his Majesty's Solicitor-General (ihe 
present Lord Chancellor), and ihe Honorable Company's Soli- 
citor (Mr. Bosanquet), when called on in consequence of the 
proceedings of the Madras Court. 

The jurisdiction as to natives in ihe Company's service seems 
su£Sciently defined, and may remain as it is. It is hard on 
natives in ihe Company's service that ihey should be amenable 
to two independent jurisdictions, and not obviously necessary; 
but as the Legislature has declared them to be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Bang's Court, under certain limitations as to 
civil suits, the case is clear, and the exercise of ihe power is 
not open to dispute. 

With respect also to natives, in civil actions, regarding 
transactions in which they have bound themselves to be ame- 
nable to the Court, there is no room for doubt. 

But it will be necessary to define more clearly the jurisdiption 

SIS JxjtasDnoiiOB of ms tiwra oottsib. 

aver Ae BstiTO idttUtnte <if CbJemMs M^^ 
Aa* i^t over iMfebvs rending witlun tii6 1i^^ 
^iotkm of Ae Court St €idi RMdenoy. 

Affitnal inhabitiiiliiritiiiii ihflie familiiiniBioCcoone ho oon- 

adeied folly amenable in both dvil and criminal tnattoiii wdi 
Ifco pnvikgOB, noferthoieaBi aa to thar own lawa and naagesy 
fgoyided hj Aa Maotmanti of ifae T/^fllatBro and the ciiarteiB 

Pancna Tenfing elaewlieiei who may fima e ilj lioTa naided 
vitiim tlia local Uflnli, nnat be amanaUa for aota f i cwninit t fid 
during liiflir xeaidaooo within the Umits, but ought not to be ao 
Hog aeta ccnimitled within the juriadiotion of the FtcmaatX 
Courtly or daewhaset bqrond file local liniitB of the Boyal Ckx^ 

Peiaona who haTe never xeaided within die limito ought not 
to be liable to arreat, nor geneml^ amenable to the Cooita' 
juriadidaon, en the plea of being inhabitania, on aooount of 
tranaactiona of a peeoniazy nature within the limits in which 
they may be aaid to have been conoemed. Nevertheleaa, for 
pecuniary tranaaotionfl on their behalf within the linutB, any 
pioper^ within the limits which snob penons may poaeeas 
ougbt to be liaUey due notice being given of any aoitp in cider 
that ihe party concerned may answer to it at hia option, or 
allow it to be dedded on the evidence cf the plainti£ Bat 
property beyond the limits ought not, I conoaiTO, in such cases, 
to be liable to the Courts' juiisdictiony it beingt neyerthelefls, 
liable to the jurisdiction of the province in which it may be 
aituatedi for transactions within the jurisdiction of the King's 

The liability of persons and property, with respect to juxia- 
diclion, ought generally, I conceive, to be determined by re- 
sidence and locality. The course sometimes pursued by the 
King's Court would set such a consideration at defiance. /We 
have seen, as before mentioned, a man arrested as an inhabitant 
of Calcutta, at a distance of seven or eight hundred miles, who 
never perhaps had been much nearer, and certainly never had 

inliititBii>i &t ft niMr of iome ewiodfyieQt to him 
fiom C hl a att ft by thepig^ mho tMued aad fupadiikBiided Iub 
OB llie pkft ihftt be wm an iabafaituift of OJciUte, in 
) of baiiiig p rop er t y sad «pployiag agente an cooi- 
nerdal dealings. It seems absolntelyseoecMuy that onraal^ 
«il>J6et0 ihoidd be proteeted agamsleiieb i»N)oeed]n^ 
ptvpoM I bavB piopoied the leatrioliooa above stated. 

With xispeet to tbe prop e rty of persooflv British sabjeots or 
^hsn, by Uw fbUy emenable to the King's Court, their pro- 
perty, wfaererer situatod withiii the British territories, musty I 
eondade, be liable; but ^pvooess of the Court regaxdingtudb 
ppop e ity ought not to be executed by ite own officers, but by 
the looal magistnte; and rules ought to be made to predude 
iiie offioen of the Sing's Court from proeeedmg beyond its 
loeal limits, and to make the local msgistifttes its instruments 
fer carrying into efieet ile lawful orders regarding pexsoos or 
pi e p e i i y liable to ite jurisdiction, although residing or situated 
beymd the local fimite thereof. The aending of the o£5cem of 
the King's Court into districte where there is another juria- 
diction is useless in itself, and attended with considflrable in- 
convenience and mischief by causing the appearance of a double 

No natire ought to be dragged &om a distance to show 
wheAcr he ia or is not liaUe to the jurisdiction of the King's 
Court. It is a grievous oppression that persons not subject to 
the jurisdietion may be arrested and brought before the Court 
from any distance before they can show that they are not 
amenable. This evil might be remedied by making the local 
magistrate in each district the channel of executing the Courtis 
write, and by giving him power to submit the excuses of any 
native denying the jurisdietion, and to try a^d report on the 
question of jurisdiction on the spot under the Court's orders, 
mbiding, nevertheleaB, by the Courtis decnsion on his report 

The decrees or write of the Kb^s Court ought not, beyond 
ite own local jurisdiction, to interfere with the previous decrees 
of the Provincial or District Courte of any other local jurisdiction, 

S84 juxiBDicnoH or thb cbowh ooubis. 

•8 Rich interferenoe musk luiTe ihe efiect of bringing tlie local 
jurisdiction and the authority fiom which it ffman>tfft into oon- 
tempi. Of coune no decrees of the local jurisdiction can set 
aside those of the King's Court previously issued, if directed 
against persons legally amenable. 

It ought to be the duty of local authorities to bring to the 
notice of the Government any instance within their ju ri adiction 
of acts of encroachment by the King's Court beyond its known 
and acknowledged powers. The GoTemment, if it entertain 
the same opinion, ought to have the power of calling the at- 
tention of the King's Court to the subject, either through the 
Advocate-General or some other channel. The Court ought 
to be bound to listen to the reference, and explain the grounds 
of its proceeding; and if the Gkyvemment should, notwidi- 
standing, remain convinced of the ill^ality of the supposed 
eictenrion of the Court's powers, it ought to have the right to 
appeal to the King in Council, or other competent tribunal; 
and in a case which it may judge to be of sufficient importanoe, 
the power of arresting the progress of the encroachment pen^dng 
the result of the appeal 

I now proceed to advert to the supposition of a change, by 
which the judicature of India, instead of being divided into 
separate and independent jurisdictions, might be ft^fl^gti^at**^ 
in one. 

Such a change, when judged fit, it will be best to introduce 

The connexion between the two jurisdictions might, in the 
first instance, be established^ by making his Migesty's Supreme 
Court at each Presidency the highest Court in civil and cri- 
minal judicature for all the territories of such Presidency, that 
is, what the Suddur Dewanee and Nizamut Udalut is now. 

In that case the Suddur Udalut at each Preadency might be 
abolished, and its judicial duties transferred to the Supreme 
Court, with such modifications as might be requinte. 


It would thea be proper that the selection of judges for the 
Sxxpteme Court should be partly, as at present, from barristers 
of the English, Irish, or Indian bar^ and partly &om judges, 
practised in the judicature of India, and acquainted with the 
language, laws, and usages of the natives. 

It is surprising that a knowledge of any language spoken by 
the natiyes has never been considered a necessary qualification 
for a judge on the bench of a King's Court in India. There 
hBBf consequently, scarcely ever been an instance of its being in 
the power of a judge to understand what is said by the native 
i^tnesses and prisoners; and this ignorance generally extends 
to the banisters and officers of the Court, as well as to the 

Supposing a Supreme Court to be constituted as above sug- 
gested, much of the duties which the Bang's Court has now to 
perform might be transferred to an inferior Court at each Pte- 
mdency; the more important duties being retained in the Su- 
preme Court. 

The jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court might 
be exercised everywhere through the local Courts and autho- 

At first, the local Courts would have no more power or juris- 
diction over British subjects than they possess at present, but 
as occasions might arisci from time to time, for extending their 
powers, authority ought to be vested in the Supreme Govern- 
ment, in concert with the Supreme Court, under the control of 
the Legislature, for conferring such powers as might be necessary 
for the due administration of justice, and for modifying and 
regulating the jurisdiction, practice, and proceedings of those 
Courts as might be most expedient, securing to British subjects, 
as much as possible, the enjoyment of their own laws, and 
always the right of trial by jury in criminal cases, and extend- 
ing ^e same right to native subjects as soon as it could be done 
with the prospect of benefit, securing to them also their own 
laws and usages; and when in contention, between two parties 



of dimrani pttflQMKMiy any douMfiil point ihonig tBtn on ne 
dtfkrenoe of kw% tiie pnfinoooe m^t W gitca to ikoi^of 
the defieodant 

It would be pMoompftiioui im me to tMoupi to dcoflribe aU 
the subsidiaiy alteratioM tiiet nigb^ m titmjM i of tkna^ UOom 
the change pro p o e wl . All Aa* I aim st k to eonvej tbe itn- 
prenioii tiuit sodi a change, if opver deemed deaaUe^ ni^ 
be effected hy a gradnal in toe d ocli o n c£ bupnfnmtatp wbbomH 
the eonyulaye deitniGtion of that ffitem of jeJicalMie ta which 
oar mitiTe sabjeelB are aocuilomedr* 

* After a li^M oC nesfy »(. 

of a centuiy these consid^tionfl 
forced themselyes on the minds of 

of SUrGhad«Wood(^^ 
introdudng the new India BUI: 
'^ We pfopOB^ iiho^ Hi [iBprofeaieiilr 

in the emsttfcutioii of the Supedor 
Courts of India. At present there 
is the Queen's Ck>urt in each of the 
Prendnncy towaa €oc the admioktn^ 
tion of justice to the English inha- 
bitants; and there is also the hi^i^est 
of the Compan^s Courts, composed 
of Companf's judges, selected from 
the civil sendee, aJled the ' Sudder 
Adswlnt,' bemg sdbrtMitlaUf the 
same Court for civil and enminal 
justice, under different names. We 
propose to oonoilidato thne two 
Courts. We believe that the con- 
stitution of both will be improved 
by this smal^amatioB; we Move 
that the addition of the Queen's 
judges will introduce the improved 
law and knowie^ wldoii they canr 
from this eoimtiy into the CompanvV 
Courts, and that the addition of the 


from this oountiT will give tfiose 

English lawyers wnat they 
aoyMiatamiewith thoMnMn^and 
habita. and kwv iA In£a. We pro- 
pose tbat this Court shall betiieniti* 
■ate Osuzt of sfpealin caokoftke 
Preaidenciea from all other Courts^ 
and that minor Courts for the admi- 
nistration of English bm, shall be 
ia8titatedi&,eac£of the PxaaidMicy 
towns, subject to an aopeal to the 
ospenor txim winen, i nve nen* 
tioned. We propose, also, that in 
certain cases this Superior Court 
shall hai« or^iaal JQnsdSetion, and 
that the Wulgca sihafl be oocasioiialhf 
employed by special commission to 
try cansea in any part of vbc eonBtry. 
We bdiere that tkM» xeforms will 
be the means of introducing an im- 
proved practice and tone inw afi the 
iSowta o£ tba osontiw; sod m every 
part of the coin^ there will be the 
advantage of trifOs conducted on 
Mmg oeeuBOBs bef ofe judgm ol tke 
highest Court of Judicature." 



tJpraiS, 188I.I 

I do not like the tenas ^^ Suddox Aumaen" and '^ Piincipal 
Suddur Aiiim^en** as applied to natiYe judges; but as tliefonnec 
la ertaUiahedy a&d. tlie latter is a consecinenffl of the former, I 
shall aot urge any objectioiu 

I dioaki ooncitf in the extenioa of the powecs of the Moonsifa 
proposed bj the jndgea of the Suddur Udahit as£u as regards 
natLYea only, bat as; long aa the judgea must be ezclusiveljr 
natives, I am decidedly of opinion witk Mr. Bhmt that British 
sabject^ European foreiguerBy and Amftrican Ghrisrian»^ ought 
to be exempted from their jurisdiedon; and as Brxtisb subjects, 
I would include the class of subjects of Eurq^ean descent calling 
themselves East Indians. If Eurcqpean and East Indian British 

* "Previous to 1831 there had 
been Imt two cissses of nsnve jitdges, 
wi& very Mnited powsn sad veij 
small salaries. The hiffher class were 
known as ' Soddnr Atuneens ;' tile 
lower ss ' Moensiffii.' The Mooo' 
siffii,^ originallj denominated com- 
missioners, haa been appointed bj 
Lad GbanrsQis to isliBTe the pns- 
son on the Jhrnspean. jndces* In 
1793 th^ were empoweredto deter- 
nme sats rBhtiBg' to acooulsnDt 
ennesding &0 nmees» In 1803 the 
office of Bnddnr Anmeen was insti- 
tnftedy witik a Jmiidictioii ezlsBdtnff 
to suits of 100 ranees. In 19Sa, 
after some intermemate enlargement 
of the power of botii daiM» the 

Moonsiib had been empowered to try 
svfts extending to 150 rapees, whilst 
the Soddnc Animen took eognisanoe 
of cases to the amoont of 500 rupees. 
In 18S7, the anthoritr in tiie latter 
case had beea do«!Ued, and the 
Soddnr Auneen* if so empowered 
bj the Boddor Gonrt, had inxisdie- 
tKMi orer esses gitesriing to 1000 
mpees. In 1831, Lord William 
Bentinck established a snperior dass 
fli natiro jedJeial officers^ known as 
Soddnr Aomeens>' with 
I and higher salaries.'* 

iOompofigJl Itiatotbe 

joris£ction of these native jodges 
that tUs paper rehto. 



sobgecta were eligible equally with mttiyes to ihe office of 
Moonaif or Anmeen, I should not see the same objection^ as all 
would then be on the same footing; but if the judges are to be 
ezduttvely natire, the juiiadiction alao ought, I conceive, to 
be exclusively over natives. The power of the Moonafr and 
other native judges ought not, in my opinion, to extend to 
any quesdon in which the revenue or interests of the State are 
concmied. If thdr power does so ext»id by the regulation; I 
should like to have it modified so as to preclude that power. 

I do not dearly peroeive the object of the additional .adauae 
suggested by the judges of the Suddur TJdalut. It can hardly 
have reference to Mahomedans or Hindoos, because clause 2 
gives to those classes the benefit respectively of their own laws. 
If the additional clause refers to all classes, with the exertion 
of Mahomedans and Hindoos, it seems to mean that while the 
inheritance of Mahomedans and Hindoos is to be r^rulated by 
their laws, ihat of Christians and all other dasses, European or 
native, is to be determined by the "justice, equity, and good 
consdence" of ihe Moon&f, he being dther a Mdiomedan or 
Hindoa If this be the right interpretation of the dause, it 
would, I think, be objectionable. 

Although I should not object to an intermediate appeal to a 
native judge, subject always to a further appeal to an European 
judge, I neverthdess entirely concur in opinion with Mr. Blunt 
and the judges of the Suddur Uddut, that the only mode of 
maintaining an efficient check over the proceedings of the native 
judges is to subject them to an apped to European judges. I 
have, therefore, no difficulty in assenting to the propel tliat 
all appeals from native officers should be heard and tried by an 
European officer. And in one view of the question it is de- 
sirable that the Courts of the native judges should be tribunals 
exclusively for origind suits, and those of the European judges 
ezclusivdy for appeals. But I do not think it necessary or 
desirable to retain the Register Courts for this purpose, as 
Registers and Acting-Registers will generally, I concdve, be 
too young to be proper Judges of Apped. 


I entirely concur in the addition proposed by Mr. Blunt, and 
should wish to extend the exception to East-Lidian Christians 
of European descent 

I am disposed to concur in the opinion of the judges of the 
Suddur Udalut, that the offices of Suddur Aumeen and Prin- 
cipal Suddur Aumeen, and I would add that of Moonsif also, 
ought to be open to any person whom the Governor- Gteneral 
in Council may consider duly qualified. If such an alteration 
were adopted, it would considerably affect my opinion on other 
clauses of this regulation, as then I should not object to sub- 
ject all classes to Courts in which all would be alike eligible as 
judges, want of due qualification being the only ground of ex- 

That part of Mr. Blunt*s concluding proposition which re- 
commends that appeals from Moonsifs be heard and determined 
by the Re^sters, depends, of course, in great measure on the 
decision of the previous question, whether the Register Courts 
shall be retained or abolished. Even if they were retained, I 
should prefer that the appeals from Moonsifs were heard and 
determined by the district and city judges, if that were not 
impossible owing to excess of bunness in their Courts. 

In the latter part, which suggests that appeals from Suddur 
Aumecns and Principal Suddur Aumeens shall be heard and 
determined by the Zilla, or city judge, with a special appeal ta 
the Provincial Court, 1 entirely concur. If the Provincial 
Courts be abolished, the special appeal might be to the Suddur 

If the plan were adopted of making the Courts of European 
Judges exclusively tribunals for appeals as (ar as regards suits 
in which both parties might be natives, and the Courts of 
Native Judges exclusively tribunals for original suits, it would 
be necessary to revise all those clauses in this regulation which 
limit the amount of claims to be tried by the higher native 
tribunals. And if all classes were eligible as judges in these 
tribunals, all exemptions from subjection to their jurisdiction 
might be abolished. 


SM juKuanoB or xhx fbotihgeal ooinafu 


The only part of the new arrangements for the civil admi- 
nistzatiaQ of this Pxeadency on which I think it neoesaai; to 
ifioard an J detailed observations, in addition to those which I 
have already submitted, is the proposed abolition of the Pro- 
vincial GourtS) whicli appears to have been left by the Bight 
HonoxaUe the Govemor-G^eral as a question £(x the decision 
of the Honorable the Court of Directors. 

Although the continuance of the Provincial Courts is advo- 
cated by mj honorable colleague Mr. Blunts for whose opinions 
I entertain a very sincere respect, I must acknowledge that I 
regard the abolition of those Courts aaa concomitant and essential 
part of the new system about to be introduced* 

When the Provincial Courts were established, they were for 
the most part Courts of Appeal and Circuit with some original 
jurisdiction in civil suits, and with the control of the police. 
The judicial establishments below them consisted of district 
judges, who were also magistrates, and of r^;isters and assistr 
ants, all being European functionaries. 

Without adverting to intermediate changes, it is sufficient to 
remark^ that we are now transfening the duties formerly per« 

* The ProTihcial Courts, or Courts of the judicial system of the couu- 

ef Appeal in the ProrinoeB, esta- tir introduced by that ««l%i>^>-»«l 

blishea bv Lord Comwallia, were nobleman, but aubsequentlj ooaai- 

abolishedoy Lord William Bentinck. derablj modified and improyed by 

This was part of an extensive reform orders from homs. 


ibmed by distnct judgei^ legislen, and amrtaiifB, to Bative 
judges of thtee daaseB; tfasfc tlie doties of iq)peal and circiiit 
axe to be entrusted ta tiie distnet judges; tbat the ma^strate's 
offiee is to be joined to tliat of the coUector; and thai the 
Gontitd of the police is iridi the oommumonexa of diviaon& 
Tlfte Soddnr Udakii ia, as befoi^ the Supxeme Couxt, and 
thexe does noi seem to be any plaee left fioi the FiovinGial 

Instead of the gradationa of aoistanty legister, district 
judge, Pxovineial Conit and Soddnr Court, we shall have 
Moonsifa» Suddur Anmeena^ Principal Suddnr Aumeens, dis* 
trict judges with the poweia of Provincial Courts^ and two 
Soddnr Gonrta instead of one 

The dutiea of the district judges being transferred to the 
native ju^es^ the district judges may be expected to be comr 
petent to perCbrm the duties of the Provincial Courts^ and for 
the dischai^ of those of the Suddur Court there will be two 
Suddur Courts, one of whieh^ established in the Western Pro- 
vinces, will appcosimato the powex of final qqpeal to the inha- 
bitants oC ihat part of our torntories. 

The foimer duties of the Provincial Courts having be«& 
transferred to other fiinctioliaries, those Courts form no part of 
the new system. New dutaes, intermediato between what they 
fixmerly had and those of the Suddnr Court, might no doubt 
be invented for them, but the system is o(»nplete without 
them; it has aU ihe gradations that before ejdsted, with a. 
Tariation of the designations of the functioDaries, and the 
interventbn of Courts with new duties seems to be an unne- 
cessary additional expense, which it is exceedingly desirable to 
sv<nd. I have befoce expressed the apprehension, which I 
continue to entertain, that without great care to avoid it, we 
shall, in these intended improvements, run into greater expense 
than has been anticipated. I shall not, indeed, be surprised if^ 
koBH the tenden^ of charges in all offices to increase, the 
cxpenseof our civil administration under the new system be. 
eventually greater than it haa ever been heretofore. I ant 


292 AJB/oidnas of ths fboyikcial ooubts. 

therefoxe of opinion that the utmoet attention is neceaaaiy to 
avoid any expense that can be dispensed with. Of this natnze 
I consider the expense of the Provincial Courts. They do not 
belong to the new system. If the native judges, the district 
judges, and the Suddur Courts, which compose the new system, 
be found inadequate for the administration of justice, it will 
then be time to conader whether they can be made adequate, 
either by a new distribution of duties, or by an increase in the 
number of funcdonaries belonging to the new system, or by 
the intervention of another class of Courts. The expense ne* 
cessaiy to give efficiency to the system must be incurred, or 
the system must be again modified. But to set out with the 
intervention of Courts which, in the system proposed, have no 
duties assigned to them, and for which, therefore, new duties 
must be devised, would be, it seems to me, a voluntary and 
premature increase of expense, which must be held to be unne- 
cessary. I therefore regret, that while those parts of the pro- 
posed scheme which involve increase of expense have been 
carried into efiect without reference to the Court of IXrectors, 
the only part which would have produced a considerable and 
certain reduction has been postponed for further conaderation. 
As this is probably the last occasion on which I shall have to 
record any opinion on the plans which are about to be carried 
into execution, I shaU take the opportunity to express my 
anxious hope that they may succeed. It is unnecessary to say, 
that the scheme is not predsely the one which I should have 
recommended as best adapted for the government of our Indian 
subjects, my sentiments on that subject being already on record; 
but as an improvement on the system heretofore administered, 
I trust that it will be attended with advantage. The transfer 
of the powers of the Provincial Courts to the district judges, 
with the Suddur Court over them, I consider to be a decided 
benefit; and I have the same opinion of the transfer of the 
duties of the European district judges to native judges, tmless 
this experiment should fidl, which I hope it will not. The 
establishment of a Suddur Court in the Western Provinces will 


also, I oonceive, be decidedly beneficial, piovided that the Fro- 
Tincial Courts be abolished, — a measure which seems to me 
to be indispensable for the economy of the hew arrangement, 
and otherwise recommended by their forming no component 
part of the scheme. If any local supervision over the district 
judges, more proximate than what the Suddur Court could 
maintain, were deemed necessary, the requiate powers merely 
for the purpose of supervision of their general conduct mighti 
I conceive, be conferred on the commissioners of divisions. 
These powers would of course be restricted to certain points, in 
order to preclude unnecessary interference in matters more pro- 
perly cognisable by the Suddur Court, as well as to prevent too 
great an increase of business to the commissioners. It is not 
necessary to enter into details, as the proposition is not at pre* 
sent before the Board. I only now notice the subject as sug- 
gesting, without expense, the means of local Supervision, if this 
alone should be deemed a sufficient object, which must other- 
wise be provided for by the retention of an intermediate and 
expenave authority, such as the Provincial Court. 

IMi^ 19, 1838.] 

The English language seems to be the channel through which 
we are most likely to convey improvement to the natives oi 
India. I should, therefore, be disposed to promote the use ot 
it as much as possible in our Courts of Justice. 

The Persian, like the English, is a foreign language in India, 
but having preceded the latter by some centuries, and having 
been made the writing language of State business by the con- 
querors who introduced it, is now &miliar to the generality of 
well-educated persons; and the present race of native public 
servants must pass away, and be succeeded by another dif- 
ferently educated, before the Persian can be superseded gene- 
rally in our Courts by the English language. 

2M tJgB OV THE nraU 8H LAVQUAfflL 

Wludh thaU iihimately be tfie oSdal kngDq[e for tcoovIs 
10 a matte of ckoioe between two, es to India, foragn hat^ 
guagei; and ocnrndenng that tfie Englnh ean enpplj more 
knowledge than the Perun, it desenres to be the ficroiite, be- 
ddee having a chdm as the langoage of the gof er nor s of flie 
oountrj; onJ pleadSngi and the examination of w i tneaeeB nraet 
prooeed as now in the Temacnhr tongtie. For xecotd, lliej 
may ai well be tnuulated into BngUah as into Peinan, when 
the paUic officers have a sufficient aoqnaintsnoe with Ae former. 

Then is one part of our jndidal proceedings wUcSi onght 
always, I oonceiTe, to originate in English — that is, whaterer 
written order emanates fiom die Enzopesn jndge. He ooglit 
to write it with his own hand, and fiom his own head, in tiie 
language in which he can best e ap reao himself, which will of 
conrse be his own. As long as the rest of the records are kept 
in PeiBBan, the judge's English order, containing his own 
reasoning, might be accompanied by a Pernan transhtion pi^e- 
pared under his direction. 

I concur in what my honorable colleague proposes to be issued 
as instructionB to the Suddur Udalut. I should have no ob- 
jection to go further, but do not wish to press such a course. 
The papers will, I conclude, be forwarded in the first instance 
to the Right Honorable the Govemor^G^neraL 



A DESPATCH {rom Bombay of the 22nd May, 1828, brought 
a minate, Tecorded by the Honorable the Oovemor of that 
Presidency, relating principally to the subject of rendering our 
Indian Army more efficient, with respect to the number of 
officers actually doing duty with regiments. 

The same subject must have attracted the attention of every 
one accustomed to reflect on the peculiarities of our Indian 
Empire; and as it has often occupied my thoughts^ I venture to 
offer the suggestions which occur to me, not with the presump- 
tuous notion that they will be found free from objections, but 
xmder a belief that a subject of such vital importance cannot be 
too much discussed by those whose minds have been drawn to- 
wards it. 

The defect most frequently compltdned of in the Indian Army, 
in the last twenty years, is the want of officers with re^ments, 
which must proceed dther from there being an insuffidency in 
the number of officers posted to each regiment, or from the 
taking away of officers from regiments for employment in dvil 
or staff duties. 

An intended remedy for the evil felt has latterly been devised, 

* This paper wba accidentally gestions it contains are too impair 
omitted from its proper place among wt not to induce me to restove ii^ 
the Militarj Minutes; bat the sug- nnder the present head. 


by limitiiig the number of offioere to be withdrawn fitom ooips 
for employment ebewhere. 

But this limitation^ by the restraint which it imposes on the 
Gbyenunent in its selection of officeiB for other duties, must 
fiequently be injurious to the public service; and that part of 
the regulation which compels officers, on promotion to the rank 
of captain, to relinquish whatever situaticm they may hold 
away from their regiment, if two captains be already absent, 
appears to me to operate very hardly on the officeis so treated, 
as well as injuriously to the public service ; for although the 
power is reserved of making exceptions in cases in whidi the 
public interests may seem to require them, that will not prevent 
the frequent removal of officers from situations in which their 
services are valuable, and whenever the power so reserved may 
be exercised, it will be ascribed to favor, and give rise to general 

I conceive, therefore, that it would be much better to adopt 
some plan by which the Government might be at liberty to 
command and retain the services of any officer required for the 
staffer civil employment, without affecting the e&deacj of the 

And this object, it appears to me, might be accomplished by 
a very simple arrangement; — 

In the first place, let the complement of officers requisite for 
actual duty with a regiment be fixed — whether more or less, or 
the same as the present establishment — without reference to the 
number that may be drawn away for general staff duty, or civil 
employment, or any other exigency of the public service. 

It is of essential consequence that the Grovemment should 
have the power of calling away from regiments any officers 
whose services may be required elsewhere, without any limit as 
to number. 

It is, at the same time, of great importance that this power 
should be exercised without injury to the efficiency of the 

And it is also very desirable that any plan designed to 


weeme that object should not interfere with tKe constiiation of 
the Army, or the system by which promotion is regulated. 

I hare premised that the complement of officers for a regi- 
ment is to be fixed, without reference to the number that may 
be withdrawn for other duties; but I will suppose the comple- 
ment to include a provision for the absence of the usual average 
number on furlough to Europe, or leave from sickness or pri- 
vate a£Sur8^ and to be accordingly, to that extent, beyond the 
number actually required to be present. 

Wiihout presuming to othr any opinion as to the number of 
officers that may be requisite with a regiment, I will, for the 
sake of explanation, suppose the complement to be as at present. 

Exclusive, then, of the colonel, or lieutenant-colonel com- 
mandant, whose presence is never considered necessary, a regi- 
ment may be said to consist of one lieutenant-colonel, one major, 
five captains, ten lieutenants, and five epsigns. 

Let it be supposed that several of these officers, no matter 
what number, are required by the Government for public service 
elsewhere, and withdrawn from the regiment 

I have now to suggest the arrangement which seems to 'me 
advisable in order to supply the places of those withdrawn. 

The general principles of my proposal are, that officers with- 
drawn from regiments should cease to draw any pay or allow- 
ances as belonging to regiments, and should be exclusively 
remunerated by suitable dlowances attached to the offices to 
which they may be appointed, and chargeable to the depart- 
ments to which these offices may belong ; and if, in consequence 
of their being officers of the Army, it be necessary that a portion 
of their allowances be drawn under the denomination of military 
pay, that such portion should form a part of the remuneration 
fixed for the duties assigned to them, and not be in addition 
thereunto, and should not be chargeable to their regiments, 
which should be relieved from all expense on their account; 
that they should, nevertheless, retain their regimental rank, and 
rise, with regard to promotion, precisely as if they were present 
with their regiments ; that the regimental pay and allowances 


wliioli ioey would oisw if premit wioi their v^giBiQaili flhoad 
be reoenred by those -mho may pexfenn theb duties in coBe&- 
qpxnoe of their mnovml; nd th«t the TaoMKnee oraaed in 
xegiments by the withdrairingof officeni for other duties ehoidd 
be supplied by supennnnenury offioen. 

For exmi^ let it be supposed that the lientenant-coknd 
be appohited to some sttuation on the general sta£^ or to sone 
cinl office. 

According to the principles before stated, he ifonld be paid 
entirely by the allowanoes of die office to which he night be 
appointed. His militaiy pay and sllowanoeSy as lieulenanlr 
oolonel of his regiment, would be disposable. 

In such a case, the major of the regiment, supposiag him to 
be present, would haTC to perform the duties of lieutenantr 
oobnel. I should propose, also, that be be allowed to receive 
the pay and allowances of that rank, as acting lieutenant-colonel 
of the regiment; retaining, however, the designation and Army 
rank of major only. 

The senior captain might draw the pay and allowanoes of the 
regimental major, whose duties he would hare to perform, re- 
taining only tihe designation and Army rank of eaptsin. 

The senior lieutenant might be promoted to the duties, pay» 
and allowances of captain, and the senior ensign to those of 
lieutenant, each zetaining his own rank in the Army. 

The vacancy caused by the removal of one officer from the 
regiment might be filled up by the addition of a supennnnemy 

Sttppodng the lieutenant-colonel to return to the regiment, 
or another to be posted to it, and join it, in consequence of the 
removal of the former, in either case the major, the captain, 
ihe lieutenant, and the ensign who had been advanced to 
higher duties and allowances, would fall back each into his 
proper place, and the supernumerary ensign might be posted to 
any other regiment where there might be a vacancy. 

The same process might take phuse whatever number of 
officers were withdrawn from any regiment. The withdrawing 

HfiHEFim OF TBOP06E1> 8TBTEM. 290 

of field-officexs would adTanee captains, the wilikdrawiiig or 
ad^fBnoement of captsim would advanoe fieutenants, and so on. 

In like manner as the absence of offioers in other emploj^ 
ment would give to i3ioee remaining with regimeirts the adiraiW 
tage of a rise in paj and allowances, the latter might also be 
allowed to benefit by that portion of the allowances of officen 
absent on furiongh, which by the regulations of iSie serviee 
may not be drawn by the absentees. 

In order to accomplish the plan suggested, it would be ne- 
cessary to have in the Army a number of supemumersry ensigns, 
equal to the number of officers employed away from regiments. 
The supernumerary ensigns, while supernumerary! might be 
disposable to do duty wi A any regiments where their services 
were required. They might be promoted to ensigncies when 
▼scant, and posted permanently to corps according to senionty 
in the Anny. As supernumeraries they might receive the pay 
and allowances of enagns. 

By this plan, it seems to me, the following advantages would 
be gained: 

The Grovemment would be at fall liberty to apply the ser- 
Tices of officers of the army wherever they might be most bene- 
ficial to the State. 

At the same time, the efficiency of regiments would be 

And the system of promotion existing would be preserved 
without infraction. 

By making every department and office chargeable for the 
whole of the pay and allowances of officers employed therein, 
there would be no temptation to apply the services of officers to 
inferior duties, or to duties paid by inadequate allowances, on the 
fallacious ground that they were partly paid by their regimental 
pay and allowances — a eystem by which the State cheats itself, 
stealing, as it were, officers from r^mental duty for other 
services without supplying substitutes, rendering re^ments in* 
efficient, and blincting itself to the actual expense of offices 
held by military servants. 


The ezpenae of every office ironld be Tnanifewt SmteUe 
ftUowances would be fixed for each tccoiding to its duties and 
importance. Military officers would not accept such as mi^it 
afford no adequate compenaation for quitting their regiments. 
Some, now enticed away, would remain with their xegime&tSy 
adding to the efficiency of the Army; and in any case the foil 
complement of officers, those on furlough and le»ye excepted, 
would be retained with every regiment by the nmpk prooesB 
of appointing an additional cadet for evexy officer taken sway 
from r^mental duty. 

I am aware that» supposing the same number of offioeis to 
be necessarily employed away from raiments as are now em* 
ployed, with salaries equal to their present aggr^ate allowanoes^ 
and supposing the same complement of x>fficers to be required 
with regiments that constitutes the present estabUahment, there 
would be a considerable increase of expense in filling up r^- 
ments with supernumerary officers; but, if necessary for the efli- 
dency of the Army, the expense ought to be incurred, for it is 
a mere delusion, and no economy^ to fancy that we are obtaining 
cheap service because officers on staff or civil duty are in part 
paid by pay or allowances to which -they are entitled as r^- 
mental officers, or that we have officered regiments when we 
have posted a certain number to them without r^arding 
whether the complement is present for regimental duty, or 
otherwise disposed of. 

If the complement of officers now allowed be greater than is 
required for actual duty, it might be diminished; but a system 
is necessary which shtJl secure to regiments the full comple- 
ment deemed requisite, without depriving the Grovemment of 
the power of selecting officers for staff or civil employment in 
any number demanded by the exigencies of the State. 

Such a system, it appears to me, would be established by the 
scheme which I have suggested; and this scheme, from its sim- 
plicity, and from its not afiecting the system of promotion 
established in the Indian Army, seems to me to be preferable to 
other plans that have been recommended. 


The one wliich Sir John Malcolm appaxenlly advocates is 
the foimation of skeleton regiments of officeis without soldiers. 
This appeals to me to involve a complicated, and in other re- 
spects objecdonable, arrangement. In its operation it would 
assign to do duty with regiments officers of all ranks not 
brought up with those regiments, and thus tend to prevent 
that union between the European officer and the native officer 
and soldier which is the result of continued intercourse and 
connexion. It would also create rank without obvious duties 
thereunto appertaining. And it would not completely provide 
for the actual presence of a sufficient complement of officers 
with each corps. 

It may certainly be objected to the plan which I have sug* 
gested, that it does not accelerate promotion; to which the 
answer would be that it does not profess to have that object in 
view. It is merely intended to provide with certainty a suffi- 
cient complement of officers for each regiment, and does not 
aim at any more general arrangement. 

The acceleration of promotion is a distinct object, very de- 
sirable for the army, and of great importance to the State, but 
requiring distinct consideration. 

It seems, however, a necessary part of any plan for securing 
an efficient employment of officers to regiments, that at least 
one field-officer should be present with each regiment, and if 
that is not provided for on the present system, means ought to 
be adopted to accomplish it ; — 

Which might be done by an addition of field-officers equal 
to the number required for that purpose. If the number re- 
quired were equal to the number of regiments, the addition of 
a field-officer to each regiment would be the obvious remedy; 
but as that is not the case, the addition of a sufficient number 
of extra majors to the Army might be substituted, which num- 
ber might be increased whenever requisite. 

The promotion to these extra majorities might take place 
from the captains, according to seniority in Army rank, with- 
out interfering either with regimental promotion as now ex- 


ktingf Of vitk the right of those oflken to succeed to the 
yegimeatftl majoritiea of their own s^^ents when, vacanti 
which thejr might do without kwing the edvantage in Arm j 
lank of their prior promotion to an extra myoiitj. The 
tiansfisr of an extra major to a zegimental majority would cauae 
ai faoancj among the extra majoxSy to be filled np hj the pro- 
motkm of the aenior captain in the Army. 
. The eztca majon would of conne be available tor duly with 
segimenta not haTiBg any field-officer presents 

If iibeaaidthat one field-officer with a rqpment is not suffi- 
cient, and that there ought to be at least two jMscseat, a Hen. 
tenant-colonel and a major, the same scheme o£ extra majors 
■ifl^t be extended to the nomiBation of cxtm lieutenant- 
colonela. The ftdtantage oS the scheme is, that it is cspable of 
expansion to any extent, or of beiii^ gradually b»Might back 
within any limita, according to the aetaal exigencifls of the 
pnbUc senrioe. 

It is desirable, however, that regimental fidd-officeis should 
have every poosible inducement to remain with tfaeb corps. 
The moK adimntageooa their r^^entaL sitoaliona be rendered 
in comparison with other offices to which they might be digibles 
die better the efficiency of the Army will be provided for. 

The plan of making every office responsible for the aggr^te 
sUowancea received by the inenmbeBt, and of rdieving regi- 
ments firom every chai^ge on account of officers absent on other 
employment, would aid in some degree in prodacingthat effiact; 
for each office would of coarse have only such allowances 
attached to it as might be deemed equivalent for the services 
rendered; and there would be less temptation foe officers of the 
highcar ranks to seek unsuitable employment. Fidd-officers 
would have no encouragement, fit>m the higher pay of their 
rank, to remain in situations fitter for wytsiiw or subalterns. 

This object is at present in some degree provided for by 
rules whijdi compel the relinqmshraent of certain offices on 
promotion to certain ranks, and as fiur as it may be desirable to 
retain these roles, tiiere is nothing in what I harre sc^gested 
that would clash with them; but the compulsory relinquish- 


neni of an office must slways be disagreeable, and it is never 
desirable that increase of rank ahould be attoided wi^ disadi' 
irantage* It would be betler that ihe retinquishmcnl of office 
should be voluntaiy, in Goiiseqiienee of the greater advantage 
of militaij ccMnmaiid or regimental dntj in ibe higher ranks ; 
and by whatever means thia object eonld be aceomplishedt the 
^idenqr of the Army would be thereby greatly increaaed. 

To the utmoat extent thai it may be piadacable^ oonsislently 
with finamrial security^ to angmeni tbeaUowaneea of regimental 
ooflunand and duty, the efficiemsy of the Army would be pro- 
moted by so doing. 

I have ofiked these remarks for consideration along with 
those piesented by others on the same subject, and not with sdj 
pnanrnption that better schemes may not be devised; but there 
ia a part of what is herein suggested that mi^t, I conceive, be 
earned into execution at once, with benefit to the Army and the 
State, and without any ground of objection that ought to pre^ 
vail i^gainst it, unless our pecuniary difficultka be such as must 
abaokitely pcedude its adoption. 

Many officers absent from their regiments, and enpkyed in 
civil duties, do not draw their militazy aDowanees, whidi are 
in oonaequenoe saved to the Staicy while their r^imental 
duties are pttfonned by other offioexsw Thcie seems to be no 
valid reaaon why the offioen p e rfoeming the duties diould not 
draw the uBapprojwiated allowaB]ce& Foe instance, if the 
ma^or of a regiment be absent in an employment in which he 
zecidves a civil salary and his military pay, but not his military 
allowances, it would appear to be very proper that the senior 
q^ptain present i^uld draw the allowances not drawn by the 
miQory that the senior lieutenant should draw the captain's 
i^wancea,. and the senior ensign the lieutenant's^ those of the 
cmsign being aaved. A similav pioceaB mi^t take place with 
r^ard to other instances of unappropriated aflowancea in the 
regiment,from the absence of offiem either in civil empk^yment, 
or on furlough, or on leave, whenever, in short, regimental 
allowances, wholly or in part, may be left disposable. 

This arrangement would improve the situation of regimental 


officers, without any extra expense on the part of OoTemment 
that could properly be so considered^ for, when regimental pay 
and allowances were fixed, it could not have been intended ^t 
the duty should be performed and the allowances unpaid. 

This boon to the Army, coming after the reduction of certain 
stations to half-batta allowances, might serve to allay, in some 
degree, the distress and disappointment caused by that measure. 
I wish, indeed, that we could have granted the boon without 
the previous reduction; but as it has been our painful duty to 
carry the latter into efiect, in obedience to the reiterated orders 
of the Court of Directors, it seems to me to be the more incum- 
bent on the Government in India to grant every reasonable 
indulgence and advantage, in order as much as possible to re- 
compense the officers of the Army for the retrenchment from 
their small allowances, to which they are immediately or even- 
tually exposed by the operation of that unexpected and dis- 
heartening measure. 

I know not what increase of actual expenditure such an 
indulgence would cause, but if it be so considerable as neces- 
sarily to deter the Grovernment, on that account alone, from 
adopting the proposal, we must then acknowledge the melan- 
choly and alarming &ct that we are not in a condition to main- 
tain our Army even in that degree of efficiency which its present 
institutions were intended to accomplish; for it never could 
have been originally designed that regimental allowances should 
be undrawn, and constitute an indispensable saving. Diminu- 
tion of escpenditure from that source could not have been cal- 
culated on. 

I therefore venture to propose, for the consideration of the 
Oovemor-General and the Council Board, that regimental 
allowances not drawn by absent officers be granted to those 
present in the next rank, according to seniority: — ^thoee of 
lieutenant-colonels to majors; those of majors to captains; those 
of captains to lieutenants; those of lieutenants to ensigns. 


lOdober 26, 1828.] 

I am about to offer some remarks on Sir John Malcolm's 
plan for levying a sort of fine, under the designation of Nuz- 
zurana, from assignees of public revenue, on the succession of 

If we have rightly construed his design in supposing that 
the extension in perpetuity of revenue assignments, which 
would otherwise, by right, lapse to Government on the demise 
of incumbents, is therein included, the plan, in that case, con- 
tains two separate proportions, so distinct, so different, and so 
opposite, ihat they manifestly require separate consideration, 
and ought not to be confounded together. 

One is to levy a tax, in the shape of a fine, on succession to 
revenue asngnments, the enjoyment of which, according to our 
easting practice, would of course descend to heirs in perpetuity, 
without the payment of any tax, fine, or nuzzurana whatever. 

The other is, to continue in perpetuity the alienation of 
state revenue, which would otherwise revert to Government^ 
relinquishing the lawful right to the whole, and accepting, in 
lien thereof, occasional payments, at distant periods, of a small 

The enjoyers of alienations of state revenue may be divided 
into two classes: those who have an acknowledged title to the 
continuance of the enjoyment in their families during the ex- 
istence of lineal heirs of the original asdgnee, and those who 



hold only for lifei or under other limitatioiui which fix the 
period for the termination of the privilege. 

With respect to both dasBes, the aangnment is liable to an 
eyentual lapse; but with r^^ to ihe latter, the lapse is certain 
in a limited period; while, with r^;ard to the former, it is un- 
certain, and the alienation of revenue may be perpetual 

It has not been the practice of our GoYemment to grant 
alienationB of revenue in perpetuity. Where they exist under 
our rule, they axe continuations which we have allowed of 
grants received from a former governmenti and other correctly 
or erroneously supposed to have conferred a perpetual or here- 
ditary tenure. 

For my own part^ I cannot conceive a more legitimate subject 
for taxation than the possesdon of a perpetual alienatioii of 
public revenue held under the grant of a precediDg government. 

It is necessary, for the apprehension of my meaning, to con- 
dder under what ciroumstances such a grant was made^ and 
under what circumstances it has been continued. 

It was not originally a gratuitous grant Personal servioe 
was to be rendered. Troops were to be furnished according to 
the extent of the assignment. The native government was 
supported, not weakened, by the arrangement; and in addition, 
nuzzurana or fine was payable on succession, and on other 

What follows? We come and conquer the country. Tlie 
holder of the tenure has done his duty ; he has been our enemy, 
and fought against us. All alienations of revenue property 
lapse to the conqueror. We have a right to consider this aa- 
ngnment as having lapsed. Instead of which we confirm its 
continuance. This is very generous, no doubt ; but it ia a 
gratuitous waste of revenue, and one of the causes why British 
India is likely to sink under the pressure of expen^ture ex- 
ceeding income. 

The sacrifice of revenue was not without a return to the 
Native State, Perhaps the original grant conferred a reward for 
past devotion, by which the State had benefited. Anyhow, it 


by flerrioey byatteduneni, byfaiihfiil rapport 
It dsD took its ooeanonal nozznmui. 

With IIS tlieaUeiiatioa of revemie is a perfect sacrifice. We 
either neglect the condition of serrice altogetheri or it is to us 
uselesB and insignificant. Nuzzorana is not required, because 
it is not included in our regular system. We receiye no return, 
and the loss of rerenue deprives us of the means of paying 
those who would fight our battles and maintain our empire. 

I am therefore of opinioa that there is no other class of our 
sal^ects so peculiarly fit for taxation as the holdem of aliena* 
tioos of state revenue. 

I do not think it necessary to examine minutely Ae difierent 
descriptions of peisons who hold the hereditary alienations 
which we have confirmed. Of all, it may be truly said that 
they are drones who do no good in the public hive. 

I do not profess that I would have recommended resumption 
in every case. But we had a clear right to resume all aUena- 
tions dp revenue; an4 having, instead, continued them, it 
appears to me that we may very justly call on the holders to 
fulfil towards us a part of the obligations which the existence 
of the awignminits enjoyed by them impHes, and which they 
would have had to observe towards any native government. 

The payment of nuzzurana would undoubtedly have been 
one of their obligations; and, although the measure is new 
witii us, it is not liable to the charge of innovation witii them, 
for it is one which is in general use under all native govern* 
ments, and especially on succeanon to possessions of any kind. 
It would, therefore, be the least unpali^ble mode of imposing 
a tax, and would be scarcely felt as a grievance on the occasions 
on which it would be levied. 

Sir John Malcolm, indeed, is of opinicm that the impcntion 
would be reoeived as a benefit, and confer confidence and se- 
curity. Even that, I concrive, is possible; for the very gra^ 
tuitous indulgence which we have conferred on the holders of 
hereditary asngnmcnta of public revenue, so difbrent firom 
what they wece befofe accustomed to^ may not unnaturslly 



bftve ezdted an alann that sach a boon cannot be lasting, 
which the impodtion of nazEorana on hereditaiy wic y^u wi ^ m 
might tend to allay, aa indicating the intention of taking acMne 
leoompense for the booni instead of ultimately xesoming it alto- 

I am, for the reasons above stated, entirely di^Msed to concur 
in Sir John Malcolm's proposition for levying nuzznnma on 
suoqealdon to all hereditaiy asngnments of pablic revenue; 
and shall be glad if the Oovemor-General and the Council 
deem it expedient to authorise the Oovemment of Bombay 
to carry the measure into effect, as &r as concerns the hoIdetB 
of perpetual asngnments in the territories of that Prendency. 

But the extension of life grants, and their convernon into 
perpetual hereditary tenureSi is a very diffisrent question. 

Viewing it as a financial one, it is manifest that this pro- 
ceeding would be perfectiy injudicious. By adopting it, we 
should be sacrificing an annual revenue, and taking in lieu 
one year's portion of it, or less, on the demise of sssignees — a 
very small part instead of the whole; a miserable percentage 
It would be as if it were proposed in England to continue 
in perpetuity pensions granted for one life, on condition of 
payment of a portion of one year's income at the succession of 

Solely, thereforej as a financial question, this proportion 
ought imdoubtedly to be rejected: and I have not quite per- 
suaded myself that Sir John Malcolm has meant to advance it; 
altiiough I must acknowledge that some expressions in his 
minutes seem to warrant such an inference. 

The advantage of tiie proposition, if it has any, must rest 
exclusively on political grounds; and these, I imagine, will not 
be found to be very strong. 

It may be supposed that we shall conciliate and attach to 
us, by ties of gratitude, the individuals benefited by such a 
boon, and that tiie act would be generally popular. 

The same might be said in favor of any otiier gratuitous 
donation firom the public treasury; but we cannot afibrd to 


puichaae by sacrifices of xeyenue a precarious and unavailing 
popularity even if such should be the consequence; which is 
not only not certain, but very much otherwise. 

Our dominion in India is by conquest; it is naturally dis- 
gusting to the inhabitants, and can only be maintain^ by 
military force. 

It is our positive duty to render them justice, to respect and 
protect their rights, and to study their happiness. By the 
performance of this duty, we may allay and keep dormant 
their innate disaffection; but the expectation of purchasing 
their cordial attachment by gratuitous alienations of public 
revenue would be a vain delusion, sure to be attended with 
fatal disappointment if the experiment were carried to any 
great extent, impossible, indeed, to be acted on universally, 
and useless, insignificant, and incongruous on a small scale. 

We cannot ^pense with our lawful revenue. We are even* 
bound to increase it by all just means, in order to meet and 
keep pace with our excessive and increasing expenditure. On 
political grounds, therefore, the revenue of an asngnment, 
which has justly lapsed to Government, is of more value, in 
my opinion, speaking generally, than any probable consequence 
of the gratuitous continuance of the alienation in perpetuity. 

Decidedly preferring the use of the revenue for the mainte- 
nance of our dominion, to any supposed political advantage 
expected to be derived &om its sacrifice, I nevertheless protest 
against being deemed an enemy to a liberal consideration of 
just claims, where claims do really exist; but I cannot admit 
that the mere possession of a gratuitous boon from the Oovem* 
ment confers on the heirs of the favored possessor a claim to 
its perpetual continuance. When was it ever agreed in Eng- 
land that the grant of a pension for one life, or any number 
of lives, even in reward of the greatest public services, con- 
ferred a claim to its continuance in perpetuity ? 

According to the principles which I have endeavoured to ex- 
plain in this minute, if it rested with me to propose the terms 
of a reply tQ the Government of Bombay, or Sir John Mai- 


oolm'a pioponlioii for levying nnmnaia, I AonU adtoeifte 
ihe tranimJMnon of inftradioiif to the fbUowing eflbci: 

let To leyy iuisnixaiia» agieeaUy to Sir Jobn Muloolm'e 
pliii, on all alJBDatiopa of paUio xeraaoe acknowledged to be 

2nd. To resume, at the period prescribed by the gt^^tfug or 
confirming <»der of tbe British Govomment» aU aKfnatJcmff 
which are eventually to kpae to Government. 

Srd. To take into oondderation all doohtfiil caaei^ and deal 
with them according to the instructions prescribed fiir thai of 
the two above^nentianed classes to which th^ nay 
justly be assigned. 



I have the honor to concur in the Govemor-G^enerars pro- 
posal for the nomination of Mr. Grant to be Superintendent of 
the Government Press; and I trust that the reasons which in- 
duce his Lordship to recommend this deviation from the orders 
of the Court of Directors will sati^ the Honorable Court of 
its e3q)edlenc7. 

I cannot refrain from availing myself of this opportunity to 
express my regret at ihe tenor of those orders, which entirely 
exclude the servants of the Company from any share in the 
exercise of the power of the Press. 

Hiat no person in high official station should have any share 
in the profits of a newspaper, or any connexion whatever with 
the polidcal Press, seems to be perfectly proper and unques- 

But that ihe only class of persons who feel any interest in 
the Company's government should be utterly precluded from 
the employment of their talents in the operations of the Press, 
appears to be very impolitic. 

The Press in India, although not free from restrictions, is 
Boffidently free to make it desirable that it should not fall ex- 
clusively into the hands of those who, however loyal as British 
subjects, are disaffected towards the Honorable Company; and 
that it will be generally engrossed by such persons must be the 
natural effect of precluding the servants of the Company from 
taking any share in it. 

Since the enactment of the local law by which newspapers 
are printed under a license, revocable at pleasure, the proprietors 
and editors being responsible for the contents, it has been found 
expedient to admit a considerable latitude of discusdon; nor 

312 comnszioirorGorxBKMBHTSEByAimwiTHTHBPBEas. 

can this be avoided wiihont adoptixig one of two 
either employing the extreme meesuxe of extinction on eveiy 
construed breach of regulation^ which would be hanh and 
ezdte popular dii^gust, or entering into a continual ezportola- 
toxy and inculpatory correspondence with the editors, which 
would be quite derogatory and disreputable to the GroTemment, 
and much more likdy to bring it into ridicule and contempt 
than any freedom of discussion. 

I take it as uniTersally granted that the Press ought to be 
free, and subject of course to the laws, proyided that it be not 
dangerous to the stability of our Indian Empire. 

Should it ever threaten to become so, the local government 
ought imdoubtedly to possess the power of protecting the safety 
of the State against this or any other danger, from whatever 
quarter it may proceed; because it is impossible in this distant 
region that we can be protected on emergenqr by any enact- 
ments of the mother country. 

But at present there is no symptom of danger fiom the free- 
dom of the Press in the hands of either Europeans or natives; 
and the power 'being reserved to provide^ for the pubUc safety 
against any danger by which it may at any time be menaced, 
to crush what is in itself capable of great good from an appre- 
hension that it may possibly under circumstances as yet uncon- 
ceived be converted into an evil, would be a forecast more 
honored in the breach than the observance. 

Aiguing, therefore, on the supposition that the Press is 
abready in some degree free, and that it is not desirable to 
strangle its growing libertjr, the exclusion of the Company's 
servants from taking a share in the exercise of the power which 
that engine wields, appears to me to be the very reverse of expe- 
dient ; and I much regret that the orders of the Court of Directors 
have not left employment in the Press open to all their servants, 
excepting those in high official stations, and especially to 
gentlemen in the medical line, on the indispensable condition 
that such employment should not be allowed to interfere with 
the due discharge of public duties. 


IMareA 5, 1830.] 

I have the honor to concur in the aentiment expressed by 
the Grovemor-Gteneral in the minute which has this day been 
read in Council, as to the expediency of giving authority to the 
Supreme Gtovemment to move from the Presidency, whenever 
its presence may be required^ in any of the provinces subject 
to its rule, or in any of the territories of dependent States. I 
intend, however, to confine my remarks to this question, and to 
treat it generally, without entering on the wide field of discus- 
sion presented by the several topics touched on by his Lordship 
in support of his argument. 

I do not propose to advocate the permanent removal of the 
seat of government from Calcutta to any other quarter. The 
enormous expense which would attend such a measure appeals 
to me to be a decisive objectioh against it; and I am not aware 
that the speculation has ever been seriously entertained with 
any view to its practical execution. 

But I am thoroughly convinced, that whenever the public 
service requires the protracted absence of the Governor- 
General from the Presidency, excepting the case of his pro- 
ceeding to another Presidency, or commanding an army in the 
field, he ought to be accompanied by the Council. In other 
words, that the Government ought, in any case, to remain 
united, and as complete as possible, and not be divided into 
separate authorities, acting with ill-defined relative powers. 

The provision of a Vice-President in Council must originally 
have been designed for the case of the Gt>vemor-General's 
absence at another Presidency, or beyond the limits of his own 


Frendenojy when he ceases to exercise the fimctioiis of local 
govenunent In such a case, the Yice-Fresident in CSonncil 
becomes the local govenunent of the Bengal Pieside&cy, and 
beais nearly the same relation to the Supreme GoTemment 
that the Governor in Coimcil of a subordinate Predden<7 
bears xmder ordinary drcnmstances. In the cases supposed, 
the Supreme Govenunent is either tmafisixed with the person 
of the Governor-General to another Presidency, or is vested 
solely in his own peison, wherever he may be. 

' Ihai the nomination of a Vioe-President in Goancal was not 
originally calculated fx the absence of tiie GovemoF-Genenl 
within the territories c£ hb own Pkeodeney^ is diown by the 
remarkable fiict ibat no such provioon is made at either of the 
subordinate FresidenGies, although the absence of OoremoiB 
fiom tiie seat of government has been firequent. In etery 
other respect, the constitution of the subordinate goveraments 
resembles that of the Supreme Government, and if the office of 
Vice-President had not been intended to provide for the abeenoe 
of the (jovemor-General at a different Presidencj, it is reason- 
able to suppose that a nmilar arrangement would have been 
established at the other Presidencies also, and that it was only 
thought unnecessary at the otiier Pretidencies, because a snboi^ 
dinate Governor could not, like the Gbvemor-General, remove 
himself to another Presidency, and exercise his proper functions 
at the head of the Council of that Presidency. 

The first instances of the nomination of Vice-Presidents in 
Bengal will be found most probably to have occurred on occa- 
sions of the nature before described. It seems afterwards to 
have become customary on any absence of the Govemor^Gene- 
ral that promised to be of length. But the powers to be exercised 
by the Governor-General, and by the Vice-President in Council, 
separately, in the Government of the Bengal Presidency, are not 
clearly defined, which makes it the more likely that this double 
government of the same Presidency was not the case contem- 
plated when the nomination of a Vice-President was projected. 

It seems to be undeniable that the government of a vast 


teniioiy, like tibat which is under the Bengal Flrettdency, 
ought to have the power of performing its fimctiottB w h erev e r 
it oaa be most advantageooflly ezerdsed for the public good, 
and it most often happen that this wonid be at places remote 
ficom the seat of government. 

It is true that ibe OoTemo^*General has the power of 
moving; bat if it is salutaiy that the Gbvemor-General should 
have a Coanoil to aid him in the ordinary transactions of go- 
vernment at the IVeodency, it mnst be salntaxy also that he 
should have the same asnstanoe when called to a distant part 
by important eTigendes of the public service. 

It is to be remembered that the Governor-General carries in 
his own person the Supreme Government, and the practice has 
always been, during the absence of the Governor-General finom 
the Presidency, that matters of peace and war, and political 
nq^tiation — ^matters on which our existence as a pown in India 
may at any time depend — are under his peculiar and exclusive 
controL How can it be ihat the same law which has declared 
the deliberation of a Council to be necessary for the adminis- 
tration of his goYemment in the most ordinary affidrs, should 
mean unnecessarily to deprive him of that assistance, or to 
remove that cheek, when the most important measures are to be 
undertaken? The law which has given full powers to the 
Governor-General, to be exercised in his own person, was 
sorely calculated for a case of necesnty, when the Council 
could not be with him« It could not have been intended pur- 
posely to separate him £rom the Council, when there was no 
real impediment to their being together. 

The law which, for the public good, confers on the GrovemQr> 
General the right of acting against the opinion of the Council, 
does not dispense with the presence or deliberation of that body. 
In short, it is manifest that the Grovemment provided by the 
L^islature for India is a^ Govemor-Gtoeral with a Council, 
and it is equally dear, that to prohibit his being attended by 
the Council, when required by the exigencies of the public 
service to quit the Presidency, is to declare that he shall rule 


this TWt empie as an autocrat, without a Council, m palpable 
oppofiidon to the intentions of the Legislatuie. 

The Council of Bengal is desngnated " The Supreme Coun- 
cil,*' from the supremacy which this Preddency exerdses oirer 
the others; but from die moment of the Govemox^Genaral's 
departure from the Presidency the supremacy of the Council 
ceases. The supremacy accompanies the Governor-General, and 
the Council becomes practically a mere local Board, neitiier 
ezercimng the supremacy OTer other Prendencies, nor that of 
government over its own — the supremaqr and the g o v emment 
are both gone. The power, the efficienqr, ihe usefrdness of 
the Council are annihilated by the absence of the Grovexnor- 
General; and the most important measures affecting the wel- 
fare of the State in every department, may be adopted without 
either its assent or its dissent. 

I recollect having seen a letter from a Yice-Prendent to a 
Gbvemor-Gteneral, absent from the Presidency, but within the 
territories subject to Bengal — I avoid names, because the com- 
munication was private — stating that he was glad that '^the 
Governor-General had adopted a certain measure — an increase 
of the army— on his own responsibility, because he, the Vice- 
President, coidd not have concurred in it, if it had been made 
a measure of the Government 

The practice which prevails of providing India wiih a Go- 
vemor-Greneral every few years, who is not likely to have any 
local knowledge of the Presidency which he is sent to govern, 
renders it almost certain that he will wish to visit the provinces 
under his government; for how can he rule them with satisfac- 
tion to himself, or independence of the opinions of others, 
without such local knowledge? The very cause which makes 
it almost indispensable that he should visit the provinces, ren* 
ders it scarcely less desirable that he should be attended by the 
Council appointed to assist him. 

In every view that I can take of the question it appears to me 
to be in the highest degree expedient that the Governor-Gene- 
ral, when absent from the Presidency on any lengthened service, 


Bhould have the assistance of the Council, and that the Supreme 
Oovemment should exeicise its functions, both of general 
supremacy and of local government, without division. I cannot 
flee any inconvenience or expense attending the union of the 
Goundl wiih the Governor-General when he may be absent 
from the Presidency, that ought to be allowed to obstruct an 
arrangement in other reqpects obviously beneficial. 

It would not be necessary that the bulky part of the Govern- 
ment should be moved. All the offices of record, all the 
establishments used for transcribing proceedings for Europe, 
would remain at the Presidency, together with a portion of die 
secretariat. A light corps of the secretariat, such as has usually 
accompanied the Gk>vemor-General, might attend the Govern- 
ment I have little doubt that with management the expense 
of moving ihe Government might be less than what has hitherto 
been caused by the movements of the Governor-General and 

The local business of the Presidency might be conducted 
rither, as was proposed last year, by a member of the Grovern- 
ment, as Deputy-Governor of Fort William, with powers de- 
legated by the Governor-General in Council, or by a Board 
of some of the principal servants at the Presidency, selected for 
that purpose. There is little or nothing in the way of business 
that could not be referred as usual to the Grovemment, wherever 
it might be, or entrusted intermediately, if pressing, to the 
Boards and Courts at the head of the several departments. All 
absolutely necessary, perhaps, would be to have an authority 
to control the others in cases of collision, requiring instant deci- 
sion, and not admittmg of a reference to the Government at a 
distance. If the experiment were once tried I am confident 
that all apprehended difficulties would soon vanish. I do not 
allude to legal difficulties, because, if there are any such, they 
can oxdy of course be removed by legal remedies. 


lOeMer 88, 1887.] 

The Agent in Bundelkund has eubmitted, in hie deHpetdi 
dated the 7th insL, with laudabk public Bpirit and alnEtjr, 
a queedon of great importance, affecting the rights and in- I 
terestB of the British 6oyemment| and those of the princes and | 
chiefs of Bundelkund. | 

The question is, whether chiefr and princes^ not having heira 
c^ the body, have a right to adopt a saocessor, to die exdiMBon 
of collateral heirs, or of the suppoeed rerersiooaiy rights of the 
paramount power, and whether the British Govenunent is 
bound to acknowledge the adoption. 

^ In the diiq>osal of this question there is a wide diffoaice 
between sovereign princes and jageerdars^ between tkoee in 
possession of hereditary sovereignties in their own right, and 
those who hold granto of land or public revenue by gift from a 
sovereign or paramount power. 

Those who are sovereign princes in their own right, and of 
the Hindoo religion, have, by Hindoo law, a right to adopt, to 
the exclusion of collateral heirs, or of the supposed reveraonaxy 
right of the paramount power; the latter, in fiict^ in audi caaes 
having no real existence, except in the case of absolute want of 
heirs, and even then the right is only assumed in virtue of 
power, for it would probably be more consistent with right 
that the people of the State so situated should elect a sovereign 
for themselves. 


In the ease, theiefoie, of ECndoo soTezeigii prmoeoy I shonld 
say thaly on fiuluie of hein male of the body, ihey have a right 
to adopti to the exdadon of collateral heixs, and that the Bri* 
tiflh Govenunent is boond to acknowledge the adoption, pro- 
Tided that it be i^ular and not in violation of Hindoo law. 
The present Maha Rao of Ex>tah was adopted, and his case 
affords an instance in which the right of adoption in a tribntazy 
and protected State was fully discussed and admitted by the 
British Govemment as the paiamoont power. 

In the case of Mahomedan sovereigns there seems to be 
greater doubt. I do not know that they have by law a right 
to adopt, to the exclusion of collateral heirs. Mahomedan 
sovereigns have, however, more than once claimed a right to 
nominate a successor j&om among their sons. But the Maho- 
medan law appears to be loose with regard to succession to 
soverdgnties; and the safest way, where we are paramount or 
have a right to interfere, is to acknowledge the legitimate suc- 
cessor according to Mahomedan law. 

With respect to chiefs who merely hold lands or enjoy public 
revenue imder grants, such as axe issued by a sovereign to a sub- 
ject, the power which made the grant, or that which by conquest 
or otherwise has succeeded to its right, is certainly entitled 
to limit succession according to the limitations of the grant, 
which in general confines it to male heirs of the body, and 
consequently precludes adoption. In such cases, therefore, the 
power which granted, or the power standing in its place^ would 
have a right to resume, on failure of heirs male of the body. 

These sentiments are to be communicated to the agent in 
Bnndelkund, with a request that he will classify the princes 
and chiefs within the range of his superintendence, with refer- 
ence to the classes above described, and submit, with a list of 
the several classes, a statement of his reasons for placing each 
in the class to which he may have assigned him, and a copy of 
the treaty, engagement, or grant, by which each chief is con- 
nected with our Government. 

It is not improbable that there are some chiefs in Bundel- 


kund whom it may be difficult to place in either of the ckflBeB 
noticed. Thoee with whom we hare treaties, and who were 
sovexeign prinoeB before we were connected with Bnndelknnd, 
wiU naturally be conndered as such now. Those who hold 
solely by grants, such as are issued by sovereign to subject, and 
have not been generally considered as soverdgn princes^ will 
apparently belong to the other class. But there appears to be 
an intermediate dasB inBundelkund, neither soverdgn nor sub- 
ject, with whom we have engagements distinct from treaties or 
grants, and whom it may be difficult to aseign precisely to either 
of the preceding classes. In such cases the agent must exercise 
his discretion, and state his doubts, accompanied by the docu- 
ments necessary for their solution. 

The question submitted by the agent has originated in an 
application from the Rajah of Oorcha. The agent will of course 
repeat to what dass of chieft he considers the Rajah to belong, 
under the foregoing definitions. The impresaon at present on 
my mind is, that he is a sovereign prince, and, being a Hindoo, 
fully entiUed to adopt a son and successor, in the event of his 
having no heirs of his body; and the adoption of his brother's 
son seems to be an xmobjectionable arrangement. The recog- 
nition, however, of this adoption will depend on the decision 
of the Right Honorable the Gbvemor^General, and the whole 
question discussed in this minute will be submitted to his Lord- 
ship on the receipt of the agent's further report. 

The agent has noticed the apparent incoherence of the past 
decisions of our Gk>vemment in acknowledging successions 
among tiie Bundelkund chiefs, and concludes that they have 
not been based on any fixed principle. But the principle which 
has generally operated on such occasions, has been that of recog- 
nising the succession apparently agreeable to the prince and 
the people, or to the latter on the demise of the former; that 
is the principle of non-interference in tiie internal affiurs of 
other States. 


(Colonial Bt^pattbt^. 


[The annexed despatch to the Colonial Office, detailing Sir Charles Met- 
calfe's first impressions of the political and social condition of the Isknd of 
Jamaica^ was written shortly after his arrival there. Soon after its receipt 
in England, it was published, among other papers, by the Colonial Office ; 
and Metcalfe was of opinion that the difficulties of his position were greatly 
enhanced by its pnblioition. Allusion is made to this, post, pages 345, 346.1 


October 16, 1839. 
My Lobd, — I am about to submit to your Lordship such 
ideas on the state of this island as I at present entertain, de- 
rived from the little knowledge that I have acquired since my 
amTal^ and not, therefore, entitled to much weight. Never- 
thelesB, it seems to be my duty to offer them in preference to 
total silence on a sulgect so interesting and important. 



When the freedom of the slaves was established, the great 
question that agitated the island was, on what tenns free labor 
could be obtained for the cultivation of the estates, from which 
the wealth of Jamaica has hitherto been derived. It naturally 
became the interest of the owners of properties to obtain labor 
on the cheapest, and that of the laboring population to sell it 
on the dearest, terms; and a struggle with these opposite views 
commenced between the two parties. 

The practice which prevailed in slavery, of granting grounds 
to the laborers, from which they derived the means of sub- 
sistence, in esculents for themselves and their fiunilies, and by 
the sale of the surplus produce, gave a great advantage to the 
laborers when they acquired freedom, as it rendered them in a 
great degree independent of labor, and enabled them to hold 
out for terms. The proprietors could not hold out with the 
same safety, for the want of labor on their properties, at some, 
if not all, periods of the year, must ktve been nnnous. The 
wages of labor, therefore, have been hitherto settied more at the 
will of the laborer than at that of his employer; and this must 
continue to be the ease mitil a great increase of ^ laboring 
population shall make labor cheaper, or until laborers shall be 
more dependent on labor, or until sack a number of propertks 
shall be thrown out of cultivation by the impossibility of meet- 
ing the expense, as may produce the same efiect as an increase 
in the laboring populaticm. 

It is to be hoped that the utter nnn of estates will not take 
place to any vast extent; but it is confidently predicted that it 
must in many inslancesL The poorer propriefoiv, aecnstomed 
to pay for labor by the xnetiiod of provision grounds, with little 
outlay of money, and perhaps none until the value of their crop 
had been secured, find it difficult, if not impossible, to raise the 
means of paying laborers daily or weekly, and that too without 
the certainty of obtaining labor when it may be most required; 
for the laborers are shy of entering into any engagements. 

The laborers in some parts of the country w(^ for only four 
days in the week, requiring Friday and Saturday for the cul- 

tiTatioBL of their owb gsoiuKls and as tbe best season fbi culti* 
vsldon will oAfltt be the auae foe tkeii own grounds as for those 
of thisir raqpkgrer^ eaQearaising theii right to work car not to work, 
and not choosb^to bind tbens^Yea bjr any c<mtract» it cannot 
be BttHer of siuprias if thej pmfisc iitekt own interests to those 
of their emploj^. It H I iimleBrtaiid» often necessary to bribe 
highly in carder to procajoe labor on Fiidaya <s Saturdays, or at 
the eritieal periods of the crop. 

There is, I fiauc^ no doubly thai owing to these causes^ great 
lose has been, and will be sustained cm many of the estates^ 
chiefly in flie angar pkntataona, where ccmtinuous labor is most 
iifedispeBsable^ This le not so nmeh the case in the coffee plan* 
tetioBs; and I htswe seen statanents showing that the cultiyap-^ 
tion of estates by fiee labor is eheaper than it was during 
slavery and ^>prentifiedup>-«-^ result whkh it would be most 
gratifying to find generally established. 

As a eoiittlerpQi8& to iiie pow«r of the laborers over wages, 
the proprietors have that of charging rent for the houses and 
gtoands tenanted by the laborers, and thie right is often exer- 
cised with a view to counterbalance, aa much aa possihle, the 
payment of wi^^e^ and noi with rrference purely to the value 
q£ the house and grounda. Thus in many instances the rent 
of a house is charged, not aa a rate fixed for the house, but at 
a rate fixed fiv sndh oceiqpttit of the house. These counter^ 
daima for rent and wages keep up mneh irritation and litiga- 
tion, but vnll, it ia to be helped* in tune, be settled on the besb 
of mutual intotflt. 

With respeol to the party most to Uame in these disputes, it 
in di£Scult to arrive at the truth where party spirit so mucb 
prevaik Were I to give implicit credit to some official re- 
ports that I have reeetved, I should eondude that, whenever 
afiaiis on an estate went wrong, the manag^nent be to blame^ 
aaad that the laboren were never xmreasonable; while fronik 
otherquarteralhaveawhoUydifierent statement I conclude 
tbat the tmlh lies probaUy between the two extreme^ and thai 



the patience of dther party ia occaaonally tried* Mach, no 
donbty must depend on the ehancter of the numager. 

Hie obvious remedy for the power posaesred by the laborer 
oyer'wages, and for his independence of labor, bang the resump- 
tion of his grounds, vAndi the proprietor has the right to resume, 
it may be asked why ihe exercise of this right is not had leooane 
tOj aSy in fitct, the instances of ejectment have been oompua- 
tivelyfew. For this there are sevcnral reasons. The proprietor, or 
manager^ still clings to the idea that ihe tenants on his estate 
will continue to labor for him exdnnvely. He is not, there- 
fore, disposed to eject them, but seeks to make thdr houses and 
grounds the means of securing thdr labor at the least coat It 
is felt also that ejectment, carried generally into efibct, would 
be harsh and cruel, and might drive the laboring populati<m to 
desperation ; for they are peculiariy tenadous of these poa- 
sesdons, to which they are naturally much attached; and in the 
purchase of fire-arms whidi has lately taken place among them, 
while one party is of opinion that it proceeds Stom a love of 
sport, the other asserts that it is avowedly for the defence of 
thdr houses and grounds. 

In some instances laborers have purchased small lots of land, 
and thus become proprietors. I should be glad if this were a 
general practice. It would put an end to the causes of irrita- 
tion which may continue to exist while they hold their houses 
and grounds on an uncertain tenure, while it would not neces- 
sarily throw them out of the laboring class, their properties not 
bdng sufficiently large to exempt them entirely from the 
necesdty of seeldng other means of support. Where they are 
tenants on the properties of others they are anxious to obtain 
leases for tiidr grounds, which the proprietors are willing to 
give, if the laborers would enter into engagements to labor for 
dmilar periods; but the latter are adverse to any contract with 
respect to labor, and the former, or their representatives, do 
not like to relinquish tiie hold which they condder themsdves 
as having on the laborers by keeping them as tenants at will. 

I do not percdve any remedy for this state of things, except 


what time and a natural sense of self-interest may supply. I 
ahould apprehend that legislation can do little or nothing 
towards amendment; and that it will be most advisable to let 
these matters take their natural course. If justice be fiurly 
administered to all parties, they will, it may be hoped, come to 
a nght understanding among themselves. 

In attempting to describe the present relations between pro- 
prietors and laborers, I beg to be understood as speaking only 
generally. There are, no doubt, numerous exceptions with 
which I may become better acquainted hereafter. 

This natural struggle between proprietors and laborers has 
been attended with discord and virulence between other classes 
of society. The Baptist misnonaries have made themselves 
peculiarly obnoxious to the proprietors by the advice and aid 
which they are supposed to have given to the laborers. It 
seems very possible that the intervention of a third party 
between the two immediately concerned, giving its support to 
one, may have prevented a settlement that would otherwise 
have taken place favorable to the other, or equally fair to both; 
and it is quite natural that the proprietors should dislike this 
interference in a matter of such vital interest to their properties. 
It may also have operated to cause distrust and resentment be- 
tween the interested parties, which is a serious evil; but at the 
same time it was natural that the laborers should seek the advice 
of the pastors and ministers who had evinced a great interest in 
their welfare, had weaned them from their barbarous supersti- 
tions, and had opened to them the blessings of Christianity ; and 
it was not unnatural that, under these circumstances, advice 
should be given, and it may be that without the advice and 
support of their ministers the emancipated population might 
liave fared worse in their dealings with their former masters, or 
might, from disappointment, have followed desperate courses. 
Considering what might probably have happened without the 
influence of the ministers over their flocks, it is not easy to esti- 
mate the full value of the operations of the missionaries of all 
denominations; but it seems undeniable that the Baptists have 


puifloed a eoorse difieM&t fiom tiMi of all other 

for I hear no nproftoh altered ngnut 1^ Wmdejm^ or i 

TiaB, or P^«8by««aa> or Ohiwah of Em^kmi 

The BftplMte alone ham becooM a polkkal {vty, «mI 

thenneh^ to be regarded «i hoBlik to Hhepiopaetaiy i 

From the parliBanship whidii tiiey laEve cmMsed, ik^ hama, it 

may be pieeuiaed, gveater iaflcNnoe dun any olhar »ot in diis 

iduid, a&d are prepariag, I am infoxned, to i a fli i emop i 

tioBsoftaduBolutionof^eAsiembly, wben aaoh of the ^ 

cipated population ae may be<diily qaafified ivattbeeomeeBladed 


If the poEtied power esDeR»ed by Ittt Baptiste be aai eiil 
(and I am c&po6ed, generally apeakhig, to dunk thai it a aa 
evil whenever the miniaterB of leligioii deviate fiem dwia: 
purely leligioaB functkqu to take a part ia tlie atdfe and brcols 
of politioal parties)^ it is an evil which -does not adaoit of any 
present remedy. E«ither Ikmt infln^noe will dionBisli finm 
their flocks not liking to pay lihe amovnt requisite for the aap^ 
port of 1h^ ohnrch estabHiBbmeatSy or it will oontoma to in- 
crease by the activity of the Baptists in drawii^ more into 
their fold. In the latter oase, whether liieir rnflnence be a 
bane or a blessing to the country, mot d^end en the spirit in 
which it is exercised. On the wholev akhoogh I esteem Ibe 
oonduoit of ihe other missicmaries in confining therasehea to 
their religious duties, and arbstuning from |>oh'lacal strife, ns 
more admirable and more beneficaal to the conntry than that of 
the Baptists, nevertheless, if the good and the evil dmse by the 
lattor were to be weighed against each dther, ite good, I oon- 
orive, would preponderate. The benefit of religious rnstmction 
and of its moral consequences seems sufficient to vrarrant that 

The conduct of the laboring population generally is rqne- 
sented by the stipendiary magistrates, ^hose reports mre the 
most firequent chaxmels of official information possessed by the 
govemmrat, as being orderly and irreproachable; and I see no 
reason to doubt the truth of their represe&tatioaa. Fartionlar 

THE BnPKSmkST TtMSfOTMikrm. 327 

I of «n <3ppoBile cbiffacter hatn eone lUKkr jBjaotiee 
riiioeiBjamTal, bat I tnirtaiid believe thigfc they necsEoepticDB 
to iSm gen«»l rule. The geDera%trniqdll rtafeeof die eouBiqr 
iviAoiit sny police, is s "Btrong ^nxif of like ^vennt fttaoeAil 
Sspoflitioii of the ialiabiftaasts. Tbe eburaelfeer, iiowemr, «&- 
qiB^ed by. ibe -people in their tmuidoii from dsveryiboj&eedooi, 
Bttui s to be more thaA of jndepesdenoe tham of nbiBiseian to 
the inS tjf ottheiB. They are, I imagme, «b indepettdent wbA 
liiiTviiig, and as %ttle mibBenrient, as «&y iabonng popoktion in 
the world. They axe a3so, tts iar as I escn see, dbeexfcd end 
inerry. l%ey«e generally, in this n^hboiaSaood, intii maStiakg 
faeesmd civil tongues^ and seem pleased with being Aotioed. 

The sispendiairy magistrflftes axe « dass, with indsviduail ex- 
ceptions, ofifensiye to the propnelKiry inteoesfe. THas is itot 
Borprasing. The magistracy of tbe c oun tr y -copsiBted foDneriiy 
exclnavely of propnetors» or tiieii representatiyes, pecfinaooiig 
thdr duties gratmtoiisly. Tbe special justioe^ or stipendiary 
magistrates, were thrust among them purposely ito pcotect the 
apprenfioeB against them^ and with ^olnsi^e powers £zr fliat 
purpose. Thar servaoes he^pe been continued with jinilar 
views regaivding the free iaborors. These arrangemeHiB were 
no donbt necessary. It waB scarcely poaeible to eaitroBt (bhe 
diBpenBKtion of juBtioe entirely lo those =iv9io weise ihemselves bo 
nrach inlereBted in the questionB likely to aisse fixT'diaonnton. 
NeverthelcBB, the eBtabUshment of stipendiary sni^iatrBteB 
was extremely gmtmg to the landed inteveBts ; and, added 
to the nbolitioa of ekvery, became -a second vevolotion in 
the island. The annoyance was aggravated in « 'great degree, 
partly by the inescperience snd imfitness of some of the 
stipendiary magistrates, and partly by their reoeKving a 
bias from the purpose for which they were appointed, and 
by their regarding themselves Tather as proteotara of the 
laborers than as dispensers of equal justice io all portieB. 
The laborers, understanding the purpose of the n omi nati on of 
stipendiary magistrates, looked to them exclusively for justice ; 
and the latter, acting under the immediate direction of the 


Qortamoty and fomuhing him with oontiniial icprcsent ala on s 
of oppreanon on the part of ihe proprieton or thor agents, a 
Btate of things was produoed very unaatiafiustoxy. The bulk of 
the magistrates of the idand were distrusted by the government, 
and, together with the ckss to which they bel<mged, became 
generally disgusted. The continuance of such feelings is much 
to bo deprecated. A magistracy divided into two paztaes 
hostile to each other^ one party distrusted by the government 
and the lower orders, and the other distrusted by all the aris- 
tocracy, presents a picture which cannot be contemplated wi^ 
gratification. This subject engages my anxious attention, but 
I do not at present clearly see a remedy. There is a dispodtion, 
I understand, likely to show itself in the House of AssemUj, 
to form local Courts under persons qualified by l^al knowledge, 
and firee from self-interest, to be paid by adequate salaries. If 
any arrangement of this kind could be devised, aSbrding real 
justice to the people and palatable to the landed interest, I 
should think it advisable to encourage it 

I trust that nothing that I have said will be conadered as 
imputing blame to the stipendiary magistmtes. They have 
been placed in a very delicate and arduous pomtion, one whidi 
required that every individual holding it should be ^fted, not 
only with legal knowledge and strict impartiality, but also with 
peculiar tact, temper, and discretion, and the power of sweetai- 
ing a bitter potion. It was not to be expected that all could 
come up to this standard. Some have conducted themselves 
admirably, and have apparently given satisfaction to all dasses 
of the community among whom they have been placed. If 
others have received a bias from the puipose of their appoint- 
ment, and leaned too much to one side, it was a natural error. 
I do not suppose that they have in any instance intended to 
commit injustice. I have no reason to be dissatisfied with the 
conduct of the stipendiaiy magistrates generally, as far as it has 
officially come under my notice. 



(This paper is printed, not in regular chronological sequence, in order that 
Sir Charles Metcalfe's views of the general state of the ishmd and its inha- 
bitants may appear, before his detailed opinions are given on individual points.] 


March 30, 1840. 

Mr LoBD, — ^Being desirouB of taking the earliest opportonitj 
to visit all parts of this island, and improve my acquaintance 
with the state of affairs by personal inspection of the country, 
and intercourse with all classes of the inhabitants as far as that 
might be practicable, I took advantage of an interval between 
the last sitting of the G>urt of Chancery and the adjourned 
meeting of the Legislature, and quitting the seat of government 
in the middle of February, made a tour of the island, and re- 
turned on the 16th instant. 

I availed myself of the use of one of her Majesty's steam- 
vessels in some instances in which, from the bad state of the 
roads, I was advised not to proceed by land; but for the most 
part I travelled by land, that mode affording better means of 
seeing the state of the country. 

I was received everywhere, as the representative of her Ma- 
jesty, with the most cordial manifestations of loyalty towards 
our Queen and country, and with unbounded hospitality, at- 
tention, and kindness. 

I have been disappointed in the state of the country as con- 
nected with its agricultural prospects, and have been sorry to 
observe much of mutual dissatisfaction between landlords and 
tenants, employers and laborers. 

The dissatisfaction of the landlords or managers of properties 
arises from the want of sufficient labor, and the consequent dread 


of rain. It is almost impomble to procaie continuoiis lalxx; 
The laborers are, in a great d^ree, independent of it, and 
therefore afford as much, or as little, as suits their own oon- 
▼enience; and in choosing to labor or not to labor axe capricioiis 
and inconsidentei and often "rtHke or TcFnse to irork ivhen the 
intmwrs €»f the fitopactf peoufiadj BeqaisB iheir 
Ihij ivfine to cater into liawiiafti for aaj peoDd, and < 
tiienr iinfli nffl fron mj to dayi seldufli giiug we iBaa, nier 
dajB* work in the week^ or five at the utmost and not even 
these quantities steadUy. 

This description refers to the state of things most genecsl 
thnraghoutifiie island. There are instances of abundant labor 
firam a faical supeiubnndance of poptualaoBy and other nstsiioes 
of a 'Sufficiency from good Tnanagcmeiit, or eztnarmnaiy ao- 
vantages in wagetf or otherwise ; btft in general there is ^mSx 
reason a complaint of want of labor, and cuuscquent deteriovaficn 
of property^ Besides the mani&st ialfing off of eateftes in piodnce 
and profit, the want of labor is evinced in ofter caxcnmstBnees. 
Few, xf any, of uie gentiy of the island ^an anoid to cnxavitte 
flower-ga^rdens or lay out pleasure-grounds^ altxKyngn nnture 
holds out every temptation for such enjoyments. Labor is too 
scarce and too valuable to be applied to luxuries and le&ie- 
ments, or to anything less solid or essential tiian profit, or sub- 
sistence, or indispensable convenience. The Toads, whidi are 
for the most part in a bad state, and for the improvement of 
which considerable sums were voted by the Hoise of AsBBmbly 
months ago, are left nnsepairedy all the labor procurable bong 
required for agricultural purposes. Advertoements ibr con- 
tracts liave been issued by local authorities, but remaon un- 
noticed; and it is probable that the roads will not be touched 
until a season of some respite from the urgency of agriculture. 

The want of labor proceeds firom two obvious causes: the 
actual want of population, and the facility with which lihe popu- 
lation can support themselves without laboring in the service of 
others. In these and other remarks I am only repeating what 
I have said before; but where early information has been con- 


finned Ify m1fleq[iient -chnvntAxm aad iBqidrf , it is difficuit lio 
'8w>]d vcpodtion. The fimnflr «(f tiie oBines above motioed cu 
•oolylyewBiedieA by libe iiattmal mcrefl»fiodaced byline, or 
l>7 q cfce naw ^ inmngrtttiQn, ivkich ^ m^qmstion beset mtk aBuy 
i££Giefiltks. The ftciEty <of mippoit is move litely to incNHe 
l3uai finoBalitaitil there %««glhxt m the market of the psoohKe 
^idh Ae negroes generally cattarate for sale. They n^t 
idnen be more tmder lft» neoeseity of havmg TecomBe to ihe 
wages of labor; bat &e two proifesBioiis of day-labover said 
maafkeVgarAenet ^seem icaliber inconafirteiit^ aad as long as they 
remain nutted, «i &ey now are in most pcrts of the isfaoid, «ob- 
tmnons Ubor camiot be expected, and all labor nnait be at the 
opdon 'of "fte peassoft ^o give 'or withhold. There is not ihb 
same degree of necearilty pressing <on him as tiiere is «Kn the 
same class in other coimtries. <^, rather, there is scarody such 
tt class in iftns island as that of agricnltural laborer ex:cliisively. 
The laborer here goes out to labor for such time only as he can 
spare &om the cultivation of bis own grounds ; and if the ^desires 
of ihe negroes were limited to what laborers in other conntrie» 
are farced to be content with — ^if they were not fond of luzmien, 
tmd smart cloAes, and good fnmitare, and riding horso, or had 
not the better motives of educating their children or supporting 
their chnrcb— they would hardly haree any inducement to labor. 
The difficulty of procuring labor has led Ae bulk of the 
landowners or managers to have recomse to a system of levying 
rcBft, which is meant to eacact labor. If a peasant living on an 
estate, his wife, and grown-np 'children, labor steadily for the 
property, sometimes no rent is asked for the honse and ground 
which iSiey occupy; sometimes a moderate rent. If they do 
not work for the property, a double, or increased rent is de- 
manded. Rent for ground especially is very generally demanded 
from the wife as well as the husband, and from each grown-up 
child, on the principle that if they work in the groimds which 
they occupy, and not for the property, they are deriving an 
advantage from the groxmd in proportion to the number of the 
fiimily, and are, therefore, all equally bound to pay rent. In 


such caws ihe quantity of ground is not strictly defined, and 
the rent may be said to be taken, not as so mudi ground, but 
as ground for so many. It rarely happens that the ground is 
measured and let by ihe acre. It is generally what is tenned a 
ground, and has no prescribed limits; and it is deemed fidr to 
take rent from every one who contributes to its productmnesL 
Some landlords pursue— wisely, I think — a different conne. 
They have the house and ground valued by two perxuu^ one 
on their own part, one nominated by the tenant Ihe rent is 
fixed by these persons, or by one umpire appointed by ihesn 
in the case of their disagreement, and is taken fix>m the head 
of the family without any reference to its numbers. Rent is 
sometimes made a separate concern from labor; wages are paid 
in full, and the rent is received at another time. But generally 
the weekly rent is deducted from the weekly wages, and is 
often, diminished or increased according to the continuance and 
punctuality of labor, or tiie reverse. 

Labor and rent, therefore, are the questions which agitate 
the island from one end to the other. The want of labor, 
which threatens ruin to his property, is the general cause of 
discontent on the part of the landlord. The payment of rent, 
or in a greater degree, the vexatious manner in which it is 
generally imposed, is almost universally a source of great dis- 
satisfaction on the part of the peasantry. I include the pay* 
ment of any rent as a part of their dissatisfaction, because, al- 
though they do not profess to deny that rent is a proper conse- 
quence of living on another man's property, it was evident, in 
all my communications with them, that it is in itself very un- 
palatable, and a consequence of freedom to which they can 
hardly reconcile themselves. They held their houses and 
grounds, in a state of slavery, free from any charge. They 
cherished the idea that the change to freedom was to be in 
every respect an improvement. The payment of rent is a dis- 
appointment. The actual delivery of money, or the deduction 
from their weekly wages, is a sore annoyance; so much so, that 
they often prefer paying their rent in labor rather than in money. 


They either supposed spontaneously, or were led to suppose, that 
a law would come from England giving them their houses and 
grounds free of rent. The state of feeling described is not 
-without exceptions. There are instances of a willing and cheer- 
ful payment of rent; but in most parts of the island very little 
rent has been paid. Many landlords, who are staunch advo- 
cates for its being required, have not ventured to take it them- 
selves. It is only recently that the attempt has been generally 
made, and it is therefore at the present moment that a greater 
degree of excitement and discontent prevails on this subject 
than heretofore. During my tour, rent in the various shapes in 
which it was demanded was almost the only topic of complaint 
on which the negroes applied to me. I encouraged and sought 
communications with them. They professed to wish to ascer- 
tain the law £rom me, but I could hardly ever ^ve them satis- 
fiu^tion. From the questions which they asked, it became my 
duty to explain the right of the landlord to such rent as he might 
choose to demand, the tenant having the right to seek an abode 
elsewhere if he did not like the terms proposed. My explana- 
tions generally caused great dissatisfaction, which was expressed, 
and by the females more loudly than by the men. 

From all that I have heard and seen during my tour I regret 
exceedingly the practice pursued by the generality of managers 
of properties on this subject. I. am persuaded that it is inju- 
rious to properties, as well as harassing to tenants, to attempt 
to force labor by the terms of rent. It keeps up a continual 
bickering and heartburning, which place the overseer and the 
laborer in a state of constant hostility that cannot be beneficial 
to the estate. Were the laborer comfortably settled in a home 
from which he could not be removed^ or not, at least, without 
saflident notice, there would, I am almost sure, be a better 
chance of obtaining willing labor from him, than there is of 
compelling him to work by altering his rent on every failure of 
labor, and by the constant disputing which such a plan en- 
genders. Were he settled in a home, either purchased by 
himself or rented on a lease, let it be even for so little as a year 

S34 OH THE 80CIAI. ooannxxcuf of the people. 

ottteiB, with HZ moaftlw' nodca to ^dl^ke w»U 
ooidii^ to the qmj^tj of groud that be bed obteued, be 
sUe to nqiport buMdf eetizely mdiout going oat to Ubor, 
or be would go out to work ibr bio wonts^ or wilke Tiew to 
tbo incrane of his meaes of o^oTOoait. A pcnoA m tbe 
former dxcofliftoBcefl^ ft&d eoMteni witk the praduee of bis ova 
grotad, GOBBOt be c^ieeled to kbor; eed, boTiag the BMeaeof 
pleongbiiMdrm dMfc pMitim, emmA be eoeyelM to lebor 
hy may attonpi to rodaee bim to tbei m au B oit j . A. pcana 
under tbel neoenhj^ or ii^iieed to kbor bj akadeUe doue 
for ineieBfle of means, will nalnraUj kbor, ae^sm jmrAm^ or 
the piopertj on which be ia a tenant^orontbaiii^ickia neaRSt 
to bim, and whicb gms him tbe kiei tioabk in reaching hia 
wodc. I am happy to add that seTcnl gentloaacBL take tbis 
view of tbe qneetion; that some haw sold knd to nqgroea, and 
tbns given them a settkd abode; thai otbeia are bqpnning to 
perceive ihe advantage of doing the sesne; and tfaadt tbis view 
is, I trust, gaining ground. I diaU do all tibat I oan to pro» 
moto it, from a ooavietion that it wiU incroun tbe bappiiMfli 
and content of the negro popnktion^ and from a bdrf that il 
will also tend to the benefit of kndkxds. Mj notions <» tbe 
subject have alreadj been puUiclj cai^icssed. It may be ex- 
pected that they will be unpaklidik to those wbo think dif- 
ferently; but I hope that by degrees the same view wiU be 
generslly adopted. Wherever I have found tbe kndkrd or 
manage satisfied with bis kboiers^ I have also found that tbe 
ktter bave been in some way made easy <«^ tbe sulject of renk 
Comd^nng the mutual discontent goierally prevailing be* 
tween landlords and kborexs residing on the properties^ it ie 
surprising tibat the parties do not separate oftener than tbey da 
But Aere is on both sides a tenacity to the old oonnmon 
which keeps tbem together. The kndbrd does not like to 
eject tbose whom be still r^ards as bis propa kboren^ al> 
tbougb be cannot obtain kbor firom than, and the kborer 
dings to bis bouse and ground on the estate whore be has kng 
held diem, although be k harassed by vezatioua demands on 


aoerani of resL Thus diey lemaiQ togetliei: aqnaUalnig aittl 
inJhmfBg mtttoal Ul-will^ when Aey would anderstoDttd eack 
other mudi better if Ihej separated^ and lednced ihe qneBtinsi 
betveen ikcm fo ooft of kboir and vage& Eitfxer diuy or the 
pladiig <^ tWzent question on a distinct and settkd footiag^ 
is, I eonceivey lad&spenBaU^ both fior the eomfori of tiw pea- 
santrjr and the wdtdoaag of the propextiesL The chief caase 
of the mJMMiwkfrai andiDgB xeapeotiiii^ rent ia^ that Hoe landkcd 
caics little £bt the rentp and ahnost soUyr^asdakbor. W^;^ 
rent taken fior ita own sake dbtinetiy, it wotdd soon be aettkd 
on a pieper fooling. 

In parts of the isknd separation. has taken placey and eonai- 
derable manbaai of the n^xoes have porchaaed knd, on whkh 
they sore buaiiy engaged in setting themsdtresL I have heard 
of thebpa]nngashi^arateaa50L— «qual to 302. sterling .per 
acre; but in general the rate is much lower* Different ophnons 
are entertained as to the result of dwse settkmenls. Of tiiose 
qualified to judg^ sosne snppoee that from the land becomii^ 
in a short time less produetiTe, the possessop wiU be compeUed 
to labor for then suppeat, iriiile others anticipate that thej will 
coatinuey notwithstanding, to derurea scanty sufadatenee ftam 
their land, and* will themaelYes deekne in pcoqwarity along wi& 
ity preferring a Hfe of idleness and want to one of industry, 
comforty and respectability. It appears to me Aat the land 
which they purchase is chiefly for the purpose of obtaining % 
secure home; that it is generally too little in extent to be looked 
to as a pomancnt source of subsistence; and that they nnist 
calculate either on obUdnii^ additional means of comfort by 
going out to labor, or on taking more land on lease for their 
own cuMvation. I do not, therefore, anticipate the unfitTor- 
able result which some predict; but as these are genliemen who 
have expeiienee of the negro dbaracter, I should hesitete to set 
up mj opinion against theirs, w^re it not that others of equal 
experience differ from them,, and maintain ^ more &T0iable 
view of the question. For my own part, I rcgotce at these 
settlwnenls of the laborenL Thtiat present happmess must be 


gieatly incieMed» and I do not see that the ooiueqiie&ces must 
noocwMTily be injurious to the landlords. I rather think that 
there is a greater probability of their proving benefidaL 

In observing the di£krent manner in which different proper- 
ties are going on, some doing well, others deterittrating, one is 
often puzzled to discover the cause of the diflferenoe. Some- 
times it is obvious enough. In other instances it cannot be ex- 
plained, and it would require a most minute knowledge of all 
thg cireumstances to detect it One might suppose that kind- 
ness, whidi succeeds in one case, would do so in others; but it is 
not always so. The landlord acting with the same liberality on 
all his estates, finds the plan which succeeds admirably on one, 
totally to fail on the other, and is at a loss for the reason. Hie 
same manager having two estates under his chaige dosdy ad- 
joiningi and using the same management in both, finds the 
tenants on the one working well, and ihose on the other doing 
the reverse, without any perceptible cause for the difierenoe. 
In addition to other circumstances which operate, and are not 
always discernible^ there appears to be a sort of distinct cha- 
racter belonging to the laboring community of each estate, or 
some motive of action which they embrace in common^ inde- 
pendently of the doings on neighbouring properties. One hears 
continually that the people on sudi an estate have always done 
well, while those on another dose by have at all times borne a 
bad character. The same distinction exists with respect to 
parishes: the people of some having a better reputation than 
those of others. It is difficult to understand how such differ- 
ences have been brought about, considering the common origin 
in one sense, and nmilar education of the people everywhere ; but 
as the nations of Afiica £rom which slaves were brought diffisr 
greatiy in character from each other, it is possible that diflfeient 
characters may have been formed in dififerent parishes or on 
different estates, according to the predominance of docile or 
indocile raoes among the alaves imported therem. 

It is common in this idand to ascribe the sullen conduct of 
the laboring population of certain parishes to tiie influence of 


the Baptist miflfiionaries, which in those distncts is predominant. 
Whether the charge be just or not, I cannot pretend to deter- 
mine; for, although I see much to regret and blame in some of 
the missionaries of that sect, who, instead of being ministers of 
peace, are manifestly fomenters of discord, and whose conduct 
would naturally tend to produce the effect ascribed to it, I do 
not see reason to believe that the people in those parts in which 
the Baptist misdonaries have little or no influence, are alto- 
gether free from the same disposition which these are accused 
of creating. It seems probable to me that their great influence, 
where it exists, is more owing to their encouraging the feelinjgs 
of the community under them, than to their having called 
those feelings into existence. 

That they do encourage feelings of discontent, and that they 
direct them against the landowners and the authorities of this 
island, cannot be disputed. They recently assembled some 
thousands of their negro congregation, in order to persuade 
them that certain laws passed during the first pari* of the 
present session of the Legislature are iniquitous, and to tell them 
that one of their pastors was going home to e£^t the repeal of 
those laws. A ludicrous circumstance occurred at the meet- 
ing, showing that the negroes were perfectly insensible of any 
injury from the laws, and that they were merely tools in the 
hands of ihe missionaries, who had brought Uiem together. 
The language used by the missionaries at this meeting was caU 
culated to inflame the negro population against the Europeaik 
part of the community, as well as to persuade them that no* 
redress of injuries could be obtained from the Local Govern- 
ment, and that their only chance of relief was by the influence 
of their missionaries with the Queen's Government at home. 
The motives of these gentlemen in this conduct can only be 
known to themselves; but as it suits their interests to produce 
the impression that they alone in this island are the friends lEind 
protectors of the emancipated population, it is not surprising 
that they have not credit for perfect disinterestedness. Whatever 
may bo their motives, their conduct must foment disaflfection 


Ill ttiammda of an inflanHttable people. I do not eappoee tkaft 
tbej mean to produce iasumclioa end Uooddied; hut llicy 
ou^ to Bee ^t tkey mulj tmm a epint niiiek ii will not be 
■o easy afterwarda to aabdne, and, on the wbole^ I naafc oon- 
denm aiioh prooeediaga, aa beiAg both cnuamei and eub- 
ohieYonai aldioagh I have not dMNigbt it aeoeaMry oc eac- 
pedient to take aotioe of diem. 

One of die moat reauikable inataaeea of finhne of {npertiea 
la on twoeatataa bdonging to Ixod Seafiird, caUedtbe OU and 
New Montpeliexa. Tkej axe among the fineat piopeiliei in tlie 
tdand. Tbe wodca were deateoyed during the kat icbeBicn, 
bat ha^ bean lebnilt on one of tfaeeatetea, and are aaffieienttj 
extenaiye for the use of both. Tka eatatei ha^e had nmplr 
time to leeover firom the dinaatein of Am lebellion. Loid Sea* 
ford ia known to be one of the moat Und, wmaidmatp, and 
generooa ptoprietom of the island. £b haa had good aaaagan, 
iriK> ha^e been aocoeaB&l in other instanoea. There is aa ez* 
tmordinarf number of peaaantiy lending on the hmdn The 
psopeitiea ha^e abundance of fioeL, and ewtgy aeqamite within 
diemaelTeay and the aanatanoe of one of the finaat cattle foma 
of the island, belonging abo to Lord Seafind, near at hand. 
No estate in dM colony has better means of doing weiL One 
would my that the two ICon^Mliers, which, theiigh two in 
name, are, in fiict, so oompietely joined as to fom one imdivided 
property, ought to be moat proaperoaa. Newcthelea^ the re- 
verse is the result In the kat year dwy £d not prodaoe one* 
tendi of thffir produce in former days. Tfaia year they am 
ezpeeted by the manager to yidd still leas. They not onlj 
absorb in dieir own expenditure aU 4he profits of the catde 
fiffm abovn meatkmed, bat die eultme of the whole ia a net 
loes of a conaiderable aum to the ptopdeter. The people wOl 
not work in anfficieat numbers, nor with aafimnt wtoHMi;»w 
NeidieKy aa I undersftaad, do diey pay reai finely, a tt h o api ^ 
Lord Seafocd was one of dm first to enjoin the eagtise aepam- 
tkm of the aent ^aaatson fipom that of labor. It ia diffieak t» 
fortheivmef diempioperdea. It m and that Lanl 


Setfixd aetod ngucUotoMty in buiUmg "woAs at tihe Now 
Moaipelier far botib estates, instead of at the Old^ after those of 
both were bamt down bj the stareB in the last rebellion; as in 
ooDseqnenoe of hit doii^ ao the people of ihe Old Moaipelier, 
who regarded themaelyes as superior to those of the New, took 
nnhiage, wad have erar mnee ie£aaed, or beem dinnclined to 
labor at the new works. ThiSi however, which is true to a 
great extent, and is A striking instance df the sort <£ esprit d$ 
carpi edstang in ihe separate corammiitiee established on pro- 
petties, would not aeoooni for the abioknitfw of labor on the part 
of ihepeople of New MoBtpeUez^ and the extreme deterioration 
in ihe quantity t£ piodnce. Some other reason, therefore, 
nmat be aaof^ I have hesnd the oondnet of the people on 
both piopertiai loosely ascribed to the iafluenee of the Baptist 
missianaiies, beeanae their inflneDoe is supposed to operate 
gOEierally in sack a way, and is predominant in ihat quarter; 
bot I have not heasd any more poaitiv« season asngned for the 
belief in this instance. Neither can I imagine what particular 
motiTC they could haTe ibr persoading the people to work less 
on Lord Seaford's proper ti es than elsewhere; nor do I beKere 
that the peopfe would be dissuaded from working if thar wants 
were not an^y snpphed nthout it. I tliamfore attribute Ihe 
dflteriarated condition of iliose properties to the fact that on 
the broad Janda belon^ng to them die people enjoy tlie use of 
unlimited and exteasive grocmds, wintk they cultiTate for their 
own benefit, and thttb the nece ssa ry stimulus for labOT on the 
properties is consequently wantbig. 

I have made this 'partionlar refisrence to ihe deterioration of 
ifaeMcnttpdier estates, beeaBse, though a remarkable, it is not, I 
belieTe, a singnlsx instenoe. There are many properties said to 
be in a jimikr predicsment. There ace otiiers which are yezy 
p ro sp e r ous. I have asea statements showing that the expense 
of fiee lahor is conaidembly less than that of supporting skves; 
and if sufficient hbor ctaM be procured, tiiis would, I ccmoeiTe, 
be the general result; but when labor cannot be found, and 
pBoperties in ccaaefoence become deteriorated, the contrary 



urae miiBt be felt There axe thoae who still mMTrtain that 
labor can alwaya be procaied by Idndnefls. I wish that I ooald 
think so. I diould then have better hopes than I can at pre- 
sent entertain of earl j prosperity with the present popolatioii. 
But it cannot, I fear, be justly denied, that there is a gieat 
want of labor proceeding from the obvious and natoial causes 
of a scanty population and a fadlity of subostence. The Tery 
idea that labor must be coaxed is a confirmation of that facL 

When one seeks the remedy for this hindrance to the coki- 
▼ation of properties, and to the development of the latent 
resources of diis fertile island, which is probably a mine of 
unknown wealthy one can only look to the increase of numbeis 
in the slow progress of time, or to the eflfect of eztenaire immi- 
gration. This subject naturally engages the attention of all 
persons concerned in properties, or who take an interest in the 
prosperity of the isUnd. Various plans are thought oL The 
majority of those interested advocate the introduction of free 
Africans, as being the people best suited to labor on the low 
lands, where the most wealthy estates, those of sugar-cane, are 
generally situated. Asiatics also are looked to; but it bdng 
known that great objections exist at home to any attempt to 
obtain either African or Asiatic emigrants, it is supposed that 
the Maltese will be the best substitutes. The colored popula- 
tion of America are also objects of speculation; but it is under- 
stood that they have higher wages in their own country than 
properties in this island could afford to pay. The introduction 
of Europeans has been tried, but generally without success. I 
submitted to your Lordship, in a former despatch, a statement 
of a successfiil establishment of Europeans on the property of 
the late Gkneral Fiaser. I was sorry to learn, during my recent 
tour, that since that gentieman's demise the experiment has 
proved a fidlure. Three townships also, estd^lished by the 
Legislature of the island, have failed. I have, however, seen a 
party of English laborers on the property of Mr. Salmon, a 
member of tiie Council, mosUy young men, who were healthy, 
happy, and prosperous. It was very gratifying to hear from 


iheii own mouths a statement of their prosperity and content- 
ment They mentioned that they had difficulties to contend 
"With at first fix>m not undeistanding the methods of cultivation 
suited to the country, but that now they were not only at 
ease themselves in that respect, but could put any of their 
countrymen who might join them in the way of doing well. 
Their life seemed to be one of great comfort and enjoyment,. 
and &r superior, in those respects, to that of laborers in England. 
They were located in an elevated part of the island, where the 
dimate is cool and salubrious. I saw also a considerable im- 
portation of Scotch families on the properly of Mr. M^eil, 
the custos of Westmoreland. They had sd&red most la- 
mentably from a typhus fever on board ship on tiieir passage 
out, but the survivors were recovering fast under Mr. McNeil's 
care. They were then in the mountains. Some of them have 
since, I understand, been located on his properties in the low 
lands, and are said to be doing well. My own desire would 
be to see the elevated parts of the island peopled by our own 
countrymen, English, Scotch, and Irish, leaving the low lands 
to the negroes, who seem to prefer tiiem, and where Europeans 
cannot, I conceive, be located as laborers, connstentiy with the 
preservation of their healtii. In tiie high lands the climate is 
congenial to Europeans, and far superior to that of our own 
country. They could perform all the labor requisite, and would 
realise a plentiful and very comfortable subeistence; but they 
must come contented to be laborers, until they can raise tiiem- 
selves higher by their own exertions. They must be tempe- 
rate, else they would soon be destroyed. Houses must be 
prepared for them in the hills ready to receive them on their 
arrival; and they must not be allowed to remain in the low 
lands after their arrival, otherwise tiiey would most probably 
lose their health. If shoals of emigrants were landed at the 
seaports, without previous arrangements for locating them in 
the mountains, there would be dreadful mortality among them. 
On the whole, tiie subject appears to me to be full of difficulty, 
and I do not entertain any sanguine hope of speedy relief t9 

H2 ox THE scHHix coBOsaisam ow the people. 

the agiiciiUiudi iateKsti fitom nam^ntioiu A bill <m the 
ful^eoi ii now faeibte the Hoose c^ AnemUj; and a ataiBg 
deidre ezietayeiy generally to pcoeute so inoreaeeof popidaiiaa 
in thaiwaj. 

X turn fipom the cbeerlesi pnMpeols of pioprielQiB to a ] 
pleanng feature in the preeeiil Older of tUiiga. Thethxi?ing'C 
dition of the peaiiiitiy ii ytxj attikaqg and gr a tifjii ig. I do not 
aniqpoee that any penwintry in the woildhaTBaonuBijoomfarts, 
or 6o mneh independence and et^oyiBent. Their bAarioor is 
peaceable^ and in eome lei^ecta admirable. Tbej am finad of 
flttiTn*HBg divine 8eryice» and axe to be leen on llie Losd^a Daj 
thronging to their req>eetiT6 chuxohei and chapek, dieved in 
good ololhefly and many of them riding on honeback. They 
lend their children to school^ and pay for their sohooling. 
They fobacribe for the erectkn of chnrehes and chapeb; and 
in ^ Baptiet oonunimideB they not only pnnride the "whole 
esrpenae <^ the religious eitablishment, but by the amount of 
their contiibutiona afford to their ministen a mecy respectable 
eoi^rt Marriage is general among ^e people; their morals 
ar% I undecBtandf muxk improTed; and their aobrietf is re- 

For these very gratifying oircamstanees we are indebted totbe 
ministen of religion in the island of all denominations — CSinrdi 
of England, Ourch of Scotland, Moiayisns, Wedeyans, Bap- 
tists. Bish^, dergy, and missionaries all exert thenuelyes, and 
Tie with eaoh other in amicable liyalry to do good to their 
ftUowH^reatoresL The number of ohnrdies, chape^ and sdiools 
built and being buiU in every part of the isknd affords a most 
pleasing and enoouraging sght. In this respect ihe prospects 
of the island are very cheering; and the liberal support afforded 
to use&l institutions, and the encouragement given to religious 
teachers without bigoted exclusions, are creditable to the island 
Legidature^ and every part of the community. 

My attention has necessarily been directed, as one of the most 
important parts of my duty, if not the most important of all, to 
the administration of justice by the magistratea. 


The Bqptifl party pzodanoff ihtl the peesMitiy aie cppraned 
and crashed b j enid kadloids and by lanqidloua laws passed in 
tliefiistpartof tiiepraKBtScssioB. I ootainly did noi peiceiTe 
any geaeral symptoms of sadk oppressioii duzmg my ton. I 
fimiid the peasantry lemazkably comfortable, with money in 
plenty, and independent and their own masttts in a greater 
dcgze^ I belieTey than any peassntzy in die world. The pri- 
sons were ahnost empty. The only vexation that the peasantry 
seemed to me to be snk^eoted toy was fixon the erroneous system 
of tsldng rent adopted by the mgonty of kndlorda or their 
managers, whidi has been aheady described; and fixnn that 
vexation Ab people could rdieve themselves, either by workiBg 
atoadily for the estate, or by seekii^ a more comfortable tenure 
dsewhere, which tibere could be no difficulty in finding in a 
eouiitry abounding with qmre land of the most fertile descrip- 
tion; I do not mean to advocate in the slightest degree what I 
oonceive to be a very erroneous exercise of the rights of land- 
lixds in die mode so firequendy adopted of regulating rent with 
a view to obtain labor. I heartily wish and constantly hope that 
it may cease. But it does not seem to me to merit die of^oro- 
brioas designatioQ of oj^nression; whatever, however, it may 
be termed, it is die only manifest annoyance to which the 
peasantry are subject 

With respect to die laws passed during diis Session, I am not 
aware diat any of diem are iniquitous. The petty debt act has 
come into frequent operation as the readiest method of recovering 
rent or wages^ It applies equally to both sides, and I do not 
perceive that it is an unjust act, unless rent and wages ought 
to be left unpaid. The establishment of a Police is not likely 
to be popular with the bwer classes until diey experience 
benefit firom it, because it must in some respects operate as a 
restraint. I received, however, only two complaints against the 
Police during my tour, which were connected widi die exami- 
nation of goods under the suspicion of their being stolen or 
ilHcidy conveyed. A Police improperly directed may be a 
nuisance. I therefore issued injunctions to prevent vexatious 


intennedclling with the people when the law peased, and have 
renewed them in consequence of the complaints that I leoeiTcd; 
but the paudty of complaints is rather a gratifying proof that 
the Police are not o&nsive. There are other laws, which by 
the party that will not allow Jamaica to settle into a state of 
peace, are reprobated as iniquitous^ but I have not heard a 
single instance of their being the cause of injury or snfieriiig to 
any one. 

Of the gentlemen of the country and the magistrates genenJly 
I see much reason to entertain a good opinion. I see none to 
suppose that they are bent on injustice. There are instances of 
irregular proceedings and wroi^ judgments £rom ignorance of 
law, such as may occur, probably, in all countries where there 
are Courts of impaid magistrates; and there are compkints 
of undue bias in their decisions against both ordinary and 
stipendiary magistrates; but I do not believe that there is 
wilful injustice. I certainly should not pass over any instance 
in which I might be satisfied of its eidstence, wiUiout such 
punishment as it might be in my power to inflict. I hope, by 
obtaining legal opinions on every disputed question, and. so 
laying down rules for future decisions, to prevent gradually the 
errors to which the petty Courts are liable. I feel^ however, 
much the want of Courts of Appeal, and shall endeavour to 
institute them out of existing materials, if they be not provided 
by new enactments of the Legislature. 

I regard my administration as an experiment wUch will 
show whether justice can be faithfully administered, and the 
emancipated population be duly protected in the full enjoyment 
of their freedom and rights on a system of conciliation and 
confidence towards the local Legislature, the island magistracy, 
and all classes of the community. My opinion at present is, 
that this system and those results are not incompatible. If I 
find myself deceived in this expectation, I shall lose no time in 
apprising your Lordship of my disappointment. 

The chief obstruction to the general harmony and happiness 
of the island appears to me to consist in the unceasing effi)rts of 


a amall'party to blacken nearly the whole of the European com- 

munity. That party is composed of Baptist missionaries and a 

few odier individuals, and has two newspapers in its interest. 

It attacks the island institutions, as well as individuals, widi 

virulence, and is not deficient in either talent or energy. Fro- 

feaang to be the only friends of the negroes, its members have 

much power over the minds of that class. They have also the 

ear of the society in England calling itself the Anti-Slavery 

Society, and communicate with the press connected with that 

80<nety. They* therefore, form a party of gxeat influence, 

either to a£fect measures or to injure reputations. 

I have incurred the resentment of this party, owing to the 
publication, among the papers laid before Parliament, of my 
letter of the 16th of October last — ofience having been taken at a 
portion of the information and remarks submitted therein — 
aldiough there is nothing, I think, in that despatch beyond 
what evezy reflecting man would admit it was my duty to state 
in seeking to afibrd information on the state of the island. I 
represented in my letter of the 30th of September last the diffi- 
culty that there would be in conciliating all classes, and how 
conciliation towards any party might lead to distrust and irri- 
tation in another. My apprehensions have been realised. The 
harmony subsbting between the several branches of the Legis- 
lature, and generally throughout the island, has been received 
with distrust and disappointment by the party above described. 
A suppressed disposition to attack me on this account had been 
evinced before the arrival of the last packet; and now that my 
despatch of the 16th of October has afibrded assumed ground for 
resentment, I must expect that my measures, past, present, and 
future, will be reprobated. Threats have already been uttered. 
One reverend gentleman has taken the field, one of their two 
papers is up in arms, and the other may be expected to follow 
the example. 

The publication of my letter alluded to of the 16th of October 
has counteracted the plan, which I had carefully adhered to, 
of avoiding the unnecessary expression of sentiments at which 


eeeded lluit aeillier mj mcMiras nor my cpiniow bad been 
allMfad by «iiy p«rty ; aUiaagli tke cae a qvesliai eti- 
dendydaEked die gomd cocdiii% CBkabbked in theSnv* 
petti ooomMBiiy. Their peMeeUe eoadnd tcmndi die 
Gofemor penonaUy nqglifc have ksled unltt ge&enl aadbo- 
mdoB had ezdnguiBbed parly ipuh: bat paaoe bae ben 
abrapdiy tmninaliyl by dieir xenBtoai at Ibe ktter Aawe 
awBtioiiedy and die aOaeta i ance made are ptobaUy Urn eoan- 
■MDOOMat of an intenainable aenea. I dhall, BevexdMkn^ 
continue to conamaicale to yoor Ixxddnp my Beuluueata on 
aU eubjeeli of paUie intezeBt wxdiovt leserre, boUiag it to be 
iny diity to do aow It will left widi yoa to c btom iia e lAuAa 
die paUicatioB of those aentimeola od etefy ooottaoi be ea^e^ 
dioBt for the pvbhc semoeor odierwiaB. 

I have not alluded to die declaied enaiily of one of die 
partiei in dna island fiom its ptobable efieet on me penooally. 
I haTO been long enough in pnblio Ufe to kmm diat a pablic 
naan nmt expect aboae, and that bis only sure stud^ is the 
app robadop of hia own oonadenoe. I am not, dieRfoie, com- 
plaining of what I know to be inevitable and irremediable; 
but I think it right that your Lorddi^ should be aware of the 
position in whidi the GbTemor now stands, his attempt to 
conciliate all parties hairing failed widi xespect to one; and that 
party, though small in die European community, posKsamg 
immenae influence over masses of the negro pqpolationy and an 
intimate connexion with a hage party at home. 

They are fully senmble of their influence over the n^io 
peculation of their own peisaasion, and, judging fiom their 
past piooeedingB, I cannot rely on their wisdom and modention 
in tl^ use diat they may make of it in order to accomplish 
dieir ends. What dieir ends are I cannot comprehend; fiir 
if they were really the welfare of the island and the happiness 
of die peasantry, I cannot imagine how these gendemen could 
expect to accomplish diose objects by encouraging hatred in 
the negro popuktion against die European community, and by 

THB BMrnst MvmumkwrFS. S47 

ixtitatmg the latter with incessant abuse. The Baptist mis- 
sionaries were, I understand^ in past times subject to much 
obloquy and persecution, and still receive an equal measure of 
abuse in return for what they give; but at present I regard 
them as the aggressors^ for all other parts of the community 
seem to me to desire peace and harmony. 

I speak of the Baptist missionaries as a body, because they 
appear to act as a body, and because there is no symptom 
among^them of dissent from their pabEc proceedings. There 
may be individuals among them who do not concur with the 
majority, but if there are, they show no sign of disapproba- 
tioB* As ODBiBten of religion and instructors of youth, they, in 
wmaiuxm mA ■nnstoni of odier churches and seett, have zen- 
dfised and are w i kkring ineatimable aearvice to the Goloiiy ; but 
as Ae poKlical body into which they hsve constitated them- 
sdvei^ ihej are, I imty intensted, derigning, and torbakBt^ as 
well as iMBgetooB to the pabfio peace j&om ihe infliiewiw which 
they have acquired. I consider it to be very unfortunate that 
this powecful party has become initated agaiast &e Governor 
persona&y, because this feeling may do incalcalaUe injiny to 
the pdbEc service; bofcnotfiiiig on their part shall induce me to 
swerve fiom my duty, whidi indndes justice, liberality, and 
ooooifiatioii towards them as well as towards every other party 
in the eokny. My (^[unions r^arding them have been forced 
on my nund by their ptoceediags; and these opinaciisit is my 
duty to sabmit. I shall heartily lejoice if I see reason to 
change them; and my most amdoos epprehensioas Hoarding 
the fiite <^ Jamaica woald thereby be removed; bat ao repre- 
soitatioii o( the state of the island could be fsithfnl that ez- 
doded fiom view the influence poesessed by the Baptist mis- 
nonaties, and the spirit in which it is exerdsed. 




NoTember li, 1839. 

Mt Lobd, — .... I have been endeayouzingy ever 
siiice I assumed the charge of this govemmeiity to inculcate 
temper, forbearance, charity, and harmony among her Majesty's 
subjects in this island, and I see much reason to hope that ^e 
good sense of all parties will ultimately secure these desirable 

The real difficulty, with regard to the prosperity of the pro- 
prietors, appears to me to consist in the means possessed by 
the laborer of comfortable subsistence, independent of labor for 
wages. He may have regourse to the latter for the sake of 
money, or handsome clothing, or luxuries^ but he is hardly 
ever reduced to it from absolute necessity. The usual order of 
things prevailing in other countries is thereby reversed in this; 
and it is here no favor to give employment^ but an assumed 
and almost acknowledged favor to give labor. There is a sense 
of obligation in being served, but none in being employed. I 
see no remedy for this difficulty but what time may produce. 
Immigration, from various causes, is not probable on a sufficient 
scale; and people will not labor without an adequate sense of 
self-interest. Those who do not feel the necessity or advantage 
of working from that motive, cannot be expected to exert them- 
selves from benevolence to others, or notions of duty to the 
community. Nevertheless, from all that I hear, I believe 
that, in respect to labor, considerable improvement is gradually 


maldng way. The tone of the landed gentry is not universally 
so despondent as it appears at one time to have been. The re- 
spective parties are making arrangements together, with more 
or less mutual satis&ction in different parts. A return of staple 
exports, from the 10th of October, 1837, to the 10th of October, 
1839, herewith enclosed, shows a large decrease in the exports of 
ihe last year of that period compared with the one preceding, 
and it is apprehended that there will be a further falUng off in 
those of the next season, owing to the want of labor in 1838; 
but there seems to be a general opinion that the return of 1841 
win be more &vorable. 


December 80« 1839. 

Mt Lobd, — ^I see no reason to be dissatisfied with the 
manner in which affidrs generally are at present proceeding in 
tills island. A good understanding between employers and 
laborers appears to be gaining ground, and tiiere are fewer 
complaints than there were on the part of landholders of dis- 
indmation on tiie part of the peasantry to work. It seems to 
be now generally admitted that there is a manifest improve- 
ment in this respect, comparing the period of this year since 
August or September with the same period of the last 

Disputes and litigation still continue in some degree, but the 
instances, with reference to tiie number of the parties in ques- 
tion, do not appear to be numerous, and have muck decreased. 
Those that have come under my notice have been for alleged 
breach of contract on tiie part of tiie laborer, and consequent 
withholding of wages on tiie part of the employer, or few 
demands of rent for houses and grounds. As tiie laborers 
seldom enter into engagements for labor beyond a week, the 
landowners, in many instances, refuse to let house or land for a 
longer period. Rent, therefore, may be legally exacted witii a 
very short notice, on any terms that the landlord may choose 


to impoia; aad it is oAat aade mbflenrieBt to kbor, faeing 
leoeaed or CBtiiriy remilted, im mddktOB to pftjmcBi of wagea, 
if kbor b affoided, attl dooUed « tid]U if kWr ifl mtU^ 
It k im sone {dbces a praolioe to talcs vml from everf iadi- 
Tidual subsistiiig UvtBelf by eabiviliai on a pnpertj, if lie 
do not woik for the eilate, vidiovt i)i^[»d to the mnAer Ifcat 
aHj ooempj me hooBe or till tlie «udm gunrnd, the Tent Bot 
beiAg levkd on ^ aotual vike of ihe Jiouaei or OR aaj fpeoifie 
qnaality of grouAd — this being im xaoBt easei vitbomt pinBe 
lirndftB or meamememt— bnt on tbe privilege cf lesidaioe amd 
the advantage of deriving subsistence ftaaa tbe kmd of ihe 
estate. In such cases, the demand is modified or relinqnished 
if the tenants work on the property, but exacted in full if they 
do not. This mode of levying rent is deemed lawless oppreasion 
by the excluave advocates of the emancipated class, while by 
thoaa who hanw seoourse to it, it is regarded as a necessary self- 
defence agaiaat the power of the kboEers to nun the eatsie by 
strikiiig voik at any critical pesiod— a poirar whick tjkey geme- 
zally poaseBSi firon ikeix lebotanoe to enter into engi^gemieBts 
liar woric, amd whioh they axe said to ez^nise witbant bestalioB 
whenitadistheircomvenienoe or pleasnietodoBO. Xhe: 
levioltiag featurn of this state of thinga ia, that the < 
of provirioma planted by the temamta is^ along witk their es- 
pokion, aometimea, but X hope xmrely, die mnanq[nrnnr of dia^ 
putes with the mianager of the pxoperty. I imm heard of 
infltonces of thk land , but aone have owie oflfeimHy beftne tne ; 
nor htfireaay^asfiuraslam awue, been iMale Oe sak^eotof 
oompkint bc^tbae any Court. There may be eaaoani which even 
thk eztiemily, bMrbarow as at seems^ m$j foe both legal and 
justifiable; but I tmat that the ooeuxrenoe of ike practaoe k 
oottfiBed to the few inatanoes in whieh I hsi« heard of it I 
have adverted to thk question of xent in a fimer deapsldi, 
but have recmxed to it again, beoauae it aeema to me to be <he 
one that zemaans more unaettkd tham any other part of the 
lektiona between die agricultural kborer and Us employer, 
and lihe cody one likdy to ooi^iuuie a aubjeet for agitatm. It 

is not, however, to be inferred that the owners or managers of 
all properties act on the STStem described. I have heard seyeral 
dilate with pleasure on the advantage which they have derived 
from making rent and wages totally unconnected; by taking 
their rent separately, regularly, and without diminution; and 
by paying wages without any deduction on account of rent. 
Under these circumstances, diey say the tenants prefer, for 
their own sakes, as well as from good feeling towards their 
landlords, to work for the estates on which they are located, 
and do so cheerfully, so that there are no disputes. I should 
hope that most commonly the separation of the questions of 
rent and wages has already taken place, and that it will become 
the pmctioe univexsaUy. Thexe will be no diffiouky on these 
subjects when labor is tm esseatial to the praMut as ii is to the 
kadlord^Md »k« liie Mrt of lioiK «nd iaad ^ 
suffioienl ^ixe to xeoompeiise the landlord for tiie letting of 
his property^ without reference to other condderations. Until 
then, I can only hope that good sense wHl mutually prevail, 
and the two parties concur in what is beneficial for both; for I 
apprehend that anj attempt to interfere by legislation would 
be both futile and injurious. 

With jrfeiqaut to the relations of Jamaica with the mother 
comtry, a gwd spixit seems to me to picrail throoghomt the 
iilaad; and this has, I think, been evinced in the pxooeedxBgs 
of the Legislature during the present Session. I am awaiting 
the seeopi of copies of the iiumeious aols tlurt have been pasKd, 
in oflfder to lay them before your Lotdship, yriAk such vemsrics 
as the <wwieati of each may suggest 



[At page 897 refSsraioe is made to the cucnmBtanoes under whkk the 
Stipendiazy Ma^pstnAei were appointed. Tinej irere sent out witii the 
object of oountencting the sapposed one^dednesa and iogiutioe <^ the 
local magistracy, which was composed principally of the proprkiUns and 
their agents ; bat Sir Charles Metcalfe, seeing that mnch ill-will was per- 
petuated by the existence of the stipendiary body, was anxious gradually to 
abolish it, by abstaining from filling np vacancies as they arose.] 


December 21, 1839. 
Mr LoBDj — ^I report with regret the death of Captain 
Reynolds, one of the stipendiary magistrates, and a respectable 

I should have suggested, for your Lordship's conndeiadon, 
that the opportunity unfortunately afforded by this casualty 
might be taken to commence a gradual and experimental re- 
duction of the number of stipendiary magistrates, for reasons 
which will be explained in a subsequent part of this letter. My 
only inducement for not submitting that reoonmiendation on the 
present occasion is, that there are two gentlemen acdng as sti- 
pendiary magistrates in the places of absentees, on whose return 
they would be thrown out of employment, if they were not 
proyided for by nomination in succession to vacancies, by death, 
resignation, or removal. They were appointed to officiate by 


my predecessor, and are, I understand, deserving men. It rests 
with your Lordship to determine whether their claims to succeed 
shall be allowed, or a reduction be actually commenced on the 
present occasion. If you approve the gradual reduction that I 
contemplate, I shall avoid the occurrence of any future claims 
of this description by abstaining from the nomination of any 
additional magistrates to act for absentees, — a course that I have 
no doubt can be adopted without disadvantage, while it will 
tend to advance the gradual reduction which I conceive to be 

Your Lordship will probably expect from me a statement of 
my opinions on the question of the aboUtion of the special magis- 
tracy in August, 1840, or its continuance beyond that period. 
I therefore embrace this opportunity to submit my sentiments 
on that subject. 

It is impossible to enter on this question without bringing to 
mind the hardship, and suffering that would attend the turning 
adrift of a number of meritorious gentlemen, whose sole de- 
pendence is on the subsistence afforded by the offices which 
they hold. I am sensible, however, that the question must be 
decided on public grounds, and that private considerations 
must be excluded. 

In some respects the abolition of the existing stipendiary 
magistracy is very desirable. It would remove the only cause 
of offence in the present order of things. The stipendiary ma- 
gistrates have had such a part to perform in this island, that the 
landholders, composing the principal portion of the influential 
community of the country, cannot be expected to be reconciled 
for a long time to come to an arrangement which they regard 
as a grievance and great affront to themselves. No measure 
could be more gratifying to them than the abolition of the sti- 
pendiary magistracy. Many admit that, in the altered state of 
society, some stipendiary magistrates are necessary, and that 
the business of the country cannot be sufficiently carried on by 
unpaid magistrates alone. The Legislature would probably be 
willing to provide for the requbite number of fixed magistrates, 



and migbt not object to the employinent of a £em of Ihe pse- 
■ent ifeipendiarief ; bat the cnriiiting msthotioii and the majontj 
'of its memben axe objects of looted dialikey and lia abc^tion 
would canae great joy and aatiafiiction to the landholdeiB gene- 

I do not aaeribe these feelings to any eiq>ectation that the 
ramoTal of the sfeipendiaiy magiafcmtea would xeatore a ou e id f e 
power owe the kbonng population — forldo not imapne that 
any such idea ezkia— but to the belief that the prcsm oe of the 
fitipendiaiy magistrates on the present flystem, and the spizit in 
which thdr fimctioaa haye been ezerdsed, do and will prevent 
the inflnenoe which the landlords in other free comtries na- 
torally possess over the agiicultaral laboroa in their Tianity, 
and over tenants on their estates. 

I cannot pretend to say what would have been &e conae- 
qnence in carrying the establishment of freedom into eflEect if 
stipendiary magistrates on the present footing had not been 
located in the several pari^es, but it appears to me to be 
certain that their introduction has, in a great degree, tended to 
predode the formation of the mutual agreement and attachment 
which exist elsewhere between landlords on the one hand, and 
tenants and laborers on the oth^r, and are fisflential £ar the con- 
tentment and prosperity of an agricultural community. What- 
ever may have been the advantages produced by the stipendiary 
magistrates in other respects^ they have, I fisar, caused or pro- 
moted the great evil of discord between the landhddea and 
the laboring population. I should, tiierefbre, r^ard the aboli- 
tion of the stipendiary magistracy as most desirable, if I were 
satbfied tiiat it would now tend to establish those rdations 
which, for the welfioe of the conmittnity, ought to subost be- 
tween the higher and the lower ordecB. 

It may naturally be doubted whether the abolitioit of the 
stipendiary magistracy could be carried into eflfect without pro- 
ducing injustice towards the laboring population, by placing 
them under a magistracy composed almost ezdnsvely <k hmd- 
J<»ds and their agents. I cannot presume to determine so un- 


poitaat a queBlion, bni I ahould entertain a confident hope that 
the measaie might be adopted without that lamentable result 
The local magistrates are remorable by the Governor at plea- 
anre; and I should expeot that, by a watchful attention to their 
conduct^ by working on ihdr good feelings, by settling all 
doubtful points either by law or by l^al opinions, and by in* 
sisting on the administration of justice accordingly^ as well as 
by the formation of such institutions as the Legislature of the 
idand might be disposed to maintrfiin for the purpose, the equi- 
table administration of justice might be secured here, as well as 
elsewhere, without the continued imposition on the colony of a 
class of magistrates who are naturally odious to those whose in* 
fiuenoe they in great measure subvert. 

I have no apprehension that the laboring population would 
tamely submit to injustice, even if I saw reason to anticipate, 
which I do not, that injustice would be systematically at- 
tempted. I do not suppose that theie eidsts in any part d[ the 
world a laboring population less likely to submit to oppression 
without making every practicable exertion to resist it. They 
are fully stable of die rights of freedom; and having stepped 
into them suddenly, they are mose tenacious of them, in every 
tittle, than those who have grown up in the possession of those 
rights from infimcy to manhood. At the same time, having 
bc^n taught, by circumstances and the instruction of others, to 
regard their former masters as their enemies, they are devoid of 
that habitual deference and respect for their landlords and supe- 
riors which the rural population of other countries generally 
imbibe. I have not the slightest apprehenaon that they would 
submit to injustice without struggling for redress. I should 
rather fear that they would be hasty in conceiving and resent- 
ing it» even where ^e etymptoms might be questionable. These 
opnions may be erroneous, and I shall be glad to coixect them 
when I find that they are so. I submit them now without 
sufficient experience to give weight to them^ because the occa- 
sion requires that I should state what my opinions are on this 
important point 

2 a2 


As fitr, iherefoie, as legards the essential admimstratioii of 
justice, and the conduct to be expected firom the local magis- 
tracy, I should have no hesitation in carrying on the goTem- 
ment of this colony without the aid of the present body of sd- 
pendiaiy magistrates, and am of opinion that they might be 
discontinued without any ill effect on those points; but there 
is one consideration which deters me from recommending thor 
sudden or complete removal The emancipated population 
have been taught to regard their former masters as dieir op- 
pressors, and the stipendiary magistrates as their peculiar pro- 
tectors — as a body especially appointed for the security of their 
freedom and rights. If the charge against the stipendiary ma- 
gistrates of pardality towards the laboring population be in any 
degree true, that circumstance must tend to increase the exclu- 
sive confidence of the people towards them. I cannot tell 
what might be the effect of a sudden removal of the stipendiary 
magistrates. Its operation on the imagination of the people 
might produce serious and deplorable consequences, even if no 
pains were taken to aggravate their despair. 

I cannot, therefore, venture to recommend a proceeding, 
which otherwise, on some public grounds of importance, I 
should regard as very desirable* But I am induoedf by the 
various considerations that I have stated^ to believe that a gra- 
dual reduction is advisable. 

The gradual reduction which I have recommended may seem 
to your Lordship to be too slow in its operation, if you sbould 
approve the reduction of the number of stipendiary magistrates 
on any plan; and it certainly would be too slow for the expec- 
tations of those who desire the removal of the whole body. I 
nevertheless am unable to suggest any other scheme of reduc- 
tion that appears so likely on the whole to accomplish the 
various objects that must be kept in view. The method that 
I propose is, that every opportunity be taken of death, resigna- 
tion, removal, or promotion, to reduce the number, and that 
the operation be facilitated by taking advantage of every occa- 
sion on which a magistrate can be transferred to any other office 


without injury to his interests. By this method the people will 
become gradually accustomed to the want of stipendiary magis* 
trateSy and if any evil should thence arise, it will become 
apparent before ^e mischief be either great or irremediable. 
In the mean time the stipendiary magistrates may be instructed 
to pursue a course which will render them less obnoxious to the 
landed gentry, by seeking exclusively to do justice, without 
reference to the situation or color of the parties, and by ceasing 
to regard themselves as the protectors of a particular class — a 
feeling which can hardly fail to impair their judicial impar- 
tiality. In this manner^ and by settling doubtful points, and 
leaving less to the discretion of magistrates than is at present in 
that predicament, owing to the numerous questions that arise 
imder a new order of things, I should hope that the gradual 
reduction of the stipendiary magistrates might take place with 
good effect and without any mischief, and that by degrees the 
irritation which their appointment or their conduct has caused 
will cease, so as eventudly to lead to their admission, by consent 
of the local Legislature, into the institutions paid by the island, 
as a useful and efficient body — an admission which is at present 
totally impossible. 

If your Lordship, admitting the expediency of some reduc- 
tion without a total abolition, should insist on an immediate 
reduction to the lowest number that might be deemed necessary^ 
it would be my duty to state that the number might be reduced 
to one for each parish, or about one-half of the present esta- 
blishment; not, however, without some apprehension on my 
part that so great a reduction, suddenly executed, might alarm 
the emancipated population, not merely through their own fears 
for the loss of so many supposed protectors, but also through 
the sentiments which they would hear from their advisers. 
On the other hand, such a reduction would be- more gratifying 
to the landholders than the gradual one before suggested, as it 
would in a greater degree advance the object of their earnest 
desire. If your Lordship should require so great a reduction at 
once, I would recommend that it should be carried into efiect 

Sfi8 8TXPJEEn>uxr KAfiunuiss. 

on some general principle, snoh m the letwitinn of llie scDian 
snd the disohazge of the jonioEB; thfti noiild piediide the idea 
of piitiaUtfi ficom which it would be scaxodj posiible to eacepe 
in any edeodon aooozding to eetimated meot, llie efeandnd of 
merit being bo diflEnent in diflbient hranfJinB of Ihe cooDBmsity^ 
that the abienoe of partialitj would not be anffiiMnt to piefeot 
Its bong inferred. 

lliere ie et present befi>re the Hooee of AfisemUy a lall for 
ihe improvement of oar judicial establiahmenti, wUch indndea 
a provision for the appointment of chairmen of the CodxIb of 
Quarter Sessions, to be nominatwl from gentlemen of legal 
education and praetaoe, either bamsters eaocfaisvely, or indnding 
aoIicitoiB, as may be determined. Ifthisbill becaixiedy ssFecal 
members of the House of Assembly will have given their aop- 
port to it chiefly for the purpose of eflEbcting the xemoval of 
the stipendiary magistrates. If the Courts, under legal dbaix^ 
men, obtain the confidence of the emancipated popnlatian, the 
only objection on public grounds that I see to the xemoval of the 
magistrates paid by the mother coontxy will be obviated. It 
vrould then become my duty to submit an opinion to that efihst 
for your Lordship's consideration. 

I have now stated, I fear in too hurried a manner, owing to 
the expected despatch of the packet, all the esHpaitial pconts 
that occur to me on this important subject; my own inrJinatiop 
being at present towards the gradual reduction that Ihave t 
deavoQted to describe. 



[Erom a deBpatch» dated Januaiy 12, 1840, revievisg oertain acts of the 
local Legislature.] 

[ExTBACT.] — No. 44^ ^^ An Act to provide an adequate 
Salaiy to support the honor and dignity of her Majesty's Be- 
piesentatave in this Island," fixes and increases the Goremor's 
salary, and abolidies feea which he zeoeiyed as dbanceUor, and 
ordinazj and other allowances formerly assigned in lieu of 
servants, of Pen, and of Mountain, the two latter terms having 
reference to country seats at one time supplied to lihe Governor 
at the expense of the island, for which amount sunui of money 
were subsequently substituted. The allowance for servants was 
a substitute for the slaves fonnerly attached to the King's 
house. Besides these fees and allowances, the Governor had 
an umual salary, from wnat is termed the Council Fund, of 
15001. sterling. Li bygone days and during war ihe emdu- 
ments of the GoTeznor are said to have been very large; but 
latterly, the salary, fees, and allowances above notioed, together 
widi a share of escheats, constituted the total of his remunera- 
tion, unless it was augmented by an additional grant firam the 
island Legidatuze. The aggregate, independently of such a 
grant, was on an average rather under 5000/. sterling per 
annum. It was customary, as one of the first measures of the 
Assembly after ihe anival of a new Governor, to Tote an addi- 
tional salary of 16002. sterling per annum. The aggregate cf 
llie Gbvemoz^fl stipend with this increase was on an avemge, 
according to the accounts laid before the House of Assembly 


on the prese&t oocanon, 6480/. sterling per annum. The addi- 
tional allowance of 1500/. above mentioned was Yoted for tbe 
last time to the Maiquia of Sligo; but when, during hia Lord- 
8hip*8 adminiatration, the feelings of the Hoose of Aaaembly 
had become embittered, a resolution was passed that no addi- 
tional salary should be granted to any future GroYemor. This 
resolution was in force on tiie accession of Sir Lionel Smith; 
and whether it was from conastency, or because he was only 
at first Lieutenant-Governor, or because, as Commander of the 
Forces, he had already an addition to his civil allowances larger 
than that which it was customary to vote, no further salary was 
granted. He was subsequently, I believe, instructed to apply 
for the usual additional salary, and did so. It was tiien leftised; 
partiy, it is now said, because it was demanded as a right, and 
partiy because he had a larger remuneration, owing to his 
military allowances, than any civil Governor would have, even 
with the usual addition. On my succeeding to the govemmoit, 
it was my determination not to make any attempt whatever, 
either directly or indirectiy, to obtain the usual additional 
salary. This was not only in my opinion the course most 
suitable to the character of the office which I hold, but was the 
more requisite, as one of my first duties being to conciliate the 
House of Assembly by all proper means, it was essential to 
avoid anything that could possibly attach unworthy motives 
to the conduct that I had to pursue. The proceedings of the 
House, therefore, in every part of the measure now enacted^ 
have been perfectly spontaneous. One of the members in the 
first instance, and soon after the commencement of the session, 
announced his intention of making a motion for an additional 
salary to the Governor, but subsequentiy gave way to another 
member, who took up the question with a more enlarged view 
of it, and urged the propriety of fixing an adequate salary for 
the Governor in one 8um, and of abolishing the fees and other 
allowances heretofore drawn. This gentieman had the courtesy, 
before he brought in his bill, to consult me on the principles of 
it, without any reference to the amount of salary that might be 


fixedi and zeoeiTed my complete and hearty assent to those 
principles. These were, that the objectionable and derogatory 
mode in which the Governor had been accustomed to receive 
his remuneration — ^that is, by fees and various petty allowances 
— should be abolished, and a fixed salary of one amount substi- 
tuted; and that the salary should be fixed, not for the present 
Governor alone, but for all future Governors likewise, so that 
no future Governor should be placed on his arrival in the 
awkward position of depending for a portion of his salary on 
the humor of the House of Assembly at the time. Both of 
these principles have been attended to in the act, the former 
satLsfactorily, but the latter not so perfectly as I expected, and 
understood to be intended. This will be explained in the 
sequel Before the bill had passed the House, and while it 
was still in the committee to which it had been referred, the 
same gentleman who had previously consulted me as to its 
principles, took an opportunity of statbg the probable amount 
of the salary which would be fixed^ and mentioned 7000/. ; 
on which I remarked that I considered it as quite suffi- 
cient, and even more than was requisite. That was in 
reality my opinion, for I neither expected nor desired more 
than had been customary. Notwithstanding this intima- 
tion, the committee recommended the larger sum of 8000/., 
and when the proposition was discussed by the House, the 
only debate that took place was not from any objection to 
that amount, but on two motions to increase it, one of which 
would have made the salary 10,500/., and the latter, 11,500^ 
The recommendation of the committee was finally adopted, and 
the amount fixed at 8000/. — ^that is, 6500/. in lieu of fees, 
various allowances, and other emoluments^ in addition to the 
1500/. received from the Council Fund. This salary is ample, 
without being excessive, with reference to the calls on the 
Governor for expenditure, if he performs that part which his 
station may be said to require of him. The spirit in which the 
measure was carried through the House could not fidl to be 
highly gratifying, but the satisfactory character of the arrange- 


has been impeiied, and one of its pnnaqplee ui a gnat 
degiee deperted fioni, by limilaig ile dmatiaA to fiw Teeo. 
The fldaiy is eftill a edaiy, not for me peiBoiuJlj, bat ix the 
Govttnor £nr the tune beingt andthedniatiflnoffive jeaairillf 
moil paofaeUt^t extend bejond the period of myadmrniftortiffn; 
bat this Hmitatinn will bring the qneetian of the Govenot^e 
fldery agun befose the HoaaB^ and nnder it hable to be 
afibcted by ^pc^ukr finding of the tinie^ whatever it may be. 
Th^ rrpfeTiatifm gmn 1^ tw^ f^^ i3m }writ^**'V!\ ^i thatalthoogh 
tibe adary ia at pieBent meant to be pennanent &t all Gotbt- 
noBSy it ia, neveilheleBB^ <^Tpfidifait diat the Legidatuxe shonld 
have the power of eodier ledudng it or increaaing it, afier an 
interval, aocoodingly as the state of the piosperity and veaoozoes 
of the isknd at the time may eaggest the one or oompd the 
otheiw I was not airue of thia limitation of dandon given to 
the act until it had passed die House of Aanmbty. I ehonld 
otherwise have prevented it, by pointing out that it might pze- 
dade my consent to the aot» firom ita not being quite oon- 
sistent with the letter <^ my instmodons to aasent to it^ theae 
direoting me not to aooept any additional salary unleas it were 
granted tome and my aoooeesoaB, or to me for the period of my 
administration. When I became acquainted with die limita- 
tion as it stands in the aot» there waa no mode left of 
exduding it otherwise than by xejectbig the whole act, — a 
measure which it did not aeem to me right to adopt, aa die act 
aoocrds with the spirit of my inatmcdons in grsadng die aalaxy 
to fiiture GovemoEB ss well aa myself and, being altogedier a 
different measure fi(»n diat contemplated by die inatmcdaDS, 
hardly appears to come under them. Shonld your Lorddi^>, 
however, be of opimon that die alteration ia desirable, I am 
assured diat there will be no difficulty in altering the limitadon 
to die term of my adminifiratian. I acknowledge, however, diat 
I piefiar the present Umitation to one that would make die 
grant more personaL The act rests at present on a better 
principle, aldiough die dmntion is too diort ; and die only 
ahfiradans in that reject that appear to me to be desiaUe are 


either the lengthening of the duiation, or the total abolition of 
the limitation. There is a clanse in the act which limits the 
aakzy of a Lieutenant-Governor, or Governor exerdaing the 
military command in the island, to 6000Z. sterling, in addition 
to his military allowances. I am not aware that there is any 
objection on principle to this clause, according to which a 
Grovemor, holding also the military command of the forces, will 
stiU have a larger salary than one exercising only the civil 
government By a subsequent resolution of the House, the 
payment of the difference between the salary fixed and the 
allowances to which the Governor, under the law repealed, 
was before entitled, has been made retrospective firom the 
commencement of my administration. It may be proper to 
semaric, that if^ fix>m any csose^ this act shoold not be renewed 
at the tetmiiwfcion of its penod of duration, the law which it 
repeals will of course revive, and the aUowanoes of the Gt>ver- 
non win be what they were before ihis act was paased. 



April 15, 1840. 

My Lord, — ^I have the honor to sabmit an abstract of the 
act for the reform of the administration of jusdoe Which has 
been passed by the Legislature of this island. 

Its principal provisions are, the creation of a profearional 
Vice-Chancellor, two professional Assistant Judges, and nine 
professional Chairmen of Quarter Sessions, who will also be chief 
Judges of Common Pleas, and will form Courts of Appeal from 
the Petty Sessions, and from the summary jurisdiction of ^e 

The Vice-Chancellor is to have a salary of 25007. sterling; the 
Assistant Judges of the Supreme Court, of 2000/. sterling each ; 
and the Chairmen of Quarter Sessions, of 1000/. each. 

The Vice-Chancellor and the Assistant Judges, I r^iet to 
say, are to be selected from the Jamaica Bar alone. I do not ex- 
press this regret from any doubt of there being gentlemen at 
the Jamaica Bar fit, from their qualifications, as well as eligible 
by the terms of the act, but because the range of selection is 
thereby on general principles too restricted, and because this 
part of the act will not, I know, have your Lordship's appro- 
bation. It was strongly contested in the House of Assembly, 
many members seeing distinctly the propriety of throwing the 
selection open to the Bar of the United Kingdom as well as to 
that of Jamaica. There was only a majority of four in favor 


of the limitatioii. The Council tried an amendment, throwing 
open the appointment of yice-Chancellor, but that also was 
rejected by the same majority. The minority in the Assembly 
made another efibrt, and would, it is said, have equalled their 
opponents on that occasion, but it was too late. The limita- 
tion, of course, proceeds from local feelings; and there is this 
to be said in favor of it, that xmless the selection be confined 
to the Jamaica Bar, there is little chance of their ever practically 
benefiting by the appointments created, as when nominations 
can be made fix>m home they generally are made from home 
for obvious reasons, and the Jamaica Bar, who have no prospect 
of promotion at home, are thus cut ofi*from it here also. Never- 
theless, from higher considerations than the interests of the Ja- 
maica Bar, it is clear that the range of selection ought to be more 
extennve. Your Lordship will perceive that the limitation in- 
cludes gentlemen now at home who have at any time heretofore 
practised for the requisite number of years at the Bar of Jamaica. 
I will endeavour to procure a list of gentlemen under those 
circumstances, and transmit it, together with a list of those now 
at the Bar here, for your Lordship's consideration. 

The appointment of the Chairmen of the Quarter Sessions is 
on a better footing. The act enables your Lordship to appoint 
the whole of these &om England, and to select them from bar- 
risters of two years' standing at the Bar of the United Kingdom. 
This appears to me to be an enactment of great importance, for 
it is in the lower Courts, not in the higher, that distrust of mo- 
tives is likely to prevail. With Courts of Appeal, consisting 
of men of legal knowledge and unbiassed judgment, all in our 
power will be done to give confidence in the administration of 
justice between the landowners and their laborers; and the 
usefulness of those Courts may perhaps be hereafter extended. 
I should wish, with your Lordship's concurrence, to reserve one 
of these nominations for a gentleman — Mr. Bernard — ^who is 
a sufferer by this act — for he will lose a judgeship — and the 
only man, I believe, in the island possessed of all the requisite 
qualifications, with the additional very essential one, that his 


iioiiimation would be palalable to all putieB. Thoe ne odna 
qualified in all other xeapeeli, and olheiB who miglit bsve the 
oonfidenoe of all partoes, hot are nol pffrfcannally qualified. 
The gendeBBan abore named hat the aingnlar fiaitoDe to be 
digible in eveiy reaped, and la the onlj one of ivhott I ean 
(^ dial opinion. iBhoddthereftnebehappjtobeaBDlhoxiBBd 
to confer one of theae appointmentB on him; and if your Lordr 
ship will aend dght uprighti nnbiaand gendemen, of legal 
knowledge and aotmd judgment, to fill the other seala nnder 
Ihia arrangement, the Goorta of Qoarier Seoiana and Common 
Pleaa will be greatly improved, and the GooitB of Aj^ieal will, 
I trost, work wdL 

Whatever poweia aie given by ihia aoi to the (aovemor, are 
of course given to your Lordahip, under whoae oides the Go- 
vernor acta. 

It 18 not my intention to carry into eSbct airjr put of ihe 
act that depends on me until I receive your sanction and in- 

The increase of the salaiyof the Chief Justice to 3000iL aker- 
ling 18 a proper measure, anl fiilly merited by the long and aUe 
services rendered by Sir Jodiua Bowe to the eokmy, in which 
his impartial and benevolent admimstntion of juatioe baa gained 
nnivenal confidence and admiration. 

I hope that the defect in the bill produced by the lif^tatiffin 
of the three appointments in the higher Courts to tiie Jamaica 
Bar will not induce your Lord^p to disallow the act. It is 
in other req)ects a very good act, and ought not, I tiunk, to be 
tiirown away. If your Lordship will confirm the act, and in- 
struct me to endeavour to procure the amendment of any part 
that you may deem objectionable^ my best efibrta ahall be ex- 
erted to accompHdi your widies. 

P.S. — It occurs to me to notice to your Lorddiip tiiat no 
banister can be admitted to the Jamaica Bar who has not been 
previously caUed to the Bar in England. 



Uuly 33, 1840 J 

[Tbe Mowing extracts from despatches to the Colonial Office are giren 
in ilhtstrstion of the ooncifiatQiy oonne of poficj wMdi Sir Charles Met- 
cdfe so ipisefy ponoed in JaDMSca^ and which was pxodoctrre in the end of 
sock bmcfieial reanlta. He was of opinion that mneh harm reaolted from 
the disposition of the Home QoTenmient to mistrust and to interfere with 
the local L^;iaktare ; and these despatches were written, parti j« in respectful 
deprecation of this mistrust and interference. It was ohvions that at such 
a time the worst consequences would ensue from a rupture with the House 
of Assembly.] 

[Extract.] — It will be seen £rom tlie xemarka herein sub- 
mitted, that, of the fear acts which your Lordship piopoeea to 
extingiiiBh, three fonn Boards by which a considerable portion 
of the public boanesB of the cokxnjr is conducted with benefit, 
I oonceiTB, to the State^ and with so much comfort and satifl- 
faction to myself as the Ocnremor, thai I should find it difficult 
to say in what manner the same duty could be more efficiently 
or moie carefully perfcrmed; and that the fourth act is one for 
which apparently no snbsdtute could be found. 

Gnmtbg, however, the possibility of finding substitutes for 
these acts, whidi, being more in accordance with the practice at 
home, would be more agreeable to your Lordship, there remains 
» most cogent reason for abstaining firom disallowing them, 
which is, that they could not be discontmned with the concur- 
xcnce of the isknd L^islatore. 


The control over the finances and the ezpenditare to the 
extent proyided by these acts, is held to be the right of the 
popular branch of the Legislature, established bj practioey as 
many rights are in most constitutions of long standing. It 
would be no consolation to the island constituency for the loss 
of this right to hear your Lordship's explanation of its origin. 
They would deny that during the time of Slavery the popular 
branch of the Legislature was generally, if ever, the passive and 
obedient instrument of the Governor's will, and would appeal 
to facts in history to show that the House of Assembly had 
frequently during that period made a resolute stand against the 
Elxecutive Government, and most commonly with success. They 
would argue that the possession of these powers by the popular 
branch of the constitution is an indication of former strength, 
and that such powers are not ordinarily conceded to weakness. 
The abolition of these four acts would be regarded as a revolu- 
tion, and would, I apprehend, be reristed by all the means that 
the popular branch of the Legislature possesses. I cannot per- 
ceive any advantage that would be gained by the abolition that 
could compensate for the injurious consequences of a rupture 
with the island constituency. 

If your Lordship should continue to deem it of paramount 
importance that the powers possessed by these Boards should 
be wrested from the legislative and transferred to the executive 
power, I would still recommend that the measure should be 
deferred until a sufficient number of the membeis of the Legis- 
lature be willing to concur in it, or until other circumstances 
arise to justify such an attack on the hitherto acknowledged 
privileges of the island constituency. It would be doubly ill- 
timed at present to rush into such a collision, when tiie colony 
is only recovering from the wounds inflicted by the recent 
contest, and when the conduct of the legislative bodies is sudi 
as to entitle them to approbation and esteem. 

There are two methods of governing Jamaica: with and by 
the island constituency and its representatives, or against them. 
The first, to be successful, must be consistent. A measure of 


condliatioii to-day and one of irritation to-morrow, an altcfna* 
tion of confidence and distrust, of kindness and jealousy, will 
not produce cordial co-operation. There must be continued 
confidence, mucli patience and consideration, sincere respect 
for established rights and privileges, and credit for good inten- 
tions. Then I believe every amendment that can be desired, 
either in laws or in administration, for which the resources of the 
iaknd are adequate, and which do not encroach on hitherto 
recognised popular powers, may be gradually accomplished. 
But I cannot conceive anything more calculated to throw back 
all improvement that depends on co-operation, than such an 
attack on the established rights of the Legislature as would be 
involved in the abolition of the four acts which form the subject 
of this report. 

If I had any hope of being able to carry that measure into 
effect without a rupture with the House of Assembly and the 
island constituency, I should bedeech your Lordship to let me 
know what you w6uld propose to substitute for those enact- 
ments; and if your Lordship be determined to annul them, it 
will be most necessary that you should clearly explain what 
arrangements will satisfy you as substitutes; for to apprise the 
House of Assembly that they are to be deprived of the powers 
which they hold by those acts without showing to what their 
concurrence will be expected, might throw them at once into a 
state of exasperation and despair. But, believing as I at present 
do, that those acts cannot be annulled without a rupture witk 
the House of Assembly and the island constituency, and not 
being able to perceive any advantage in the proposed measure- 
that could compensate for so serious an evil, I venture most 
earnestly and anxiously to recommend to your Lordship that the 
arrangements provided by those acts be allowed to continue, 
either permanently as acknowledged parts of the Jamaica con- 
stitution, or at least until the concurrence of the colonial Legis- 
lature can be obtained for their abolition. 

Notwithstanding the decided opinion that I now express of 
the impracticability of obtaining that concurrence, I shall not 



omit to svail iBTnlf of any oppoitonitj to endeanroiir to i 
tuBi without gmng paUicitj to jour Locdahap's 
wbidi wouldi I ooneehre, be injimoiis, wheAer tliero k any 
psobabilitjrofaoqvienaioe; andif I find that I fasve been mis- 
taken, and diat oonciineiioe k not impoanUe,! shall not fidi to 
aj^iiiaayoiirLorddiipof 8iiehachangeinmjexpectati<HUL I 
must natmally be anziooa to cany your inafenietions on all 
oooasions into efieoti and nothing but a strong sense of duty 
would lead me at any time to question the ezpedieney of the 
measufss that yon preaeribe, or to refer fiir leoonsidentkm a 
question on which you had c x piea sed a decision. 

I depvaoate any peremptory measures destractiTe of die 
powers hitherto exercised by the popular branch of the island 
Legifllataie. That bodyi with respect to the Groyemmenty is per- 
fidctly independent Theve ia no way of influencing its ^o- 
ceedings except by that treatment which inspirea oonfidoice. 
It win do anything that it belieTes to be f<v the good of the 
idand. It will do much to meet the wishes of her Majesty's 
Ministers. But it will turn if trodden on. If it be treated 
with onntinnal distrust, and if its hitherto admitted priYiI^es 
and powen be foraUy taken away, its aflbctions will be 
alienated, and its ooidial co-operation in such measures as her 
Majesty's Ministers may deare, cannot be expected. What 
else in that case may erentually happen, is beyond the scope of 
my present speculation. I should hope that, with oondderate 
treatment, collision with the Legiskture may always be avoided ; 
but if it be sometimes inevitable, I trust that the cause of its 
occurrence may never be ascribable to aggression on the part of 
the Gbvemment 

IJufy 89. 1840.] 

[ExTEAOT.] — It may be noticed, as an instance of the readi- 
ness of the local magistracy to adopt any improvements suggested 
to them, that they have universally, on my recommendation ad- 
dressed to the several custodes, established Courts of Reconcilia- 
tion on the model of those existing in Norway and Barbadoes, in 


wiikli jisiei of the Iftboiiiig popoktioii fettle t^ 
finrtenity; The Gki f qin or of Borbadoet, I bdiere, under youi 
LordAip'f BoggtB&mf finroied me inth a desoriptian of the 
ertabBrimeat of those Ccmrts in that island. Their intio- 
dQction into Jamaica appeared to me to be very deniable; and 
my Tiewa wete oopfially and zealondy met by the looal autho* 
litiet. Coorftiof Reeoociliatioii arenowin operation^and will^ 
I hope, produce good effects. The people seem to be pleased 
with them; and some of the npper class have aUowed their 
difiercBcea with their laboreni and others to be adjudicated in 
these GooTtsi What the permanent result of their introduction 
win be when the noreky shall have ceased, is yet to be seen; 
but I see no reason to despair of its being beneficiaL 

I am happy to be able to add that the stipendiaiy and the 
local magiatntes are generally co-operating cheerfiiUy in all 
branches of their dulaes, that the differences between ihem are 
less frequent^ and that the strong feeling existing genei^y in 
the island against the stipendiaiy magistrates has in a con- 
siderable degree subsided. I have much reason to be satisfied 
with iheir condnct, and have great pleasoxe in beaiing testi- 
mony to their useful and meriUnrious services. 

In the coochtding remarks of your Lordship's despatch on 
the dntj of affording protection to those classes of the Queen's 
subjects who constitute the great majority of the population of 
Jamaica, I beg leave to express my entire concurrence. No 
person in the world can be moie sensible of the weight of. that 
obligation than the Governor who, in addition to the cal|B of 
humanity and public duty, has the further motive that his 
reputation depends on the fulfilment of that purpose. The 
only question is how it can best be accomplished; — ^whether 
by riding roughshod over the idand institutions, and knocking 
down right and left everything that stands in one's way, or by 
cordially oo*opefatmg with the isbnd authorities, legislative 
and executive, profiting by their good feelings^ taking them 
by the hand, and leading them gently to every desired im- 
provement, Teq>ecting their just rights as well as those of otheiSt 


372 ADVAirrAGES of oomcilzatiov. 

and, above all, by not suspecting and distrosting them. Tbe 
latter is the coune which natorally presented itself to m^ and 
if your Lordship allows me to proceed in it, I will answ^ for 
this deddedlyi that the people shall be efficiently protected; 
and if I cannot answer for everything else^ I will candidly 
apprise you whenever I see reason to anticipate a failure; and 
I confidently trust that in the mean time no harm will have 
happened from the experiment 

Applying the question to legislation, I would say that I 
know no limit to the improvement in our legislation that 
might be effected by gentle means. If your Lordship would 
send me the most perfect code of laws in the world, securing 
in the utmost degree the liberty and protection of the subject, 
I could almost engage that it dhould be adopted as the code of 
Jamaica; and I would say the same as to any amendments of 
our existing laws that can be suggested, provided that they 
come recommended purely as improvements; but if the im- 
pression be produced, however mistaken, that our well-meant, 
albeit imperfect, legislation is received with suspicion and dis- 
trust, examined with a censorious spirit^ rejected and hurled 
back on us branded with the opprobrium of demgned injustice 
and oppression; that what is deemed good and just law for the 
fi*ee people of England is reprobated as the reverse because it 
is enacted in Jamaica; that affection and care are entertained 
for only one class, and that all others are regarded with in- 
jurious prejudice, — then disgust must arise, which would be 
followed by disaffection and its consequences. The island could 
only in that case be governed by the main force and coercion 
of the mother country. The cordial co-operation of the island 
Legislature and constituency would be at an end. I am in 
this description only endeavouring to point out the opporite 
working and effects of different systems; and by inference, the 
consequences to be expected, according to the inclination which 
your Lordship's measures may seem to have towards tiie one or 
the other. I am sure that your Lordship's intentions are both 
just and generous, but much> it appears to me, depends on the 
way in which tiie most generous designs are pursued. 





My Lobd, — I have the honor to submit the thoughts that 
oocui to me on the subject of your Lordship's despatch of the 
26ih November, No. 166. 

I am not aware of any benefit that would be derived in the 
present state of Jamaica from the formation of two Councils^ 
with different designations, in lieu of the one at present exist- 
ingy which under one designation performs on different occa- 
sions different functions; and although there does not appear 
to me to be any objection to such a change, objections might 
be raised on the part of the island to what might be construed 
as an alteration of the constitution now established. 

At present a body exists designated the CounciL Without, 
I believe, any distinct definition of its double character, this 
Council acts as a legislative body in passing, amending, or re- 
jecting the bills sent to it by the House of Assembly, and as a 
Privy Council on certain occasions in which its concurrence is 
necessary to legalise acts of the Governor, and on other occa^ 
sions when the Governor may desire to seek its advice. As a 
Legislative Council its right to originate bills is disputed by 
the House of Assembly, and as a Privy Council its duties are 
generally few and unimportant, except on rare occasions, when 
weighty questions may be brought under its deliberation by 

S74 oonxiTuiuMi or tbb ixksal 

either the law or the Governor. With thoae ezceptioiifl, the 
executive authority is exercised by the Grovemor without 
reference to the Council, and an opposite pracdce would both 
retard the despatch of business and impair the power of the 
Gbvemor, which is not so extensive in this colony as to need 

A\m\rntAnnff . 

There is, therefore, no Council in Jamaica bearing the de- 
flignation of Executive Council, although the Cooncil, when 
acting as Privy Council, may be considered as acting in an 
executive, as dis ting u is hed ftom ilB legislative, capadi^. 

The Council is a post of honor which many, no doubt, 
would be glad to enter, but it would be in its double capacity, 
or in its legislative capacity, that it would be so considered. 
A separate Executive Goundl, to which the mere duties of a 
Vnrj Ooondl wwe tnmafeaed, would o&r fitde inritewfit to 
honoimUe ambition, and I do not know that any addition of 
duties could be made that would much increaae tba ten^tioB. 

The nomination of membeis of the House of Assrmh^to the 
SsecativeOounoil,iftfaqr oould be indnoad to aooept the ap- 
pointment, would piobably draw on them the anspioiom of not 
being independent, and would diminish their inflnimoe in thnr 
own House. Ihia would be a reason with lesdi]^ memben, 
iriio might nemrtbeless be well disposed towards the Oovnm- 
meat, to deoliiie auch an appointmenli and if them were any 
desirous of it, they would most pcobaUy be such sa could aoi 
render much aid to the Goyernment in the Assembly. None 
possessing influence would choose to lose that and the reputation 
of independenoe by aooepting an appointment wUoh woald 
neither oonfer power nor emolument, sttd could aoaiody, under 
the cireumstanoeB suj^osed, be deemed in any high degree an 

I should not, therefore^ eiqwct any increase of influence to 
the Govemment from aubh a course; and oonstitated aa the 
House of Assembly is, and possessing the powere whidi it has, 
I cannot perceive any means of influencing it at the command 
of the Government, except what may be derived ficom 


Iktion and miiliial ooidiifity tnd oo-opeimtloiL Muchofwlial 
ifl dwiiimhlft for tlie good gavenaami of the lalaiidiDay, I ogH'- 
00m, be aooompEdied by these meens; but it is not to be ex- 
pected that the Aflsaiibly will be teadity indnoed by any means 
to lelinqniah the asBnmed nghts and pri^ilqies^ or the actual 
poiwer which it has acqniied dming the progzessiTe finmatiMi 
of the Jamaica cooatitalion* 

Acoording to the foim which this has psactically assnmed, 
the House of Assembly asserts all die rights and pavil^ges 
whidi bekng to the House of Gammons in the Lzqierial Par* 
Hamenty and mndi moie» for it naiTntains the sole nght of 
originating bills to the ezdnsion of the Gonndl^ and akhongh 
this eadnaiTe right is not admowledged by the CSooncil, the 
power of stopping the sappUes glides such stiength to the 
Aanmbly in any dispate, that the Gooneil natorally and laud- 
ably abstadns from a contest which would cause much mischief,, 
and has long submitted on this point to the pieteDsiotts or 
rights asserted by the Assembly. 

The House of Assembly furdier daims the pri^ilqge, not be* 
kngittg to the Hoaw of Commons in England, of aj^ointing 
Boards, consisting in one instance* of all ihe memben of the 
Assembly exofasiTely ; in another,t of the members of the Aa- 
ssosbly Mid the membem of the OouncO noasinally, in which 
the fanner virtually exercise erdusiTe power; in another^ of 
the Assembly, the Oouncil, and the Govemor nominally, with 
neariy the same eflbet. These Boards sit permanently, notwith* 
stanflbng the prorogation of ^e Assembly, and even in ^ case 
ofadissoltttaon until the meeting of a new AsMmbly. Andthese 
Boards exercise a considemble part of the powers, and perform 
a krge portion of the duties, which in other countries belong 
to the ezectttive authority. 

These peculiarities in the constitution of Jamaica, if it may 
be so called, haye been noticed and objected to by your Lord^ 
ship and by Lord Glendg. As the Boards in question are 

* The Board of Accounts. f Committee of Coirespoiidenoe. 

X The Board of Works. 


nominated under acts of the Legialatuze, dther annual or 
triennial, the Council and the Grovemor must be consenting 
partieSi and her Majesty's Ministers a confirming par^ to those 
acts, in order to render them valid. The power, therefore, 
exists of disallowing them; but the exercise of this power 
would ^ve extreme offSsnce to the House of Assembly, without 
perhaps producing any other addidonal efl^t than that of de- 
stroying the means which exist of carrying on the goyemment 
harmoniously, for the power of substitution without the concur- 
rence of the Assembly would be wanting, and its ready co-ope- 
ration under such circumstances could hardly be expected. I 
should not, therefore, anticipate any benefit from entering into 
a struggle with the House of Assembly for the abolition of 
these Boards equivalent to the evils which it would excite, and 
am of opinion that it vrill be wise to abstain from any attempt 
with that view, until there be manifest reason to suppose that 
the Assembly may be persuaded to co-operate. 

Looking forward to changes which may already be in pro- 
gress, there is a possibility, perhaps a probability, although it 
cannot be regarded as a certainty, of a considerable alteration 
in the constitution of the House of Assembly. If the number 
of freeholders belonging to the laboring class increase so as to 
affect the elections, and if they be under other influence than 
that of property, the Assembly may in time be composed chiefly 
of members of a different class £rom those who now represent 
the present constituency. If the new members be in a nunority 
opposed to the still dominant party, they may be inclined to 
support measures recommended by the Government. When 
tliey become themselves the ruling party, they will probably be 
as tenacious of the power acquired as their predecessors in the 
Assembly have been, and as all bodies and individuals, whether 
aristocratic or democratic, generally are. The time when the 
government might expect to possess the greatest influence in 
the Assembly would probably be during its state of transition 
from representing the proprietary of the island to representing 
the mass of tiie people. When the proprietary, before being 


actually reduced to a minority in the AsBemUy, see, neverihe- 
less, that such a fiite is inevitable, they may naturally become 
more disposed to add strength to the Government, and to reduce 
the power of the popular branch of the constitution within the 
bounds beyond which it has extended itself. The Government 
would then have^ from the influence of circumstances over both 
parties^ the best chance that is likely to occur of obtaining, 
with the assent of the Assembly, that degree of executive 
authority which your Lordship deems to be essential for the 
due administration of the Government. 

For if the conjectured change in the House of Assembly 
should really take place, a considerable alteration might natu- 
rally arise also in the feelings of the proprietary of ihe country. 
Those who are now tenacious of their own power, and jealous 
of encroachment on the part of the Government, might see evil 
in ihe transfer of that power to a lower order, and might be in- 
clined to co-operate with the Government, in order to guard 
against apprehended encroachment from the popular party. 
Under such circumstances, the Government would probably 
strengthen the Council by a larger infusion from the proprietary 
body of the island, while the latter would look to llie Council 
as an honorable poation, and as the means of retaining a por- 
tion of power. Thus the two great classes of the aristocracy 
and the democracy would become severally represented in the 
Council and the Assembly. This seems to be the natural course 
of affidrs in the case supposed. 

On the other hand, if property retain its influence, if the 
good feeling which appears to be growing up between the 
landholders and the peasantry be confirmed, or if a new class 
of voters be introduced to any extent by immigration, the 
change imagined may never take place, or not, at least, for a 
long time to come, and power will remain in the same hands 
that now hold it. 

Quitting these conjectural views of the probable future, and 
looking only to the present, I am not able to suggest any mea** 
Fures that seem to me likely to alter the existing state of things. 


or to iacBeaw the s»fl«-i^ of the GovaaiieBt m the Hooee of 
Ammblj. I haye eiraady slited that I abodd aot airtnpete 
■Mh aiewlt fioBi the oioatioo of a aepaiate EaecatiiFeOouBcfl, 
aal the pkci^g Ihenui of aame leading membeD of the Howe 
ofAflBDnUy. I diafly aeferthekH^ keq» m oonatnt wv/onr 
Lofdflhip't lanliiiation on thia aulgeet^ and if I ewer aee maoft 
to «qppoaa diat it ean be acted on wilb adtanti^get I will not 
fiol to aabmat my opinion to that effbct 

I hare Ae hmor to oononr eatiidy with yoor Loxdrinp in 
tlunking it dedrable that thd kw^offioen of the CSrowrndbDold 
ham nets in the AaaemUy; hntlhia, atpoeeent, caaoDljrbe 
aooompEahed by nooinating ai kw-oflSoeia of Ae Grown indi* 
Tidnab who ha^e ^ looal inflnenoe neoeaaiy to aeonre thsir 
alaotiop. That laflwoey e?en then, ought be iinpai rod by 
their appaanqg in the Hoaas as the avowed paitiana of the 
Q oven nae n t; and an offioer ao ntnated would have ooniUber- 
aUe difficalty in reoonciling hia aappoaed obligation to his 
ooMtitnentB with his dnty to the Grown, or hia iadepaodent 
dMuaoter aa a member of the AaseBaUy wilb hia olher ofaa- 
motar aa a aerfaat of the Gvremment Hie finnaliliwr,ira 
being all independent of the GoTemment, theea are no oertain 
meana of prooaring the letom of any offioer of the Gbown; biU 
I do not aappoae that being an offioer of dm Crown would pre^ 
vent hia eleotion if he had penonal infloenoe, or were aqipoaed 
to be a fiiend to the idaad. I ahould not diink it impcamble 
that the House of Assembly might be brought to agree to die 
admission of aome offioeia of the Goremmeat, avowedly sepre- 
senting the GoTenunen^ with the privilc^ of speaking and 
detivexing their opiniona, and propoeingi or advocating, or 
oppoong meaaiuesy but widiout die power of voting ao aa to 
imduoe a deciatve eflhot on results. Even diia, however, 
might very probably be objected to aa an innovatioa ; and 
when I express an opinion that such an arrangement may not 
be impractioaUe, I have no better fbundadon for the notion 
than the reaaonableneas of die proposidon that the Government 

DUTfiiBonoiHr OP PAXBraracHB. ST9 

ahonU poMs the moiiifl of camminricrting hatiy wkk llie 

Sib inflnminft iMA moot Qonamnfii axeraae in toBie 
dagiee<nrer oomwnilMBi oonatitaensies, jmd pnMioimwnMiM, 
by the agency of patronage, ' has been thrown away ai to 
Jamaioa, by the jaanner in which the patroni^ of the Qrown 
has gBaanllj heon eoBBrdBed. I allnda more apeoially to 
£>oeer dayi» when patent fliieonze cffioes were gxanted to indi- 
Tidoab in Wiiglaml, mi Ae ezpenae of the eokny, die duties 
to be pcrfiamed by itt-paid depntia^ Ae emohanenti to be 
chiefly enjoyed by genflflmen lesi&ig in England. When 
sach waa the mode of distributing patronage in the idaad, it 
cannol be wondeesd at that a spint of coanteinctbn arose, and 
that local patrom^ has genecally been kept out of the hands of 
die Government by the House of ABMrnUy, and granted to its 
ownmend)flDQrtoh>calanlSiocxtie& The mode of distributing 
the patronage of the Gmwn above aUnded to has for the fiituie 
ceased, but the ^^pointments wfaioh the Grown oonfins are alill 
made genemfly at fa am e t hat is, firom individnals who aie 
strangers to Jamaica* 

In Older to piodnoe the local influence which m%ht be ac- 
quxred throughsnoh means, not by conuption, but legitimatdy 
by liie popnlaaty of sudi m oonne, the patronage of the Grown 
ought to be bes tow e d within Ae idand en individuals rsoom* 
mended by the Gbvemor as tbe most deserving and best 
qualified. I do not mean to propose that the selection should 
be excfaisively with the Oovemor without control, or that the 
Grown should not have the option of ovetrdzBg his nonma- 
tion— ibr an abaolnto power vested in the Governor might be 
abused-— bat that the appointments should be made by the 
MinisteBB of the Grown after receiving the recommencbitions 
of the Governor, and diould be conftrred on inhabitants of 
Jamaica, whether natives or those who have setfled here, 
except when there may be paramount public reasons for a 
difisrent choioa. This system might tend to oreato influence to 

380 coNsnTunoH of the local goysbhxent. 

the Ghyvemment in the island^ wUle the neoeeniy of placiiig 
the gioundfl of his xecommendation on xeoord would iacieafle 
the carefiilnett of the Govenior in his selecsdonfl, and promote 
the employment of the most efl^ent individuals of the oam« 

Another cause, perhaps, of the want of inflaenoe of the Go- 
venmient oyer the local Legislature is the absence of nearly all 
of the wealthy proprietors of the island. Had they beoi resi- 
dent they might have formed a sort of aristociacy moie ready 
to support the Government than those who loealbf £11 their 
places as their agentsj and are more dependent on the consd- 
tuencies which they represent As, however, there were 
resident proprietors who acted with the House of Assembly in 
its violent career during the recent straggle with the Govern- 
ment, it is not certain, although it seems not improbable, that 
a larger number of wealthy proprietors resident in the island 
would give greater strength to the Govenment. 
. That straggle tended, at least for a time, still more to widen 
the disconnexion between the Government on the one hand, 
and the Assembly and their constituents on the other. 

Whatever may have been the causes, the result is that the 
Assembly is an independent body, acknowled^ng little influ- 
ence other than that of the constituency which it represents — 
in other words, the supposed interests of Jamaica. Whatever 
measures are calculated to promote the interests of the consti- 
tuency, without being manifestly unjust towards others, wiU 
naturally be carried. Whatever measures are abstractedly 
good without injuriously afiecting those interests, are likely to 
be carried; but whatever measures may be decidedly injurious 
to the interests represented, or may threaten to curtail the 
powers and privileges of the Assembly or the local authorities, 
will most probably be resisted; and I do not perceive any other 
means in the present materials of society of exerdsing any in* 
fluenee over the Assembly than what may be derived from a 
good understanding, founded on careful and conciliatory con- 
duct on the part of the Government, and on the good sense and 


good feeling that may pievail in the House. Any attempt to 
form a (Jovemment party, as disdnct from the island party, 
would at present fidl, and would not, I conceive, at any time be 
desirable. There are now no parties in the House. There are 
individual member^ more ready than others to advocate liberal 
measures, but they do not form a distinct party; and there are 
questions on which the whole House would probably be united 
as one man against any encroachment on the part of the 
Government. The wisest course, under sucH circumstances, 
appears to me to be to regard the Government, the Council, 
and the Assembly as forming one party, and to lead all as 
much as possible to good measures. The executive adminis- 
tration cannot be so efficiently conducted as it might be with 
fuller powers in the hands of the Government, but until these 
can be obtained with the concurrence of the Legislature, I 
should think it more advisable to make the best of things as 
they are, than to cause them to be worse by endeavours at alte- 
rations which could only be accomplished by the forcible sub- 
verdon of the exiflting constitution, and the probable destruction 
of harmony and affection. 




Mr Lord,— I have ihe h<»ior to sobniit the BepovtB of In- 

speefeon of Prisons fer 1840. 

These reports scaxoely indicate any imptoveraent in ihe pri- 
sons of this isUnd anoe 1839. In some instmoev explanations 
have been called for from local anthorities^ whodi axe abo for^ 
warded; and I have added copies of instmetiooB and other 
communications issued as occasions required. 

To place all the parochial prisons in Jamaica in a state that 
would provide for the most limited separation of their inmates 
in classes, would require an expenditure hardly less than two 
hundred thousand pounds. Ten thousand pounds per annum 
has been devoted by the Legislature to this purpose, and it 
may therefore be hoped that it will gradually be accomplished. 
In the mean time, it lessens the mischief attending the want of 
classification, that the inmates of the parochial prisons are 
generally few in number, and for short periods; all who are 
under sentence for more than two months being removed to 
prisons better adapted for classification. 

It is my intention to endeavour to introduce the separate 
system into the Penitentiary whenever it may be completed, 
which, however, will also be a work of time; and the very 
commencement has been delayed, first by the difficulty of 


bimging together w0 appooiled eommittBe firam iinAt seveml 
aTocKtioius aaid, salieeqiientlyy hy iSbe d aagcrow illnesB of tlie 
iflknd eDgineer^ on wliose e^ip ec ted report fbrther prooeedixigB 

Until the erection of the Penitoituaj, I prc^pose to nse the 
Kingston prison aa the general prison for male conricts sen- 
tenced to more than two mondis' imprisonment^ as it has 
greater aooonnnodation, and admits more of separation and 
classificatioBi lor which I am indebted to tiie exertions of the 
mayor, than any otiier prison in the island. It neverdietesB 
has many defects, which I must try to get remedied as weD as 
I can; and I intend, as far as posnble, to introduce into this 
prison the roles and habits that will be erentnaliy establidied 
in the Penitentiaiy. But our progress in amendment wiD pro- 
bably be dow. 

I have aseigned two separate prisons in different parts of the 
island for female convicts sentenced to more tiian two months' 
imprisenment^ which has enabled me to separate that class of 
prisoners effectually from the males. 

The three county gaols are appropriated ezclomrdy to debtors 
and prisoners committed for trial; excepting that of Cornwall, 
at Montego Bay, where there is no other prison for male mis- 
demeanants under short sentences, the former house of correc- 
tion having been converted into a prison exclusively for females. 

The greatest difficulty that I have met with in attempting 
the separation of prisoners has been in the necessity which exists 
for accommodating six classes of prisoners in every parochial 
prison — namely, debtors male and female, untried male and 
female, misdemeanants under short sentences male and female, 
without any means generally of preventing intercourse during 
the day. It is not possible to surmount this without a large 
pecuniary outiay beyond what can be obtained otherwise than 
gradually from the island resources. 

I was for a considerable time in correspondence with the 
parochial authorities on this subject, and plans of new prisons, 
or of alterations of those existing, for the purpose of meeting 


my viewd, were sent in from Berenl panshea ^th appaient 
decile to cany them into effect; but the care of the prisons was 
transferred daring the last sesdon of ihe Legidature from the 
parishes to the island, and the quesdon of alterations and new 
buildings is now imder agitation with the Board of Works, 
which has not funds at its command to do more than a Tcry 
small part of what is required. 

I have, according to your Lordship's desirei prohibited the 
employment of prisoners out of their prisons, whenerer means 
can be found for providing work within the walls. 

My attention has been incessantly given to the object of 
effecting improvements in every part of prison arrangements. 
I cannot say that I am satisfied with the degree of amendment 
that has been effected. There is a division of authority which 
retards and practically impedes advancement. Someihing de- 
pends on the Board of Accounts, something on the Board of 
Works, something on local authorities. I have no reason to 
complain hitherto of intentional want of co-operation; but au- 
thority that is divided cannot be wielded with the same celerity 
and efiect aS that which is united in the same hands. 

I have called to my aid in this department, as Inspector of 
Prisons under the act of the last session, Mr. Daughbrey, one 
of the most zealous, able, and discreet of the stipendiaiy ma- 
gistrates, and I expect to derive great benefit from his as- 



[The fonr folbwiDg brief despatches are inserted in illustration of Sir 
Charles Metcalfe's constant anxiety for the welfare of the troops under his 
command. He saw that they were being sacrificed to ignorance^ negligence, 
and fslse economy ; and he exerted himself, not without success, to establish 
a new order of things^ by locating on the healthy high grounds of the 
island the European regiments which perished miserably on the plains. It 
was characteristic of Metcalfe that he made the first movement on his own 
responsibility, and offered himself to bear the expense.] 


January 8, 1841. 

Mt LORDy — With reference to mj despatch No. 152, I 
have the honor to report that, in consequence of a communi- 
cation from the Major- General commanding the forces in. 
this island, I have sanctioned a provisional arrangement for the 
posting experimentally of one hundred men of the European 
troops at Newcastle, pending your Lordship's decision with 
r^ard to the proposal made for purchasing ground and erecting 
a permanent barrack at that station. 

The arrangement which I have sanctioned is, Ist. The renting 
of two hundred acres at Newcastle, for one hundred and sixty 
pounds per annum, for a term of years, with the option to the 
Government of annulling the agreement and purchasing the 
property for three thousand pounds when so disposed; 2nd. The 
erection of a temporaiy barrack for one hundred men, with 



due regard to economy and to ihe prospectiye use of the build- 
ings under a more permanent arrangement, should the latter 
be authorised. 

Having sanctioned this temporary arrangement on my own 
responnbility, I shall be prepared to regard the expense as 
chargeable to me personally, if the arrangement should not 
have your Lordship's approbation. I have considered the 
health of the troops as too important to allow me to hesitate 
in incurring this risk. 


Ane 17, 1S4I. 

Mt Lobd, — The mortality among the European tioopa sta- 
tioned in the low kadi, on the south nde of lUa idand^bas 
been dreadful durii^ the hi*ter part of dw kit, aad die first 
portion of the present, year. It has now, I trusl^ snosideaL 

All the stations alluded to have been visited by that pesti- 
lence, the yellow fever. Port Boyal^ which continued healthy 
for some time after the other stations had suffered, latterly be- 
came the most afflicted of all. New comers have been the 
greatest sufferers. The artillay, recently arrived, have lost 
numbers of non-commnrioned officers and privates; aid of the 
officers who came out with theaa, and did not retom with, the 
detachment relieved, all have perished; whik those wIm wen 
here before and remained with die relieving^ campaaia^ although 
attacked, haive generally survived* 

The cause of so much &tal sickness has probaUy been a very 
unusual season, unexampled drought having pesvuled for a pio- 
tracted period. This calamity has also ceased, a great quantity 
of rain having recently fiJkn, b«t not bafiare ruinous ispuy 
had been inflictsd on some parishca. 

The troopa stationed at Brown Town, in the high kBd% hasie 
been healthy. Among the blade troops statinoed in the low 


lands the laortality haSy I undemtandy been confined to the 
European officers. Eveiything tends to show that all the Eu- 
ropean troops in this island ought to be stationed in the high 
landSf and the charge of the low landff be left to black troops, 
to whom the dimate of ihe low lands is congemaL It wocild 
be eren desirable, I think, diat the number of artiUerymen 
whom it might be neoeasary to retain at P<Mrt Royal shocdd be 
black, and diat the fine body of Enropeaos belonging to the 
Royal Artillery should be posted in the moontaina and saved 
from the pesdlenee of die hyw landsL 

Of theofEceis who ha^e peridied during thiaawfidTisitalion, 
Colonel MarshaD, of her Mqest/s 82nd Raiment, and Captain 
Slade, of the Royal Artillefy, have each left a widow and 
serera! children without adequate proniBion for their support. 
I know not whether the regulations of her Majesty's seryiee 
admit of extraordinary bomities <m such oooadons, but I con- 
sider it to be my duty to bring die cases to your Lordship's 
notice aa well worthy of comaderation. 

Cobnel Blarshall raised himself to rank and hononentirdj 
by his own merits. He serred his oountry actiydy and without 
intermission aa an officer fer forty-one years — was engaged in 
the war in Spain, France, Canada, and dsewhere — and was 
sereral times severefy woonded in the field. He leaves a widow 
and four children, two boys and two girb. 

Captain Slade, of the Artillery, served in the Peninsula and 
North America, and has left a widow and three duldren. His 
means did not enable him to bring them with him to Jamaica^ 
and during his short residence here he imposed many privations 
on himself on tfaeb acooant. 

A number of orphans, the children of non-commissioned 
officers and privates, have been left totally desolate, their parents 
having been victims to the raging fi^er. 




June 99, 1841. 

Mt LobD| — ^The following are some of the distreaniig de- 
tails of the xecent mortality among the European troops sta- 
tioned in the southern part of Jamaica, owing, in mj opinion, 
entirely to their being quartered in the low lands, or in por- 
tions not sufficiently elevated to be above the reach of jellow 
fever, the pestilence of this island. 

Within the last eight months, the 82nd Raiment has lost 
by malignant yellow fever five officeis, nine sergeants, one 
hundred and forty rank and file, thirteen women, and twenty- 
two children, the number of deaths increamng with each suc- 
cessive week, up to the middle of the past month; and the 
ejademio vidting with almost equal virulence every station 
occupied by the re^ment, or to which it was removed for the 
chance of relief. It has, by deaths and discharges consequent 
on wasting sickness, lost one-third of the numb^ brought into 
the island little more than fifteen months ago; and one-fourth 
of the regiment has been carried off by fever. Of a draft of 
one hundred men which landed in the middle of January, one- 
third died within four months, and two companies of artilleiy, 
which landed in February, have shared the same fate. A bat- 
talion of the 60th, landed recently, and since the pestilence 
was supposed to have subsided, has, neverthelessi had nine 
deaths by fever in one week. 


Angost 18, 1S41. 
Mt Lord, — I grieve to report that the mortality in her 
Majesty's 60th Regiment has continued unabated. That regi- 
ment has lost by death firom fever, in two months, one hundred 
and thirty-eight in number, including eight women and six 
children, amounting to one-third of the strength stadoncd in 


the low countiy. Every station where there was accommoda- 
tion has been tried, and all have proved deadly. The deaths 
at Stoney-hill alone, out of a garrison of eighty, were sixteen 
in last week. 

I lament to add that Lieutenant-Colonel the Honorable A. 
F. Ellis, the commander of the regiment^ son of Lord Seaford, 
has been a victim to the pestilence, beyond the number above 
mentioned. He exerted himself to the utmost degree in care 
and kindness to all under his command, and remained in the 
low lands until arrangements could be made for the removal of 
the whole of the regiment to the hills. He went up a few days 
ago, but was carried off the day before yesterday by the pesti- 
lential yellow fever caught in the low lands. He is mourned 
for with heartfelt affliction by the officers and men of the regi- 
ment, towards whom his kindness was that of a father; and is 
deeply regretted by all who knew him. 

A party of one hundred men has been stationed at New- 
castle in the hills, of whom one has died, and two of a party of 
thirty stationed for some time at another property. All these 
deaths were in consequence of disease imbibed in the low lands, 
and took place immediately after arrival in the hills, as in the 
case of Colonel Ellis; and now that many have gone from the 
low lands with the disease in them, further deaths must be 
expected in the hills, although the yellow fever never origi- 
nates in the high lands. 

The Major^G^eral commanding the forces has been for 
some time engaged in arrangements for the removal of the 
whole of what remains of the regiment to Newcastle and its 
vicinity. They will be temporarily accommodated on neigh- 
bouring properties, and afterwards in cottages erected for them, 
or in tents. No expense will be incurred in erectipg barracks 
beyond what has already been undertaken under the authority 
received from her Majesty's Government. Nevertheless, the 
temporary arrangements necessary will cause some additional 
expense, which will, I trust, be sanctioned. I entirely concur 
in Sir William Gomm's measures. I conceive the removal of 


ihB wgimeBt item die low k&df to be elMoIutelj iMmrimij for 
tfaenfefefoftiieinmvocs; and I eeamdy bope liiet her Ma- 
jeifrf^t Gbfemmeiit nill unction die eneodoii of banacke at 
Newcastle for die whole r^ment stationed on this side of the 
isbnd, and fi>r the Emopean AidUeiy ilso^ other theie or in 
•one pari of the hilh^ in oader thai die tooops may never again 
beeKpoaedto soeh draadfiil moHality aa has been eiqmenoed 
during the last jear by the artillecy at Fort Royal, and die 
gSnd and 60di Hfgiments in the aeival sladoaa of Up Park 
Camps, Fort Angosta, Port Boyal, and Stoney HilL 

To enaUs die finropeaa AxdUeiy to be poeted in the hillsi I 
wonld stron^y leeoraniend, what I hsve already <m. a fbrm^ 
ooeaBion suggested, diat a email party of Afrioan Artillery 
dbodd be finmed for the daily vootine dnties of Port Boyal, 
whidi mi^ be done either by entertaining A^cnn recmite 
for die purpose, or by training a detachment of <Hie of die 
Weat India regiments to the gun praodoe. 




Mr LoKDi — in a xeoent oonramiiicatioii I intimated that I 
aboaid take die earliest oppoTtcmily <^ submitting to your 
Loidahip ihe gvcmnds on irinch I considered myself to be justi- 
fied in scdioiting penmaBion to letive horn the giovenmient of 
Jiamaiea, and letozn to England at a period not tax distant 

When the olEkt o{ the Gbremondup of iina islaiid and its 
de^MBdencieB was conireyed to me» my only indnoement in ac- 
cepting it was the hope of rendering some service to my ooontry 
by becoming mstnunental in ^e reconciliation of the colony 
with the mother coontiy. 

That object was accomplidied, soon after my aRival, by the 
good sense and good fe^ng of the colonistBi who leadily and 
coidialiy met the condHatoiy disposition whidi it was my duty 
to evince towaids them. 

The next subject that most attnKrted my attention was the 
imwitJHfactoiy feeling of die laborii^ population towaida their 
employen. This has naturally subsided into a state mme con«> 
ntent with the rektaons of the parties, and there is no longer 
any ground of amdely on that account. 

Other dissensions in the community, which grew out c£ pre* 
ceding circumstances, have, either entirely or in a great degree, 
ceased, and order and harmony, with exceptions which will 
occasionally occur in eveiy state of society, may be ssid to 


The refonn of the jadicial eitabliahmeni was oonaideted bj 
her Majesty's Gbveniment as an object of eaential imp(»ta]ioe, 
and was likewise desired by the looal Legislatore. That mea- 
sure has been carried into operation, with eveiy assnranoe of 
suooesBi at a considerable cost to the island. 

The improvement of the prisons was another object much 
desired bj her Majesty's Government. The local LegislatQie 
has co-operated sealousljand liberally towards it. Means have 
been provided for its attainment to the utmost extent at present 
practicable. The reform of all the prisons is a work of too 
great expense to be performed at once, but it is in progress, and 
the realisation of all that is desirable in the details of this inte- 
resting question is in a course of gradual accomplishment. . 

Many laws have been passed with a view to meet the change 
that has occurred in the social relations of the inhabitants of 
the colony, and to approximate the statutes of this country to 
those of England. Although the business of legi^tion must 
ever be one of incessant advancement, I am not aware of any 
peculiar matter, immediately pressing, that requires to be un- 

Of agricultural prosperity I cannot speak with any certainty, 
because it depends on prices at home, and on circumstances 
which are not under local control; but the prospect as to the 
crop now on the ground, and the expected produce of the great 
staples for exportation, is more promising than that of any season 
for many years past. New sources of wedth, in the prodacdon of 
silk and cotton and the extraction of copper, have been called 
into action, but have not reached a state of certainty, and cannot, 
therefore, be regarded as securely established. The articles which 
yield most profit will naturally be those most cultivated; which 
is the reason, combined with the scantiness of population, why 
the exports of Jamaica are so few. Commercial interests have 
sufiered, partly from over-trading on excessive credits suddenly 
withdrawn, and partly from the disturbed state of affidrs in the 
South American State of New Ghranada; but it is supposed 
that the worst has passed, and that trade is likely to revive. 


These aie matters which the Execudve Government can hardly 

With respect to the laboring population, formerly slaves, but 
now perfecdy free, and more independent than the same class 
in other free countries, I venture to say, that in no country in 
the world can the laboring population be more abundandy pro- 
vided with the necessaries and comforts of life, more at their 
ease, or more secure from oppression, than in Jamaica; and I 
may add, that ministers of the Gospel for their religious in- 
struction, and schools for the educatioji of their children, are 
established in all parts of the island, with a tendency to con- 
stant increase, although the present reduction of the Mico 
schools is a temporary drawback. 

Under all these circumstances, as the peculiar state of Jamaica 
at the time was my only inducement for coming here, and as 
I have never wished to remain longer than might seem to be 
necessary for the accomplishment of the importGUit objects 
which presented themselves, I trust that the expression of my 
wish to be relieved will not be deemed inconristent with the 
sense of duty that brought me to this post. 

It is far from my intention to represent that there is not 
ample and noble employment left for my successors. There is 
a great field for continual improvement. The country has 
vast resources yet undeveloped. A larger population of Afri- 
cans for labor in the low lands is requisite; and the establish- 
ment of a population of Europeans in the high lands is highly 
desirable. Capital, which in despair of adequate profit has 
been withdrawn, will require increaring enterprise and success 
to tempt it to resort hither. To secure and maintain the 
afiectionof the colony towards the mother country; to promote 
the welfare and prosperity of the island, and the happiness of its 
inhabitants, will form a task of high interest and importance, 
the progress of which cannot fail to be attended with heartfelt 
gratification; but its perfect fulfilment can only be the work of 


Hoping that my retirement will have your Lordships sane- 


laai^ItelDetbeHberiyof «ddi]^dMiiId^^ be 

relieyed about the middle of April, as the voyage acuMS tihe 
Adawtio IB Ekdj to befiimnUa at llwtaeasoBiajidayatiival 
in Ettgiaad wonld probaUy take place at a time of ilie year 
better adted than the wiiitor noatkB to those vho oome 
fiom a tfT*fTi^ ftinwite Should theie be any ohatacie to the 
•nfralof my 8uaceaK>r at lihai peiiodi and your Lordifaip would 
pemit me to make cnrer tlie gotenunei^ at aoch time as I 
ndglit find moat cooveniaii to the lieotenant-GoTemor, you 
may be aanned, from Sir William Gomm's oharacteT, dnfity, 
judgment, and local knowledge^ that no delzimeat to the paUic 
aeryioe oould arise from that arrangement. In piopodng with 
80 much freedom these particulai detuls Sat my peESonsl oon- 
Tenienoe, I idy on your Lordship's indulgence, and b^ leave, 
at the same time, to assure yon that I diall cheerfiiUy confioim^ 
as in duty bound, to any otW that you may deem mose expe- 
dient for the pubEc service. 

Anticipating your Lordship's aasttit to the main purpose of 
this oommunicaticm, I beg permisrion to request that yon will, 
at such time as you may judge to be proper, lay at the foot of 
the throne my humbk and dutifiil resignation of the office 
with which hat Majesty was gradously pleased to honor me in 
the administmtion of this govemmoit. 

AK6WSBB TO JAMAICA A-nn angmMf 395 


(Rwanui be bme in Bund thai these AiitveEB to AddroHsee jra but a 
very fev aeleoted Iram a iaige number. A complete OQUeddon of the 
difereni addresses presented to Sir GSharles Metcalfe in India^ Jamaica, and 
Canada, mth their answers, would occupy as large a yolnme as the present 
one; but it was considered expe£ent to gnre in tins place a few dooao- 
teristic specimens of the replies.] 

To the Magistrate^ Freeholdere^ and ether Inhabitants of the 
Parish of St CaHeriae. 

I wish, gentlemen, tliat it were in my power to expaesB how 
deeply I feel the kindnesB which you have manifested, not on 
the present occasion alone, but throughout the 'period of my 
remdenoe among you, to an unbounded extent, and in every 
possible way. Words, however, would convey a feeble notion 
of the thaakfuhieas with whidi I shall ever dwell on the secol- 
]eeti<m of the friendly conduct that I have ezperienced in every 
part <^ this ialaiid. 

I shall part irom you with great regiet The only cause for 
my retirement is that craving £» home which seems to be im- 
planted in the hearts of aU, and whi<^ aodiing but necessity, 
or a strong seme of duty, can oveioome. Having persuaded 
mysdf that I may return to England without any dereliction 
of duty, I have yielded to the desire which I cannot eradicate, 
and hope to pass the remainder of my ^ys in that country, 
firom whi^ I have been separated by occupation in the public 
service for more than forty years. K I could have regarded 
any land but England as my home, I know not where I could 
have been more happy, than in Jamaica, in the discharge of 
duties rendered easy by general support and co-operation, in 
cordial interoourse with warm and generous hearts, enjoying, 


in your beautiful mounUdns a deBglitful dimate not to be aor- 
pasBed in healtlifiilneflB, mildnen, and equalnlity by any in the 
world, and contemplating the interesting prpgieaa of a happy 
population, who, in full posBesrion of liberty, independoioe, and 
comfort, are efficiently protected in all the rights of freedom by 
the impartial administration of equitable laws. 

I appreciate, as the highest honor that a man can reoem, 
the esteem of those who are competent to judge his conduct; 
and although I am senrible that in my case your praise must 
be ascribed to your kindness, I shall not the less cherish with 
pride, as long as I live, the remembrance of your affectionate 


Accept, gentlemen, my heartfelt wishes for your weliare and 
happiness; and my anxious hope that Januuca may soon add 
the return of wealth and prosperity to the other blessings which 
she now enjoys. 

To the Magistrates^ Vestrymen^ andpther Inhabitants of the 
Parish of St, Ann. 

The regret, gentlemen, which you express at my approaching 
retirement from the government, and the assurances of esteem 
and affection which accompany it, are exceedingly gratifying 
to me, and confer a high honor, the recollection of which I 
shall ever cherish with pride and thankfulness. 

I came to this island led by the hope of being instrumental 
in the reconciliation of one of her most valuable colonies with 
the mother Country. That object was accomplished soon after 
my arrival by the wisdom of the Legislature and the good 
feeling of the community. 

There nevertheless remained other causes of anxiety. There 
were internal dissensions and party feelings, which engendered 
strife and obstructed harmony. The relations also between the 
landholders and the laboring classes were in an unsatis&ctory 
state. Those difficulties have been removed, and it is not too 
much to say, as all seem to believe, that in those respects afiirs 
are much ameliorated. 

ST. ANN'S. 397 

The part that I have performed in this improyement has 
been to endeavour to do equal justice to all parties, and to dis* 
courage whatever had a tendency to impede the restoration of 
fellow feeling and brotherly love; but the change is mainly 
owing to the wisdom of the Legislature, and the good sense of 
the island. 

While, therefore, the praise bestowed on me in this hour of 
parting, when all connexion between us, except that of our hearts, 
is about to be severed, cannot be otherwise than most pleadng, 
it produces the additional feeling of gratitude for that warm 
and generous kindness which has taken the will for the deed, 
and appreciates my humble services at a price &r beyond their 
intrinsic merits. 

I shall often be reminded, gentlemen, of your parish of St. 
Ann, in moving about England; for it is the only part of this 
island that has put me much in mind of the scenery of the 
mother country. That the most beautiful part of an island, 
which does not yield in beauty to any perhaps in the whole 
world, should resemble English scenery, is a high honor, I con- 
ceive, to the latter; and, on the other hand, there are few 
things in which a resemblance to England would be a cause of 
regret. But there are two. You may congratulate yourselves 
on having your delightful climate free from the too frequent 
chilliness and perpetual uncertainty of that of England. You 
may also be proud of the great comfort enjoyed by your labor- 
ing population, instead of the distress which falls so heavily on 
the same class in the mother country. 

God grant that these advantages may always conduce to your 
health and happmess. 

I have further to congratulate you on the successful intro- 
duction into your parish of the culture of silk, from which 
there is reason to hope an article will be produced that may 
rival and surpass the silk of Italy, and be a new source of wealth 
to this country. 

Accept, gentlemen, my heartfelt thanks for all your good- 
ness, and my wishes that every blessmg may attend you. 


Toih$LthaiiiaattofdieParuhofSL Thaauu m Oe East 

I am most senaiUe, geBdemen, of ihe geBetam Itimlim 
which has didated jwa tftctxniftte addrea. 

Whether I have, in any d^ree^ mailed yoor podsea, or 
whether they are eolely to be ascribed to your fiiendljr pax- 
tiaEty, I cannot be otherwise than highly giatifiel and de- 
lighted by sneh a manifealatioo of wann feding. I muat enr 
r^razdy aa the lutppiest event of my life^ thai I canie to Jamaca. 
One mimite b^xe I accepted the totally nnezpected offer of 
the goTemmesI of this iaknd and its dqMndeocieSy if &e idea 
of my going to the West Indies had n^igested itsdf to any of 
my fiiends, I should have laughed at it as eomethmg so otlExly 
improbable aa to be next to an impoanhility. The oflEer leached 
me when I was living in retirement, with no other plan befioxe 
me but that of making my retirement moie complete* I had 
no desiie for offidal employment of any kind. I had no pie- 
tenaona to any chim on the Ministry. I had no cwi un i on 
with any party in the State. I had no local infioencethat 
could place me in Parliament^ the only sphere of public dntj 
for which I had any indination. No individnal could hare 
been found more totally unconnected witfi public men ud 
public life than I was at that time-Hioiie more studiously re- 
tired from general society and intercourse with the gay or busy 
world. I had returned from India scarcely a year before, after 
thirty-eight years' uninterrupted absence from home in the 
service of my country, with the intuition and hope of paaeii^ 
the remainder of my days in Enghm^- Excqiting as to my 
own family and friends, and near neighbouis in the conntiy^ I 
was, in fiict, a recluse. It is due to her Majesty's Ministers of 
that time, and especially to the Secretaiy of State for the 
Colonies, one of your former Gk>vemors, the Marquis of Nor- 
manby, who made the ofier to me, and whom I had nefier 
seen, to remark, that whether their selection was good or bad, 
their sole motive must have been the advancement of the public 


Wfaea I reeerved tlusofier, a momenl'B oonsdexataoa satufied 
me tbat mj daJfy to my coantiy reqimed thai I should aceept 
it. Had Jamaiea been in a pesfiectlj aatiaEuslozj and ha{^y 
8ta^, I sboald havB dediBed the haoae^ hrnwing^ as I have aakl, 
no widi for official employment; but under the oiicumfitaxiees 
which then odfltedt thoe vnm apmeAing o£ importance to be 
done, and I oonadered myaelfy by die o&r mad^ aa called on 
to do it I did not» therefore^ he8itat& I undertodE the trust, 
enooomged by the hope of soccea^ human nature being the 
same in all parts of the world. I thought that you were wrong, 
but I abo ihou^ it probable that you might be induced to 
put youw elves right, and that tibe mother country and the 
colony m^;fat be reconciled. I conceiTed that, coming among 
you as a stmnger who had never been eiq;aged in any strife 
regarding the colonies, I should derive some facilitiea from that 
circumstance. After my arrival, I was at first rather appalled 
by the violence of party spirit which seemed to prevail. But 
the first proceedings of the House of Assembly assured me that 
all would in time be weD. My task since has been an easy one. 
The good sense of the colony has done aff. The plain and 
obvious course that I have pursued has been animated by 
general support and oo-operation. Had the advantages which 
have been gained been acoompiiriied by any injustice or injury 
to the population recently emancipated firom a state of shiveiy, 
my feelings, in retiring firom the government^ and your own 
too, I am sure, would haive been wid^ different from what 
they are now, and the reverse of gratifying. But, whatever 
may be Ae state of the rahmd with regard to the prosperi^ of 
the higher classes — whatever may be the depression of the 
present time, and the fears for the future, c<msidering the in- 
terests of proprietOGS of land, and merchants, nnd traders, and 
the general body of the medical fiiculty, all of which classes are 
now suflering, no one can deny that the lower orders, especially 
the great mass of the emancipated labOTers, enjoy a greater 
d^ree of prosperity, independence, and comfort, in every 
respect, than &1Ib to the lot of the laboring dass in any other 


oomitiy that we know oC So that I ahall depart, aasiiied that 
iheir intezests aie eflbctoalljr piovided for. The chief appie- 
henaoa and anxiety remaining are prodaoed by the uncertainty 
which seema to attend the continuation of the profitable colti- 
ration of your staple products, on which the interesta of oom- 
mexoe, as well as agriculture, greatly depend. God giant that 
aU feaxB on that ground may be speedily removed, and ihat 
your favored pariah, which can justly boast of containing the 
garden of Jamaica, may always continue to be one of the most 
prosperous in the island. 

Accept, gentiemen, my gratefol thanks for the honor that 
you have conferred on me. It will be among the most pleaang 
recollections that will cheer my future Hfe. In saying farewell, 
it is the uppermost wish of my heart that every blessing may 
attend you. 

To the Members of the Jamaica Misrionary Presbytery m the 
Parish of St. Mary, in conjunction with their respective Con- 

I thank you, gentlemen, most cordially, for the goodness 
which has induced you to come from the parish of St Mary 
on this deputation^ to do me honor by the presentation of your 
affectionate address. 

Your praises, although I am conscious that they far exceed 
my humble deserts, are sweet and soothing, as the ofispring of 
ki^d hearts that are disposed to put a high appreciation on good 

For your prayers I shall ever be grateful. The prayers of 
the pious are heard at the Throne of Mercy, and plead for the 
sinner, in whose behalf they ascend. 

I have observed with great satisfaction, during my residence 
in Jamaica, the readiness of the mass of the people to embrace 
the benefits of education, their eagerness for religious instruc- 
tion, and their general attendance at the worship of the AI- 


mighty. For these conspicuous virtues in their character, 
which are blessings to themselves and the whole community, 
we are indebted, in the greatest degree, to the ministers of re- 
ligion, who have devoted themselves to the interest of their 
flocks. While the imperial and local Legislatures concurred 
in the righteous measure of releasing the people from bondage, 
the ministers of the Gospel were strenuously employed in eman- 
cipating their minds from the chains of ignorance, and their 
souls firom the powers of darkness. Thence arose a connexion 
between the pastors and their congregations, the most interest- 
ing and delightful that conceived. The former, imi- 
tating the Divine Shepherd of the whole Christian flock, 
brought the waadering sheep into His fold. Their followers, 
sensible of the benefits conferred, looked up to their benefactors 
with reverence and attachment These ties were cemented by 
taking a powerful interest in all their affairs — ^by aid in the 
hour of distress — by the balm of consolation poured on the bed 
of sickness — ^by condolence and sympathy with the afflicted — 
and by administering the means of grace and the hope of glory. 
Thus many of the ministers of religion in this island have ac- 
quired a hold on the hearts of their congregation not surpassed 
in any part of the world. It is a power gained by devotion to^ 
their sacred duties. May it be always exercised for the general 
good, and for the spread of that neighbourly love and Christiaa 
charity which we have the highest authority for believing is,, 
next to the love of God, the best of human virtues. 

Such, reverend gentlemen, I am persuaded, is your conduct 
towards your flocks — such the attachment of your congrega- 
tions towards you — such the exercise of your influence over 
them. May the Father of All bless and sanctify the holy union, 
and grant you, here and hereafter, the fruits beyond price of 
the faithful discharge of duty to God and man. 

To the President f Vice-President^ and Member s of the St. George's 
Agricultural and Immigration Society. 

I thank you, gentlemen, cordially, for the kind sentiments 

2 D 


wlueli yott entertam towaids ma I shall eyer lemember ^tL 
pleMoxe my oonneadoii with your Bodetjf the foimaUon of 
which w«0 cmlmlatiirf to render, and is, I trust, rendenog, and 
will continno to render, great benefit. 

I sympathiae in the feelings which you ei^reas, anang from 
the want of certain and oontinaous labor. It is manitpBt that 
in many parts of the island this dishfatrtening evil wei^ 
heavily on the agricultural propnetor, and the more so, because 
the oidy perceptible remedy may be slow in coming, and cannot 
be thoroughly realised with the requisite speed. European im- 
migration hsB been tried, and, as a general or immediate relief, 
has proved a &iluie. The mode has not been discovered with- 
out sacrifices on the part of their employers, which few can 
aflfbrd to encounter, of reconciling Europeans genendly to a re- 
sidence in those parts of the island best suited to llie European 
constitution. They become dissatisfied, and flock to tlie towns 
in the low landi, where many die, I hope that the day may 
come when they may be located in numerous villages in proper 
positions in the interior, where, I am sure, they would add 
much to their own comfort and happiness, and to the welfare 
and prosperity of Jamaica; but it is difficult to anticipate whence 
the means wfll be derived for a plan which will necessarily, in 
the first instance, be ezpenave. 

Endeavours have been made to procure laborers from Sierra 
Leone, the Bahama Islands, and the continent of America, with 
partial and hitherto inadequate success; but I trust that the 
object will be persevered in, and ultimately accompUahed. 
There is abundance of space in Jamaica for any number of new 
laborers that can be obtained within the bounds of probability, 
without the slightest injury to those who at present compose 
the laboring dass in this island. A great increase is obviously 
necessary to snpplj the places of those who withdraw, and to 
procure a sufficient number, bound by their want? or their 
habits, to labor continuously for their employers; without which 
it is impossible that the latter can cultivate their estates on the 
present system without frequent disappointments, and consequent 


heavy losses. It is most true that, owing to this general want, 
the Tesources of Jamaica cannot at present be developed. The 
same want is happily not universal, for there are some localities 
in which all the labor required is said to be sufficiently supplied, 
and such would be everywhere the natural e£fect of an abundant 

As this is not likely to be produced by any contrivance, other- 
wise than gradually, it behoves the possessors of land to consider 
whether any means can be devised that may enable them to 
dispense with any portion of the labor at present requisite, and 
thus to render the existing supply practically more sufficient. 
The general use of the plough, and the increased employment 
of machineiyy oSkx some resources in this respect. Another 
mode of proceeding, which has been suggested and elsewhere 
put in practice vrith declared succesSj is to alter the coimexion 
with the laborer, and convert him into a tenant, or at least 
give him an interest in the produce, by making him the pro- 
ducer and a ishaier in the profit. The manifest efiects of such 
an aiiangemeat would be to reduce the great outlay of money 
wages, which is now a continual burden on the landowner, to 
cause the produce to be reared at the cost and trouble of the 
tenant or cultivator^ to receive^ free of expense in advance, a 
due portion, as belonging to tibe owner of the soil, and to entice 
a greater degree of active and zealous labor on the part of the 
cultivator, he sharing the advantage of it. Whether in other 
respects, or on the whob, this plan would be beneficial to the 
proprietor, and preferable to the present system of labor and 
money wages, it is for him to consider and determine, as he 
must be the best judge in what regards his own interests. 

The only fear that I see reason to entertain in quittbg 
Jamaica, is with regard to the difficulty of cultivating the land 
with adequate profit; and I shall look anxiously to the result. 
God grant that it may be such as will benefit all parties; for 
the laborer, as well as the proprietor, is interested in the success- 
ful cultivaiaon of the land, and the iptogpenij of its owners. 

2 d2 




Apiil 25, 1843. 

Mt Lord, — ^In my confidential despatch No. 1^* I alluded 
to the State of Parties in this country as the subject on which 
I should next address you. 

The violence of party spirit forces itself on one^s notice im* 
mediately on arrival in the colony, and threatens to be the 
source of difficulties which are likely to impede the suoocssAil 
administration of the Government for the welfare and happiness 
of the coimtry. 

The parlies into which the community is divided are the 
French-Canadian party, the Reform party, and the Conservative 
party. I use the names by which the parties designate them- 
selves. The Reform party are by their opponents branded as 
Republicans and Rebels, and the Conservatives by theirs as 
Tories and Orangemen. 

* The despatch here referred to heDsive view of the- same subject I 

relates to the system of Goyenunent have given it in preference to the 

as established in Canada; but as a earlier one, after the present paper, 

later despatch, nnder date August 6, in due chronological order, 
contains a more mature and oompre- 


The French party is the strongeet, from being thoroughly 
united and acting together ahnost as one man. Unless any 
question were to arise which would unite the discordant Engli^ 
parties in a common feeling, the French party, firom its com- 
pactness, could influence the votes of the Assembly more than 
any other. This party is much gratified by its recent accesdon 
to power; by the appointment of two of its leading members 
to the Executive Council and to responsible offices, together 
with the appointment of others on the recommendation of their 
leader; and by the natural consequences, in patronage and 
otherwise^ of such an arrangement. This change has created a 
strong feeling of gratitude throughout Lower Canada towards 
Sir Charles Bagot. It is much to be regretted that no means 
could be devised for introducing this party into power at an 
earlier period. Their exclusion was injustice, and would have 
been a perpetual cause of disaffection. Their admission, al- 
though the manner of it, and some of the circumstances attend- 
ing it, may be regretted, has apparently produced very beneficial 
effects. Lower Canada is tranquil, and does not present any 
apparent ground of apprehension; and as I consider it to be my 
duty to regard French and English alike, to acknowledge no 
difference between them, and to treat all as loyal subjects, en- 
titled to equal protection and equal rights and privileges, I 
ihink that I can answer for their having no cause for reason- 
able dissatisfaction; although I cannot answer for the conse- 
quences of unreasonable expectations, if such exist. The views 
of this party are directed to the maintenance and extension of 
their own power as a French-Canadian party, and to the in- 
terests of their fellow-countrymen of French extraction. They 
may act vrith other parties on the principle of reciprocity, sup- 
port for support, but their own views are purely French-Ca- 
nadian, including in their objects the preservation of their own 
laws and language. They strongly resent every attempt that 
has been made to anglify them. 

The Reform party designates that portion of the English 
community in Upper Canada which was opposed to the Go- 


befovo the rebdUon* It isoladet m ili naks some 
who aoftoallj went into rebeUkay some who tlood aloof on that 
ocwMJon without taidng an j aotm part in liofaw? of the 
QoveiniiMni, and aome who, although actiiig with the Refbnii 
paitjr befinre the nbeUion, peifocmed their dvtj aalojal aabjecto 
when that oooafton arose. The two latter daaBea are r^raaited 
in the ExeontiM Oouncil by indiTidaals who respectively pm- 
med the oooneB desonbed; anditia anaocaaationjfpdnit the 
Oooneil that they haw appotatad to oflke men who weze 
eotnally engaged in lebeUiceu The Befonn party, thercbie^ 
inohidet those iriio were formeriy dissstisfied with the Govern* 
ment of Upper Oanada, those who at that time weva sepposed 
to desire separation firam the mother ooimtry, those of the eom* 
nuinity who hare the greatest inclination fi>r denMwatiG insd- 
tationsi and oonseqnently, as would at present eppear, the 
largest portion of the eleototal oonstitnencisi^ or tkait eks 
whioh oonaidets Itself to be meet Jnteiestsd in presf whig insd- 
tutions of that description, which the eTample and near neigh- 
bonrhoodof the United American States have rendered fiBHBiIisr 
to men's minds in this country. It is this fcoliiy, I oonottve, 
which gives to the Beform party iheir migcrity in Ae Kepre* 
sentative Assomblyi presuming that they have, aa they say, a 
m%}onty over the Oonservatives independent of the Fiendi 
party* Thisi however, is disputed by the Oonservalaves; and 
as popukr feelings and eleolions axe liable to chsngSi I do not 
mean at present to ^)eakpoeitively on that point. In attempting 
to desoribe the compodtion of the Befocm party, I have no in* 
tention to convey any doubt of their present kyallj. Ihey 
seem tobeperfectly satisfied with the existing order of things. 
The Oonservative party in Upper Canada embraces the 
greater portion of what may be ndatively tenned the aristo* 
cracy of the country— that is, the men of wealth and educatioiH 
and by birth and connexion of the dass of gentry, tc^^ether 
with a considenible number of the middle and lower oidezSi 
It includes those who formerly were consideied as exercising 
great influence in the Government under the reproachful title 


of the Family Compact, and whoee exclusive appropriation of 
power, place, and profit, h often alleged as an ezcofle for those 
who went into rebellion, and sought to separate Canada from 
the mother countiy. The ConservatiYe party inolndeB those 
to whom tiie coantry is deeply indebted for putting down that 
rebellion in Upper Canada. It includes the Orange Societies, 
whose proceecBngs are mischievous; and the Constitutaanal Asso- 
ciation, the efl^ of whose institution is not yet devdoped. In 
Lower Canada the Conservative party consDSts of those who 
would formerly have been termed the EngliA party, in oontiB- 
distitidion to the French, and consequently includes those who 
were loyal and true to the mother country when the Frrach- 
Canadians were in rebellion, or disaffected. It therefore em- 
braces in both Canadas those who were fisrmerly most con- 
spicuous in thear devotion to oonneadon with the British Empire 
and loyal subjection to the Crown. 

The French and Reform parties having coalesced, have ob- 
tained a decided majority in tiie Representative Assembly and 
the Executive ConnciL The parties tiierefbre which contain all 
ihose who were fonneriy disaffected have acquired the aaoen- 
dancy, to the exclusion of those who proved tiiemselves to be 
wen aflfected. The dissatis&ction felt by the fbnner on ac- 
count of their exclusion is now transferred to the latter ob, the 
same ground; and those who now bint at ihe probability of 
separation are among the Conservatives; but I trust that their 
professed loyalty is better founded than to be driven out of 
them by the success of their opponents; and I am still per- 
suaded that tiie firmest adherents to British connexion aie the 
main body of the Conservative party. 

Under these circumstances, and with much more eympatliy 
in my own breast towards those who have been loyal than to- 
wards those who have been disposed to throw off the dominion 
of the mother country, I find myself condemned as it weie to 
carry on the Oovemment to the utter exclusion of those on 
whom the mother country might confidently rely in the hour 
of need. This exclusion is contrary to my inclination, and 


much, in my opinba, to be deprecated; but it was forced o& 
my piedeoesBor bj the triumph of their opponents, and I do 
not at present see a probability of its being remedied without 
setting at defiance the operation of Responable Administration 
which has been introduced into this colony to an extent un- 
known, I believe, in any other. 

The strife of parties is more conspicuous in Upper than in 
Lower Canada, for in the latter the majority of the French 
party is so decisive, that no popular commotion could be ex- 
cited in favor of their opponents; but in Upper Canada, ihe 
power of the Reform and Conservative parties being more 
nearly balanced, there is more contest, and a disturbance is oc- 
casionally threatened and sometimes committed. It is in such 
cases that the Orange Societies are most mischievous. Formed 
originally, I believe, more as political than religiona associa- 
tions, their tendency, nevertheless, is to foment religious dif- 
ferences. If a violent Conservative vrishes to overawe a public 
meeting or to carry an election, he collects a party of Orange- 
men, or Irish Protestants, armed with bludgeons. The Re- 
formers, when they have notice of this, endeavour to bring a 
large party of Roman Catholics armed in like manner; or the 
Reformers may commence, and the Conservatives follow in this 
course, the Orangemen being always on the side of the Conser- 
vatives, although many Conservatives are not Orangemen. 
Sometimes an a£fray ensues; sometimes prudence prevails, and 
the weaker party quits the field without a contest In this way 
Protestants and Romanists are pitted against each other for 
political purposes, and religious hostility is excited or aggra- 
vated. Recently at this place a cross having been erected to 
indicate that a Roman Catholic place of won^p was about to 
be built, the cross was cut down during the night, and a pla- 
card substituted, intimating that no Roman Catholic place of 
worship should be erected there. I need not, I trust, say that 
my anxious endeavours will be directed to allay religious as well 
as political animosities, and to promote peace and harmony. 


It is customary, on the arrival of a Gk>vemor| to piesent ad« 
dresses' of congratulation and compliment. It is so muck a 
practice, that it would be a mistake to regard it as a personal 
affidr. I have received several properly confined to these pur- 
poses; but in other instances party spirit has introduced com- 
ments on political questions, or reproaches against adversaries. 
In some instances I have been called on to sustain Responsible 
Oovemmenty and follow the footsteps of my predecessor; in 
others, to uphold the prerogative of the Crown and the au- 
thority of her Majesty's Government^ and to abolish the rule of 
the Executive Council. On all such occasions my answers have 
been such as prudence seemed to me to dictate; and I have 
endeavoured to dissuade from party dissension, and to inculcate 
good-wiD to all men; but most probably in vain. 

The course which I intend to pursue with regard to all parties 
is to treat all alike, and to make no distinctions, as far as de- 
pends on my personal conduct, imless I discover, which I do 
not at present, that principles and motives are concerned which 
render a different course proper. I may here remark that the 
necessity of bringing the French into the Council is universally 
acknowledged, and that the Conservative party were disposed 
to form a junction with them before the change which brought 
them into the Council in alliance with the Reform party. The 
hostility of the Conservative party is chiefly directed against 
the Reform party in the Council; although there is also occa- 
sionally an inveteracy that the Govetement has been surren- 
dered to the French. 

If I had a fair open field I should endeavour to conciliate 
and bring together the good men of all parties, and to win the 
confidence and co-operation of the legislative bodies by measures 
calculated to promote the general welfare in accordance with 
public feeling ; but fettered as I am by the necessity of acting 
with a Council brought into place by a coalition of parties, and 
at present in possession of a decided majority in the Represen- 
tative Assembly, I must, in some degree, forego my own in- 


iiiithaitiHpeet8,aldioag^IiBayflt31 slnve as a nie- 
diitor to allaj the bkloniiai ctjnif wpaaL Even ibe hope of 
ibai my be abort Ihred, ton waj measme diat can becoBBtnied 
aa indicatiBg Ae adopdon of the aqtpoaed policj ef ifae party 
in the Oonnoil wiU cxoite the anunontf of ihe eBodoU party 
againgt me penonally, ao aa to d eetroj audi naefiihiffai on my 
part eran in that Ittde d^gvae. 

It ia, hoipaw, an advanti^ of die pie wm t ajfalem that op- 
podtion to the Goonoil need not be xegaided aa oppo d ikm to 
the GovemoTi aa feng as the Oooncil ii TOtnaUjr nominated by 
the Representative AaBemUy; and diat oppoeidon to die local 
AdmiaiBtrntioni even when die Governor la an object of atteck, 
need not be ooneiderod aa oppoeidon to her Majeatj^ Ooven- 





Mr LOBDy^-^R^arding Lord Sydenham as the fabricator of 
the fiame of govenunent now ezistixig in this province, I have 
load his despalohes to her Majesty's Secretary of State irith 
attmion, in veaich of some explanation of the predae view 
with which he gave to the local executive administration its pre- 
sent form; or of any dear understanding which he authorised 
the oolony to entertain on the mooted question of Responsible 
Q o vd iun e n t . 

I £ad that in the eaxfy portion of his despatches, whenever 
the notion of Responsible Govenmient is alluded to, in the 
ssnse in which it is here understood, he scouts it. There are 
someiematkaUe passsges in his letters £com Halifioc, or about 
the time of his mission to Nova Scotia, which indicate deci- 
smiy his view of that question. In speaking of a vote of 
want of confidence passed in the Legislative Assembly of that 
ptovinee, with r^ard to a meqaber or members of the Execu- 
tive Council, he reprobates such a vote as unconstitutional. 
He does not entertain the same opinion of a petition from the 
House to her Majesty for the removal of the Governor. This 
proceeding he regards as the coiuftitutional mode by which a 
colony may express its disapprobation of the administration of 
the government, and seek redress against the measures of the 
Qovernor. Nothing could more dearly define his view of the 


responnbilitj of a colonial Gk>Teniineiit, whidi eiideatly was, 
that the Ooveraor is the responsible Gk>Temment ; that his 
subordinate executive o£Boers are responnble to him, not to the 
Legislative Assembly ; and that he is responsible to the 
Ministers of the Crown, and liable to appeals fiom the oolcmj 
against his proceedings; it being, at the same tune, incumbent 
on him to consult local feelings, and not to pennst in employ- 
ing individuals justly obnoxious to the community. 

Regarding this as the view taken of the question by Lord 
Sydenham, it is beyond measure surprising that he adopted 
the very form of administration that was most assuredly 
calculated to defeat that purpose, and to produce or confirm 
the notion of Responsible Government which he had before 
reprobated; that is, the responsibility of the executive officers 
of the Oovemment to the popular Legislative Assembly. Li 
composing his Council of the principal executive ofEcera under 
his authority, in requiring that they should all be members of 
the Legislature, and chiefly of the popular branch, and in 
making their tenure of office dependent on their commanding 
a majority in the body representing the people, he seems to me 
to have ensured, with the certainty of cause and efiect^ that the 
Council of the Governor should regard themselves as respon- 
sible, not so much to the Governor as to the House of 
Assembly. In adopting the very form and practice of the 
Home Government, by which the principal Ministers of the 
Crown form a Cabinet, acknowledged by die nation as the exe- 
cutive administration, and themselves acknowledging respona- 
bility to Parliament, he rendered it inevitable that the Coundl 
here should obtain and ascribe to themselves, in at least some 
degree, the character of a Cabinet of Ministers. If Lord 
Sydenham did not intend this, he was more mistaken than 
from his known ability one would suppose to be possible; and 
if he did intend it, he, with his eyes open, carried into practice 
that very theory of Responsible Colonial Government which he 
had pronounced his opinion decidedly against. 

I cannot presume to account for this apparent inconsistency 


otherwise than by supposing either that he had altered his 
opinion when he formed his Council after the union of the two 
provinces, or that he yielded against his own conviction to 
some necessity which he felt himself unable to resist. His 
despatches do not furnish any explanation as to which of these 
influences he acted under; at least, I have not discovered in his 
latter despatches any opinion on the subject on which he had 
previously declared his decLdon against the theoiy, which be 
practically carried into effect, by avowedly making the tenure 
of office dependent on the support of a majority in the popular 
branch of ihe Legislature. 

It is imderstood that he was little accustomed to consult his 
Council, and that he conducted his administration according to 
his own judgment. His reputation for ability stands very high 
in this country; but it is belieyed that he could not have 
carried on his Government much longer without being forced to 
yield to the pressure of the Legislative Assembly on his Execu- 
tive Council. Before the commencement of the first session of the 
Parliament of Canada, the only session of the united province 
that he lived, or ever intended, to go through, he was threatened 
with a vote of want of confidence against a part of his Council — 
the very vote which he had pronounced to be unconstitu- 
tionaL This was averted during that session by a division in 
the Reform party, but the session, I am informed, was scrambled 
through with d^culty, the majorities reckoned on in support 
of the Government on some questions not exceeding one voice, 
and there not being in every instance even that. The first 
week of the session was occupied in extorting from the mem- 
bers of the Council an avowal of their responsibility to the 
majority^ according to the popular construction of Responsible 
Government. The vote of want of confidence was averted in 
that session only to be brought forward in the next, when, as 
is known, the dread of it operated with decisive effect. 

I dwell on Lord Sydenham's administration because it has 
had most important influence, which is likely to be permanent, 
on the subsequent government of this province. He esta- 


bliflhedv among the last acta of his adminiflfcrstioa, what ia iae 
called Responsible Govemme&t, and left the pioUeiii of the 
suooesB of that system in Colonial Government to be solved bj 
fiitarity. It may have been that to carry the measoies which 
he had immedii^y at heart he oonU not avoid what he 

The term Respomible Government, now in gmeral use in 
this oolony, was derived, I am told, fipom the marginal notes of 
Lord Doriiam's report Previously to the puhheation of that 
document, the Democratic party in Upper Canada had been 
struggling for a greater share than they possessed in die ad- 
ministration of the government of the country; but they had 
no precise name fi>r the object of thar desires, and oould not 
exactly define their views. Lord Durham's report gave them 
the definition, and the words Lrresponsible Government, Be- 
sponnbility of the Gbyemment, Bespooability of the Offieen 
of the Gbvemment, occurring repeatedly in the marginal notes, 
it is said furnished the name. From that time, ^^ Besponsible 
Government'* became the warHsry of the party. Lord Sydai« 
ham, on his arriYal in Upper Canada, had to enooonter or 
submit to this demand. One of his objects was to win the Be£brm 
party, the name assumed by the party in question, and they 
could only be won by the belief on their part that BesponsifaJb 
Government was to be conceded. In fact, Lord Sydenham, 
whether intending it or not, did concede it practically by the 
arrangements which he adopted, although tite full extent of 
the concession was not so glaringly manifested during his ad- 
ministration as in that of his successor. 

There appears to me to have been a great difPerenoe between 
the sort of Responsible Gh>vemment intended by Lord Durham 
and that carried into efiect by Lord Sydenham. On examining 
Lord Durham's report in search of what may be supposed to 
have been his plan, I find that he proposes that all officers of 
the Government except the Governor and his secretary should 
be responsible to the United Legislature; and that the Ghyvemor 
should carry on his government by heads of departments, in 

<< BBSPOK8IBII.ITY." 41fi 

whom the United Legialature xepoee confidence. All thia might 
be done without impainng the powers of iiHRfnlneBB of the GK>- 
vemor. K the secietaiy who issued the Governor's ordeis wexe 
not responsible to the Legislature, there would be a great dif> 
ferenoe from the present arrangement under which the pro- 
vincial administration gooerally is carried on throi^h secre- 
taries- professedly so responsible. The general respondbilitj of 
heads of departments, acting under the orders of the Governor, 
each distinctly in his own department, might exist without the 
destruction of the former authority of her Majesty's Govern- 
ment In this scheme there is no mention of the combination 
of these (dicers in a Council, to actbodilywith the character of 
a Cabinet, so as manifestly to impair the powers of the respon- 
sible head of the Government* Lord Durham's general coUp 
ception does not seem to have been formed into a distinct plan, 
and when he says that the responsibility to the Legislature of 
<< all officers of the Government except the Governor and his 
secretary should be secured by every meana known to the 
British constitution,'^ he does not explain by what means this 
should be done ; and ^t is by the means of doing it that the plan 
must be most materially affected. 

Lord Sydenham realised the conception in the way most 
calculated to weaken the authority of the Governor, and render 
the responsibility of the officers of the Government to the popular 
branch of the Legislature complete, by transacting the business 
of the province through the provincial secretaries, and making 
them and all the heads of departments a Council responsible 
to the Legislature, and holding their seats by the voice of the 
majority. As far as Lord Sydenham's deqtatches show, this 
was an optional and spontaneous arrangement on his part, al- 
though clearly opposed in its natural consequenoes to the sentir 
ments which he had previously expressed. 

Lord Sydenham's policy in Upper Canada was to win the 
party calling themselves Reformers, to crush the party called 
the Family Compact, and to form a Council <^ the moderate 
men of the Reform and Conservative parties. Li the two 


former of these objects he sucoeeded. In the latter he most be 
said to have fkiled, for, although the Council so formed struggled 
through one short aeanon of the Legislature, it could not meet, 
or was afraid to meet, the threatened storm in the next, and 
was broken up, the Conservatiye portion retiring to make way 
for the French party, and what was considered the extreme 
Democratic, or Reform party. 

Lord Sydenham's policy in Lower Canada had been to sub- 
due the French party. In this he failed. They remained 
compact and exceedingly embittered against Lord Sydmham. 
They united themselves with the extreme Democratic party; 
these were strangely joined by the extreme Conservative party; 
and this combination overthrew Lord Sydenham's Council, 
which had been previously recruited by Sir Charles Bagot, 
with accessions from both the Conservative and the Beform 

By these manoeuvres the French and Reform parties became 
imited, the Conservatives were thrown into a minority, and 
the ultra-Conservatives, who had aided in bringing about this 
change, were dropped by their recent allies, in accordance with 
the terms of their alliance, which was only for offensive war 
against the Council. 

The result of this struggle naturally increased the convicdon 
that Responsible Grovemment was effectually established. New 
councillors were forced on the Govemor-G^eral, to at least one 
of whom he had a decided antipathy. The Coundl was no 
longer selected by the Governor. It was thrust on him by the 
Assembly of the people. Some of the new members of the 
Council had entered it with extreme notions of the supremacy 
of the Council over the Governor — that is, of the necessity of 
his conforming to their advice on all matters, great or small; 
and the illness of Sir Charles Bagot after this change threw 
the current business of administration almost entirely into their 
hands, which tended much to confirm these notions. Subse- 
quent experience has, I hope, modified these impressions, and 
produced a more correct estimate of the relative position of the 


Govemor and the Council; but it is obTious that the existence 
of a Council, in reality appointed and maintained by a majority 
in the popular branch of the Legislaturei must tend to impair 
the power and influence of the Grovemor. Whether this, in 
the end, will operate advantageously for the colony and the 
mother country, time alone can positiyely show. I am disposed 
to think that its immediate efiects are injurious, presuming, as 
I do, that whatever good it may seem to e£fect might have been 
produced in another way. 

One evil of this kind of Responsible (Government is, that it 
tends to produce the government of a party. The "Governor 
may oppose himself to this, but will hardly be able to do so 
eflfectnally. The Council will be apt to think more of securing 
their own position than of cordially co-operating in the accom- 
plishment of his wishes. Their recommendations in matters of 
patronage, which in the relations existing between them and 
the Grovernor are likely to be often attended to, even without 
admitting their claim to a monopoly, will be almost always in 
&vour of partisans. Their supporters look to them for the ex- 
clusive bestowal of places and emoluments, and threaten openly 
to withdraw their support from them if they do not favor their 
views. To maintain the majority by which they hold office 
will be with them a primary concern; such, at least, is the ten- 
dency of the circumstances of their position, without supposing^ 
the total absence of higher and better motives. 

Without a Council so circumstanced, a Gbvemor, acknow-^ 
lodging the propriety and necessity of conducting his govern- 
ment according to the interests and wish^ of the people, and 
of condliating and winning the Legislature — and this might 
have been made a rule for the guidance of Governors never to 
be departed from — ^might render his administration of the go* 
vemment satisfactory to all parties, and obtain an influence 
conducive to the preservation of affectionate relations between 
the mother country and the colony, and to the welfare and 
interests of both. Under the existing system, the Govemor, it 
appears to me, is not likely to obtain influence. If he and his 



Coancil axe oordially uniled, he beoomeB, either in lealitj or to 
appeaxance, a partiaan, without any reaaon for faia being so. 
The ciedh of iJl the good that he may do will be aiawmrd by 
them, iwaacnbed to then, by their party . All that maybe eos- 
aideredevil by the other party he will have the diaciedit of allow- 
ing* If he evinoee any diapodidon to oondliate the othar party, 
he beoomea an olgect of diatmat to hia Council and their paitjr. 
Their intereafes and hia, and with hia thoae of her liBJeaty's 
Oovemment, are always distinct; for they have their intaests 
as a party to guard, which must be distinct fiom thoae of her 
Majeety'a Goremment, as well aa Icom any which the GoTenor 
may personally feel wUh respect to the credit of his ndminis- 

I will endearour to describe my own postioo. I am not 
perfoctly satisfied with my Coumal, chiefly beeanse they arc 
under the influence of party Tiews, and woold, if they oould, 
drag me on with them in the same course. The only eflfectoal 
remedy would be to dismiss them, or such of thorn as are most 
in the eitreme on this p<nnt, and fonn another GounoL But 
the consequence to be eaq>ected would be, that a cry would 
be raised accusing me of hostility to Re^onsifcle Goremment. 
The new Council would not be able to stand against a ma^cixty 
in the popular branch of the Legiskture, and I should either 
be obliged to take back those whom I had dismisBed, widi a 
sort of disgrace to myself injurious to the efficiency of my go- 
vernment, or be in a continual warfare with a majaixty in the 
House of Assembly that would render my preaenoe here of no 
benefit to her Majesty's service* Such a contest I would neither 
shrink from nor yield to, if it became my duty to enoountor it; 
but it is so desirable to avoid it, that it would require strong 
grounds to justify its being wilfully incurred. 

My objects are to govern the country for its own weUaie, 
and to engage its attachment to the parent State. For these 
purposes it is my wish to conciliate all parties; and although 
this might be difficult, I do not perceive that it would be im- 
practicable, if the Grovemor were firee to act thoroughly in that 


spirit; but the acoompliahment of dbat iriali aeems almost im- 
poBsible when tho Governor is trammelled with a Council 
deeming it neoeseary for their existence that their own party 
alone shoald be considered* Sooner than abandon myself as a 
partisan to such a course, I would dismiss the Council and take 
the consequences ; but it is scarcely possible to avoid the in- 
flu^ioe of party Bpint in an administration in which every ad- 
viser and every executive officer is guided by it; and the 
chief difficulty of my position, I conceive, is to act according 
to my own sense of what is rights and in opposition to this 
party spirit, without thereby breaking with the Council and 
the majority that at present support them. The form of ad- 
ministration adopted by Lord Sydenham appears to me to 
have put heavy shackles on any Governor who means to act 
with prudence, and would not recklessly incur the ccmsequences 
of a rupture with the majority in the popular Assembly. The 
meeting of the Legislature will probably enable me to see my 
position mtxe deariy. It is at present far from certain that a 
change of councillors would produce any beneficial alteration 
in respect to the difficulty noticed, for any Council appointed 
on the princuple of Canada Responsible Government would 
most probably have similar party views, and the same pressure 
on them from their partisans. 

It becomes a question whether Party Government can be 
avoided. The experiment of Responsible Government in this 
colony hitherto would indicate that it cannot. It seems to 
be inevitable in free and independent States where Responsible 
Government exists; and the same causes are likely to produce 
similar efficts cvexywhere; but there is a wide difference 
between an independent State and a colony. In an indepen- 
dent State all parties must generally desire the welfare of the 
State. In a colony subordinate to an Imperial Government, it 
may happen that the i»redominant party is hosdle in its feel- 
ings to the mother countiy, or has ulterior views inconsistent 
with her iuteiestSL In such a case, to be obliged to co-operate 
with that party, and to permit party government to crush 



those who are best affected, would be a Btresge podtion for ihe 
mother country to be placed in, and a strange part for her to 
act This ought- to have been well consideied before the 
particular system which has obtuned the name of Reepon&ble 
Government was established. It is now, periiaps^ too late to 
remedy ihe evil. I have supposed an extreme and posnble 
case without intending to apply the description to the state of 
parties in this colony. I trust that it is in a great degree in- 
applicable. It is nevertheless so &r applicable, that the party 
always known as the British Party in ihis province is now in 
the minority. It will be my study to make all parties con- 
tented and happy; but that part of my task, I fear, is hopeteas. 
It will also be my study to promote loyalty to oar giacions 
Sovereign, and attachment to the British Empiie. Hiese feel- 
ings will be most successfully confirmed by an adnmustration 
of the government satisfactory to ihe people, and by a con- 
viction on iheir minds that their interests are promoted by 
British connexion. The acts of her Majesty's Government 
in guaranteeing the loan for public works, and in faciUtating 
the importation of Canada wheat and flour into ihe United 
Kingdom, ought to have in this respect a very beneficial ten- 
dency, as evincing a fostering care for the colony which can 
hardly fail to be highly appreciated. 

I have to apologise for some repetition in ihis despatch of 
sentiments nearly the same as ihose expressed on former occa- 
sions on which I have noticed the same subject It is one 
which has unavoidably occupied much of my attention, and 
is brought before me continually by daily occurrences. I 
feel that the littie power of usefulness ihat I might have had 
under diflferent circumstances is obstructed by ihe plan of ad- 
ministration introduced into this colony ; but ihat any attempt 
to remove ihe impediment would most probably be still more 
injurious. I have therefore dilated on the peculiarity of my 
position more frequently than may seem necessary; and I trust 
that I shall not again trouble your Lordship on ihis topic. 


[The antidpationB shadowed forth in the preceding despatch were soon 
fulfilled. Sir Charles Metcalfe said truly that " the chief difficoltj of his 
position was to act according to his sense of what was right without 
breaking with his CounciL" In a preceding despatch he had spoken of the 
requirements of his Council, and the impossibility of submitting to them 
consistently with the duty that he owed to the Imperial GoTemment. " I 
am required/' he said, " to give myself up entirely to the Council; to sub- 
mit absolutely to their dictation; to have no judgment of my own( to 
bestow the patronage of the GoYemment exdusively on their partisans ; 
to proscribe their opponents; and to make some public and unequiyocal 
dedaiation of my adhesion to these conditions, including the complete 
nullification of her Majesty's Goyemment." But he was not disposed to 
purchase peace on such terms as these. As the autumn advanced, the 
prospect of a rupture with the Executive Council seemed more and more 
imminent: "At the end of November the crisis came. The question 
which precipitated it at hist was a question of patronage. Metcalfe had 
appointed to his personalStaff a French-Canadian officer who was distasteful 
to Mr. Lafontaine. The appointment was intended to conciliate the French- 
Canadian community, but it offended their chief. The leaders of both 
parties in the Council then waited on the Governor-General, intent on ad- 
vancing the pretensions of the Executive. They demanded that the Go- 
vernor-General should make no appointment without the sanction of his 
Ministers. During two long sittings, on the 24th and 25th of November, 
Baldwin and Lafontaine pressed their demands with energy and resolution ; 
but Metcalfe, in his own phicid way, was equally energetic and resolute. 

On the 26th of November, all the members of the Council, 

with the exception of Mr. Daly, finding that they could not shake the firm- 
ness of the Governor-General, resigned their offices, and prepared to justify 
their conduct to Parliament and the colony at large." Hie following letter 
contains Sir Charles Metcalfe's exphmation of the circumstances in which 
this important event had originated, and the results which were likely to 
attend it.] 




Dee. 80, IMS. 

Mr LoBDy — ^The xedgnatioii of the late C!oiiiic3 waa bo sot- 
priong, oonaideiiiig the power which they denved ficoia the 
sapport of a kige nugoiity in die Aanmbly, thai wnons oon- 
jeotareB have been fonned as to the came of that proeeeding. 

It is said that thej were beginning to totter in Paifiament. 
Some clauses in the jadicatuie bills for Lower Canada, brought 
in by Mr. Lafontaine, had been thrown out» owing to Mr.Yigei's 
opposition on principle to the anangement therein proposed of 
j udges sit^g as a part of a Court of Appeal on the hearing of q>- 
peals from their own judgments. Mr. Baldwin's King's College 
TTniversity Bill was threatened with certain fidlnte, and would 
probably hare been lost on the day after their res^inationy if 
the latter had not fuznished a pretext for withdiawing it with- 
out asBJgning the prospect of defeat as the cause. Their as- 
sessment bill likewise gave general disaatis&ction in Upper 
Canada, and they had been compelled to modify it considerably. 
These and some other occasional Sjrmptoms of defection, al- 
though not affecting their general majority in the House, were 
regarded as omens of approaching weakness, and it is supposed 
that, in order to recover waning popularity and power, they 
sought a rupture with the Governor, determined to make use 
of it for the purpose of raising a popular cry in their own favor, 
through which they might either return to power with increased 
force, and the complete prostration of the Grovemment to their 


will, OX thiow the Governor lato a state of eollkion nidi ibe 
AnemUj, and head a {K^wlar and o^enrhdining oppontion 
agunit hka end any Gonacil that he mghk ferm. This ex- 
pkafllion has obtained Bome emiency ; but I cannot saj Aat 
I give fall exedeau)e to it as aaffidently aoooimtnig tag their 
oondiKti althoiigh the circumatanoea stated may have had a 
share of inflnenoe* 

A mote ob^ona motiTe may be found in other dxcmBBtaneea. 
There were aerend bills befiKe the ParKament which, if passed 
into laws, would have ereated seYenl new appointments widi 
conaideKable aahoies. Someof theae^itwaanmiouredytheyhad 
{Nromised away in the pnrcfaaae of support^ eq)ecially of Totes 
on theSeatof GoTenuneotqiiestion. To secure the fstiibution 
of this patronage £ar their own party purposea was^ I concerr^ 
the immediate object of their demand, or one £Dir the sairender 
oi the patronage into their hands. If the demand had sno- 
oeeded, they woold haye accomplished that purpose, would 
have prostrated the Government at their feet, and would have 
gone someway to perpetuate their retention of power. If tliey 
failed in that demand, they could adopt the oooras which in 
the conjecture adverted to in the precedii^ paragraph they aie 
supposed to have sought premeditatedly the means of following. 
When the rupture had occurred, they took care that the pa- 
tronage in the distributioa of which diey had reckoned should 
not be created. The bills were eitherqnashed, or the patronage 
clauses ezduded. 

As soon aa they had made up their mind to resign, they 
manifestly determined to raise the cry of Besponstble Ghrrem- 
ment in their fiivcMr, and to pretend that this fiivocite syston 
was in danger at ihe handa of a Governor who was trying to 
restore the old days of die Family Compact, and so forth. They 
suppressed entirely the facts on which their resignation took 
place, and when that suppression was exposed, they pretended 
that all that they required was that their advice should be taken 
respecting all appointments, not that it should be followed,— a 
representation of their views too absurd to merit lengthened 


nfiiUtion; for tbere if not a word that can be odd agabii 
makixig appointments without asking their adyice, that might 
not with less dispute be urged against making them eontnrj 
thereto. They suppressed all mention of the demand that they 
had made, to the purport that no app<»ntment should be made 
injttri9us to their party influence. It is perfectly desc that 
their object was to extort a surrender of the patronage into 
their hands; and one word from me agredng to the most 
limited of their demands, would hare shackled the Ooremor, 
and dragged him at their chariot-wheels for erer. 

Their conduct is nevertheless surprising. They might safety 
have reckoned, from my past practice^ on a large share of pa- 
tronage. Theb pretence to the Parliament and the public was, 
that they only wanted to know of appointments before they were 
made. Hie fiicts of the case on that point are, that I scarcely 
ever heard of a vacancy except by a nomination £rom them for 
the succesdon; that I rarely made an appointment otherwise 
than on their recommendation; and that I do not recollect a 
angle instance in which I made an appointment without being 
previously made acquainted with their sentiments rq^arding it 
I certainly did not consider myself absolutely bound to consult 
them regarding every appointment, nor to surrender my judg- 
ment to their party views — and when a demand was made that 
I should so fetter her Majesty's Oovemment, I decidedly re- 
fused — but practically they had more than they pretended to 
desire; and not only had the means of expressing their opinion 
on any appointment about to be made, but had actually most 
appointments given away on their recommendation. Woe I 
now endeavouring to account to your Lordship for any exercise 
of patronage, I should be much more fearfal of bebig found 
guilty of too much consideration for the Council, than of too 
rigid a maintenance of the prerogative of the Crown. 

When they set up the cry of Responsible Government, their 
success was at first wonderful, especially in the Ass^nbly. 
Nearly all of the party called Reformers, moderate as well as 
extreme, probably from fear of their constituencies, thought it 


neoeeaary to jom them. Misiepresentationfl had also some effect 
in the country, which, however, seems to be diminishing in 
both Lower and Upper Canada. Neverthelessi the discussions 
ihat have arisen in consequence of the resignation of the Coun- 
cil have shown that the opinion of the party, which may be 
called the Responsible Govemment party, goes' the full lengdi of 
the pretensions of the Coimcil^ and that it is really understood 
that Responsible Goyemment means the entire submission of 
the Gbvemor to the advice of the Council, and consequently the 
entire supremacy of the Council, excepting only when by an 
appeal to the Parliament or the people the Gk>yemor can obtain 
a majority for a new Council in any difference with the one 
from which he may part. Responsible Government carried to 
this extreme appears to me to be impracticable in a colony 
with any preservation of the authority of the mother country, 
for time after time fresh encroachments on that authority will 
be made by the spirit of democracy. This has already advanced 
so fiir, that it is now impracticable to carry on the govemment 
with any chance of support from the parties at present com- 
posing the majority in the House of Assembly without acknow- 
ledging Responsible Gk>vemment as the rule, although so unde- 
fined a theory may still admit of different constructions. Be- 
tween these two impracticabilities the prospect as to the future 
govemment of this colony is very uncertain. The time cannot 
be £ur distant when it will be necessary eitiier to submit to the 
extreme view taken of that principle in this colony, which 
would complete the subversion of all govemment on the part 
of her Majesty, and the substitution of that of the dominant 
party, or to resbt the popular frenzy with the risk of separation. 
I do not mean to say that the rage for Responsible (Govern- 
ment is universal. The addresses which I have received and 
submitted to your Lordship show that there is a considerable 
party willing to support the Govemment against republican en- 
croachments; and if Upper Canada were alone, I could at this 
moment, by an appeal to the people, obtain a majority in the 
Assembly composed of the British or Loyal party. It may 


daj beocMe muuuumiy to km entinly on that party, and 
than die qnartioii will be tried vfaedier tlie goy e n u net can be 
ottiied oo with tbeir aid akne. If xednoed to Aaft n eoea al ^ , 
I dboald not deapait. It preaenti abnoat the entf chaaee of 
the eolonj'a xemammg a BiitBh oolonyin moie than same; 
and the mcaaiiieB of the (SoTCinment might be aa Ebenl with 
that party aa yMt any odier, ao aa to piedade any le aeonaMe 
canae of oonaphdnt But naaon baa litde inflnenoe in party 
strife; andthorewooldbenriricinTeatiiigaoleljonAatperty, 
wliioh I would not enooonter widKmta neoaasHj. 

I have, therafeie, rinoe it became neoeamiy to fbnn a new 
Oonnoil, tried to ootn p oae it of die VreaA paTty, the British 
psr^, and the Befann party. The btter party^ in the fiiat 
inatanoe, evincad fdactanoe to ooaleaoe widi the Britnh party, 
and aoDght to obtain an aasuiaiinj firom the domimmt leaden 
of the majority that they wonld mxpportf or at least not oppoae, 
a Oooncil fenened ezdarireiy fiom the Reform and Fiendi 
partiesL Thia, however, did not suit the viewt of these domi- 
nant kadeia, and I was spared the embanassment of detemining 
whether to take such a CSooncilY for the sake of an immediate 
majority, to the ezdarion of the British partyv who had eome 
forward ardently and generously to sapp<»t her Majesty's Go- 
vernment in the time of need, or whedier to adhere to the 
Loyahsti^ widi the aaerifioe of a majority in die Asssmbly. I 
stin entertmn hope of being able to form a Goancil co m pose d 
of die duee parties before mentioned, who are already xn aome 
d^iee represented in the Provirional Gonncil at pi u sent nomi- 
nated, — Mr. Viger representing die French party, and both 
Mr. Daly and Mr. I^aper representing in some degree aa to 
each both die British and moderate Beform parties. Mr. Viger 
requires time. No influential person of the Frendi party haa 
hitherto joined him; but he expects a diange in die opinions 
of th«t party, and ia not without h<^>es of eventual support. 
In the mean time he ia very valuable to me as a link connecting 
the Govenmient with die French-Canadian intereetB, and as 
showing my own disposition towards that race. His oonAict 


has been •dmiwbfe. He has evinced eoesgjf fimmeaB, didn- 
t CAm l eJi ieM, asad pat riotiBiii; and Ins princaplen^ as mil aa theae 
of Ifr. Daly and Mr. Draper, are entirely aatiafiutory. Tlie 
other armngemeBta tost the complelkm of the Comicil and the 
nomiiaitton to vaeaitt officea are auapeaoded until Mr. V iger'a 
plana for the junctk>tt of geayemen of Lower Canada bring ai^ 
from that quarter, and mtil ike Upper Canada Belbrm party 
cooelade Aeir anangementa for a junctioii uriiibh is pending. 
Theae ddaya and oautiona, whidi in a difionent atate of affiuza 
would be unneoeaniy, are preacribed by the uzgenfc expedieney 
of aecnring, if poonble, a majorby in Parliament, which can 
only be eflboted by aaliafying the three partiea before deaignated, 
or aofficrent portiona of them. 

After the completion of the lequiaite arangemaitfl^ I shall 
meet the preaent Parliament^ whenever that may be reqoistte, 
either with or without a majority in support of the Goyem- 
ment. If then be a majority, I trust that our meaauzea will 
be audi aa may ooafiim it. Should the Gk>yexnment be in a 
minority, and proceedings be ftctiously obstructed by the ma- 
jority, I must then diasolve the Parliament. After the election, 
if a majority ahonid be retnnied in &yor of the Gtoyemment, I 
may ezpeet that public buaineaB will proceed. In the contrary 
case, if factiooa measurea be adopted to emhanaiw the Goyem- 
ment and force back on me the objectionable gentlemen who 
have reaigned, all that I can at pieaent foresee i% thai I will not 
yield to foetioua opporition, nor submit to have m^i forced 
back on me in whom I cannot jdace oonfidence. I shall then, 
in ibe case supposed, be in a state of collision with the House 
of Assembly, without the hope of advantage £rom a further 
dhsolution. The fooling of the majority will by that time have 
become acrimonious against me penonally, and either I must 
be recalled for the sake of peace in the colony, or Respcmsible 
Government will be practically exploded. 

I have hitherto written on this subject under a conviction 
that I was right in resisting the demands <^ the late Council, 
and that I could not have prevented their resignation without 


a dqprading sabmiBnon that woidd have Yiitiialiy nneBdered 
the oomminioii that I hold from her Majesty into their hands. 
Whatever may happen, I shall not regret the retisement of 
gentlemen who, from anti-Brituh feelings, are unfit to be the 
adviserB of the Goremor of a Britidi colony; and if a majodtj 
in Padiament be determined to force ihem back on me in that 
capacity, I shall despair of the probability of Canada's l<mg re- 
maining a British colony. Tonr Lordship may posnbly take a 
different view of the case, and be of opinion that the pteaent 
crisis has been produced by some mismanagement or deCed of 
judgment on my port In that esse, a diflkrent remedy may 
suggest itself from any that I propose; and whenever the time 
may come when your Lordship may conader, whether now or 
at any later period, that my remoTtd will be beneficial to the 
public interests, I earnestly entreat that no penonsl delicacy or 
indulgence towards me may have a moment's influence in re- 
tarding such a measure. I do not mean by this request to 
imply the slightest desire to retreat from the contest that may 
await me, as long as my presence can be of any service. While 
I retain your Lordship's confidence, I shall have greater satis- 
faction in endeavouring to maintain this as a British colony, than 
I ever could have had in co-operation with gentlemen whose 
constant objects seemed to be to reduce the authority of her 
Majesty's Gt>vemment to a nullity, and to' rule with unbridled 
power according to the most illiberal dictates of the most anti- 
British party spirit; according to which, every man wbo had 
beeii a rebel was deemed deserving of reward, and every one 
who had loyally and bravely defended his Queen and country 
was to be proscribed or neglected. 

From the time of their resignation, forgetful of the mayimg 
of Responsible Government by which they profess to be guided, 
and which ought to have taught them respect for the represen- 
tative of their Sovereign, they have practised, by themselves 
and their partisans, and the portion of the Press under their 
influence, every endeavour to raise a cry against me as an 
alleged opponent of Responsible Grovemment ; and having no 


fieusts on which such an accnBation could be founded, have 
inFentedy without Bhame, gioundless ^Isehoods, to give a color 
to the aasertion. One absurd one is, that I had removed from 
the printed copy of my reply to their explanation of their 
rerigimtion, sent down to the legislatiye bodies, the paragraph 
containing my declaration of adhedon to Responsible Goyem- 
ment; as if, independently of the unworthiness of such a pro- 
ceeding, I could designedly remove the paragraph the best 
calculated to refute the iujurious part of their explanation; 
and as if, after placing one copy of my answer in their hands, 
and having had another copy read in the Assembly, both 
including that paragraph, I could have subsequently taken it 
out with any hope of any benefit that might be supposed 
possible fix>m suppressing it. Another false statement, almost 
traceable to one of themselves, is that their dismissal had been 
long premeditated, that it took place under your Lordship's 
orders, and was settled before I embarked from England. 
Any statement of this kind that can ezdte a ferment in their 
favor and against me is resorted to without scruple, and no 
doubt produces eflfect. 

As to Responsible Government, I venture to say that never 
has this &vorite system been so carried into practice by any 
former Governor as by me, excepting during the period of my 
predecessor's incapacity from sickness, when the powers of the 
Government were entirely assumed by the Council. One of 
my first duties was to resume the authority of the Governor 
with respect to the ordinary transaction of buriness, conducting 
the administration of the government through the secretaries, 
without reference to the Council, except in cases in which the 
law required that I should have their consent, or in which I 
was desirous to avail myself of their advice. It is remarkably 
characteristic of their exclusive views, which were almost lite- 
rally confined to the possession of patronage for party purposes^ 
that in all their attacks on me since their resignation in support 
of their accusation of opposition to Responsible Gt>vemment, not 
one word has been said of the numerous daily, and often im- 


portant, oiden iflsaed by me irilhout nfevenoe to tliem; wkUe 
on the sabjed of petronige, tbe sole objed of theb eajadilyt I 
eaimoty as befora lemarked, xemembcor a Binf^ iiMtenee in 
which I made any appointment without being previonaly 
awaie of their aentimentB regaiding it, or without reoeKring 
their leoommendadon of a 8iicceaK>r, which moat frequently 
announced the Tacin<7 to be supplied. lapeakof theordimxy 
practioe, (or I never retinquiahed the ri|^ of ezeidsing the 
pterogatiTe of the Grown at my diacvetian ; and dus is ihe 
point on whidi I have been in coUisioa with the majority of the 
AsMmbly supporting die lato Ezeoutiye CounciL 

The object of the party since their resignation seems to 
haTe been to fbroe thMnselves back on me by the weight of 
their majority; or, &iling in that, to ftnhamtfw me as much as 
possible, by obstructing the program of baiefioal meamnes, 
and by opporing any Council that mi§^t be formed. The first 
object I regard as quite unattainable. It is impossible that I 
can receive them back. The second they may eftct; but such 
an opposition will be wholly factious, and must have a tendency 
to destroy their favorite object of the supremacy of the Council, 
88 1 conclude that her Majesty's Gbvemment will deem it unwise 
to submit to such dictation from the ^ Civinm ardor pmva 
jubendum," which, if successful, can onfy end in the annihiia* 
tion of the power of thei Crown, and in eventual sepaiation or 
civil war; aldiough it is likewise possible that resistsnce may 
lead to the same result 

I have hitherto omitted to notice that the xesignation of the 
members of the Council was on the part of most of them relnc* 
tant. It was brought about by Messrs. Baldwin and Lafon- 
iaine, and chiefly by the former, who, perhiqM, not liking his 
position as second to Mr. Lafontaine, and having lost p(^- 
larity in Upper Canada, may have desired to place himself at 
the head of the whole Responsible Government party by raising 
the cry that their favorite scheme was in jeopardy. Seven 
others followed the two leaders in their resignation, although it 
was evident that sevezfJ of them did not relish the proceeding. 


They went, however, either from conceiYiiig adherence to their 
leaders to be their proper course, or from expecting to return 
along with them to power. I let them go without any effi>rt 
to detain them, for there was only one among them, Mr. Morin, 
whom I could have any desire to retain, or whose continuance 
would have been of any service to the Government. It seemed 
to be generally expected, for some time after tbe rengnation, 
that I should be forced to call them back; and this impression 
may have influenced some of the votes given in the Assembly 
in their favor. Several members of the House came to me in 
suooessive deputations as mediators, professing to desire re- 
conciliation; but I received no overtores directly from the 
rengnefs; and any attempt at reconciliation on my part would 
have been an acknowledgment of defeat^ and would have been 
attended with the prostration of the Government before a domi- 
neering facdon. 

Her Majesty's decision in favor of Montreal on the Seat of 
Government question, received by this padcet, may irritate the 
parties hitherto since the rupture moat dii^KMKd to support me 
in Upper Canada, and make them lukewarm or even adverse; 
but if that consequence ahould take place it cannot be helped. 
The decisii^ if I may presume to say so^ is right; and after 
the reference to the L^jislatuie, could not have been otherwise. 
Recent events have not altered the opinion which I before ex- 
pressed on that subject; that is, that the fittest place in the 
united province ought to be chosen, without regard to sectional 
claims or feelings, which could only embarrass the decision. 
The effSsct, however, in Upper Canada is doubtful, and there 
are predictions of agitation for a repeal of the union; for which 
retrogression neither division of the province is much indisposed. 
It is not necessary at present to trouble your Lordship with my 
notions on that question. 





July 8, 1843.* 
Mr LOBD, — I find among leading men of all parties in 
local politios in this piovinoe a oonndeiaUe alarm pieTmiltng 
lest the hostile attempt in progress in Ireland to dumonber the 
Biitiah Empire, under the pretence of seeking a lepesl of the 
Iq^islatiTe union of that country with Great Britain, should 
a£bct the security of CSanada. 

It is supposed that if any coDiaon were to occur in Ireland 
between the GoTenunent and the disafiected, it would be fol- 
lowed by the pouring in of myriads of Boman Oatholic Irish 
into Canada from the United States, assisted by the inimicsl 
portion of the Ammcan population^ and that tiiey would be 
joined by the great body of Roman Catholic emigiants now 
settled in this province. So strongly has this ahrm preyailed, 
that a gentleman of information and ability, and a member of 
the House of Assembly, recentiy brought to my private secre- 
tary a letter received firom New York, written by an individual 
on whose veracity the gentleman relied, stating that Frendi 
officers were actively engaged at that place in drilling Uie Irish 
with whom it abounds, witii a view to the invasion of Canada 
immediately on the occurrence of any outbreak in Ireland. I 
cannot say that I gave credit to this intelligence; and I trust 
that the tdarm so generally entertained is an exaggerated one; 

* The expediency of placmg one ]pKper out of its proper duronological 
after another the three preceding de- sequence ; but it snmcientij tdls its 
spatohes has thrown the present own stoiy in this place. 


but as it exiistSy it is right that your Lordship should be apprised 
of it. It arises solely from apprehensions of an outbreak in 
Ireland, and when these shall be dissipated, as I devoutly 
hope they will be, by the success of the endeavours of her Ma- 
jesty's Government to maintain tranquillity unimpaired in that 
country, the alarm will cease and be forgotten here. 

From their being in some degree connected with this subject, 
I enclose two placards which lately appeared in Kingston, the 
one summoning an Irish repeal meeting, and the other calling 
a counter-meeting at the same spot, for the avowed purpose of 
obstructing the former, as the placard says, "peaceably if 
we can, forcibly if we must." It was evident that if the 
parties came together there would be collision, and anxiety 
was naturally caused by the prospect Two of the principal 
magistrates called on me, and very, properly represented the 
danger. They seemed to expect that I should authorise mea- 
sures to prevent the repeal meeting; but although I deprecated 
such a meeting as much as any one, and cordially detest its 
object, it appeared to me that it could not be deemed illegal if it 
were peaceably conducted, and that those would be to blame who 
might attempt forcibly to obstruct it. I therefore recommended 
the magistrates first to try whether they could not dissuade the^ 
leadersof the repeal movement from holding their projected meet- 
ing, and if that effort failed^ then to exert their influence with 
the other party to prevent any obstruction to the meeting, and, 
at all events, to take measures to keep the peace. The matter 
ended in those who had called the repeal meeting being dis- 
suaded from persevering in their purpose. Although disturb- 
ance was thereby prevented in this instance, it is evident that the 
Irish emigrants have brought their combustible character along 
with them to this province, and that collision is not unlikely to 
occur, as opportunities arise, between those of the Church of Eng^ 
land and tiiose of the Church of Rome. Orange Lodges have 
long existed in Upper Canada, but originally they were more 
amnect« with political than with religious differences. Lat- 
terly, however, Hibernian societies have been formed, in which 



the Bomaa Ixuh congv^gmfte, and the ■fiiinl Bociflliei oanythe 
oolon «nd icngnia which belong to the oonpe^NndiBg partaos im 
Iielftnd. The 12fth of July is Mfiptomiang, on whkh dsf Ae 
Ozange Lodges are i^t to make demoafltmtiaBa wineh the Iriah 
Bomaa CetholioB deem affeneiye. I haw had pfffTnul eooK 
munication with both the QtandMarterof theOr aa geawaand 
the Bomaa Getholk) VioaisApoetolio— lihe Boman OBtholic 
Bkhopbeiag oGnfiaed to hit house by dolmoBB — oa thieanb^t 
They have both promised their asnstanoe in pemading tlieir re- 
spective parties to keep the peace. No Onmge pmesBona are, 
I underatand, to take pkoe at Kingston and other pkoes wine 
there axe lodges^ but they will, I am mfczmed, in aoma plaoos; 
and I can only Jiope that wiiese they do they auj pasa wiAimt 

The di&cenoes between the opponent aocietieB areetiD, I be- 
lieve, more of a political than of areligious charaoter, but ikose 
of the ktterdesoriptian are likewise ezcitfid. The Qiange Lodges 
side with the CoBservatives, oi:^ as they seem now most disposed 
to caU themselFO, ihe Oonatitationaliati^ and the Ilibemian 
societies with those who call themselves Be&cmesa. The 
danger of coUisbn and distorbaxioB fiom theae aacietiea is at 
present confined to Upper Canada. My •**"**^^ will natu- 
rally be fixed oa tius subject, as it is meat desiable that such 
causes of anschief should on both jides cease to exist 



[ExtbaotJ— Mjr poil is far itoin a pleaaMil ona While 
I wish to devote my nind exoliioively to the welfare and hap- 
piaeflB of the ooontiy thai I have been aent to govern^ I find 
myself almost paralysed as to any good puipose, and engaged 
in a flontinual straggle to maintain the due authority of my 
offioB against the asnnnltn of the very men whose ptofessed duty 
it is to assist ine» The stnigg^ as to idtimate results ]S» I fear, 
fruitless, whatever ien^xMcaiy and limited efieot it may have 
in wacding off their oompletioB. It must be always difficult to 
withdraw power once granted to the leaders of a representative 
body diosen by jlie mxdiatQde, and scaicely less so to with- 
stand their eBcmaehanenlB. lK)rd Sydenham attempted an im- 
poBBibilityy in composittg tm Ezeeotive Cknmd! as he did, and 
expecting that the power of the Oovemor would remain unim- 
paired, or could be exercised as freely as before, if such were 
really his anticipations. I see no prospect of any cessation of 
this almost unavailing struggle until the principle for which the 
present Executive Council and the House of Assembly are 
practically contending — ^namely, democratic and party govern- 
ment — ^be fully admitted ; and then the prospect of being a tool 
in the hands of a party would be anything but enviable — and 
even now it is difficult to be otherwise — ^for whatever personal 
influence the Governor's character or conduct may exercise, 



must strengthen the hands of his ostennble adiisaB. Were 
the power of the majority in the hands of a party thoroag^y 
attached to Brittsh interests and connexions, there would be a 
ground of mutual cordiality and confidence which would render 
real co-operation more probable, concesdon more easy, and 
even submisnon more tolerable. The diflbrenoe between me 
and my Ooundl in views and feelings in ihese easential points 
is so great, that I should certainly part with them if I could see 
any sufficient prospect of carrying on the government suc- 
cesBfuIly by a change. But there is no such prospect. Hie 
party in office have the strength of the majority, and seem 
likely to retain it; and I can see nothing but embarrassment 
and convulsion as the probable consequences of their dimiisHal. 
I therefore think it necessary to bear with them, to co- 
operate with them in any good measure that may present 
itself, and to resist anything that appears to me to be wrong; 
in doing which a rupture may some day arise, which, when un- 
avoidable, I must wade through as wdl as I can. In the 
mean while I must make the best in my power of a state of 
afiairs which, to my apprehension, is ihe reverse of satisbctoiy. 
Fortunately there are some measures in which we agree, and 
which I hope may operate to the benefit of the community.* 

* This paper Bhonkl ri^tly have extract to indicsie ihe unwiTInigneas 
preceded tne one on the Resignation of Sir Charles Metcslfe to f — '-'^ " 

of the Gonndl, to which I gave pre- a raptnie, though he felt it to be 
oedenoe for reasouB stated in a pre- inevitable, 
ceding note. I append the present 



[After the resigDAiion of Lord Sydenham's Goxmcil, Sir Charles Metcalfe, 
seemg little probability of his new Ministers obtaining a majority in the 
House of Assembly, dissolTed Failiament and appealed to the oonstitiLencies. 
The following despatch relates to the result of tiiis appeal] 


NoTcmber 23, 1844. 

My Lori>» — ^The returns of the recent general election of 
members of the House of Assembly in this province exhibit 
the following results: 

Upper Canada — ^Avowed supporters of the Government, 30. 

Avowed adversaries, 7. 

Undeclared and uncertain, 5. 

Lower Canada — Avowed supporters of the Government, 16. 

Avowed adversaries, 21. 

Undedaied and uncertain, 4. 
Total of both sections of the Ptovinces: 

Avowed supporters of the (xovemment^ 46. 

Avowed adversaries, 28. 

Undeclared or uncertain, 9. 

These results show that loyalty and British feeling prevail in 
Upper Canada and in the eastern townships of Lower Canada; 
and that disaffection is predominant among the French-Cana- 
dian constituencies. By disaffection I mean an anti-British 
feeling, by whatever name it ought to be called, or whatever 


be its foundatioiif which induoee habitoally a letdineflB to op- 
pose her Majesty's Grovemment. In some iniitanceB in Lower 
CSanada, the candidates avowedly opposed to the Groyenunent 
have been rejected by the constitoencies which ihey before re- 
presented. It is, however, remarkable that Mr. Viger, Mr. Neil- 
son, and Mr. Cuvillier, our kte Speaker, the three popular indi- 
viduals formerly nominated as a deputation to England to re- 
present the allied grievances of Lower Canada, have lost their 
elections, because the two former are avowed sapporters of her 
Majesty's Government, and the latter was suspected of bdng so, 
mthout any avowal or demonsftiaAiQa on hia pari to thai efibct 
Mr. HoA likewise Iks odLy FreMh^CbndM Mmber beiida 
Mr. ViKv who suppotftBd ker Msgesty^ OomniBB^ in th^ 
Parliament after ike resignatron of tlie late Oxmoii, hm now 
been thrown out. The same has happened to Mr. Baithe, the 
editor of the Atavre^ the only French-Canadian member who, 
nnoe the pionigatfon, has taken an active part in support of Mr. 
Yiger; but with respeoi to Mr. Battbst it is light to state that 
Aa los of hia election iaaHnbuted to tbeaa having hepnaimthpr 
candidate in the same county also avowing wgyort of die Go- 
v«nmient| by iHudi the votaa of the Gonrenuofint saj^parten, 
forming an aggregate majority, were divided bstween two can- 
didates, while those of the adverse pacty weie ffSf^B^ to oae^ who 
thereby oUaiasd a mqooty oves eash of the othesBL If ihis 
be a correct explanation of the result of the YssMwkn election, 
the division of the votes in suppoct of the Ckweriflnit was 
very unfortunate, for tiie eeseLaaiQii of Mx. BactW» who usee 
the prorogation has been vcay proetinemi in wxpgcA of BIr. 
Vigor, is a triumph to the other partj^andascniraeQf sigzetto 
the Government Mr. Vigor attributes his own defeat ia Bkhe- 
lieu to the previous reseh of Mx.Bazthe'8eonttft. McVq^'s 
successfi^ antagonist was Dr. Wolfided NiebcA, a leader of ds 
rebels in 1837, who owes his impunity to his noi having been 
bcongjit to trial, and to the somaaiy j ttdgment of Lord DurhasD, 

subsequently deemed ill^aL 


I hftve stated io a fimner oommunioatloii that the Blim^ of 
the oppanenls of her Majesty's Grovemment in thiB prorince 
rests en disaflfection or an anti-JBritish feeHng. In hoyiKit 
Gasmdit it appcan to be the latier, ^thont any definite object 
The Fiencb-Ganadiani are described by moet of those who Kve 
among them asa qmet, oiderly, amiabfe race^ who, if left to them- 
selres, would be peaceable and good subjects. Bntitisobserrable 
that they are moie easily led against than for the Bcitirii Gb- 
vemment; and that althoi^h this may be the effect at ndsce- 
pgesentaticgi,nQ misrepcesemtation and fidsehood is too gross £» 
tfaciz credence if directed against her Mqes^s C tov e nmient or 
ita snpportenL That airir one of their own race who is sterna- 
tised as a snpporter of her Ma^esty^s GroTemment, however po» 
pidar he may have been, loses all his inflnenee and becomes 
odioos. This spirit is wwked on and inflamed by the maHg- 
mmsy of ike French-Canadiao party, consbting of yonng 
lawyers, notaries, and other influential members of rural commxi- 
utieSb This spirit of disafiection in Lower Canada, I have aboTC 
renadced, has no definite object. I ought rather perhaps to 
say ihat it does not mamfestly aim at immediate separation firom 
the British Empire, or union with lite Fnited States of America, 
or the formation of an independent Republic. If it has any de* 
finite object, it is the aaecmdancy of the French-Canadian na- 
tioBality. Its tendency, nevertfaeiess, is to adopt any scheme 
hoetQe to the Bkitudi GofemuKnt The circumstances which 
bfoi^t MesBX Lalbntaine and Moris into the Council, ao- 
complished in a great d^;ree ibe ascendancy of the French- 
Canadians, and tihtai state of aflfairs was naturally popular among 
theuL The union of dxat race with the kteExecurdveComxsil 
was not in snpport of her Mqesty's Government, but for its 
salijugation; and it was in the baffled attempt to e£bct the latter 
purpose that the Council resigned, and haire since beoi strug- 
glihg to fesce themsdves back into power. 

In Upper Canada the qpirit of disaffection is various* The 
party whicli haa assumed the unsuitoble nansa of Befounuis 


indadefl all shides of the duft£fectod, and some who may not 
properly come under that dengnation. Some of the diwif&rtftd 
are for a junction with the United States; others for an inde- 
pendent Bepublio. Others are content to let British connexion 
nominally remain on the footing of the Britiah nation, bearing 
all the expense of the protection of Canada, while the anii- 
British party should rule the province without regard to the 
suprema^ of the mother country, and practically exdodii^, 
depressing, and proscribing all those most attached in prin* 
dple and in feeling to Britiah connexion* All of the seT^al 
classes described are supporters of the late Council, reckoning 
on the latter as either sympathising with them fully, or as ap* 
proaohing nearer those views than any other leaders that could 
have any chance of being admitted to a share in the govern- 
ment of the colony. Among the supporters of that party, 
howeveri are probably some who, without any disLojal views, 
adhere to it because it is the party to whidi they had pre- 
viously attached themselves, and whose superiority they deem 
necessary for the establishment of Responsible Government, 
without clearly comprehending what is meant or ought to be 
understood by that fascinating and indefinite term, which, al- 
though descriptive of an excellent principle, is liable to inters 
pretations tending to establish absolute democracy or anarchy. 
A new element of disafl^tion has been introduced into both 
sections of the province by the influx of late years of Irish 
Roman Catholics from Ireland and the American States, 
strongly imbued with feelings adverse to the British Govern- 
ment These feelings have been diabolically worked on for 
their own purposes by the party opposed to her Majesty's Go- 
vernment, representing the Protestant supporters of the Go- 
vernment as Orangemen, and thus adding religious animosi^ 
to other evils of dissension, the object being to gain over the 
Roman Catholic popuktion bodily to their side. Mr. Hincks, 
one of the late Council, has been particularly conspicuous in 
this abominable incendiarism, which, from the character of those 
worked on, has generally produced the effect intended. 


The carrying of the Montreal election in favor of the Gh>- 
veiiunent was hardly expected. The Opposition candidates, 
the former members— Dr. Beaulieu, a French-Canadian, and 
Mr. Drummond) a Roman Catholic, of Irish descent — were the 
first in the field, and it was for some days doubtful whether 
any others would appear. Mr. Moffitt, however, the highly- 
reipected member for Montreal in the last Parliament, who 
resigned his seat because he could not conscientiously vote for 
the transfer of the seat of government to Montreal, was pre- 
vailed on by the British party to stand, and with him diey 
joined Mr. De Bleury, a French-Canadian gentleman, who has 
been remarkable as a supporter of her Majesty's Government, 
and therefore scouted by his disaffected fellow-countrymen. 
He brought no additional strength to the contest, but it was 
deemed right that one of the candidates in support of the Go- 
vernment should be a French-Canadian gentleman. These 
candidates being selected, the British party seemed determined 
to win the election, or at least not to have their sui&ages taken 
from them by the violence practised at Mr. Drummond's election 
in ApriL The same violence was designed by that gentleman 
and his party on this occasion; but the British party were re- 
solved to oppose force by force, and organised themselves for 
defence. Owing to the spirit and firmness with which they 
resisted the attacks of the Roman Catholic mobs of canal la« 
borers hired by Mr. Drummond's party-r to the admirable 
arrangement of the retuming-officer, which secured iminter- 
rupted and equal polling for both sides at all the polling places 
throughout the election — and to the ready attendance of the 
military when necessary to preserve the peace — ^the violence 
attempted entirely failed, and the British party triumphed. 
As it is supposed that if all the electors could have voted there 
would have been a majority in favor of the Opposition candi- 
dates, owing to the great bulk of French-Canadian and Irish 
Roman Catholic voters being on their side, the peculiar cir- 
cumstances which gave success to the British party require 
explanation. The existing election law, confining the polling 


to two dajVy iom not cUaw time Sat leeavxDg^^ iiat Yobei of 
ao laigB & I (iiMiiini ■< y. The poHiiigv tkefdate, being ciaExied 
on equaUy m tfame wvda in. nUck neitlier pu^i ¥Olei wve 
OThaiMtf>f1j then would be little or no npeEioxity es either 
ode^ nd whet then mi^ be woeld be mnadflntad, Sndk wee 
the caae ia the htgs waidt; but in the floall w«di^ wkcet ibe 
TOlsB OML both mdet weze fully taken end mrheBetM^ tkse wes 
e nugodtj in frwor of the candidaies BoppoK&ag her Mi^c^t's 
Gtoyerawiftntt whidi aecned their suooeei wzAont BwytMitieg 
on which aide the magcnty ef the aggxegote body of diedon 
BGtnalljF waa^ ea the wlrole eoold not, for want dE tinie^ b^ 
tothepdL In ti».A^pinleIectian, thepolbhsnngbeeBseiKd 
by the hired znffiana of Mr: Dnanmend^ end the BntiBh party 
being unable to xesiat fn»i want of oiqganinliony the ntoming* 
offioen alao being either pertial or deipoid o£ eimgj and firm- 
^ the Bcstidi party had i&f» no ehanee On the paeaent 
. the nmnbers were— fixr MdtoikL, 1079f far Mr. De 
Blnirjr, 1075^ finr Mr. Dmnmsond^ a&3; and for Dc Beau- 
lieu, MUL 

At Qnebee,. and in that waighhniihood, the Britiah party 
appear to hvve been paxBlyaed, and nttde no cffixt to dispute 
the electaana. Two Oppontioa Bembera were ntnmed for die 
city of Qnebeo wilhoee a eantent Mr. Bkek, one of the 
fisnner mGmbea, did not stand. He might heTebeen returned, 
butashewonld have ownd hia aeat to the soppcat or sniFaanGe 
of the Opposition. party,.hedad m4 choose to oomeinloPar- 
hesBent fetkerai by soch en oUigatkMv akhough be did not 
dedaxe hie opubons either for or against then. Mr. Neilson, 
finierly highly popalar with the French parly, alkved hiair 
self to be put in nomination Sot tite county of Qidaec^ biii wea 
zefeeted by a large majocity in ficvor of a ycnng French-Ca- 
nadian lawy^ beeause Mr. Neilsos^. although perfectly inde- 
pendent in dunacter and oanduet, had showa himself duiing 
myadmisEstration, aa a supporter of her Majesty's GoYeiamenL 
Wheneyer inqmiy is made as to the li^lessness evinced by the 

QorsaaoEgn kuxxss m tiftsb cjlsada. 443 

Bntak pstgr a my pnt of tke proTinB^ Ae lepljr b Aat they 
ctnuoi snj on nee Msjaily^i OuwuniiMBt^ tnit tfaqr luiv€ been 
spettecyj alMDidoaed imd imfinwf ta Aeb enemiei, and ^tut 
ofkte jcanAemflflfe watomBd aoiaam im^lSm ecioBj htmbwak 
ID BefaeBian and koalifity to &ditiBik eonneaiDn. 

la Upper Canada oav snooeM in Ifae ekefeiens Ium ezeeeded 
pyprtlaliw i, and » owii^ to flie krjFaL qpxxit of the mojozitf of 
^ ptopift. It bas often been Mod Ant ibe people of Uj^er 
Canada "wonld aoi be appeided to in wn ^Acn the enmezion 
of the pto > Jiio with tke modicr eoantiy nd^ be in jeopardy, 
and the peeaeni cnnhaa been TOwed aa one of that cbaraeter. 
The mqoriQr at tibe aif^r daaaes ef Bixtisfa Canada aie de- 
cidadly iojakf and the yeomanry ba^e the aame honest feding. 
Bodi daaeaboieeaerted thcmaelreaaealoaBly and spoBtaneooaty 
on tiie pitufl neramim; and there never w aa an electiosa in ai^ 
cuiaaify nMve free from in t er fa penee on the part of the GoTun- 
menft ihanthaiof wkidilam reporting the smilt^ Itiahigfaly 
gmiifyii^ to be aarared tiat in Upper Canada a loyal feding 

The same qpiiit haa been oonapiooona in the Eastern town- 
flfaipe eC Lower Canada. The three nnmbenr who voted for 
the Ckpfonaaent on the qaeedon ndaed by the late Conncil 
after their reaignatioBhaie been again returned; aBid the three 
who nofeed for the Council have eeaaed to repteeent their re^ 
apeclive conntiea, two letixing witboiit an efibrt from an antici- 
pation of frihirc^ and one wlaiiinig defeat from a decided mn- 
joiity in favor at hia opponent. The eutsm townakipe^ liiere- 
ibie, whidi may be regarded aa the Britiflh portion of Lower 
CaMda, have all retained aembecs pledged to support her 
MajeatT^a Govennnent 

Mr. Hmcba baa been rejeeted in Ae coontjr wiiieh he re- 
prcaented in Upp« Cimada; Mr. BoolUm likewise, formeily 
Attomey-Genend in Upper Canada, and sobecqnenfly Chief 
Jnatiee of Newfknndhmd, bat dismkaed from both offices, and 
now a disooitteDted man, who has chosen to toke paart against 


her Majesty's GoTeminent, although he is not held in much 
efltimatioa by the lerohitionaiy party which he has jdned. 
Bfr. Dnrsnd, one of Mr. Baldwin's most devoted foUoweis^ haa 
also been rejected; and lir. Baldwin and his sopporters, Messra. 
Price and SmaU, were hard pushed in the riddngs wUch they 
represent, — ^the seat of rebellion in 1837. There was an ear 
ooura§^ng prospect of defeating Mr. Lafontaine in Terrebonne, 
one of the Papineaus having come forward with much prospect 
of success to oppose him; but notwithstanding a genetal belief 
that Mr. Papineau would be successful, he unaccountably with- 
drew without demanding a poll, the show of hands at the 
nomination being in favor of Mr. Lafontaine, owing to the 
more skilful management of the latter. Mr. Papineau has in 
consequence incensed those who were ready to support him, 
and disappointed a very general expectation that Mr. Lafontaine 
would be defeated in his own county — ^in which eaqiectationhis 
own party partidpated, for means were devised to procure his 
return elsewhere^ in the event of failure in Terrebonne — but 
instead of failing there, he has been returned without a contest 
The Mr. Papineau alluded to is not the one who is a member 
of the Executive Council. The latter has been returned for 
the county which he before represented without opposition. 

Presuming that a majority has been returned to the present 
Parliament disposed to support her Majesty's Government, it 
must be admitted that this majority has been elected by the 
loyalty of the majority of the people of Upper Canada and of 
those of the eastern townships in Lower Canada; in other 
words, by the party calling themselves Conservative or Con- 
stitutional, and by their adversaries denounced as Tories — a 
designation which, on this continent, seems to me to have the 
same meaning which it bore during the rebellion of the thirteen 
imited colonies, when it was applied to all the supporters of the 
British Government. The majority being so composed — ^those 
heretofore regarding themselves as belonging to the Beform 
party, but nevertheless willing now to support her Majesty's 


QoYcnmient — are somewhat sqaeamish as to co-operation with 
their new allies; and this feeling, which exists even in the 
Ezecutive Council^ is ahready, and will continue to be, the 
cause of some embarrassment. My own views are to cherish 
and encourage the spirit of loyalty and attachment to British 
connexion which the result of the election proves to be pre- 
dominant in those of British descent, and at the same time to 
act with equal justice towards all races, creeds, and parties; to 
reward merit wherever it is to be found to the extent of my 
means; and to abolish exclusion: thus endeavouring to amal- 
gamate all parties, and to mitigate, if I cannot extinguish, that 
feeling of disafiection which, fiK>m whatever cause it may arise, 
is the bane of this colony. 



[ExTSACT.] — ^The system of govenunaEit eataHiBhfd in ibis 
piovinoe during Loxd Sydenham's administration has created 
great difficulty in providing for the discharge of the duUea of 
Uie highest offices in the colony, which are those held by 
memb^ of the Executive Council, with a virtual dependence 
on the pleasure of the representatives of the people. Mere 
fitness in the individual for the office — nay, the most perfect 
fitness — ^is not sufficient, and must yield to other considerations. 
He must be of the same political opinions with his colleagues in 
the Executive Council ; he must be a member of one or the other 
of the Legislative Houses; and he must be one of a party that 
can command a majority in the Legislative Assembly. The ob- 
stacles formed by these conditions are not easily surmounted ; 
and, added to these, is the reluctance to accept office, of wHch 
the precarious tenure renders professional and private pursuits 
more profitable, and offices of inferior rank and emolument not 
exposed to the same precariousness more desired. During nine 
months of the last year I was laboring in vain to complete my 
Council, and I have now again to fish in troubled waters for an 
Lispector-General, and for a Lower Canada Solicitor-GeneraL 
The former must be a member of the Legislative Assembly, as 
he is in that body a professed imitation of the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer in the House of Commons; he must also belong 
to the party supporting the Gbvemment, and be able to coalesce 


wilii hii callwignro in the OomBsSL; he tmf^in&etyio be sa 
Upper QMadb ne m ba ^ as M pveient Ae lupimmta thies of 
Lower Gasada in the Ezacntm Coundl cue m two to one of 
those from Upper Canada. If at present a meinber of the 
House, lie ws^t go to his constitBentB for a rejection, iriiich 
will infiiffihij be coBtested; if not at presevt a member, he 
mmt poTBoade aome member to lesign in his finroc, and -will 
then have to nndergo a contest &r his deetion. Who will be 
found to fulfil all these conditiaos, and be at the same time 
willing to widertake the office, with its attendant annoyances 
and i in o rr U ii Bl i es? neither do I know, nor has wij one hitherto 
oooBxredcither tome or toany of myCaoBciL With respect 
to the SolicitoMScnenilwhip far Lower Canada, your Lordship 
is awaio thai I Jbai« been desirous of appointing a Frendi- 
Canadian to that offioet, bnt diis officer also is ezpeoted to be a 
member of the T^pigiatatiye AiwpmWy ; and it is scarody posnble 
to find a Freneh-Oanadian •oapaUe of filling Ae offioe who 
could veotnie to aepamte himsdf £ram the French Compact, 
and whose letuxn by a Lower Canada eonslituency could in 
that case be secured. The office^ ooosequently, has not been 
filled since the xesignBtBon of the last Oouncil. Although I 
might reHnqaiflk my hitherto unsuocesifiil desire to appoint a 
Ereoch-CanaflBan to that office, and might substitute a barrister 
of British eictactaon, these would still be unoeitainty as to his 
dection to the Legisbtive Assembly. This kind of fifficulty 
in filling up ofioes, and coosequenddy in dairying on the go- 
iwmment with efficiency, originated, I belirfo, in the modi- 
fioatkm of the JQaecutiTe Council arranged during Lord Syden- 
ham's administration. Whether it was wisely substituted for 
difficultiffi moie peiilouB, or apontaneoudy created without suf- 
ficient resaon, is a wide qnesfciGSL on which I will not now 
entoc, and which it is the less use&I to docnss, as I do net see 
the possibflity cf abrogating the pmctical supremacy confenod 
on the representative body by that arrangement, or of removing 
the impediments to good administration resulting therefrom. 
In giving effect to the system thereby introduced, provincial 


politicians have adopted its defects as if they were its virtues, 
and in rendering themselves slaves to exaggerated notions and 
questionable consequences, lose nght of the essentials of Respon- 
sible Government. 

Had it been in my power to report that the Executive 
Council was stable, and sure to command a majority in the 
Legislature in future sessions, I should probably at this time 
have solicited permission to withdraw from the cares of office; 
because, although my general health seems unimpaired, the 
continual discomfort which I suffer from a complaint in my 
face that has baffled medical skill, and having destroyed the 
sight of one eye, still menaces further ravages, would render 
retirement 'and rest very acceptable; but I should never be 
satisfied with myself if I bequeathed this government in a state 
of embarrassment to my successor, as long as there is any hope 
that, by remaining at my post, I can render any service to ber 
Majesty, or promote the good order and welfare of this colony. 
I do not, therefore, entertain any intention of resigning my 
charge while your Lordship is of opinion that I can be useful 
here. The time, however, may come when, owing to the state 
of parties, and the personal fedings regarding myself by which 
some of them are instigated, the formation of an administration 
supported by a majority in the Legislature might rather be 
facUitated than impeded by my departure. If that case should 
occur, I shall not hesitate to report its existence to your Lord- 
ship; and, although I should grieve to transfer my trust to 
a successor under such unsatis&ctory drcumstances, I should de- 
rive some consolation from the reflection that I had not aban- 
doned my station as long as I could retain it with any good 
effect Under what circumstances such a case is likely to arise 
I mil endeavour to explain in another communication, in which 
I shall attempt to describe the state of parties in the province, 
and the personal feelings towards myself which exist among 



May 13, 1845. 

My Lobd, — ^I propose in this despatch to submit to your 
Lordship the opinions which I entertain regarding the several 
political parties existing in this province, according to the best 
judgment that I am able to form. 

The first that I shall notice is what may be termed the 
French-Canadian party, consisting in the L^islature of most 
of the members of that race, and out of the Legislature of the 
mass of the French-Canadian people. This party, regarding 
union as strength, is banded together in a compact body for the 
purpose of acquiring power. Its chief, if not its sole object, is 
the predominance of the French race in Lower Canada. Any 
individual of that race who acts independently, and separates 
himself from the party, is in a great degree regarded as an 
outcast. So many have sufiered from this cause, that few now 
dare to try the experiment, and the party is kept together by a^ 
system of terror as well as by inclination. Many suppose that 
its success among the mass of French-Canadians is owing to- 
misrepresentation; but the misrepresentations which produce 
so great an e£^t must, I fear, be strongly aided by a previous 
di^osition. This party has most frequently been opposed to 
her Majesty's Grovemment, and is so at the present time, 
although circumstances have occurred in the last two or three 
yean which would naturally have produced a diflbrent result if 


450 STATE OF PABTU8 UT 1845. 

there had been friendly feelings to work upon. In this interral 
the French-Canadians have seen their countrymen forming a 
part of the Executive Council, and holding office and emolument 
on an equal footing with any other portion of her Majesty's 
subjects in this colony. They have seen the capital removed 
from Upper Canada and fixed in their own section of the pro- 
vince. They have seen all those of their countrymen who were 
transported to the penal colony for treason and rebellion, par- 
doned and restored to their country. But all these acts of con- 
nderation and justice, grace and mercy, have apparently had 
no eflfect ; and if they have imperceptibly mitigated malignity 
and disafiection, and thereby promoted order and tranquillity, 
they cannot be said to have produced attachment or removed 
ill-wilL This party is under the guidance of Mr. iMfontuney 
and next to him Mr. Morin is the most active and oonspcnous 
of itsmembeiSL 

As those two gentlemen were members of the Elxecutive 
Cooncil in 1842 and 1843» and were among those who lesigned 
their offices in November of the latter year, then oppositioa 
and that of the party at their command is in a considerable 
degree personal against the Governor, whom they first sought 
to reduce to the condition of a party tool, and, failing in that, 
attempted to bully into submission by the vote of a majority 
in the Legislative Assembly; and, fiailing in tiiat attempt also, 
used unsparing and reckless endeavours to misrqyresent and 
calumniate. They accordingly rest their expectation of a 
return to power on the prospect of my retirement from the 
Govemm^dt; and firom the time of their quitting office thdr 
partisans have been actively employed in circulating reports of 
the approximati<m of that event. ^So much importance is 
attached by the party to a general belief among tiieir followers 
of the certainty of this occurrence, that in the French paper, 
the Minerve^ tiie organ of that party, those passages g£ my 
speech at the dose of the session which contained the woids 
'' our next meeting*' and *< until we meet again,*' are translated 
SO: as to convert those words into "your next session" and 


<* undl joor vetam." Anotlier French jmper, the Aunri^ 
noticed the nustraBaUtion, and exposed its design, but the 
Aurore is eagoommiinicated, aqd the JUmerve is the only paper 
read to the mass of the French-Canadians. 

If there were just grounds for this personal feeling, and if 
the removal of its object would be attended by a cordial arnal^ 
gamatioa of the French party with their feUow-subjects of 
British extraction, the remedy would be easy and obvious; but 
the result, I fear, would be far £rom that desirable effect. The 
change would be regarded as a victory, and the expectation of 
a triumphant return to power would be encouraged; but there 
would be no amelioration of feeling towards either her Majesty's 
Government or their fellow-subjects; the predominance of tiie 
French party would still be the main object of contest, and any 
success in such a contest would increase the difficulty of amal* 
gamation, and knit the French phalanx more tightiy together. 

The motto of this party at present is '' Ta^t au rien."* They 
are aware that there is no exclusion of their countrymen from 
the highest offices under the Government, and they cannot 
pretend that any measures injurious to their race are adopted 
or contemplated; nevertheless they are ranged in a dose conn 
pact against her Majes^'s Government, and adhere to their 
oppodtion for tiie sole purpose of obtaining a triumph and 
establishing a French predominance. Such a course, with such 
views, reference being also had to past events, I cannot, it 
appears to me, sanction by submitting to it as long as I have 
any power to redat it. It is my belief that by a consistent con- 
duct, steadily pursued for a series of years, this hostile phalanx 
might be successfully combated and dispersed. The course 
which I would recommend would be to leave the French race 
no pretext for compkint ; to treat all as if they were well 
affected ; to give office, emolument, and privileges equally to 
the French or British race, equal fitness being presumed; and 
to avoid any exclusion even of those ranged in opposition, 
whenever the occasion might justify a selection from among 
them, but to be careful to diBtinguidi and reward those of the 


452 STATE or PABTZXB DT 1845. 

French noe who ahow a loyal diapontioii and a doiie to sap- 
port her Majesty's Govemment. I entertain a strong ctmyio- 
tion that this course would, in a short time, lead the French* 
Canadian poliddans to peroeiTe that a pertinacioas opposition 
to her Majesty's GbTemment would not tend to promole th^ 
own interests. In order, however, to pursue this oooise sod- 
oessfully, it is necessary that the GtoTemment should be aUe to 
proceed without being compelled to submit to this Action; in 
other words, that the GbTemment should have a majority in 
the Legislature notwithstanding the oppoation of the French 
party. On this account any rupture in the existing majority, 
which, by reducing it to a minority, would exalt the import- 
ance of the French compact, is greatly to be deprecated. 

The French party, notwithstanding the spirit which binds 
them together, do not like their present position in a xmnority, 
and will like it less and less the longer it continues. Disap- 
pointed in their expectation of always commanding a majority 
in the United Legislature by their union with the disafl^ted 
party in Upper Canada, they b^n to doubt the policy of that 
connexion, and some of them are understood to have expressed 
the opinion that a union with the Conservatiye party of 
Upper Canada would be more natural On the other hand, 
both sections of the Conservatiye party, anticipating a rupture 
between themselves, have a vague notion of the expediency of 
a union with the French party. I do not anticipate that these 
speculations will lead to any satisfactory result; but if 1 saw a 
probability that such a combination could be formed on right 
principleSi so as to establish a strong Govemment, free from 
anti> British malignity, I should be disposed to encourage the 

In adverting to the feelings and conduct of the Frendi-Gana- 
dians, I ought not to omit to notice those of their priesthood, 
the Roman Catholic clergy of French extraction. As these 
enjoy without restraint every right and privilege that can be 
conferred on an ecclesiastical body under the protection of the 
British Empire, it would not be unreasonable to suppose that 


their infiuenoe would be exercised in support of her Majesty's 
Groveniineiit ; and as the influence of the Roman Catholic 
priesthood over their flocks is generally understood to be great, 
it might be inferred that it would produce salutary efifects. I 
have been an attentive and anxious observer of their conduct 
I have heard in some instances of their affording support to her 
Majesty's Oovemment; in other instances, of the contrary; but 
more generally I have understood that they have abstained 
firom taking any open part in the recent political contest 
From all that I have learned, I am led to believe that the 
influence of the clergy is not predominant among the French- 
CSanadian people, and that the avocat, the notary, and the 
doctor, generally disposed to be political demagogues, and most 
of them hostile to the British Government, are the parties who 
exerdse the greatest influence. Whatever power the clergy 
might have, acting along with these demagogues, it would, I 
fear, be slight when exercised in opposition to them. There is 
also reason to apprehend that the mass of the clergy are 
imbued with the same spirit as the people, and that, at the 
best, although they must be aware of the improbability of their 
benefiting by any change which would remove the protection 
of her Majesty's Government, their loyalty is not of that ardent 
character which would produce great exertion under circum- 
stances that did not menace their own particular interests. I 
cannot say, therefore, that I expect much benefit from the in- 
fluence of the Roman Catholic clergy, although I have met 
with several highly respectable individuals of that body on 
whose loyalty and good feeling towards the Government I would 
confidently rely. 

Before I take leave of the French party, I think it right to 
add, that I continually hear reports of a reaction in the opinions 
of the French-Canadians, as if they were becoming sensible of 
the unreasonableness of their groundless opposition to the GK>- 
vemment, and tired of the leaders who persbt in dragging 
them on in this course. To such reports, however, I cannot 
attach any credit until I see some demonstration of their cor* 

464 BTATS OF PAETIB8 IK 1840. 

nctneaB. It rests on beUer feimdfttioii, md is a sonree of 
cheering hope for the future^ iimi in some of thoee rami dis- 
tricto in which the Fienoh-Cftnadians and the inhshitants of 
British extitction aie most intermixed* there is an increasing 
tendency towards good-fellowship, aooompanied by a better feel- 
ing towards the British Gioyemment on the part of the French- 
Canadians, than exists in those districts in whidi the popula- 
tion, consisting entirely of this race, are exduaiTdy subject to 
the misrepresentatbns of those demagogues who inculcate hatred 
against the British Goyemment and the British race. 

There axe among the r^resentatives a£ Low^Canada in the 
LegialatiYe Assembly three or four members of BritiA extiac^ 
tion who are returned by French-Canadian constituencies, and 
act entirely with the French par^. I am not aUe to disoover 
any motive for their conduct other than a regard for what they 
consider to be their own personal interest 

The Opporition party in Upper Canada in the L^ialatiyc 
Assembly consists of a few members, who acknowledge Mr. 
Baldwin as their leader. This party^ though now small in 
number in the Legislature, has supporten in almost every con- 
stituency in Upper Canada; and although at the last genoal 
election they were most frequently in a minority, they often 
made the contest an anxious one to the successful candidate. 
There are men of various descripti<»s in this party, and many 
probably are loyal and honest, but it is certain that all the 
disafl^ted in the province belong to it The fedanga <^ moot 
of this party are bitter against the Governor. 
. A few of the representatives of Uf^er Canada having here* 
tofore belonged to the party caUing themselves Reformers, 
conceive that they cannot thoroughly join with the Conserva- 
tive party, forming the majority in the Legislative Assembly, 
without incurring the imputation of desertion from their own 
party, and damaging their influence with a considerable portion 
of ^eir constituents. They cannot^ therefore^ be reckoned on 
as sure supporters of the Grovemment, but they do not yield 
a slavidi obedience to Mr. Baldwin, and may be found occa- 


aonilty on &&m side of the Honae. The BBBtimcate ci tii6R 
mendben, as far as I can judge, aie not pcraosiallj imfiiendlj 
towards the Goyemor. 

The snppoorters of the GoYermnent fbrmiBg a majority in the 
Legislative Assembly consist of the Conserratiye party of 
Upper Canada and the British paxty of Lower Canada, and 
two or three Frendi-Canadian members. This party is strong 
enough, with the occasioiial aid of other independent members^ 
to maintain a working majority in the House, if it would keep 
that object steadily in yiew and ayoid inadequate causes of 
• dissension; but I am apprehensiye, from what has already 
pasKd, that this d^ree of wisdom cannot be rehed on, and 
that the seeds of division and weakness have been sown partly 
by the di£Eerence which occurred on the Umversity question, 
partly by individual discontent, and partly by the want of 
popi:darity of the members of the Executive CoundiL It is 
remarkable that none of the Executive Council, although all 
are estimable and respectable, exercise any great influence over 
the party which supports the Government. Mr. Draper is 
universally admitted to be the most talented man in either 
House of the Legislature, and his presence in the Legidative 
Assembly was deemed to be so esKntial, that he resigned his 
seat in the Upper House, sacrificing his own opinions in order 
that he might take the lead in the Assembly; nevertheless, he 
is not popular with the party that supports the Government, 
nor with any other, and I do not know that, strictly speaking, 
he can be saad to have a single follower. The same may be 
remarked of erery other member of the Executive Council; 
and although I have much reason to be satisfied with them, and 
have no expectation of finding others who would serve her 
Majesty better, still I do not percdve that any of them indi- 
vidually have brought much support to the Government. The 
supporters of the Government are composed of those members 
who are most desirous of upholding her Majesty's Government 
in this province, and are consequently opposed to those who 
most strive to reduce it to a nullity, as well as to all those who 

456 8TATB OF PABTm IV 1845. 

entertttn aiili^Britiah fedings. When, therefiMe, the nqplue 
took place between the Gbyemor and the late EzBcatne 
Coundlf the Consenrative party xmUied round the Governor^ 
insprited both by loyalty to her Majesty and by advene 
feelinga towards the opposite party; and during the genoal 
election which followed, the riiral candidates stood reflectively 
on what is termed the '* ticket" of the GbvemoTy or that in 
colonial language of the ** ex-Ministers." ICany memben of 
the majority accordingly profess adherence to her Mijesty's 
OoTerament without acknowledging implicit confidence in any 
of the members of the ExeoutiYe CounciL A conaideiable 
section of the majority was not represented in the Bxecntive 
Council until the appointment of Mr. Robinson to be a mem- 
ber of that body; and since his resignation the same incon- 
venience has been renewed, and hitherto cannot be overcome, 
owing to the difficulty of finding a succeewr in that aectian,in 
consequence, partly, of thediflerenoe which has been excited by 
the University question, and partly by the other causes arising 
out of what is termed Besponrible Gtovemment, which mate- 
rially obstruct the selection of officers for the highest poets in 
the colony. 

The prospect of divimon in the next Legisktive Session 
among the supporters who carried the Government safdy and 
creditably through the last, naturally produces conaideiable 
anxiety, which suggests different projects to diflferent minds. 
My own opinion is, that every efibrt should be made, consist- 
ently wiih right principle, to keep together the majority whidi 
exists, and so to satisfy the opponents of the Government that a 
mere factious opposition, without regard to measures, for the sole 
purpose of overthrowing the Government, will not succeed ; and 
if this conviction can be established, I have little doubt that the 
compact union of the French party which at present exists will 
eventually be dissolved. On the other hand, some of my Council, 
distrustfid of the support in the next session of some of those 
who formed the majority in the last, look to assbtance fr(Mn 
the present Opposition, and especially from the French party,— 


-a scheme which I believe to be impracticable to any extent 
that would avail in securing a majority. The French party 
profesB to admit that Upper CSanada should be ruled by the ma- 
jority in Upper Canada, but claim for themselves that they 
shoidd have exclusive rule in Lower Canada, by which the 
British party in Lower Canada would be completely swamped, 
and the predominance of the French party, which is their great 
object, established. On these terms the French party, I believe, 
would readily join the Conservative party of Upper Canada ; 
but such terms are, I conceive, inadmissible, and the junction, 
therefore, imattainable. Individual members of the French- 
party might possibly be induced to join the administration, 
but they would bring no further aid to it than they themselves 
oould personally afford; nevertheless, even such conversions 
are desirable, as tending to break up a compact of which the 
views and motives are alike objectionable. 

In speaking of parties in this province I ought not to omit 
the Irish Roman Catholic body, which is annually increaang 
in number by immigration, and is generally arrayed on the 
same side with the disafiected parties of other descriptions. 
Formertjr the British party in Lower Canada had the Irish 
along with them, and were in consequence more successful in 
elections than they are now likely to be. At present the Irish 
Roman Catholics in Lower Canada are leagued with the French- 
Canadians, and it was by the violence of the former that the 
election of a member for the Legislative Assembly, in April, 
1844, at Montreal, was carried in favor of the Opposition. In 
the influx of emigrants from the United Kingdom the number 
of Irish Roman Catholics preponderates; and therefore, ao- 
oording to present appearances, there will be a continual in* 
crease to the disaffected portion of the community greater than 
that to the loyal portion, and this may eventually be attended 
with disastrous efiects. If, therefore, her Majesty's Govern- 
ment exercise any interference as to the description of emi- 
grants transferred to the several colonies^ I would earnestly re- 
commend that emigrants to Canada should be chiefly English 

468 8X4TE or TAxnxB nr 1845. 

ttrPtotettenl IrMh, and dwt Iiiah Roman GathoScs shNAd pre- 
fttably be ae&t to other ookniei that are fieee from di aaflb c ted 
partiea xeady to aeiae on the aew oomere and enUit them in 
tkeir zanka. I do notknow that the Iziih Bonan OaliiolioB 
have A single lepreaentatnFe letamed exxiamij bj tiKraaehreB 
in the Legidative Ataemblj; neither doea die atragtk of this 
ftirtff viewing it as a disafleoted one, lie in the upper dasses; 
these, as far as I know, ace well affected. Qneofthemeaabeza 
of the Exeendve Coancil, and another atavnch, aealoua, and 
eoiupicQoas supporter of the Gkuvemmeni, are Lash Roman 
Ciathoficfl^ but few of their coontrjmen of the aame denomina- 
tion in the bmer cksses go along witfi them. Of the Irish 
Roman Oalholio priesthood I should say much the same as I 
have before sud of the Freneh-Ganadian clergy. Some are re- 
p rese ni ed as well disposed, but when that is the case theb in- 
fluence over their flock appears to be insignificant. I ou^t 
perhaps to add a word regarding the Scotch portion of the in- 
habitants of this province. They appear to be more divided 
than any other, and are to be found on either side in politics. 
One of the largest and most disaffected constituenaes in Upper 
Ganada is fat the most part Scotch; and viewing the question 
of an increase of population with r e fer ence to British con- 
nexion and steady adherence to her Majesty's Government, I 
fihould my that the Scotch are not so generally to be de- 
pended on, and consequently not so desixable for immigration, 
am the English or Protestant Iridi; bat I would except' from 
this remark the upper classes of the Scotch, who are, for the 
most part, loyal and staunch. 

As this despatoh touches so much on parties, I ought not to 
omit to mention that the whole colony must at times be re- 
garded as a party opposed to her Majesty's Government. If 
any question arises, such as that, for instance, of the Civil List, 
in which the interests of the mother country and those of the 
colony may appear to be difl^nt, the great mass of the peoi^ 
of the cobny will be enlisted against the former, lliere is, in 
oonsequence, great zeal in promoting interests ezdusivdy colo- 


niai^ tad much want of it cm aahjecAs in wlu<di the oohmy^ al- 
thoQgli vitally ooDoeniedt is iny<dved aaa portion of tbe Biitiah 
Smpiie* The general pieralence of thk spixit is dunm in the 
obfitadea whibh have pievented the introduction of a pfoper 
niifitia bill into the L^datnxe; in the throwing out tiie ex* 
emption from duty of auppUes for her Majesty's fbroes; in the 
dekjB which hare oocurred in the payment of the debts doe to 
her Majesty's Gkyvenunent on account of pecuniary advances for 
the service of the cdony ; and in repeated endeavours to caston 
the Imperial Treasury charges which the province is unwilt 
ing to admit as a burden on itsd£ This spirit is manifisst on 
every occasion which has a tendency to call it forth, and is not 
confined to any particular party. It is aggravated by the 
estaUidmient of that form of government which renders the 
executive servants of the Crown practically more depoident on 
the Legislative Assembly than on the authority by which they 
are aiqK»nted; and it will require unceasing vigilance on the 
part of her Majesty's representative to secure in any degree the 
just rights of the Crown, for due attention to which he will 
never be able to rely wholly on the ungoaded alacrity of any 
provincial functionary, with the exception of the civil secre* 
taiy. The inducement to take high office being Blight, owing 
to the precariousness of its retention, the hold of her Mqesty's 
Government on the officers employed is &r from strong; and 
as any material change in the system of administration may now 
be regarded as impracticable, the only mode that occurs to me 
of counteracting the exclusive subserviency to the Legislative 
Assembly which prevails, is in creating a new source of ambi- 
tion, by the grant of personal honors to those who deserve well 
of her Majesty's Government; and even this remedy, although 
it would probably be benefidal, I would not undertake to war- 
rant as certain to be effectual. 

The system of administration called Responsible (Government 
having been struggled for by one party, and coupled with its 
own introduction into power, was for some time opposed by the 
party which was thereby displaced; but having been adopted 

460 8TATK OF PABTIS8 IK 1845. 

and acted on by the local representatiTeB of her Majesty, and 
auictioned or permitted by her Majesty's Goyemme&t, it is 
now univexaally received, and the several parties vie with eadi 
other in patting on it their own extreme oonstmctiaiiSy all 
tending to esteblish the supremacy of the LegialatiTe Assemlily* 
While the majority in that body oonasts of members on whose 
loyalty and affection reliance can be placed, there will be cor- 
diality, and in many respects sympadiy, between the head of 
the Government and the oScexs assisting him in ihe local 
administration; bat whenever it may happen, as no doubt it 
sometimes will, that the majority in that Assembly follow kadem 
whose principles, or want of prindple, axe unworthy of con- 
fidence, the dilemma will arise of either admitting such men 
into confidential offices in her Majesty's service, or of fidling 
into collision with the Legisktive Assembly. If the differences 
between parties regarded only local affiurs in which the mother 
country might have no peculiar interest, the easiest method of 
administering the Gbvemment under existing ciroumstances 
would be for the Governor to keep aloof from all connexion 
with any par^, and to receive into his Council the leaders of 
the majority by whatever party, or combination of parties, it 
might be formed; but this indifierence is scarcely possible to a 
Governor having any spark of British feeling, when almost all 
who have British feelings are arrayed on one side, and all who 
have anti-British feelings on the other. This diflbrence must 
constitute a permanent difficulty in administering the Govern- 
ment according to that system, which practically confen the 
choice of the executive officers on a majority in the Legislative 

It will be seen, firom the description of parties which I have 
submitted, that the two parties in Lower and Upper Canada 
which I regard as disa£fected, have a bitter animosity against 
me ; and if it should ever become necessary to admit these 
parties again into power, in preference to standing a collision 
with the Legislative Assembly, a case would arise in which my 


ptesenoe here might be rather prejudicial than beneficial^ as it 
would be impoasible for me to place the slightest confidence in 
the leaders of those parties. If any such necessity should occur 
in my time, it would cause an embarrassment mucli more serious 
to me than any difficulty that I have hitherto had to encounter.. 
Whatever my duty might dictate, I trust I should be ready to 
perform, but I cannot contemplate the posability of co-operating, 
with any satisfaction to myself, with men of whom I entertain 
the opinions that I hold with regard to the leaders of those 
parties. Such an embarrassment will not be impossible, if any 
portion of the present majority fall off or become insensible of 
the necessity of adhering together. It is with a view to avert 
such a calamity that I consider my continuance at my post to 
be important at the present period, as a change in the head of 
the Grovemment might easily lead to the result which I de- 
precate, and which it will be my study to prevent as long as I 
see any prospect of success. 

It is greatly to be lamented — and this reflection must have 
often been brought to your Lordship's mind by the contents of 
many of my despatches — ^that the attention of the Governor 
should be so much occupied in considering, not how the Gro- 
vemment may be best administered for the benefit of the colony, 
but how it can possibly be carried on without a collision with 
the Legislature, which could not fail to be attended with evil 
consequences. This misapplication of the attention of the Go- 
vernment is, however, an unavoidable consequence of the system 
of administration which has here been adopted, and which can 
hardly be altered unless its bad working should eventually 
convince the province of the impracticability of its continuance* 
Had the executive branch of the Government been maintained 
independent of the legislative, all the essential principles of 
Besponsible Government might have been secured by the con- 
stant exercise of a due regard to the rights and feelings of the 
people and the Representative Assembly, without creating those 
embanassments which arise exclusively from the assumed de- 

462 6T1TB OV PiJtTIXd IN 184£. 

pendeaee of the ezeoatiFe offieen on ibat body — ft syBtam of 
govemmeiit which, howerer saitoUa it may be in in iade- 
pendent Stete^ or in a oonntry when it is qualified by the 
liie Be u c e of a Soremgn and a poweifiil ariftoeiacy, and by 
many ciicamstances in coxreipondeiioe with which it hai giown 
up and been gradually fi>nned, does not appear to be wd 
adapted ibr a colony or for a country in which those qnaUfyii^ 
circumstances do not eadst, and in which there has not been 
that gradual progress which tends to smooth away the diffi- 
culties otherwise sure to follow the confounding of the legialatrfe 
and eiec u tiv e powers, and the xnconsistenoy of the practice 
with the theory of the constitution. 



[Tke fean expreaaed in the pemiltiiBacfce despaieh that the health of the 
GoTemor-Genenl would not much hmger soSet him to lemain i& chazge of 
hja office were unfortmiately realised. The summer and aatomn witnessed 
the fearful progress of the maladj with which he was afflicted; and in Oc- 
toher Sir Charles Metcalfe addressed Hie following letters to the Ck)Iomal 
Secretarj^ who exhorted him to xetum at onoe to England.] 


Montreal, October 13, 1845. 
My Lobd, — ^My disorder has recently made a seiious ad- 
vance afiectmg my articulatioii and all the functions of the 
mouth; there is a hole through the cheek into the interior of 
the mouth. My doctors warn me that it may soon be physi- 
caDy impoasible for me to perf o r m the duties of my office. If 
the season were not so far advanced towards the winter, I should 
feel myself under the necessity of requesting your Lordship to 
relieve me; but as such an arrangement might require time and 
deliberation, I propose to struggle on as well as I can, and will 
address your Lordship again on this subject according to any 
further changes that may occur in my condition; in the mean 
while, I have considered it to be my duty to apprise your Lord- 
ship of the probable impossibility of my performing my official 
functions, in order that you may be prepared to make such an 
arrangement as may seem to be most expedient for the public 


October S9, 1S46. 
Mr Lord, — ^I oontmne in the same bodily state that I 
deaoiibed by the last nuuL I am unable to entertain company 
or to leceiTe Tisitois, and my oflBcial bnnness with pabHc 
functionaries is transacted at my reddence in the oonntiy 
instead of the apartment assigned for that purpose in the poblic 
buildings in town. I am consequently conscious that I am 
inadequatdy performing the duties of my office, and if there 
were dme to admit of my being reliered before the setting in 
of the winter, I should think that the period had arrived when 
I mighty perfectly in consistence with public duty, solicit to be 
relieved; but, as the doctors say that I cannot be removed with 
safety from this place during the winter, and as that season is 
fast approaching, it becomes a question whether I can best pei^ 
form my duty to my country by working on at the head of the 
Government to the best of my ability until the spring, or by 
delivering oyet charge to other hands, and remaining here as a 
private individual until the season may admit of my return to 
Europe with safety. In this dilemma I have hitherto abstained 
from submitting my formal resignation of my office; and shall 
continue to report by each successive mail as to my condition 
and capability of carrying on the duties of my post* 

* These two letters have been al- to mt oom^leteness to this aectkm . 
ready published in the " Life of Lord of the Colonud Despatches. 
Metcalfe," but they are repeated here 



[A few of the Answers to Addresses presented to Sir Charles Metcalfe 
in Canada are here subjoined, in illustration of his opinions on the subjects 
to which thej refer but, as in the case of the Jamaica Addresses, thej are 
necessarily but a very scanty selection from a very large number.] 

loihe Town of Niagara. 

[Becmber, 1843.] 

I receive, gentlemen, the sentiments which yoa have ad- 
dressed to me with the respect due to every expression of public 
feeling. No government can be successfully conducted without 
the confidence and support of the people, and I have never 
thought of pursuing any course that could justly deprive me of 
those essential aids. 

It is gratifying to me to learn that you approve the stand 
which it was recently my duty to take in defence of the pre- 
rogative of the Crown, and that you recognise to the fullest 
extent the propriety of the 6ovemor*s judging and acting ac- 
.cording to his discretion on all occasions^ and in nil matters- 
calling for the exercise of the royal prerogative. This being 
admitted, no difficulty would arise on the question of consulting 
the Executive Council; for although it is physically impossible, 
consistently with the despatch of public business, that every act 
of the Governor in this colony could be made the subject of a 
formal reference for the advice of the Council, there can be no 
doubt that it will be the inclination as well as the duty of the 
Governor to consult the Council on all occasions of adequate 



importance. But when a systematic and overbearing attempt 
is made to render the Governor a mere tool in the hands of a 
party, then resistance in defence of the royal prerogative be- 
comes indispensable; because it is impossible that her Majesty's 
Government can ever permit the Governor of one of her Ma- 
jesty's colonics to reduce himself to that condition. The par- 
ticiJar mode of carrying out Responsible Government esta- 
blished in this province is new in a colony, and to be worked 
successfully must be worked carefully; with honesty of purpose 
for the good of the province, without party animosity and cx- 
clusiveness, and with good sense, good feeling, and moderation 
on the part of those engaged in the undertaking. My part of 
it shall be fiuthfully performed with an anxious desire to render 
the system conducive to the prosperity and happiness of Ca- 
nada, in allegiance to the British Crown, and under the pro- 
tection of the united strength of the British Empire. 

To the Township of Scarborough. 
iJamtary, 1844.] 

I have received, gentlemen, with great satisfactioui your lojal 

It is highly gratifying to me to be assured of your approval 
of my conduct. 

With you I deeply deplore the existence of any political dis- 
agreement that may tend to disturb the harmony which it was 
the most anxious wish of my heart to see established. Not only 
was I reluctant to come to a rupture with my late Council, but 
I forbore much in order to avoid it. 

Tour complaint of the distribution of the patronage of the 
Crown for party purposes, during the time when the gentlemen 
of the late Executive Council were in office, bears testimony to 
the extreme attention which, whether I was right or wrong in 
so doing, I paid to their recommendations; and yet, strange to 


say, wliile I have been accused of sabseryiency to their party 
. exclusiyenessy the alleged ground of their resignation was, that 
I presumed to exercise my own discretion in the exercise of 
that branch of the royal prerogative; and on that pretence alone 
they and their partisans have since endeavoured to excite the 
people to personal hostility against me, by unfounded assertions 
of my denial of that system of Responsible Government to 
which I have repeatedly declared my adherence. 

While, however, the people of Canada entertain, as I trust 
^b^y generally do, the loyal and patriotic feelings which you 
cherish, I cannot suppose that they will allow her Migesty's 
Government to be obstructed, and the good of the country to 
be sacrificed, by the influence of such gross and palpable mis- 

I rejoice to learn that you advocate the extension of the royal 
mercy to those unfortunate men who were formerly engaged in 
rebellion against the Crown. It has always been my anxious 
desire that the recollection of past oficnces should be obliterated ; 
and I have been incessantly engaged since my arrival in Ca- 
nada in promoting that good work, either by my own act, 
when it was within my competency to pardon, or by forwarding 
applications to her Majesty's Government when the case was be- 
yond my own reach. Her Majesty delights in the twice blessed 
exercise of mercy. Every petition hitherto submitted has been 
successful; and I have no doubt that in a short time all the ad- 
vantages that could have been obtained from a general amnesty 
will be realised in both sections of the province, by the indivi- 
dual pardons granted to those who were transported to the 
penal colonies, and by their happy return to their families and 

While I earnestly exert myself to bury in oblivion the recol- 
lection of offences, I see no rational ground for forgetting the 
loyalty of those who stood forth in defence of their Queen and 
country in the hour of need, and I shall ever regard such ser- 
vices as entitled to gratitude and honorable reward. 

Accept, gentlemen, my cordial thanks for the assurance of 


your support^ and my sincere admiration of your devotioii to 
Britiflh connexion^ and of your unalteiable attachment to the 
land of your &thei8. 

To the Freeholders and other Inhabitants of the County ofRusteU, 
Ottawa District 

I thank you, gentlemen, cordially, for your loyal, patriotic, 
and constitutional address. 

At a time when an insidious attempt is made to prostrate her 
Majesty's Government in Canada to an unexampled condition 
of subserviency, which would be tantamount to its overthrow, 
it is highly satisfactory to observe the public spirit and generous 
zeal with which those who rightly appreciate the connexion 
subsisting between this colony and the British Empire, come 
forward in support of her Majesty's representative, in his en- 
deavours to maintain this province in true allegiance to our 
gracious Sovereign, and to render it prosperous and happy as 
an integral portion of her Majesty's dominions. 

The objects of the party who are bent on obstructing the 
Government, and who are actively engaged in exciting disaffec- 
tion against me by the most unscrupulous misrepresentations, 
nre now disclosed beyond the probability of misconception. It 
is manifest that they aim at the following state of things: Tbat 
the authority of her Majesty in this province sbould be a 
nullity; that the Governor should be a subservient tool in the 
hands of the Executive Council; that the Legislative Council 
should be elected by the Executive Council; that the Executive 
Council should be in reality nominated by the House of 

The authority of the Crown and of the Legislative Council 
being thus annihilated, and every balance in the constitution 
destroyed, the whole power of the State would be usurped by 
either the Executive Council exercising undue interference 
over the House of Assembly, or by the House of Assembly 


exerciflbg unlimited interference in the Executive Administra- 
tion. It would be either a despotic and ezclusiye oligarchy, or 
an absolute, unqualified democracy. This, they pretend, is the 
Responsible Government granted to Canada by her Majesty's 
Ministers. It is neither the one nor the other. The British 
constitution is a limited monarchy, or a balance of the monar- 
chical, aristocratic, and democratic powers, without the exclusive 
ascendancy of either; the work of ages, progressively formed to 
suit the gradual changes in the social relations of the com- 
munity; and the constitution granted to Canada is the same, 
as far as the same can be practically carried into operation in a 

The constitution, as established by the arrangements of Lord 
Sydenham and by the resolution of September, 1841, I am 
using, and shall continue to use, my anxious endeavours to 
work, through responsible heads of departments, for the benefit 
and contentment of the people of Canada, with the advice and 
co-operation of an Executive Council which will, I trust, obtain 
the confidence of the provincial Parliament; and if this cannot 
be done successfully, the blame will be justiy due to those who, 
in the pursuit of unbridled power, have sought to destroy ihe 
constitution which they pretend to uphold, and are doing their 
utmost to obstruct the formation of any Responsible Govern- 
ment, while their unfounded outcry is, that it is intentionally 

Many proba"bly give their support to this party under an 
honest belief that there is reluctance on my part to consult the 
Executive Council. This is entirely an error. With any 
Council that seeks the good of the country, and does not strive 
to degrade the office of Governor to the condition of a mere 
party tool, it is my inclination, as well as my duty and my 
practice, to consult on all subjects. No Governor could dream 
of administering the Government of this province without con- 
stant consultation with his Council. 

Every Governor must be sensible of the advantage that he 
would derive from the aid, advice, and information of coun- 


dllon and heads of departments in whom he can place confi- 
dence. Bat that is not the question at issue. If it were, or if 
it had been, the country would not have been troubled with 
the present dispute. The demand of the parly now obstructing 
her Majesty's Gbrermneni is, that the Gbyemor, who is respon- 
sible to his Sovereign and the British nation for the welfiune of 
Canada, is with respect to the Goyemment of this coimtiy to 
be a nonentity; or in other words, to be the subserrient tool of 
any party that may acquire a temporary ascendancy. To this 
I could not and never can submit. This was the meaning of 
the stipulations demanded of me, and which my duty to the 
Crown rendered compliance with impossible. 

I shall ever retain, gentlemen, a grateful sense of your 
staunch support and kind wishes, and it will be the greatest 
happiness that I can enjoy during the remainder of my mortal 
life, if your prayer for my success in promoting concord and 
prosperity in this important province, be heard with favor at 
the throne of Heaven. 

To the Freeholders and Inhabitants of the District of Brock^ in 
Canada West 

I beg you, gentlemen, to accept my cordial thanks, for the 
assurance of concurrence and support conveyed in your address. 

I feel most deeply your concluding prayer, that I may succeed 
in crushing every attempt, however disguised, to separate this 
noble colony from the parent state. It is by the loyalty and 
good sense of the people, that such attempts, whenever made, 
will be crushed, as they heretofore have been, by the same 
means. The design of separation is not now avowed, and I 
should be loth to impute it to any one who denies it. The 
secret intentions of men's hearts are known only to the Al- 
mighty Seer of hidden things. The objects at present mani- 
festly aimed at, by the party who are exciting obstruction to 
her Majesty's Government, are, that the authority of the Crown 


shall be a nullity, that the Governor shall he a tool in their 
hands, and that all the powers of every branch of the constitu- 
tion diall be usurped and monopolised by an oligarchy, who by 
any misrepresentation or misconception can obtain the support 
of a majority in the House of Assembly; so that there shall not 
be a vestige of the royal prerogative, or of any balance of 
power in the Government. It is against these extravagant and 
monstrous pretensions that I am now contending; and I am 
unable to express the wonder with which I regard the incon- 
ceivable blindness of those persons, who, really desirous of pre- 
serving our connexion with the British Empire, do not perceive 
that the success of such extreme views is incompatible with the 
relations of a colony with the mother country, and must tend 
to separation. I confidently rely on the good feeling and dis- 
cernment of a vast majority of the people for the detection and 
defeat of schemes, which are either wicked or absurd according 
to the animus with which they are respectively prosecuted by 
their several advocates. 

I do not mean in the slightest degree to depart from the 
system of Responsible Government established by the arrange- 
ments of Lord Sydenham, and the resolutions of September, 
1841. I regard these jointly as forming the acknowledged 
constitution according to which the Government of Canada is 
to be conducted. The real enemies of this system are the men 
who would render its successful operation impossible, by assert- 
ing the untenable and inadmissible pretensions above described; 
and who, by misrepresentation of my resistance to their intended 
usurpation, strive to excite disaffection and to poison the minds 
of the people against me. In the prosecution of these views, 
they pretend that the unavoidable delay which has taken place 
in the completion of the Executive Council, and in the nomi- 
nation of the several heads of departments, is a sign of my desire 
to set aside Responsible Government. It is, in truth, a proof of 
the very reverse. That delay, which no one can lament as 
much as I do, for no one can be in every respect so interested 
in its cessation as I am, has been caused, in a great measure, by 


their avowed and fixed deteiminatioii to oppoee any Council not 
of their selection; and for the rest, by my own anxiety to form 
such an administration as is likely to obtain the confidence of 
both branches of the Legislature, without which the successful 
working of Respondble Oovemment is impracticable. 

Allow me, gentlemeui once more to thank you for your 
public-spirited support in what I belieye to be the cause of 
liberty, order, and good government, and therefore indispu- 
tably the cause of the people. 


[The annexed Address, which I find in Lord Metcalfe's handwriting, and 
which was written for newspaper publication, embodies in a few sentences 
his views on some of the vexed questions of English politics. I do not know 
whether it appeared in print. B[it the same opinions were expressed, at 
greater length, in a pamphlet written by Metcalfe, nnder the title of " Advice 
to Conservatives."] 


Friends and Fellow-Countrymbn, — I entreat your at- 
tention to some friendly advice from one who has your welfare 
at heart, and regards no interest in comparison with the interest 
of the country of which you form so large a portion. 

You seek to better your condition — a natural and laudable 
object. With that view you claim rights which you have not 
hitherto possessed. This, also, is perfectly natural and unob- 
jectionable, and in time your desire will be realised. But you 
listen to men, and adopt them as your leaders, who incite you 
to violence and rebellion against the laws — a course which, 
whatever might be the immediate result, would inevitably mar 
your prospects, and destroy all chance of success. 

The effect of violent resistance to the laws must be one of 
the following results: Either you would be easily subdued, 
which would cast ridicule on your proceedings and stifle your 
pretensions, or you would be subdued with difficulty, and after 



much bloodshed and all the horrors of civil war, which would 
crush all your hopes for a long period. Or you would succeed 
and overthrow the Government, the consequences of which 
would he, first, anarchy, and next, despotism, by which, in- 
stead of gaining your object, you would be reduced to dis- 
graceful slavery. 

Violence on your part, or the appearance of an intention of 
violence, must rouse against you all the feelings, good and bad, 
of those classes in whose privileges you seek participation. 
That they are tenacious of those privikges is no matter for 
wonder. It is as natural as that you should de^re to participate 
in them. Tliere is, therefore, a predisposition to question your 
assumed right; and if you attempt violence you will be sure to 
find resistance. The same blood runs in theb veins as in yours, 
and the more you display a disposition to violence, ihe more 
you will rouse opposition. 

Another point for your conaderation is, whether those 
things which you professedly seek are worth committing vio- 
lence for; that is, whether their natural consequences are such 
as in the end, supposing them to be attainable, would justify 
violence as the means, if violence could anyhow be justified. 
As I am fearful of encroaching too much on the space that can 
be afforded in the columns of a newspaper, I defer for another 
letter what I would say as to the probable consequences of the 
measures which you desire to establish; but, before I conclude, 
I must advert to one circumstance, which, in whatever view it 
may be taken, shows the utter unfitness of some of those whom 
you have accepted as your leaders to guide you in a right path 
to the attainment of your wishes. 

More than one of them are described as endeavouring to 
excite your passions by pretending, or representing, that the Go- 
vernment has in contemplation, or is likely to patronise, a plan 
for putting to death all the children bom henceforth of poor 
persons beyond two or three in a family. If these persons 
really btelieved that such a plan could possibly be conceived or 


supported by any Goyemment that could be established in our 

country, they must b^ credulous in such a degree as to render 

them totally incapable^ from want of judgment, of giving you 

good advice. If they used such a method of exciting you to 

rage and outrage without believing that such a monstrous design 

^as probable, no words can be sufficiently severe to characterise 

the wickedness of such conduct. They must, in this case, be 

totally unworthy of your attention, from their diabolical mar 


You aim, I presume, at a modification of the Poor Laws, and 
there is no reason to despair of the accomplishment of that 
purpose. The perfection of Poor Laws would be to give the 
most effectual relief without unnecessary hardship to the desti- 
tute, and to afford at the same time the greatest encouragement 
to industry and exertion, and no encouragement to idleness. 
To make any human institution perfect is difficult and scarcely 
possible. Whatever there may be of unnecessary hardship in 
the Poor Laws will> you may be sure, be amended; but this may 
be prevented by violence on your part, which will strengthen 
those who are opposed to any alteration. 

You desire, no doubt, the abolition of the Com Laws ; and 
those laws, which are contrary to all right principle, must be 
speedily abolished, without any violence. 

You call for the Ballot. This also, being calculated t6 pro- 
mote the independence of voters, is right and reasonable, and 
must soon come. Violence will only retard it 

You long for Universal Suffrage. This also is a right which 
must be acknowledged, whenever it can be exercised with 
benefit to the national interests. It is in a fair train of accom- 
plishment, notwithstanding the opposition not only of those 
who are falsely called Conservatives, but of many also who on 
other questions have been Reformers. 

I reserve what I have further to say on these and other 
subjects for another opportunity. In the mean time, let me 
exhort you to proceed with temper and moderation. I do not 


ask you to deost from any of your projects; bat pursae them 
withoat violenoe. Let your motto be, ^ Patience and pose* 
yerance; order and obedience to the kw&" In this manner 
you are likely to obuan aU that you deare, without anarchy 
and its oonsequenoei despotism; without reyolution, without 
bloodshed. The only certain result of violence is, that what- 
ever may be the issue, you must fail of obta